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Public health has increasingly cast the net wider. The field has moved on 
from a hygiene perspective and infectious and occupational disease base 
(where it was born in the 19th century) to a concern for unhealthy life-
styles post-WWII, and more recently to the uneven distribution of health 
and its (re)sources. It is of course interesting that these ‘paradigms’ in 
many places around the world live right next to each other. Hygiene, life-
styles, and health equity form the complex (indeed, wicked) policy agen-
das for health and social/sustainable development. All of these, it is now 
recognized, are part of the ‘social determinants of health’.
The broad new public health agenda, with its multitude of competing 
issues, professions, and perspectives requires a much more sophisticated 
understanding of government and the policy process. In effect, there is a 
growing recognition of the extent to which the public health community 
writ large needs to better understand government and move beyond what 
has traditionally been a certain naiveté about politics and the process of 
policy making. Public health scholars and practitioners have embraced this 
need to understand, and influence, how governments at all levels make 
policy choices and decisions. Political scientists and international relations 
scholars and practitioners are engaging in the growing public health 
agenda as it forms an interesting expanse of glocal policy development and 
implementation.
Broader, more detailed, and more profound scholarship is required at 
the interface between health and political science. This series will thus be 
a powerful tool to build bridges between political science, international 
relations and public health. It will showcase the potential of rigorous polit-
ical and international relations science for better understanding public 
health issues. It will also support the public health professional with a new 
theoretical and methodological toolbox. The series will include mono-
graphs (both conventional and shorter Pivots) and collections that appeal 
to three audiences: scholars of public health, public health practitioners, 
and members of the political science community with an interest in public 
health policy and politics.
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We doubt whether a man ever brings his faculties to bear with their 
whole force on a subject, until he writes upon it for the instruction or 
gratification of others.
—William Ellery Channing, 1890
If one is lucky, at some point in one’s life, things fall into place. The pro-
cess of writing this book and doing research for it was such an experience. 
For me, writing a book about Dutch tobacco control policy was the next 
logical step after more than a quarter of a century of research into tobacco 
control. I started my academic career developing and studying smoking 
cessation interventions. In the 1990s I became frustrated by the fact that 
regardless how much attention and counselling smokers who try to quit 
receive, the majority of quitters relapse within a year—most in the first 
month after treatment. Realising that even a combination of the best and 
most intensive treatment does not produce success rates much higher 
than 30%, I turned to more fundamental questions: what makes cigarettes 
so addictive, and what can be done to motivate whole populations to quit 
smoking? In 1998 I started to work for the Stichting Volksgezondheid en 
Roken (Dutch Smoking or Health Foundation) (STIVORO), the national 
expert centre on tobacco control. This gave me first-hand knowledge of 
tobacco control in practice, and I gradually learned about the political 
aspects of tobacco control. My appointment as Professor in Tobacco 
Control Research at the Department of Health Promotion at Maastricht 
University gave me the opportunity to cross the bridge from tobacco 
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control research to tobacco policy research. I familiarised myself with the 
public policy literature, contacted political scientists, and attended the 
fifth Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Conference of the 
Parties (FCTC COP) in 2012 in Seoul to witness tobacco control politics 
and advocacy in action at the global level. I discovered that tobacco policy 
is an important topic for public policy scientists, but that insights from 
 political science have not even begun to be absorbed by the tobacco con-
trol research community. I was thrilled when the opportunity arose for me 
to write a book about this. Most of the time the process of writing was a 
great pleasure, with many moments of excitement when I discovered new 
things and my understanding was deepened. The book has also turned 
into the first comprehensive historical account of tobacco control in the 
Netherlands, written for an international readership.
Inspiration for this work came from two sources. One was a book by 
Clavier and De Leeuw (2013) which drew attention to the fact that the 
health promotion field lacks a theoretical understanding of the adoption 
and implementation of health policies. The other was a book that pre-
sented an approach to the study of tobacco control policy that does justice 
to insights from public policy and political sciences while being accessible 
to those working outside the public policy field (Cairney, Studlar, & 
Mamudu, 2012). The first source made me realise that there is an under- 
recognised knowledge gap in the tobacco control field that needs to be 
filled, and the second presented me with a solution. There are so many 
public policy theories available that it can be quite overwhelming for a rela-
tive layperson, so I was pleased to stumble on to the general analytical 
framework provided by Cairney and his colleagues. It allowed me to focus 
on the basis elements of the policymaking process and to apply a logical 
structure to this book. I felt confident enough to borrow insights from two 
theories that I found particularly interesting, the Multiple Streams 
Approach (MSA) and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). However, 
I call on political scientists and public policy scholars to join me in studying 
the case of Dutch tobacco control. There is much more to learn from the 
enormous amount of information and data on Dutch tobacco control pol-
icy as I discovered, and it is available for further research.
I am most grateful for a grant from STIVORO, which made it possible 
to afford the necessary research and to dedicate working time to write this 
book. As part of STIVORO’s science team, I had obtained first-hand 
knowledge of tobacco control and the workings of the broader tobacco 
control coalition in the Netherlands. In addition, from 2013 until 2017, 
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I worked for the Dutch Alliance for a smoke free society (ANR). These 
employments gave me relevant data and information—a clear advantage, 
given the complexity of the topic—but there was also the danger of bias. I 
distanced myself as much as possible from my own contribution to the 
processes I examined. I further reduced the risk of personal bias by having 
people critically comment on the work. I thank Paul Cairney, Pieter de 
Coninck, Sanne Heijndijk, Gera Nagelhout, Dewi Segaar, Fleur van 
Bladeren, Bas van den Putte, and Heide Weishaar for reading and giving 
feedback on draft versions of the book. Emma Willemsen was a great help 
with the coding and ordering of the large amount of text from the pro-
ceedings of parliament meetings and parliamentary papers. I am most 
grateful to each of the 22 people I interviewed for the book. The inter-
views were crucial for my understanding of Dutch tobacco control policy 
making and assured that I had identified the main events correctly. 
Regrettably, at the end, due to the need to be succinct and to stay within 
the word count, much of the interesting material from these, sometime 
lengthy, interviews did not make it to the book. My original plan was to 
write the book in Dutch, but Evelyne de Leeuw persuaded me to write it 
in English, offering to include it in the new series on public policy she was 
planning with Patrick Fafard. I am very grateful for her advice and for giv-
ing me the opportunity to publish my work as part of the new series. Book 
doctor Margaret Johnson did a truly wonderful job of proof reading and 
polishing the final manuscript. I thank Jacqueline and Julia for their patience 
and keeping things quiet around me during the many, many hours—much 
more than I had anticipated—that I needed to study and write.
This book was first and foremost written to find out what drives tobacco 
control policymaking and to understand its nuances and complexities 
from an academic vantage point—but if tobacco control advocates learn a 
thing or two from it, it will have served its purpose much better.
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Twenty years ago I worked on an advisory report on the effectiveness of 
various tobacco control policy measures, commissioned by the Dutch 
Ministry of Health1 as part of the process of presenting a revised Tobacco 
Act to the parliament (Willemsen, De Zwart, & Mooy, 1998). Soon after 
the report was finished I attended the World Conference on Tobacco or 
Health in Beijing, where I spoke with a civil servant from the Dutch 
Ministry of Health. I asked him what would happen with the report and 
was shocked when he told me that many of the conclusions were “not 
politically feasible” and could not be taken up.
This was the first time that I was confronted with the concept of “polit-
ical feasibility.” In hindsight this was rather naïve of me, but students and 
researchers who invest time and effort in understanding better ways of 
helping people to overcome tobacco addiction sooner or later come to 
realise that the tobacco problem has political roots. To do something 
about it on a societal level, one has to acknowledge what many people 
would describe as “nasty” politics. Many scientists shy away from this, just 
as I did then, because they believe that science is independent and politics- 
free or because they are intimidated by what they perceive as complexity, 
unpredictability, and irrationality in politics for which they are not pre-
pared, being used to working from within an evidence-based science para-
digm. A more effective strategy to address the tobacco problem on a 
2 
societal level is to try to understand the policy process and why this pro-
cess at times appears so irrational.
Since my professorship in tobacco control research, journalists, scien-
tific colleagues from other countries, and students have asked me the same 
question: why is the Dutch government not doing more to control 
tobacco? This book is my attempt to formulate an answer. As an introduc-
tory text to the field, it seeks to provide an understanding of the full com-
plexities of tobacco control policy. It further aims to offer a broad 
framework for thinking about tobacco control policymaking. Many of the 
understandings in the book can be applied to other public health areas, 
and lessons drawn from the analysis of the Dutch case may be of interest 
to other countries, particularly those with similar multi-party parliamen-
tary democracies.
How does the trajectory of Dutch tobacco control compare with other 
developed countries? In the case of the Netherlands, there were nine years 
between the time that national data on the dangers of smoking were pre-
sented (1948) and the time that the government admitted there was a 
problem and the public should be informed (1957). It took another 
25  years for the first regulative measure (health warnings on cigarette 
packs in 1982). Another six years passed before the Netherlands had a 
Tobacco Act (1988), and a further 14 years before effective measures such 
as an advertising ban and a workplace smoking ban were implemented 
(through a revision of the Tobacco Act in 2002).
This is an enormous period of time. Why was there such a delay between 
recognition of the tobacco problem and the policy response? Some might 
say this is a moralistic starting point for a book because it assumes that the 
government could have reacted sooner, faster, or more decisively. This is 
undoubtedly true—at least in theory, the government might just as well 
have reacted later, slower, and less decisively. In fact, the Netherlands has 
not done particularly badly in comparison with many other countries: the 
Netherlands is in some periods a laggard, and most of the time just strug-
gles to keep up with the mainstream, but everywhere in the world there 
has been a wide gap between realising that there is a problem with tobacco 
and actually implementing effective solutions. Major tobacco control mea-
sures have had to be won in hard and long-running political battles, 
because tobacco control is a highly contested and politically sensitive topic. 
Even countries leading the way in tobacco control such as the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and Canada needed 20–30 years to come up with a 
comprehensive policy response (Cairney, Studlar, & Mamudu, 2012).
M. C. WILLEMSEN
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Idealists in the tobacco control field may expect that the presentation 
of scientific facts will automatically result in rational policy decisions, and 
when this does not happen a common explanation is that the tobacco 
industry has been successful in casting doubt on the evidence and in lob-
bying to delay regulation (Larsen, 2008). The industry is certainly well 
known for casting doubt on science, misleading politicians, and opposing 
or delaying tobacco control (Baba, Cook, McGarity, & Bero, 2005; 
Bornhauser, McCarthy, & Glantz, 2006; Costa, Gilmore, Peeters, McKee, 
& Stuckler, 2014; Lie, Willemsen, De Vries, & Fooks, 2016; Tobacco 
Free Initiative, 2008), but pointing to the tobacco industry as the sole 
reason for why governments do not take action is a gross simplification. 
Although efforts by  the tobacco industry to prevent and delay tobacco 
policy making are important factors—and I will present many details on 
how this was done in the Netherlands—there are many other factors that 
one must take into consideration if one wants to understand the nuances 
and complexities of tobacco control policymaking.
With this book I move beyond the mainstream tobacco control litera-
ture which often assumes that knowledge on smoking risks leads, or should 
lead, to tobacco regulation. I want to explore what can be learned from 
insights from public policy research. I have already found a superficial 
glance at this rich literature rewarding, as it offers many insights that are 
immediately applicable to the tobacco control field. It can teach us, among 
other things, that public policymaking is not a rational, linear process 
starting with the identification of a problem, followed by selecting the best 
solution, finalised by adopting, implementing, and evaluating. Such mod-
els of knowledge transfer do not do justice to what happens in the real 
world. It is not so much that “knowledge plays no part in tobacco control, 
but that it is just one factor among many other policy determinants, and 
one that needs a political interpretation to have a policy effect” (Larsen, 
2008, p. 764). Indeed, progress in tobacco control is a function of the 
internal dynamics of the policy process itself, and it has been argued that a 
more profound understanding of the political dimensions of health policy 
will help “to better anticipate opportunities and constraints on 
 governmental action and design more effective policies and programs” 
(Oliver, 2006). Understanding these dimensions is crucial for those who 
want to contribute to more effective policies, including to so-called end-
game strategies that may eventually eradicate the sale and consumption of 





A central tenet of public policy studies is that the relative influence of 
actors such as politicians, bureaucrats, and lobbyists on policy formation 
differs according to the policy sector (John, 2012, p. 5), so that a distinct 
sector such as tobacco control should be studied in its own right. However, 
to date there is not much understanding of politics in tobacco control. In 
2014, I conducted a study where we searched scientific literature data-
bases and counted the number of scientific publications in 31 European 
countries between 2000 and 2012 that had nicotine or tobacco as their 
main research topic (Willemsen & Nagelhout, 2016). Of the almost 
15,000 papers identified, the proportion that had either “policy” or “poli-
tics” in their title was 0.9% and only half of these dealt with the determi-
nants or impact of policies, leaving less than 0.5% of research that had the 
policy process as its main focus (unpublished data).
Despite some recent studies that have drawn on political sciences, most 
studies on tobacco control have paid little attention to policy processes. 
For example, one recent study tried to explain why smoking rates increased 
between 2005 and 2010 in France, which was “an unusual occurrence in 
countries in the ‘mature stage’ of the smoking epidemic” (McNeill, 
Guignard, Beck, Marteau, & Marteau, 2015). The research was a case 
study, comparing France with the United Kingdom, where smoking rates 
continued to decline in the same period. The main explanation was that in 
France there had been no tobacco price increases in that period, “stem-
ming from the lack of a robust and coordinated tobacco control strategy.” 
Furthermore, the French government had continued to financially com-
pensate tobacconists (small tobacco shops) with more money than was 
spent on tobacco control, and was too permissive regarding tobacco con-
trol, resulting in violations of the French Tobacco Act. The researchers did 
not say why the French government, the first country in the European 
Union (EU) to ratify the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2004, had no strong tobacco 
control strategy in the years 2005–2010, although they referred to a “lack 
of clear and consistent political will.” When we look at the Netherlands, 
only one scientific publication has tried to explain Dutch tobacco control 
policy. It is a case study of the implementation of the smoking ban in the 
hospitality sector (Gonzalez & Glantz, 2013), but does not really answer 




The tobacco control field has come to realise that we need to know 
more about the policymaking process. In 2007 the US National Cancer 
Institute published the monograph “Greater than the sum: Systems 
thinking in tobacco control” (Best, Clark, Leichow, & Trochim, 2007) 
which concluded that slow progress in tobacco control “is likely due to 
many complex and overlapping factors that must be better understood if 
more effective action is to be taken.” Fortunately, a small but growing 
body of literature emerging on the politics of tobacco control is slowly 
gaining attention (Cohen et al., 2000). In the past ten years or so, some 
useful attempts have been made to understand how and why specific 
tobacco policies have emerged in specific social, cultural, and political 
contexts (Albæk, Green-Pedersen, & Nielsen, 2007; Bryan-Jones & 
Chapman, 2008; Feldman & Bayer, 2004; Grüning, Strünk, & Gilmore, 
2008; Kurzer & Cooper, 2016; Nathanson, 2005; Reid, 2005; Studlar, 
2002, 2007a, 2007b; Young, Borland, & Coghill, 2010). To give one 
example, Nathanson (2005) examined differences in countries’ political 
systems and cultures, and how these evolve over time. She explained the 
diversity in trajectories by pointing to differences in how policymaking is 
organised and structured (e.g., whether there is a federal or centralised 
government and how much executive power the government has), the 
resources and access to policymakers that anti- and pro-tobacco groups 
have, and the dominant ideologies regarding tobacco use and the role of 
the state versus individual responsibility.
The two theories that I find most useful in understanding tobacco con-
trol policy are the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier, 1998, 
2007; Sabatier & Weible, 2007) and the Multiple Streams Approach 
(MSA) (Kingdon, 2003; Zahariadis, 2007). ACF is the more ambitious of 
the two because it aims to describe the dynamics of the policy process 
within changing environments, using competition between two or more 
advocacy coalitions in a specific policy subsystem (in our case the subsys-
tem of all people and organisations involved in tobacco control) as a start-
ing point. External events, such as a new government, may shock the 
subsystem, and such shocks result in policy change when one of the coali-
tions is better at exploiting the opportunity to reinforce its position—usu-
ally by demonstrating that its belief system can solve the policy problem 
better than opposing coalitions can (Cairney, 2013). Whether this is suc-
cessful depends on the coalition’s resources and how good it is in framing 
its preferred solution, in exploiting public opinion, and in generating soci-
etal and political support.
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What are “coalitions” in ACF theory? A network can be called an advo-
cacy coalition when it is composed of people who share beliefs about the 
causes and solutions of a policy problem and have common core values. 
They must also engage in a “nontrivial degree of coordination” (Weible, 
Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009) and the stronger the coordination, the more 
efficient and successful their lobbying power can be. People in a pro- or 
anti tobacco coalition may have a variety of positions and may include 
interest group leaders, politicians, government officials, experts, research-
ers, and journalists. Shared beliefs act as the glue that binds them. The 
motivation to align with others in the same coalition is strengthened by 
what is called in ACF theory the “devil shift” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007): 
the tendency to perceive actors in opposing coalitions as more threatening 
and more powerful than they usually are. Some scholars make a distinction 
between purposive coalitions and material coalitions to acknowledge the 
fact that coalitions such as the tobacco industry coalition mainly exists 
because its members share material (economic) interests (Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007, p. 197). ACF theory assumes that, in most policy domains, 
two or more coalitions of policy actors can be identified (Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007). Often there is a dominant coalition of people who share a 
particular belief system, challenged by one or more competing coalitions.
Participants in a pro- or anti tobacco coalition share what ACF calls “pol-
icy core beliefs” about solutions to the problem. Such deeply ingrained 
beliefs remain stable within coalitions for long periods of time, explaining 
the resistance to change. Once a conservative coalition dominates the policy 
subsystem, policy change is unlikely. When one coalition’s ideas about and 
framing of an issue resonate better with policymakers than with a compet-
ing coalition, there is a shift in the balance of power in relation to the new 
“core ideas.” Subsystems contain “policy brokers,” persons such as civil 
servants who communicate and deal with both sides. The ACF has been 
used to analyse the process of tobacco control policymaking at the national 
level: for example, in Japan (Sato, 1999) and Canada (Breton, Richard, 
Gagnon, Jacques, & Bergeron, 2008); in the EU (Smith, Fooks, Gilmore, 
Collin, & Weishaar, 2015); and at the global level (Farquharson, 2003).
The MSA is useful in identifying the defining moment when policy solu-
tions have become accepted by policymakers as the answer to a policy prob-
lem. While the ACF can tell us what drives change and helps us understand 
how actors produce policy change over longer periods of time, the MSA tells 
us when change is most likely to happen. It distinguishes three policy domains, 
each having its own dynamics and actors (Kingdon, 2003; Zahariadis, 2007): 
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the domain of problems (is tobacco seen as a problem that needs a govern-
mental response?), the domain of policy (which solutions are available for the 
problem?), and the domain of politics (is the government willing and able to 
act?). Substantial policy change is more likely to occur when problem appre-
ciation, policy solution, and political opportunity align. Kingdon (2003) 
assigns a central role to “policy entrepreneurs” (lobbyists, activists, politi-
cians, civil servants), who develop policy alternatives and couple these with 
problems at the right time (when ideological and political opportunities are 
favourable). In the political stream, a major electoral change may present an 
opportunity to advance or roll back government regulation. Changes in the 
perception of problems can also open up a window of opportunity: this might 
happen when activists point out that other countries have more advanced 
tobacco control policies and are more effective in tackling the smoking prob-
lem. It may then become clear to policymakers that there still exists a problem 
that can and should be tackled. Important changes in the policy stream can 
also open windows of opportunity. This may happen when new information 
is revealed about the feasibility and effectiveness of existing and novel policy 
options.
Kingdon (2003) developed his ideas after interviews with people 
involved with policymaking in the context of US health-care reform, regu-
lation of transportation in the United States, and US tax changes, but not 
in tobacco control. The theory is nevertheless applicable and relevant, and 
is becoming more popular as a simple theoretical framework to under-
stand tobacco policy (Asbridge, 2004; Barnsley, Walters, & Wood-Baker, 
2015; Blackman, 2005; Bosdriesz, Willemsen, Stronks, & Kunst, 2014; 
Cairney, 2009; Mamudu et al., 2014; Schwartz & Johnson, 2010).
Almost ten years ago, Larsen (2008) noted that there was remarkably 
little interaction between mainstream tobacco control literature and pub-
lic policy literature. This is slowly changing. For example, in a recent spe-
cial issue of the scientific journal Tobacco Control, out of 20 contributions 
on the topic of “the tobacco endgame,”2 most were from experts from the 
medical, public health or behavioural sciences, or from tobacco control 
advocates, but two were from public policy scholars. One discussed the 
political feasibility of various tobacco elimination endgame scenarios 
(Rabe, 2013), the other provided advice on how endgame solutions could 
be implemented and organised (Isett, 2013). Such interaction between 
political sciences and public health in tobacco control is welcome, but still 
rare. With this book I hope to contribute to this emerging literature, using 




Advanced tobacco control policies thrive within “policy environments” 
that are favourable to the implementation of tobacco control measures. 
Theories can inform the characteristics of such environments (Cairney & 
Mamudu, 2014), but a general problem in public policy is that there are 
almost as many models and approaches to the complex reality of policy 
formation as there are scholars. Each scholar takes a specific perspective, 
such as emphasising the context, or focusing on institutional factors, or 
emphasising the role of lobbyists as in the MSA, or starting with changes 
in policy core beliefs such as in the ACF.  Discussions of the various 
approaches and accompanying theories can be found in textbooks on pub-
lic policy (Birkland, 2011; Buse, Mays, & Walt, 2012; Cairney, 2012; 
John, 2012; Sabatier, 2007). Each theory offers a valuable but incomplete 
account of the policy process.
A complementary approach, using insights from multiple theoretical 
approaches, has the most chance to explain the complexity of policymak-
ing. According to John (2012), “the approaches are not rivals; they can 
complement each other and be part of the explanation” (p. 14). Instead of 
selecting the most suitable theory for each policy problem or using mul-
tiple theories and determining which describes the data and the observa-
tions best, my book follows an approach advocated by Donley Studlar and 
Paul Cairney (Cairney, 2007; Cairney et al., 2012; Studlar, 2007b, 2015), 
who identified the core constructs from diverse theories that complement 
each other. They assumed that much might be gained from looking at the 
same policy case several times, each time from a different perspective and 
applying a different analytical lens.
Cairney et al. (2012) differentiated five fundamental ways of approach-
ing tobacco control policy change, roughly coinciding with the major 
strands of thought within public policy science: looking at the context, at 
institutions, at the diffusion of ideas, at networks, and at agenda setting. 
John (2012) distinguished the same five elements and explained that pol-
icy change emerges from their interaction. These five ways of approaching 
the problem can be conceptualised as lenses through which the policy 
process can be analysed, and I will use these lenses in different chapters of 
this book. I interpret the five analytical lenses to mean the following:
 1. Context refers to the social, cultural, and economic environment in 
which tobacco policymaking occurs. The social environment con-
sists of factors such as public knowledge and concern about smok-
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ing, and public support for policy measures. Cultural values lie at 
the core of ideological preferences and societal rejection of tobacco 
control measures. The economic aspect has to do with the eco-
nomic importance of tobacco for the national economy, which 
relates to the tobacco industry’s leverage to influence policy 
making.
 2. Institutions refers to how policy is shaped by a country’s specific 
policymaking system. What is the dominant policy system and what 
are its formal and informal rules? What is the role of bureaucracy 
and parliament, and what are the opportunities for and constraints 
on lobbying? Which part of government is responsible for tobacco 
policy? Which level of governance is responsible for tobacco: the 
sub-national, national, or supranational, or some combination of 
these?
 3. Diffusion of ideas refers to the role of medical and scientific knowl-
edge. To what extent is policymaking influenced by the transfer of 
information, knowledge, and ideas from within and from abroad? 
What is the level of knowledge that has accumulated within the 
political system, and how is this important when making decisions 
on tobacco?
 4. Networks refers to the balance of power between policy “entrepre-
neurs” who are typically organised in policy coalitions. Networks 
become coalitions when network members share a common set of 
core beliefs and when there is a certain level of coordination. What 
changes can we see over time in how the tobacco control and the 
tobacco industry coalitions are organised, and how effective has 
their lobbying been? Has there been a shift in the balance of power?
 5. Agenda setting refers to the process by which tobacco policy appears 
higher on the political agenda. This involves identifying at some 
point that there is a problem and that the government needs to do 
something about it. Ideological factors have to be taken into 
account: is it a responsibility for the government, or should the gov-
ernment leave it to citizens or to the free market to tackle the prob-
lem and find solutions? Problem and solutions need to be “sold” to 
politicians and policymakers.
To understand how the five  elements fit together conceptually, and 
how they may either inhibit or promote tobacco control policy, I devel-
oped a conceptual framework (Fig.  1.1) that depicts the relationships 









































research for this book, and are consistent with theoretical conceptualisa-
tions of the policy process. The distinction between relatively stable and 
relatively dynamic contextual factors is borrowed from the ACF (Sabatier 
& Weible, 2007; Weible et al., 2009) and, like the ACF, I award a central 
place in the framework to the competition between pro- and anti-tobacco 
coalitions and how effective they are at building supportive networks and 
setting up an effective lobbying apparatus. The model further reflects the 
basic idea from the MSA (Kingdon, 2003) that policy change is more 
likely to happen when advocates from coalitions succeed in bringing their 
conceptualisations of the problem and their preferred policy solution to 
the attention of politicians and policymakers. A topic’s position on the 
policy agenda will be higher when both problem and policy solutions align 
with political opportunities. Opportunities result from changes in the pol-
icy environment, such as increased social support for tobacco control, new 
demands from the EU or the WHO, or a change of government with 
another dominant ideology. Ideology is particularly important in under-
standing tobacco policy (Cohen et al., 2000; K. Smith, 2013; Tesh, 1988). 
According to political scientist Silvia Tesh, “More powerful than vested 
interests, more subtle than science, political ideology has, in the end, the 
greatest influence on disease prevention policy” (Tesh, 1988, p. 155).
At the heart of the struggle for tobacco control is the almost universal 
fight between the economy, public health, and ideology. The model illus-
trates how new scientific information from domestic or international 
sources, about both problem and solutions, may feed into a coalition’s 
repertoire, strengthening or broadening its lobbying capabilities. However, 
since statistical facts rarely speak for themselves and the making of facts 
may be commissioned by advocacy coalitions, the arrow between ideas 
and networks points in both directions. To have an effect, research find-
ings need to be translated and “sold” to decision makers (Warner, 2005). 
The framework assumes that (at least in parliamentary democracies such as 
the Netherlands) a government’s decision to adopt tobacco control mea-
sures depends on the presence of sufficient political support (majority 
positions in the parliament and cabinet), which is subject to the lobbying 
activities of the pro- and anti-tobacco control advocacy groups. In the 
background are the more stable and enduring contextual factors (notably 
cultural values), and institutional policymaking structures which directly 
or indirectly reinforce or inhibit the extent to which opposing coalitions 
can take advantage of new opportunities. Coalitions that are the best at 
taking advantage of opportunities arising from changes in the policy envi-
ronment will be the most successful.
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The framework provides for one large feedback loop. Tobacco control 
measures that are implemented by the government contribute to reduc-
tions in tobacco consumption at the population level. When there are 
fewer smokers and smoking is less visible, smoking becomes less popular 
and public opinion changes (smoking de-normalises), leading to more 
public support for further tobacco control measures and eventually con-
tributing to new opportunities for the tobacco control coalition to advance 
its agenda. The empirical evidence for this loop is discussed in more detail 
in Chap. 4.
oUtline
The next chapter is a detailed narrative of the events that shaped Dutch 
tobacco control policy: from when the government began to take the 
problem of smoking seriously in the 1960s until around 2014, when an 
era ended with the closure of the Stichting Volksgezondheid en Roken 
(Dutch Smoking or Health Foundation) (STIVORO), the national expert 
centre on tobacco control. Particular attention is given to the interaction 
between decision makers (ministers and state secretaries) and politicians in 
the parliament, to reveal what was done by governments in those years to 
tackle the smoking problem, and the struggles and politics involved. 
Chapter 2 structures the steps taken by the Dutch government to control 
tobacco, applying the idea of policy cycles, before comparing the pace of 
tobacco control policymaking in the Netherlands with other European 
countries. It will show that the Netherlands started relatively late, but 
caught up with mainstream Europe at the beginning of this century. 
Chapter 3 is the first chapter to apply one of the various analytical lenses, 
positioned so that we first look at policymaking from afar and gradually 
approach until we examine the internal dynamics of policymaking. The 
explanatory factors that are most distant from the actual policymaking 
process are external and relatively stable parameters, and serve as contex-
tual structures that set the boundaries within which policymaking occurs. 
Chapter 4 first looks at the social and cultural environment. The govern-
ment’s willingness to consider tobacco control measures is influenced by 
social norms and societal support, and by the balance between the num-
bers of smokers and non-smokers. There is also a feedback loop, since 
these factors are also affected by the adoption of a new tobacco control 
policy. The way these factors influence each other over long periods of 
time at the population level is captured in the “flywheel model” of tobacco 
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control. Chapter 5 examines the institutional structures and the “rules of 
the game” that make policymaking possible but also constrain it. Chapter 6 
looks at how national tobacco control policy is increasingly determined by 
international institutions, particularly the EU and WHO. Chapter 7 exam-
ines the role of science and the diffusion of new ideas and knowledge about 
what works best in tobacco control at the national level. Chapters 8 and 9 
respectively discuss pro- and anti-tobacco coalitions within the broader con-
text of the tobacco control policy arena, and describe the failures and suc-
cesses of advocacy efforts. The diminishing importance of the tobacco 
production and trade sector to the Dutch economy is also discussed in 
Chap. 8. Chapter 10 takes us to the core of public policymaking, which is 
problem definition and agenda setting by advocacy groups. The final chap-
ter attempts to come to a synthesis of the main findings, answering the ques-
tion of how tobacco control policy comes about in the Dutch context.
research
As part of the research for this book, I examined several data sources. In 
addition to the scientific literature, I made extensive use of the database of 
parliamentary documents and proceedings of public debates on tobacco 
policy in both chambers of the Dutch Parliament, using NVivo software 
to facilitate the process of data ordering. This was a tedious task, given the 
large number of documents (more than 400), many of which were min-
utes of lengthy debates, but the documents proved most useful in present-
ing a detailed historical account of the policy process given in Chap. 3. 
The book further benefitted from interviews with key stakeholders and 
informants. I conducted 22 in-depth interviews with informants from the 
government, health organisations, and tobacco industry, focused on the 
five elements of public policymaking (context, institutions, agenda setting, 
ideas, and networks). Finally I examined documents made public through 
two freedom of information requests by investigative journalist Joop 
Bouma (Bouma, 2001). My research team added the Bouma documents 
to the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents database with help of the 
Maastricht University Library and the Dutch Cancer Society, so that the 
documents are now accessible for research.3 They were most relevant in 
describing the lobbying practices of the Dutch tobacco industry network 
(Chap. 8). For the chapter on the tobacco control network (Chap. 9), I 
accessed documents from the archive of STIVORO to supplement what 




1. For the sake of simplicity I refer to the “Ministry of Health” and “Health 
Minister” throughout the book. However, this ministry had several names 
in the past. The Ministry was created in 1951 as the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Public Health. It was the Ministry of Public Health and 
Environment (VoMil) between 1971 and 1982, when it was renamed into 
Ministry of Welfare, Public Health and Culture (WVC). Since 1994 its 
name is “Ministry of Public Health, Welfare, and Sport” (VWS).
2. See: “The end of tobacco? The tobacco endgame.” Special issue. Tobacco 
Control, May 2013, vol. 22, Suppl. 1.
3. Accessible through https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/
collections/dutch-tobacco-industry/
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CHAPTER 2
Dutch Tobacco Control Policy 
from the 1950s to the Present
Tobacco control policy is a long step from the neat theoretical path of 
identifying a problem, selecting the most effective strategy to tackle it, 
and then just implementing it. This chapter describes the many steps 
that were taken by the Dutch government to shape tobacco control pol-
icy. The description covers more than half a century and stays close to 
the timeline of events. The reader will learn how the government chose 
to combat smoking from the early years when it first became clear that 
smoking is not an innocent pleasure. At first the government was hesi-
tant to react, but in the 1970s it became more active, culminating in a 
Tobacco Memorandum with far-reaching policy proposals, many of which 
were killed or toned down over subsequent years. The fight over tobacco 
policy then concentrated on two major national pieces of legislation: the 
1988 Tobacco Act and its 2002 revision. These were not definitive laws 
but “framework” laws—meaning that they offered the basis for more 
specific decisions to be taken by the Council of Ministers (so-called 
orders-in-council) or by a minister (Ministerial Regulations) at a later 
stage. This opened up long periods of bargaining between interest 
groups, politicians, and the government about interpretations during 
the implementation phase.
20 
EmErging HEaltH ConCErns (1950–1970)
Shortly after the Second World War, W.F.  Wassink, a physician at the 
Antoni van Leeuwenhoek hospital in Amsterdam, published the results of 
a case-control study comparing the smoking habits of 137 male lung can-
cer patients with a control group of 100 “normal” men. He concluded 
that tobacco had to be the cause of the disease (Wassink, 1948). Two years 
later, a landmark study was published by British epidemiologists Richard 
Doll and Austin Bradford Hill (Doll & Hill, 1950). In the same year, a 
group of American epidemiologists concluded that the main cause of the 
rise in lung cancer death was smoking (Wynder & Graham, 1950). The 
international media quickly picked up the story. In 1952 the popular 
US-based Reader’s Digest published an article entitled “Cancer by the 
Carton.” This was the first mainstream publication that bluntly stated that 
smoking causes cancer, and blamed the high cancer rates on the tobacco 
industry’s relentless promotion of tobacco. The effect was tremendous. 
Cigarette sales declined for the first time in over two decades in the United 
States.
In these years, the Netherlands was still a smokers’ society, and in 1958 
90% of men and 38% of women smoked (Gadourek, 1963, p.  66). 
Although Readers Digest was not distributed in the Netherlands at the 
time, the concern about smoking was felt. Alarming messages from the 
international studies that smoking can cause lung disease were summarised 
in a report from the Dutch Health Council (Wester, 1957) and attracted 
some attention in the Netherlands.
In March 1962 the British Royal College of Physicians of London pub-
lished a landmark report that summarised the medical evidence and urged 
the UK government to take action (Royal College of Physicians, 1962a). 
It appeared in the same year in a Dutch translation (Royal College of 
Physicians, 1962b), and this attracted abundant media attention. From 
that moment, smokers’ health was part of general public attention and 
tobacco use lost much of its innocence. In the summer of 1963, reports 
from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics about an alarming increase in 
lung cancer deaths among Dutch men were discussed extensively by the 
media and on national television, and this was a good reason for Senator 
Kranenburg (Christian Historical Union [CHU], a small protestant party) 
to ask the government whether it accepted that smoking causes lung 
 cancer.1 He also wanted to know what the government was going to do 
about it. Although the state secretary for health acknowledged that smok-
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ing was the leading cause of lung cancer, the government’s response was 
restricted to education in schools, although it took the imposition of mea-
sures to reduce smoking under consideration. The Dutch Cancer Society 
received subsidies from the government in the order of a few hundred 
thousand guilders per year to execute these education campaigns. The 
Dutch government’s minimal response was similar to the hesitant response 
of the UK government at the time (Berridge & Loughlin, 2005).
The next year, a report from the US Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (1964) (Smoking and Health), based on a review of over 7000 
scientific articles, concluded unequivocally that there was a causative link 
between smoking and a 10- to 20-fold increase in the occurrence of lung 
cancer. This report had a lasting worldwide effect on how smoking was 
perceived. The year 1964 can be regarded as the year when serious con-
cerns about smoking stirred the Dutch nation and health organisations 
like the Dutch Cancer Society got actively involved with tobacco control.
In 1965 tobacco manufacturers united in an effort to prevent govern-
ment regulation of advertising, and reached a “gentlemen’s agreement” in 
which they promised to stop marketing that suggested some brands were 
“better for health” than others (Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association, 
1971). They also promised to abstain from television commercials. Since 
tobacco commercials were not broadcast on Dutch television, this offer 
was not particularly impressive. Similar codes of conduct surfaced in 
Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg (Pauw, 1971).2 The UK-based 
manufacturers had agreed in 1962 to implement a code of advertising 
practice that would detract some of the glamour from cigarette advertise-
ments (ASH, 2013). This strategy of self-regulation was successful in pre-
venting governmental regulation of tobacco advertising for many years. 
The self-imposed restrictions in the Netherlands had no formal or legisla-
tive status, but were subject to scrutiny by the Stichting Reclame Code 
(Advertising Code Foundation) (SRC), an organisation founded in 1963 
by the advertising sector to handle citizens’ complaints about 
advertisements.3
In 1968 the US Department of State inquired through its embassies 
about tobacco control activities in 22 countries (National Clearinghouse 
for Smoking and Health, 1969; US Public Health Service, 1970). Few 
countries had taken action. Twelve had not started even rudimentary 
education in schools, and many were waiting for advice from their 
national health councils. However, some were already taking the first 
regulatory steps. Some had banned advertising on television (Italy, 
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Norway, Sweden), some had banned the sale of tobacco to minors 
(Austria, Norway), and some had initiated communication campaigns 
that went beyond youth education (Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Italy). Dutch tobacco control policy was restricted to providing subsi-
dies for youth education, while the industry exhibited self-restraint 
regarding tobacco advertisements. In sum, at the end of the 1960s the 
Netherlands had no tobacco control legislation despite growing health 
concerns. The only action taken by the government was to provide a 
small yearly subsidy to the Cancer Society’s youth education school 
programmes.
ambitious PoliCy intEntions (1970–1977)
In 1970 Hans van den Doel, a Labour Party member of the lower house 
of the Dutch Parliament, asked whether the government was aware that 
US President Nixon had signed an intention to ban tobacco advertise-
ment on radio and television and to put health warnings on cigarette 
packs.4 Van den Doel wanted to know if the Dutch government intended 
to follow the American example. The government responded by setting 
up a working group with representatives from five governmental depart-
ments (the Ministries of Health, Social Work, Justice, Economic Affairs, 
and Finance), commissioned to examine the possibility of restricting 
tobacco advertisements.5 This working group was called the Meulblok 
Committee after its Chairman J.  Meulblok, head of the Public Health 
Department of the Ministry of Health.
Between 1971 and 1972 Dutch tobacco manufacturing organisations 
had several meetings with the Meulblok Committee about tobacco 
advertising. Meulblok actively sought input from the industry and felt 
that it was important that the committee and the industry were on the 
same wavelength (Interdepartementale Commissie Tabaksreclame, 
1972a). The Committee’s starting point was that it wanted “if possible, 
to prevent the necessity of interventions by the government” 
(Interdepartementale Commissie Tabaksreclame, 1972b). It struggled 
especially with the legal aspects of a ban on tobacco advertising, being 
under constant pressure from the tobacco industry to refrain from advis-
ing about advertising regulation. Meulblok thus wanted to first explore 
the option of self-regulation, because the committee expected that an 
advertising ban would be difficult to reconcile with constitutional rights 
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of freedom of press and freedom of speech (Interdepartementale 
Commissie Tabaksreclame, 1972a). Meulblok wondered if this might 
show “where a small country such as the Netherlands can be great and 
be an example to other countries.”
It was not only the lower house of the Dutch Parliament that was 
concerned about the smoking issue. In 1971 Upper House Senator 
Sidney Van den Bergh of the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie 
(People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) (VVD), the conservative–
liberal political party, read the second report from the UK Royal College 
of Physicians, “Smoking and Health: Now,” which concluded that smok-
ers were twice as likely to die by middle age than non-smokers and rec-
ommended health warnings on cigarette packs, advertising restrictions, 
and tax increases (Royal College of Physicians, 1971). When Van den 
Bergh asked the Dutch state secretary for health whether he was consid-
ering similar steps.6 The state secretary responded by asking the Health 
Council for advice on how the government should inform the public 
about the risks of smoking. It is interesting to compare this reserved 
Dutch response to what was happening at the time in the United 
Kingdom. The English Health Education Council initiated a series of 
hard-hitting awareness campaigns in the beginning of the 1970s that 
shook up the public. Advertisements had texts such as, “The tar and 
discharge that collect in the lungs of the average smoker,” “You can’t 
scrub your lungs clean,” and “Why learn the truth about lung cancer the 
hard way?” (Berridge & Loughlin, 2005). One advertisement showed 
smokers crossing London’s Waterloo Bridge interspersed with images of 
lemmings throwing themselves off a cliff. A 1973–1974 campaign 
showed a naked pregnant smoking woman featuring the text, “Is it fair 
to force your baby to smoke cigarettes?” In 1978 the English Health 
Education Council attacked the industry’s claim that safer cigarettes 
would be the solution, through an advertisement that had the line, 
“Switching to a substitute cigarette is like jumping from the 36th rather 
than the 39th floor of a building” (Berridge & Loughlin, 2005). Such 
campaigns paved the way for a more assertive and proactive governmen-
tal response to the smoking problem in the United Kingdom. The Dutch 
government did not take similar actions.
In 1975 the Health Council’s report Measures to reduce smoking was 
published. A commission of 12 experts had worked on it for almost two 
and a half years, convening 16 times. Surprisingly, their conclusions were 
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quite  revolutionary at the time, and threatening to those with a vested 
interest in the tobacco sector. It stated as a starting point  that “public 
health interests must prevail above economic interests” (Beernink & 
Plokker, 1975, p. 7). The report contained a comprehensive and inte-
grated set of policy proposals. 
The report concluded that “considering the large influence of smok-
ing on the people’s health, it is unjust and impossible for the govern-
ment to look the other way much longer” (Beernink & Plokker, 1975). 
Interestingly, the report noted that full freedom of choice did not exist 
with respect to smoking because smokers had become pharmacologi-
cally and psychologically dependent on tobacco use after exposure to 
so much tobacco advertising. Tobacco control had to be “aimed pri-
marily at the creation of a psycho-social climate in which smoking is 
negatively influenced and at stimulating a new attitude regarding smok-
ing.” The government was advised to communicate unequivocally to 
the public that smoking poses a serious danger to the health of smokers 
and non-smokers.
Measures to reduce smoking proposed a comprehensive programme of 
educational and regulative measures—and a 15-year action plan to tackle 
the smoking epidemic. The government was advised to consider a full 
tobacco advertising ban, restrictions on the availability of tobacco, removal 
of tobacco vending machines, increases in tobacco taxes to fund anti- 
tobacco advertising campaigns, and the banning of smoking in public 
places (see Box 2.1 for a more complete account of the commission’s 
recommendations). Tobacco control policy was to be supported by finan-
cial means that were in fair proportion to the advertising budgets that 
tobacco companies had at their disposal and to the revenues that the gov-
ernment received from tobacco taxes.
Measures to reduce smoking could have been the starting point for the 
development of a comprehensive national tobacco control strategy or 
plan, but it did not translate into policy. Looking back at the report 
through modern eyes, it had all the necessary ingredients to propel the 
Dutch to leadership in the field. However, hardly any of the ideas was 
taken up. Some of the measures took many decades to materialise, others, 
such as a ban on vending machines and earmarked tobacco tax revenues, 
are still not realised. The progressive cabinet of the time (led by Labour 
Party leader Joop den Uyl) was not followed by a cabinet that put the 
policy intentions into action.
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Box 2.1 Proposals in the 1975 Health Council report Measures to 
reduce smoking
• A ban on tobacco advertising
• Health warnings on cigarette packs
• Restrictions on smoking in public places, in combination with an 
educational campaign to explain the measure
• Smoking restrictions for specific occupations, such as doctors and 
teachers
• A smoking ban on public transport
• Restrictions on smoking in television shows and other programmes
• Restrictions on the number of points of sale of tobacco
• Removal of tobacco vending machines
• A ban on the sale of tobacco to minors (under 16 years of age). 
This measure was to be considered if the removal of vending 
machines was not effective enough
• Increasing tobacco taxes in tandem with neighbouring countries, 
the extra revenue to be allocated to anti-tobacco campaigns
• Consideration of a ban on the duty-free sale of tobacco products
• Mass media campaigns to stimulate interpersonal communication 
about the dangers of smoking, and to encourage the formation of 
group norms incompatible with smoking
• Health education programmes in schools, worksites and civil soci-
ety organisations
• Motivation and training of health educators, doctors, and teach-
ers to enable them to motivate and support patients, clients, and 
pupils not to smoke
• Developing effective behavioural counselling for smokers who 
wish to quit
• Foundation of a National Institute for the Reduction of Smoking, 
responsible for providing general information to the public, and 
for the coordination of education, campaigns, smoking cessation 
support, and research
• Development of a long-term scientific research program to include 
systematic monitoring of the smoking habits of the population and 
evaluation of the effectiveness of all current and future tobacco 
control measures, plus research into the psychological and socio-
logical determinants of smoking, the best ways of supporting smok-
ers to quit smoking, and the impact of smoking on health
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One recommendation from the Health Council’s report was taken up, 
though. This was the creation of a national institute for tobacco control, 
leading to the foundation of Stichting Volksgezondheid en Roken (Dutch 
Smoking or Health Foundation) (STIVORO). Since the core of the gov-
ernment’s approach to tackling the smoking problem was health educa-
tion, the new institute’s tasks were to educate the public about smoking 
and to monitor national smoking habits through yearly surveys (see Chap. 
9 for an account of STIVORO’s role in tobacco control).
Soon after the publication of the Health Council’s report, the Meulblok 
Committee presented its report to the cabinet, which sent it to the parlia-
ment in 1976. The Meulblok Committee stayed close to the Health 
Council’s recommendations (Meulblok, 1975). It adopted the council’s 
starting point: that the interests of public health must prevail above other 
interests. Meulblok pointed out that any negative impact on employment 
or tax revenues could not outweigh the necessity of protecting the public’s 
health. Another starting point was that priority must be given to the pro-
tection of youth, and that this must not be restricted to education.
For the government, the Meulblok report was the starting point of a 
long process that eventually resulted in a “Tobacco Act.” A particularly 
important recommendation from Meulblok was to start drafting a law to 
ban tobacco advertising. The committee’s argument was that “advertising 
constantly confirms and reinforces the usual [positive] attitude in our soci-
ety regarding smoking” (p. 28). The committee left open the possibility of 
a gradual approach, involving a series of restrictions, in the case that a full 
advertising ban was politically undesirable or unfeasible, but dismissed the 
idea of self-regulation by the industry. Frequent consultations with indus-
try representatives had not convinced the committee to refrain from legis-
lation. The industrial lobby had broken ranks and could not offer an 
acceptable, mutually agreed-upon alternative. Niemeyer, a local producer 
of cigarettes, no longer respected the gentlemen’s agreement between 
manufacturers, part of which was that advertisements must not give the 
impression that one type or brand of tobacco was less harmful than others. 
Niemeyer, a market leader in brands of cigarettes with distinct harm reduc-
tion appeal, wanted to promote its brands Roxy Dual and Kelly Halvaret 
as low in nicotine and tar and relatively safe for consumers, and concluded 
that this was more profitable for them than adhering to the industry’s 
mutual but non-binding caveats.
Since the industry was not able to present a convincing alternative, the 
Meulblok Committee advised the cabinet to start the process of drafting a 
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Tobacco Act that included advertising restrictions (Meulblok, 1975). The 
recommendations were threatening to the tobacco industry—which spent 
no less than 35 million guilders (about €40 million in current money) on 
tobacco advertising in 1977 (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1982).
The Meulblok Report was produced during the Den Uyl cabinet 
(1973–1977), the most progressive cabinet that the Netherlands has 
ever had. It comprised Christian Democrats and parties left of the politi-
cal centre. Prime Minister Den Uyl (Labour Party) was credited for try-
ing to free politics from corporatism. This was an era when the ideal of 
a better world dominated the political discourse, and many believed in 
the idea of a just and modifiable society (maakbare samenleving). In 
January 1977, just two months before Den Uyl’s cabinet resigned, State 
Secretary for Health Jo Hendriks sent a letter to the parliament outlin-
ing the cabinet’s strategy to combat smoking.7 This Tobacco Memorandum 
(Rookmemorandum) put forth the recommendations from the Measures 
to reduce smoking report from the Health Council and ideas from the 
Meulblok Report that were felt would be the most feasible to imple-
ment.8 Hendriks decided upon a “not too hasty approach” by not imple-
menting all of the measures proposed by the Health Council at once, 
but by opting to do it gradually.9 Health educational efforts had to be 
intensified, and accompanied by the three measures that the govern-
ment felt it could implement on relatively short notice: bans on smoking 
in public venues, governmental buildings, and areas such as waiting 
rooms; labelling tobacco products (with health warnings and tar and 
nicotine yields); and a ban on tobacco advertising. Other measures were 
considered for the longer term.10 The cabinet noted that smoking 
restrictions would help build a social climate in which non-smoking was 
the norm and that it might be a good idea, for each subsequent long-
term measure, to estimate the extent to which the measure restricted the 
freedom of the individual. It was decided that a further analysis of the 
proposals was needed, including legal and political feasibility. A new 
committee was set up in July 1977 to do this. This Interdepartementale 
Commissie Beperking Tabaksgebruik (Interdepartmental Committee for 
Reducing Tobacco Use) (ICBT)  consisted of delegates from six state 
departments, but mostly from the health and trade ministries (both had 
four seats at the table, but the Ministry of Health delivered the chair, 
vice-chair, and secretary). The committee’s task was to formulate con-
crete proposals for regulative measures—other than education—to 
reduce tobacco use.11
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Partly due to a change of government, it was almost two years (March 
1979) before the committee was officially installed and started work. In 
the meantime, advice from the Meulblok Committee to introduce health 
warnings was followed through in a proposal for a law that was attached 
to the Food and Product Safety Act in 1981, ordering that from January 
1982 onwards tobacco products had to carry the health warning, 
“Smoking threatens health. The Minister of Public Health and the 
Environment.” Mandatory information about tar and nicotine content 
was also included. This was less confronting than the advice from Meulblok 
to use the text “Smoking damages yourself and others.”
tHE ministry of EConomiC affairs stEPs on tHE brakE 
(1977–1991)
In December 1977, the first cabinet under Christian Democratic leader 
Dries Van Agt came to power and changed the political landscape pro-
foundly. This centre-right government was “fairly tolerant towards smok-
ing,” according to an internal industry memo (Colby, 1979). Philip 
Morris’ analysis was that “the new government is favouring industry more 
than its predecessor. However, more legislation will probably be enacted, 
but in such a way as not to interfere with the economic situation; the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs carries considerable weight in 
Holland” (Unknown (Philip Morris), 1979). The government’s position 
on tobacco from the first Van Agt cabinet until the third Lubbers cabinet 
(mid-1990s) can be characterised by the mantra “tobacco is an individu-
al’s own responsibility.” Governments in these years were not happy with 
the Meulblok and Health Council reports and effectively bogged their 
recommendations in bureaucratic procedures.
One of the first things the new cabinet did was to tone down the ambi-
tious tobacco control policy intentions of the previous cabinet. In a letter 
to Parliament, the new state secretary for economic affairs wrote that, 
“given the interests of businesses that are at stake here, I will make sure 
that tobacco control policy with respect to the supply side will be devel-
oped in a careful, gradual manner, in connection with the policy with 
respect to the demand-side.”12 Everything having to do with legally bind-
ing restrictions, including tobacco advertising and regulation of the sale of 
tobacco, was handled by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The Ministry 
of Health controlled the demand-side. This division of tasks ensured that 
effective tobacco policy measures could not be made without the consent 
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of the powerful Minister of Economic Affairs, who could step on the brake 
whenever the Ministry of Health moved too fast.
In March 1979, the ICBT committee began to work on its policy pro-
posal report. The cabinet did not put much pressure on the commission, 
which was allowed to take its time. The new State Secretary for Health, Els 
Veder-Smit of the conservative–liberal VVD, regarded self-regulation by 
the industry as the best alternative to an advertising ban.13 She believed 
that personal freedom and the responsibility of individuals for their own 
health were important aspects for the ICBT to keep in mind when consid-
ering appropriate measures. While the ICBT was working on its report, 
the tobacco industry presented a list of self-imposed advertising restric-
tions. This included old promises such as refraining from advertisements 
directed at youth and from making health claims, and ending the promo-
tion of tobacco products through television and radio.14 In 1979 the state 
secretary explained that “from our contacts with the tobacco manufactur-
ing industry it is clear to us that they are prepared to ban health appeals 
from their advertising messages.”15 She trusted self-restraint by the indus-
try, as long as this was supported by all manufacturers and backed by sanc-
tions. The ICBT was requested to take the industry’s proposals into 
account.
Parliament was more critical of the industry’s self-regulative proposals. 
The Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Party) (CDA) 
claimed that the industry had failed, and tabled a motion to urge the gov-
ernment to regulate tobacco advertising.16 This resulted in a ban on adver-
tising on radio and television in 1980 through the Media Act. 
Parliamentarians also became impatient with respect to smoking bans. 
Again the CDA tried to speed up the process17 by tabling a motion to ban 
smoking in public places.18 A year later this was followed by another 
motion from the CDA requesting the same, referring to the fact that 
France had implemented a ban on smoking in public places since July.19 
These motions were the start of an almost decade-long process leading to 
a public smoking ban, the main element of the Tobacco Act of 1988.
The ICBT reported to the state secretary for health in January 1981 
(ICBT, 1981). The recommendations were more industry-friendly this 
time around than the previous reports; compromise was sought between 
health and economics. The committee identified four principles as starting 
points for tobacco control policy in declining order of significance: tobacco 
use is harmful for health; youth need to be protected; the right of physical 
integrity in non-smokers has to be balanced against the right of personal 
 DUTCH TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY FROM THE 1950S TO THE PRESENT 
30 
freedom of smokers; and undesirable societal and economic consequences 
must be taken into account. The committee underscored this last principle 
by writing that it was aware that the tobacco sector contributes signifi-
cantly to the national economy. The idea of a tobacco advertising ban was 
postponed indefinitely because the commission felt that the industry must 
be allowed to use advertising as a means of “communicating” with their 
consumers about new products. The committee did criticise the existing 
self-regulation (the Reclame Code) for lack of sanctions and recommended 
that misleading advertisements should be sobered down, for example, 
through restrictions on the use of colours. The idea of deterring smoking 
through higher cigarette taxes (either by increasing general taxation levels 
or by linking the tax level to the level of harmful substances so that more 
harmful products would be taxed higher) was considered, but no concrete 
proposals were made. The most far-reaching recommendation was to 
restrict the number of tobacco selling points to specialty shops, but since 
this could have substantial consequences for the tobacco sector it was not 
to be done hastily, according to the committee. Other proposals were to 
ban tobacco vending machines and to ban smoking in public places and in 
government buildings. The ICBT report remarked that in a future 
Tobacco Act, regulation might be included to limit the quantity of sub-
stances that were harmful to health in tobacco products. In April 1981 the 
ICBT was asked by the state secretary for health to work out the details of 
a Tobacco Act, while parliament was disappointed that five years after the 
Meulblok Committee, nothing had been accomplished except further 
pointless deliberations and slow-down tactics by the industry.20
Piet van Zeil, the state secretary for economic affairs in the first Lubbers 
cabinet (1982–1986), discussed the idea of restricting the sale of tobacco 
products to specialty shops in parliament in August 1982. Van Zeil prom-
ised he would have another round of talks with the business community to 
hear their side of the argument.21 He felt that for each measure (a ban on 
vending machines and restricting points of sale), costs and benefits needed 
to be balanced, and indications that measures could pose a burden on 
businesses had to be taken seriously. He pointed out that this cabinet was 
not likely to opt for a broad reduction of the number of sales outlets, nor 
even for a ban on vending machines. The Lubbers cabinet’s motto was 
“more market, less government.”
In July 1983 the cabinet gave the green light to the idea of promulgat-
ing a Tobacco Act. At the end of 1984, State Secretary for Health Joop 
van der Reijden and State Secretary for Economic Affairs Piet van Zeil sent 
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a proposal to parliament for consideration.22 In the introductory remarks 
of their clarification document, the two underlined the importance of eco-
nomic considerations23:
Against the interests of public health, that have to do with the reduction of 
smoking and the protection of non-smokers, are economic and fiscal inter-
ests that have to be taken into consideration as well. Thousands of citizens 
earn their daily bread, or at least part of it, from the production and distribu-
tion of tobacco products. Smoking is a deeply ingrained and socially accepted 
habit, although there are clear signs that this acceptance is diminishing. The 
state enjoys considerable revenues from tobacco taxes, which are used to 
finance many useful and necessary things.
The government gave the industry the benefit of the doubt by continu-
ing the policy of self-imposed restrictions on tobacco advertisements. 
Only if this did not have the expected effect on youth smoking would the 
government consider imposing a ban by decree—but it did not specify 
how they would evaluate the effectiveness of self regulation.
The ICBT’s proposal to reduce the number of tobacco selling points 
was not part of the proposal for the Tobacco Act, “because the harmful 
effects on the business community, especially middle and small businesses, 
cannot be sufficiently compensated.”24 Only the sale of tobacco in health- 
care institutions and educational facilities was to be restricted. The pro-
posal to ban the sale of tobacco to minors and to ban vending machines 
was also abandoned, because the government wished to follow the advice 
of a “deregulation” committee (see also Chap. 5 on the importance of 
deregulation committees), which made the point that such a ban would be 
difficult to uphold and easy for minors to circumvent. With respect to a 
smoking ban in public places, the government did not want a general ban, 
but instead left it to local administrators to decide on the best way to pro-
tect non-smokers from second-hand smoke and how to decide which local 
areas should be subject to smoking restrictions. The ban was restricted to 
government-owned buildings and buildings of organisations that worked 
for the government, such as hospitals, schools, and social welfare organisa-
tions. The government wanted to leave open the possibility of restricting 
smoking instead of banning it completely, for example, by tolerating smok-
ing in designated sections or during designated hours. What was to be the 
centrepiece of the Tobacco Act became a disputable and vague instruction 
to the managers of public buildings, with no sanctions provided for viola-
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tions. Borgman, the CDA parliamentarian behind the motion from 1980, 
summarised the general feeling of disappointment among parliamentari-
ans: “the submitted Tobacco Act has, after going through the bureaucratic 
wheels of interdepartmental consultation, deregulation and so forth, more 
the appearance of a leaflet with suggestions and prescriptions than the 
ground-breaking law that the parliament has been asking for since 1977.”25 
Parliamentarian Erwin Nypels (Democrats 66) proposed an amendment 
to include private workplaces in the smoking ban.26
In July 1986, when the second Lubbers cabinet (1986–1989) came to 
office, the new State Secretary for Health Dick Dees (VVD) at first was 
open to the amendment, but after some pressure from the employer 
organisation Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen en Nederlands 
Christelijk Werkgeversverbond (Confederation of Netherlands Industry 
and Employers) (VNO–NCW),27 advised against it.28 In his national pol-
icy document on prevention of heart disease, State Secretary Dees did 
not announce further tobacco control measures.29 The cabinet did not 
want to include smoking restrictions for private workplaces in the new 
act, and opted for the path of continued self-regulation instead. This 
meant reaching agreements with the business community through talks 
and negotiations with the “social partners” (the employee and employer 
organisations).
During the final debate in the senate, State Secretary for Health Dick 
Dees (VVD) admitted that he was still negotiating with the industry about 
a satisfactory code of conduct for tobacco advertising.30 The industry 
accepted the conditions for self-regulation just before the Tobacco Act 
was published in the Bulletin of Acts. A new advertising code of conduct 
was decided upon and entered into force on 1 January 1989. It was agreed 
that this would last for another five years. Although the Tobacco Act 
included the threat of prohibiting advertising through an Order of 
Council, it did not come to this. Occasionally, the industry made small 
adaptations to the advertising code to accommodate calls for tighter 
restrictions by parliament and health organisations. This situation would 
continue for another decade. Protected by their code, tobacco industry 
spending on advertising increased from 21  million guilders in 1974 
(Beernink & Plokker, 1975) to 35 million in 1977 (Algemene Rekenkamer, 
1982) and to more than 200 million in 1996.31 The Tobacco Act included 
a ban on tobacco advertising on radio and television, to comply with 
European Union (EU) regulations (Directive 89/552/EEC). This was 




The final verdict of the senate in March 1988 was that the piece of leg-
islation was too little, too late, and could not be expected to affect smok-
ing rates. The senate supported it nevertheless, for lack of something 
better.33 The Tobacco Act was approved on 10 March 1988 and went into 
effect on 1 January 1990, after four years of deliberations, debates, and 
amendments. It is a framework legislation, where specific details may be 
decided on at a later stage through ministerial decisions and governmental 
decrees. What was accomplished was that smoking was more or less 
banned (leaving open the possibility of smoking sections and smoking 
during designated times) in about 50,000 indoor venues in government- 
owned buildings and properties open to the general public.
In response to the general disappointment and discontent with the 
weak act, the government decided to intensify education, campaigns, and 
palliative measures to appease the health lobby for a while. A working 
group was installed to develop a multiple-year educational programme. 
The government’s subsidy to STIVORO for campaigns increased some-
what from 1989 onwards, and STIVORO was commissioned to start a 
mass media campaign to motivate private companies to implement smok-
ing policies on a voluntary basis.
During this time, the government asked the Health Council to reas-
sess the harm from passive smoking in light of new evidence from abroad. 
The report was presented in 1990 but lacked firm conclusions about 
causal associations between prolonged exposure to passive smoking and 
the risk of lung cancer (Gezondheidsraad, 1990), which did not help put 
proposals for further restrictions on smoking on the political agenda (see 
Chap. 9 for a further discussion of this report and the relatively late offi-
cial recognition that passive smoking is a public health problem in the 
Netherlands).
PoliCy stagnation (1991–1994)
For some time the 1988 Tobacco Act remained the final governmental 
response to the tobacco problem. The third Lubbers cabinet (1989–1994) 
had a new state secretary responsible for tobacco control: Hans Simons 
(Labour Party). Simons commissioned Research For Policy, a commercial 
research firm, to evaluate the effectiveness of the Tobacco Act. He wanted 
to know whether the self-regulation of tobacco advertising and promotion 
by the industry was effective, and whether the new measures in the act 
were sufficient to protect youth and non-smokers. The conclusions of the 
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report, published in September 1991, were that the code of conduct and 
the new Tobacco Act had had no detectable effect on the smoking habits 
of the Dutch (Dresscher, Elzinga, & Koldenhof, 1991). The researchers 
identified weak spots in the policy and considered it “ambivalent” because 
of the government’s wish to accommodate the irreconcilable interests of 
health and economy. This resulted in advertising restrictions that were not 
comprehensive, smoking bans that offered little protection to non- 
smokers, and rules and regulations that were rarely adhered to. The indus-
try spent more money on tobacco advertising than ever before and 
managed to sell more cigarettes per smoker, so that “the result is a policy 
that is neither fish nor fowl, its effectiveness largely depending on public 
norms” (Dresscher et al., 1991, p. 76). Despite these harsh comments, 
Research for Policy did not recommend a full advertising ban, anticipating 
attempts by the industry to circumvent any such ban. Instead they advised 
a middle way: extending the existing set of self-imposed measures and 
investing more in enforcement.
In a letter to parliament, State Secretary Simons, inspired by the report, 
was critical of the national tobacco policy of previous cabinets.34 He noted 
that the Netherlands lagged behind other European countries and criti-
cised the tobacco industry’s attempts to circumvent their own advertising 
restrictions, saying that he wanted to intensify national tobacco control 
policy. He noted that the self-regulative measures of the tobacco industry 
in the United Kingdom and Denmark were stricter than in the Netherlands. 
For example, in the United Kingdom, the industry refrained from positive 
images in advertisements, such as Marlboro’s tough cowboys. He pro-
posed a substantial tightening of the advertising code of conduct, includ-
ing more restrictions on advertisements and a ban on indirect advertising 
in radio and television programmes, and he wanted to examine the option 
of restricting smoking in private workplaces through legislative measures, 
as three quarters of private workplaces had no relevant smoking policy. 
These proposals were accompanied by two press releases. One carried the 
title “Self-regulation tobacco advertising insufficient” (VWS, 1991), the 
other “Tighter approach to tobacco policy” (WVC, 1991).
The tobacco industry was furious, and quickly commissioned a compet-
ing research firm to produce a detailed critique of Research For Policy’s 
report, refuting the minister’s accusations that the industry was not abid-
ing with the code of conduct (Nederlands Economisch Instituut, 1991). 
The position of the Ministry of Economic Affairs was that Simons had to 
give the industry’s advertising code the benefit of the doubt, and civil 
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servants from that ministry suggested that if no agreement with their 
bureaucratic counterparts at the Ministry of Health was possible, Economic 
Affair’s Minister Koos Andriessen would have to talk sense to Simons 
(Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 1991). Although Simons stated that 
tobacco control was a “very high policy priority,”35 he gave in to the pres-
sure and failed to make any advance in tobacco control policy.
The Dutch cabinet reconfirmed its preference for self-regulation over a 
legislative approach.36 A compromise was reached between Hans Simons 
and the Minister of Economic Affairs that the government would not start 
the process of drafting a ban but would instead continue to work with the 
industry to increase their self-regulating efforts.37 The initiative to protect 
non-smoking employees at the workplace was left to Stichting van de 
Arbeid (the Labour Foundation) (STAR), which decided not to consider 
a ban but to allow labour representatives and management of individual 
businesses to reach mutually satisfactory policies (Stichting van de Arbeid, 
1992).38 In practice this meant that if individual non-smoking employees 
had an issue with smoking at their workplace, and were unable to find a 
satisfactory solution with their colleagues and their employer, their only 
option was to take their employer to court. They would have to point to 
relevant passages in national occupational health and safety legislation—an 
almost impossible task for the average worker.
Heated fights and debates over the voluntary advertising agreements 
characterised the first part of the 1990s. While the ministries negotiated 
regularly with the industry about the advertising code of conduct, health 
organisations publicly declared its failure. Pressure on the government 
increased when the parliament tabled a motion for an advertising ban.39 
Simons started the process of drafting an amendment to the Tobacco Act 
that would open the door to an advertising ban, in case the industry’s self- 
imposed restrictions were not satisfactory. The code of conduct was 
regarded as “the last chance that the cabinet offers to the industry in the 
way of self-regulation.”40 A new code went into effect on April 1994 and 
resulted in minor improvements, such as advertisements no longer depict-
ing persons looking younger than 30, and no tobacco ads run in cinemas 
before 6PM. In addition, the industry agreed that it would not increase its 
total spending on tobacco advertisements above the level reached in 1990. 
It was agreed that the new code would be in place for another five years and 
would be evaluated every six months, not only for industrial compliance, 
but also for whether the industry was adhering to the spirit of the code, 
which was to keep all promotion of tobacco products away from children.
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Protesters against the advertising code of conduct had support from 
the European (EC), which had proposed an EU-wide advertising ban in 
1991. However, this had been successfully opposed by a group of member 
states, including the Netherlands, which raised legal objections and argued 
that EU legislation was not acceptable if an issue could be better addressed 
at the national level (the so-called subsidiarity principle; see Chap. 5). In 
1994 the health warnings were improved slightly with “Smoking seriously 
harms health” replacing “Smoking threatens health.”
tobaCCo Control ProPosals by ministEr borst 
(1994–1997)
In August 1994 the so-called Purple Cabinet came to power. This was a 
coalition between two liberal parties (VVD and Democraten 66 (D66), 
both “blue”) and the “red” Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party) (PvdA), 
hence the name “purple.” It was relatively progressive, with only five VVD 
ministers against a prime minister from the Labour party, four additional 
Labour ministers and four D66 ministers. Els Borst (D66) was the first 
minister of health in Dutch history. Before her, state secretaries were 
responsible for public health. She had personal motives to fight smoking: 
she was the sister-in-law to a leading Dutch cancer specialist, and on enter-
ing office was already over 60 with a long career as a practising physician 
and director of an academic hospital. She had also been vice president of 
the Health Council. Borst had a strong position in the cabinet and a good 
working relationship with both the Prime Minister Wim Kok and with 
Hans Wijers, the Minister of Economic Affairs, who was from the same 
liberal-democratic party as she.41 D66 had written in its election pro-
gramme that the Netherlands was a European backbencher regarding 
restrictions on tobacco advertising, and that it should catch up as soon as 
possible.
Borst highlighted the urgency of tackling smoking in her disease pre-
vention policy document, Gezond en Wel, launched in March 1995.42 She 
characterised the Dutch tobacco policy as “mild” and made the point that 
anti-tobacco regulation had fallen behind other countries in Europe. She 
identified tobacco control as a priority for the government and announced 
her intention to “intensify” it. In a letter to parliament she explained that 
the “proven effectiveness” of a policy was an important criterion when 
choosing the right measures to tackle tobacco.43 She wanted to limit the 
availability of tobacco products to minors, sharpen the smoking ban in 
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public places by installing sanctions, intensify anti-tobacco youth educa-
tion and smoking cessation efforts, and evaluate the current tobacco taxa-
tion level in light of European minimum standards. These proposals were 
not particularly ground breaking nor were they threatening to the indus-
try—in her first years in office, Borst, a liberal politician and part of a coali-
tion with the liberal–conservative VVD, was searching for measures that 
would have political support from liberals. Most parties in parliament, 
except VVD and CDA, rejected the weak proposals. Instead, they wanted 
the government to make the decision to ban advertising sooner and 
endorsed the need for the government to support stricter advertising reg-
ulation by the EU.44
Regarding advertising restrictions, Minister Borst was confronted with 
a major obstacle. The government had recently renewed its agreement 
with the industry for a new five-year period of self-regulation, promising 
that there would be no regulation as long as the industry adhered to the 
code of conduct. Borst ordered the state attorney to examine whether the 
government could unilaterally withdraw from these agreements with the 
industry, so that the route to an advertising ban would be open. This 
turned out to be very difficult, since the agreement had legal power and 
could only be overturned if the advertising code was not adhered to “in 
letter and in spirit” (De Landsadvocaat, 1995). Borst proposed a limited 
list of acceptable types of advertising, instead of working from the current 
extensive set of restrictions. This was because poorly formulated restric-
tions were relatively easy for the industry to circumvent, evidenced by a 
plethora of incidents in which the industry continued to promote its prod-
ucts to young people.
In January 1995, the industry refrained from advertising on billboards 
in the direct vicinity of hospitals and schools, and the fine for violating the 
code of conduct was increased from 50,000 to 100,000 guilders.45 In 
1996 the industry ended tobacco commercials on cinema screens. Despite 
these small improvements, tobacco advertising was still omnipresent—in 
magazines, on billboards, and through brand stretching and the promo-
tion of brand logos at music festivals. The industry continued to broadcast 
commercials in cinemas for Mascotte cigarette-rolling paper and the 
Camel Trophy challenge. Tobacco promotion at the international Formula 
1 Grand Prix racing in Zandvoort and the TT motor racing in Assen con-
tinued as well. During this period smoking rates went up, with a dramatic 
increase from 36% (1989) to 39% (1996) in the male population and from 
29% to 32% in women (STIVORO, 1999).
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In the autumn of 1995, Borst visited the Department of Health of the 
United States and was impressed by American tobacco control policy. 
Strengthened by the visit, she ordered her civil servants to write a compre-
hensive tobacco control policy. On 28 May 1996, she sent a letter to the 
parliament detailing her tobacco policy intentions (nota 
Tabaksontmoedigingsbeleid): “in light of the grave consequences of tobacco 
use, tobacco policy needs to be strengthened.”46 The document contained 
five major policy intentions. The first was to allocate more money to 
STIVORO’s youth education activities, particularly to STIVORO’s cam-
paign “Smoking, a deadly sin,”47 which confronted youth with the short- 
and long-term health consequences of smoking. A second intention was 
to tighten the existing tobacco promotion restrictions. The document 
contained a new set of detailed self-restrictions that had been agreed upon 
by cabinet and industry after extensive negotiations over half a year. They 
were intended to keep tobacco advertisements further away from children, 
including no advertisements in cinemas and in the vicinity of schools, nor 
in magazines read by children. A third policy intention was to extend the 
public smoking ban to institutions in the culture and art sector, and to 
private companies with a public function, such as public transport and post 
offices. This would bring Dutch regulation in line with EU Resolution 
89/C189/01 that invited member states to implement smoking bans in 
public places, including public transport. In addition, the supervision of 
the smoking ban in public places, which was not well complied with, was 
to be tightened. The problem with the smoking ban was that the supervi-
sory authority could impose neither sanctions nor fines for non- compliance 
(Verdonk-Kleinjan, 2014, p. 17). A further problem was that since the 
Tobacco Act had come into force, organisations were allowed to permit 
smoking in one-third of their space or one-third of the time. The fourth 
policy intention was to ban tobacco sales to youth under 18. The fifth was 
to use tobacco excise duties as a means to reach tobacco control goals. 
This was an important step: until then, levying tobacco excise duties had 
been regarded by the government solely as a means to generate revenue, 
but from 1996 it came to be considered a valid “secondary effect” of 
tobacco taxes (Visser, 2008, p. 157).
A working group with experts from the ministries of health, trade, and 
finance was commissioned to make a proposal for price increases. Three 
months after her nota Tabaksontmoedigingsbeleid, Borst announced in a 
letter to parliament that tobacco tax would be raised in such a way that the 
new price of a pack of cigarettes (25 sticks) and a pack of roll-your-own 
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tobacco would be 50 cents higher,48 and that “with this measure a com-
prehensive package of policy measures to discourage tobacco will be 
accomplished.”
In 1997 Borst changed her position on tobacco advertising.49 She no 
longer wanted to prolong the gentlemen’s agreement between govern-
ment and industry and announced a ban on all tobacco promotion, declar-
ing that the Netherlands would no longer block the EU’s advertising 
directive. The new Labour Government in the United Kingdom had 
stopped resisting the EU’s advertising ban, and the Dutch government 
was able to follow the English example (see Box 6.1 in Chap. 6).
In the meantime, on 29 October 1996 the parliament adopted two 
resolutions.50 One was proposed by parliamentarian Rob Oudkerk (Labour 
Party), requiring the government to make preparations for a ban on out-
door advertising; the other was by Jan Marijnissen (Socialist Party), 
requesting that the government restrict the sale of tobacco to specialty 
shops. Other motions were tabled in the same meeting: vending machines 
had just been banned in the United States, and Dutch parliamentarians 
mentioned this as an example for the Netherlands to follow. This resulted 
in a held motion (by Oudkerk and others) to ban vending machines in 
bars and cafés frequented by young people.51 During the same plenary 
session, parliament also adopted a motion from the liberal–conservatives 
(VVD) to renounce tax increases.52
Drafting a nEw tobaCCo aCt (1998–2002)
In August 1998 the second Purple Cabinet was installed, with Els Borst 
again as Minister of Health. The coalition agreement contained an explicit 
goal to implement the European tobacco directive when the current code 
of practice ended in May 1999. Borst commissioned the Netherlands 
School of Public Health (NSPH) to examine the effectiveness of various 
policy options. Borst asked the NSPH to assess the full range of policy 
options, including education, sale restrictions, advertising restrictions, 
tobacco taxation, smoking bans and product regulation. She also wanted 
to know what the impact of tobacco policy would be on both public health 
and the economy. The report supported a comprehensive policy approach 
to tobacco control (Roscam Abbing, 1998). It made clear that isolated 
measures had little effect, and needed to be part of a comprehensive strat-
egy so they could reinforce each other. An important conclusion was that 
“a specific combination of measures [would] give the government the 
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ability to have the greatest impact.” The NSPH report became an impor-
tant building block for the new Tobacco Act. Borst’s proposal for a revi-
sion of the Act was sent for first consideration to parliament in April 
1999.53 The main conclusion from the NSPH report, that a comprehen-
sive approach was needed and that leaving out specific measures would 
weaken the policy, was repeated in the explanatory memorandum to the 
bill.54 Borst remarked that considering that smoking trends were not 
going down, the WHO target of 20% smoking in 2000 was not feasible, 
“and because the situation in the Netherland does not compare favourably 
with our European partners, the researchers stress that a more intensive 
deployment of policy measures is required.”
The NSPH report included a study on the societal costs and benefits of 
comprehensive tobacco policy (Van Leeuwen & Sleur, 1998). Borst 
learned from this that any negative economic effects on tobacco- 
production related sectors would be compensated by increased productiv-
ity in other sectors of the economy, and that the resulting macro-economic 
effect could even be positive. This conclusion was in line with the land-
mark Curbing the Epidemic report, published a month later by the World 
Bank, that concluded that tobacco control achieves unprecedented health 
benefits without harming national economies (World Bank, 1999). In a 
meeting with the minister of Finance, Borst used both reports to convince 
him that a tobacco tax increase in 2001 was a necessary part of the tobacco 
control policy package (Kalis, 2000). When comparing this 1998 explana-
tory memorandum to the 1984 one (which accompanied the proposal to 
the first Tobacco Act),55 what stands out is the emphasis on public health 
and a lesser preoccupation with economic objections. Negative effects on 
the commercial activities of the tobacco industry were accepted as inevi-
table. Borst made this point clear again in 2000, in a reply to questions by 
the VVD about the economic effects of her tobacco control proposals.56 
She argued that tobacco control gradually leads to less consumption of 
tobacco products and more spending on other goods, resulting in a dis-
placement of the production pattern in the economy in such a way that 
there would be a new equilibrium—much the same as the old situation in 
macro-economic terms—but far better for health: “less smoking is good 
for public health and certainly not bad for the economy: we will all gain.”
In May 2000, Borst attended the annual meeting of the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) in Geneva and spoke at length with Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, its director. In an interview with a reporter of the Dutch 
morning newspaper De Telegraaf, Borst announced rigorous measures 
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against tobacco (De Jong, 2000). Now that there had been a court deci-
sion in the Nooijen case, where an employee had successfully litigated for 
a smoke-free workplace (see Chap. 9), she felt that it was time for a legal 
prohibition on smoking in the workplace so that non-smoking employees 
no longer had to take their employers to court. She also wanted the sale of 
cigarettes restricted to specialty shops. In the interview she hinted at a 
complete end to tobacco, and threatened to ban tobacco production from 
Dutch soil: “This means that there will no longer be any future for Philip 
Morris in the Netherlands. If you don’t want future generations to smoke, 
we shouldn’t be producing cigarettes in this country.” This declaration of 
war against the tobacco industry became headline news.
On 30 May 2000 Borst sent her proposal for a revision of the Tobacco 
Act for approval to Parliament.57 This was four years after she had pre-
sented her policy intentions and two and a half years after her bill was 
debated upon in Parliament. In reply to displeased parliamentarians about 
why it had taken so long, she answered that it was because of consultations 
with the industry and discussions within the cabinet.58 The proposal was 
subject to lengthy debates in parliament for another two years, in which it 
was changed several times because of amendments (nine in total) and 
motions (seven in total) from both chambers of parliament.
The original proposition for a revised Tobacco Act contained a pro-
posal for a workplace smoking ban, but this was removed after discussion 
in cabinet. Instead, the proposal sent to parliament for approval included 
a conditional ban on smoking in shared workplaces in the private sector, 
which would only come to life if the social partners (employers and 
employees) were unable to come up with improved self-regulation mea-
sures. The government proposed to settle this through an order-in- council 
that would give the social partners another year to prove they could pro-
tect employees from tobacco smoke without needing a ban. Until then 
controls on smoking in private workplaces had been left entirely to labour 
and employer representatives who negotiated in STAR.  In 1997 the 
Ministry of Social Affairs evaluated whether this arrangement still worked, 
and concluded that it did not: at the end of that year only 28% of private 
companies had some sort of policy in place to protect employees 
(Spijkerman & van den Ameele, 2001).
Borst proposed changing the Tobacco Act in such a way that it would 
include a complete ban on tobacco advertisements and sponsorship, 
improvements to existing sale restrictions, an age limit for the sale of 
tobacco products (18  years), and administrative monetary penalties for 
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infringements. Since her proposal did not have a plan to phase out tobacco 
selling points, as requested by Socialist Party MP Jan Marijnissen, Agnes 
Kant (Socialist Party) tabled a new amendment to restrict the sale of 
tobacco to specialty shops.59 When a motion with majority support from 
parliament is not acted on by the government, the government needs to 
explain why, and be prepared to confront parliament on the issue. Although 
Borst clearly wanted to restrict tobacco sales to specialty shops and felt she 
was supported by the NSPH report, which made a strong case for restric-
tions on tobacco sale, the cabinet could not come to an agreement about 
how to respond to the motion.60 Borst translated the cabinet’s stance in a 
rather cryptic answer to the parliament: “the government has not decided 
that it will not carry out the motion by Marijnissen and therefore it has not 
made this explicitly known.” Sometime later, the Green–Left party (MP 
Corrie Hermann) tried to introduce into the act a gradual restriction on 
tobacco sales to specialty shops, cafés, and bars, with an amendment that 
proposed to do this through an order-in-council.61 Neither amendment 
made it into the final text of the Tobacco Act. The idea of sale restrictions 
was postponed for consideration as part of a new tobacco control policy 
proposal (Tabaksnota II), by the next government.
On 31 May 2001, appropriately World No Tobacco Day, the proposal 
for the amendments to the Tobacco Act was discussed in the second cham-
ber of Parliament.62 The debate lasted almost 12 hours. The parties on the 
right flank (CDA, VVD) argued against a smoking ban and an advertising 
ban. The CDA called the bill “too detailed and patronizing.” Several 
amendments were proposed, and led to two major changes to the bill. The 
first was to set the age limit for buying tobacco from 18 to 16  years 
(amendment by the Green–Left party and D66).63 This may be considered 
a success for the tobacco industry network, because of their 1998 pre-
emptive initiative to voluntarily implement a restriction not to sell to youth 
under 16 (slogan: “There is no excuse. We only sell above 16  years of 
age”), and initiatives to restrict the access of minors to vending machines. 
Following anecdotal evidence that an 18-year age limit was difficult to 
enforce, parliamentarians believed that 16 would be more effective—and 
at that time, the sale of beer and wine was also set at 16 years. The second 
change was the more important one: a direct smoking ban in private work-
places instead of continued self-regulation. This was the result of an 
amendment proposed by Corrie Hermann of the Green–Left party,64 who 
was stimulated to table the motion by a strong lobby from the health net-
work led by STIVORO, supported by Clean Air Netherlands (CAN) and 
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the Lung Foundation. Part of the lobby was in the form of media attention 
to two court cases in 2000, the first initiated by an employee of the Royal 
Post (Nanny Nooijen) who successfully litigated for a smoke- free work-
place. The other was by the mother of Nienke Hora Adema, a mentally 
disabled young woman. She had successfully demanded smoke- free living 
quarters for her daughter in the epilepsy institution Cruquiushoeve. The 
majority of parliament agreed with Borst that it should not require a court 
case each time an employee had a problem with tobacco smoke in the 
workplace, and the problem could better be resolved with a law. The 
revised Tobacco Act signified a breach with the long-term status quo 
where smoking restrictions in private workplaces were left to the discretion 
of STAR.65 However, it also included a clause that made it possible to 
exempt certain categories of employers. This was primarily included with a 
view to exempting the hospitality sector, but it was possible for other cat-
egories as well, and further left open the option to stretch the time of 
implementation to give society ample time to adapt to the new law.
The CDA tabled a motion to the effect that the government would allo-
cate 30 million guilders for education campaigns: only under this condition 
was CDA prepared to support the Act. The motion was not adopted. The 
amendments to the Tobacco Act were adopted in the lower house of parlia-
ment on 6 June,66 but with CDA and VVD voting against. The CDA felt 
the act was “too elaborate and too paternalistic” and would fail to change 
smoking behaviour as it did not include the necessary funds for prevention 
and education. The VVD argued that it could not support a bill which 
made the government responsible for protecting people from tobacco 
smoke instead of leaving it to employer and employee organisations.
On 16 April 2002, after a lengthy and difficult debate, a majority in the 
senate adopted the bill as well. This was not an easy win for the minister, 
since the CDA and VVD together held a majority position in the senate, 
and both parties had voted against the bill in the lower house. In the sen-
ate the CDA voted in favour, but only on the condition that €15 million 
would be made available for mass media campaigns and support for smok-
ers who wanted to quit smoking once the ban came into force. Most par-
ties seconded a motion by Christian Democrat Jos Werner to this effect.67 
Another condition was that the government would agree to discuss excep-
tions to the smoking ban and exact enforcement dates with affected soci-
etal organisations. This resulted in agreements with the national sports 
federation (NOC × NSF) and Koninklijke Horeca Nederland (trade organ-
isation for the hotel and catering industry) (KHN) on trajectories of self- 
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regulation. Details of the implementation of the smoking ban were 
discussed with STAR, leading to the decision to implement in 2004 instead 
of 2003.
On 18 April 2002 the revised Tobacco Act was published in the Bulletin 
of Acts. On 28 June 2002, Borst signed an order-in-council stipulating 
when the different articles of the revised act would enter into force. The 
advertising and promotion ban went into effect in November 2002, 
although newspapers and magazines were granted a stay until January 
2003. The 16-years age-of-sale was in effect from January 2003 as well. 
The legal right to a smoke-free workplace and smoke-free public transport 
took effect on January 2004, while the government allowed nursing 
homes and homes for the elderly to implement the smoking ban in 2005. 
Three weeks before the cabinet resigned, Borst managed to implement an 
important element of the first EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD-1): 
cigarette packs had to carry warnings that covered 30% of the front of the 
pack and 40% of the back, with rotating texts. This came into effect on the 
first of May 2002—remarkable, as this was four months before the date 
required by the European Commission (EC) and sooner than any other 
EU country. Other aspects of TPD-1 could not be transposed in Dutch 
law through an order-in-council, but required a revision of the Tobacco 
Act itself. This was left to the new cabinet.
An Ambitious New Tobacco Control Policy Document  
That Never Made It
In 2000 Minister Els Borst had prepared a second tobacco control policy 
paper with significant new policy steps.68 Details followed a year later, dur-
ing long debates in both chambers of Parliament.69,70 The ambitious new 
tobacco policy document, entitled Together towards a Smokefree Society 
(VWS, 2001), contained proposals for considerable increases in tobacco 
taxation, anti-tobacco marketing campaigns targeted at youth that were 
budgeted at 30 million guilders per year,71 and a clear policy intention to 
restrict the distribution of tobacco products in such a way that tobacco 
would eventually be sold in specialty shops only (in line with Marijnissen’s 
motion and the amendments by Agnes Kant and Corrie Hermann). This 
was discussed with representatives of the tobacco industry sector and the 
health sector in a meeting in The Hague, but never made it into a formal 
proposal for a new law. Although parliamentarians challenged Borst about 
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Tabaksnota II, as it was called in parliamentary debates,72 she was unable 
to secure the necessary budget. She hoped that the next government 
would take it up, but this never happened.
transPosition of tHE Eu tobaCCo ProDuCt DirECtivE 
into tHE tobaCCo aCt (2002–2003)
In July 2002, the first Balkenende cabinet came to power. This was a 
cabinet consisting of the CDA, VVD, and a new populist right-wing 
party Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF). The LPF was built around the legacy of 
Pim Fortuyn, a charismatic populist politician who had been assassinated 
the year before. This cabinet lasted 86 days and collapsed after internal 
conflicts in the LPF. In this cabinet, economist and former Labour Party 
member Eduard Bomhoff was minister of health for the LPF. He was 
not a tobacco industry-friendly minister, and after being bombarded 
with letters and requests for meetings by the industry when he took 
office, he publicly distanced himself from tobacco lobbyists. Once dur-
ing a debate on tobacco policy in parliament he spotted a tobacco indus-
try lobbyist in the public gallery sitting right across from him, which he 
felt intimidating.73 He raised his voice and said, “I see a lobbyist at a 
distance of 30 meters from where I stand, and that distance seems a very 
good one to keep!”74 Bomhoff, at his very first cabinet meeting, man-
aged to make the weekly cabinet meeting smoke-free. Smoking had 
been banned in meeting rooms since 1990, but in the most important 
meeting room in the country the smoking ban was not yet complied 
with. Several ministers were ardent smokers, including Minister of 
Finance Gerrit Zalm, and Minister of Internal Affairs Johan Remkes 
(both VVD).
Eduard Bomhoff inherited two important tasks: implementing the 
new Tobacco Act and transposing the remaining elements of the TPD-1 
into national law. He was not able to make significant steps regarding the 
first task as the cabinet had already disbanded, but the transposition of 
the TPD-1 was more pressing and could not wait. The final date on 
which all components of the directive had to be transposed into national 
law had been set by the EC as 30 September 2002. There were several 
obstacles. One was an issue brought forward by the CDA and VVD: the 
protection of tobacco industry company secrets in light of TPD’s require-
ment that tobacco producers submit and publish lists of the ingredients 
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in their products. The government remained steadfast that it would 
implement the TPD-1 requirements, despite industry protests. It 
accepted the risk of being taken to court by the industry, which eventu-
ally happened. Partly because of a change of government, the interim 
cabinet was unable to achieve the EU deadline. An additional problem 
was that the interim government failed to secure the €15  million for 
tobacco prevention education in the ministry’s budget, despite Werner’s 
motion to this effect and promises made to the parliament. This meant 
that the senate was not prepared to approve the amendments to the 
Tobacco Act that were necessary to transpose the TPD-1.75 Acting 
Health Minister Clémence Ross-van Dorp, who stood in for Bomhoff in 
the interim cabinet, succeeded in scraping together €10 million from the 
budget,76 still an unprecedented amount of money for tobacco preven-
tion in the Dutch context. This was enough to satisfy the senate. The 
decision to make this a structural, yearly tobacco education budget was 
left to the new cabinet (Balkenende II), where it stalled. The revision of 
the Tobacco Act to accommodate the TPD-1 requirements was approved 
by the senate on 28 January 2003.
imPlEmEnting tHE tobaCCo aCt (2003–2005)
At the end of May 2003, the Balkenende II cabinet replaced the failed first 
Balkenende cabinet. Former Minister of Finance Hans Hoogervorst 
(VVD) succeeded Bomhoff as the minister of Health. Balkenende cabinet 
II wanted to diminish the role of the central government further and 
decentralise prevention and cure. In June 2003, during a debate with the 
second chamber of parliament, Hoogervorst said that Tabaksnota II would 
be part of his disease prevention policy paper.77 This was a nondescript 
prevention programme with a few tobacco control policy intentions. In 
this way, the ambitious Tabaksnota II was silently killed without protest 
from politicians or from civil society.
Hoogervorst’s prevention programme had a quantitative target for 
tobacco control: 25% smokers in 2007; but it announced no new 
tobacco control measures, nor was extra money set aside for tobacco 
prevention (VWS, 2003). It was assumed that the target of 25% smokers 
in 2007 could be reached by implementing the existing measures (smok-
ing ban in workplaces in January 2004, implementation of mass media 
campaigns financed through the “Werner money,” and strict enforce-
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ment of the age limit for the sale of tobacco and of the advertising and 
sponsorship ban), supplemented with a mass media campaign targeted 
at youth. For 2004, €5 million extra were allocated for educational cam-
paigns, in addition to the ten million already set aside by the Werner 
motion.
A later date of implementation of the smoking ban in the hospitality 
sector was negotiated with employer and employee representatives 
through STAR, and with organisations representing employers and 
employees in the hospitality sector. The food and drinks catering sector 
was granted a period of self-regulation to make bars and restaurants 
smoke-free before the end of 2008. If this covenant failed, a ban would be 
implemented in bars and restaurants. This was one year sooner than Tony 
Blair’s UK government’s timeline. The UK Department of Health pub-
lished a white paper on public health in November 2004, stating the 
intention to make workplaces, including restaurants and pubs which pre-
pared and served food, smoke-free, through a staged approach ending in 
late 2008 (Department of Health, 2004). At that time very few countries 
in Europe had smoking bans in bars, or even in restaurants. In 2004 
Ireland became the first European country with a comprehensive smoking 
ban in the hospitality sector, soon followed by Malta, Italy, and Norway 
(WHO, 2006). Most countries still had voluntary agreements, or limited 
or no restrictions.
The commercial sports sector in the Netherlands wanted exceptions 
similar to the smoking ban in sports canteens negotiated between the gov-
ernment and the hospitality sector. Hoogervorst came to an agreement 
with sportsfederation NOC × NSF to commence a two-year trajectory of 
self-regulation (until 2006) so that commercially run sports canteens 
would gradually become smoke-free.78
In November 2003, parliament debated the implementation of the 
workplace smoking ban with Hoogervorst,79 shortly after the Health 
Council had published a second report on the health risks of passive 
smoking (an update of the 1990 report). The new report estimated 
that 2000 smokers were killed each year by passive smoking 
(Gezondheidsraad, 2003). Instead of underscoring the need for strict 
regulation without exceptions, parliament was sceptical of the report’s 
conclusions, spurred by an attack on the report by a libertarian journal-
ist in newsmagazine HP/De Tijd and parliamentary questions from the 
Socialist Party.80
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VVD Member of Parliament Edith Schippers tabled a number of 
motions, together with the Socialist Party and the LPF, to weaken the 
smoking ban.81 Seven out of nine received majority support.82 There was 
support (including from the Labour Party and the Green–Left party) for a 
motion to give institutions in the mental health sector and other sectors 
where people lived in private accommodations, such as homes for the 
elderly and nursing homes, the possibility of self-regulation instead of a 
ban. Other motions receiving majority support from VVD, LPF, CDA, 
D66, and SP, requesting that the government come up with proposals to 
explore the viability of ventilation techniques and smoking sections as 
alternatives to bans in the food and drink sector, to extend the self- 
regulation to commercially run bars and canteens in sporting facilities, to 
choose a broader definition of “hospitality sector” so that amusement 
arcades and cinemas would be included, and to wait until the end of the 
self-regulation period for the hospitality sector before deciding if and 
when its exception status would come to an end. The government was 
requested to determine the success of self-regulation based on a set of 
“reasonable norms” for air quality and criteria for exposure to second- 
hand smoke. A motion to consider allowing smoking in coffee shops was 
supported both by the left (SP, Labour Party) and liberal parties (D66, 
VVD, LPF). The minister, however, rejected the motion.83 He argued that 
coffee shops were part of the hospitality sector and already enjoyed the 
same lenient self-regulation trajectory as bars and cafés.
The smoking ban for workplaces and public transport came into force 
on 1 January 2004. The list of exceptions—the outcome of negotiations 
with civil society and pressure from parliament—was long: the hospitality 
sector (including theatres and music venues), tobacco specialty shops, 
amusement arcades, international trains, dedicated smoking rooms, pri-
vate rooms in nursing homes and homes for the elderly, and penitentiary 
facilities. Hotels could reserve some of their rooms for smokers. Mental 
health institutions, old people’s homes and institutions for the disabled 
were granted leeway so that smoking could be permitted in parts of the 
communal rooms, canteens, and waiting rooms. Dutch Railroads created 
smoking sections on train platforms to accommodate smoking travellers.
The implementation of the smoking ban was accompanied by a tax 
increase on February 2004 of €0.55 (including value-added tax [VAT]) 
per pack of cigarettes, a 14% increase. The tobacco manufacturers took 
this opportunity to also increase the price by €0.25, so that smokers were 
confronted with an effective increase of about €0.80. This undoubtedly 
encouraged the large number of quitters seen in 2004.
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The Ministry of Health worked closely with STIVORO to make the most 
out of the introduction of the ban. One of STIVORO’s smoking cessation 
specialists was seconded to the ministry to strengthen the collaboration 
between the two organisations. There was a long period of preparation, dur-
ing which employers and employees were kept informed: employers received 
practical advice (e.g., a “7-step implementation plan” was sent by STIVORO 
to all employers), a new website (Smoking and the Law) was developed to 
inform employees and employers about their new rights and obligations, 
employees were offered smoking cessation  programmes, and media cam-
paigns accompanied the ban. A large-scale campaign (“The Netherlands 
starts quitting”) to support smokers who wanted to quit around 1 January 
2004 was run by STIVORO when the smoking ban came into force.
The efforts paid off. When the Netherlands went “smoke-free” in 2004 
and it was no longer legal to light up in public transport and workplaces, 
there was a broad feeling of relief. To the surprise of many, there were very 
few problems. The ending of smoking in trains went smoothly, without 
noticeable disturbances, and journalists described it as a quiet revolution 
(Huisman, 2005). After one year around 70% of companies had success-
fully implemented smoking restrictions (VWS, 2005) and 75% of employ-
ers thought that the smoking ban was “fair” (VWA, 2005). Support 
among smokers for the idea that workers must not be bothered by tobacco 
smoke increased over the span of a year, from 56% before the ban to 79% 
after (VWS, 2005). A national survey showed that smokers became more 
concerned about their smoking, and more aware that passive smoking 
could be harmful to others (Willemsen, 2006). The mass media campaigns 
that accompanied the ban contributed to smoking becoming less socially 
acceptable (Van den Putte, Yzer, Ten Berg, & Steeveld, 2005). In the fol-
lowing years acceptance of smoking at work, in restaurants or bars, and on 
terraces further decreased (Hummel, Willemsen, Monshouwer, De Vries, 
& Nagelhout, 2016).
Despite the highly successful implementation of the smoking ban, 
problems remained with implementing the worksite ban in some sectors 
of society. One of the issues was the problem of smoking in health-care 
facilities where people lived permanently, such as psychiatric wards and 
homes for the elderly. These institutions had had to comply since 1990 
with the Tobacco Act, but the Act lacked financial sanctions. This changed 
with the new, amended Tobacco Act, which made these facilities liable for 
fines when employees continued to work in smoke-filled rooms. This led 
to much unrest and media attention. Adherence to smoking bans in these 
types of home had dramatically worsened since the beginning of 2004. At 
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the start of 2005, parliament debated the issue with the minister, voicing 
concerns from the mental health sector and workers in homes for the 
elderly where lifelong smokers could no longer smoke in their pri-
vate rooms, so that workers were subject to all kinds of practical problems 
involved in escorting patients to smoking rooms.84 The debate resulted in 
majority support for motions to—once again—consider ventilation as an 
alternative, to force mental health institutes to come up with a roadmap 
similar to the one in the hospitality sector as an alternative to a ban, and to 
insist that the KHN removes the goal of reducing the number of vending 
machines from their roadmap.85 This latter motion was the result of inces-
sant lobbying by British American Tobacco (BAT). The government 
responded by granting a one-year extension during which institutions 
would not be fined.
Parliament had repeatedly asked for better support for smokers with 
quitting smoking, especially financial reimbursement for costly pharmaco-
therapy for smoking cessation. Despite positive advice from the College 
voor Zorgverzekeringen (Health Care Insurance Board) (CVZ) (Kroes & 
Lock, 2003) and positive results from a pilot study in the province of 
Friesland commissioned by the government, which had shown that smok-
ers who were reimbursed made more attempts at quitting and were more 
successful (Kaper, Wagena, & Van Schaijck, 2003), Hoogervorst did not 
want to make effective smoking cessation support for smokers illegible for 
financial reimbursement through the national health insurance system.86 
This was partly because of budgetary considerations (it would cost 
€45 million per year), but mainly because he felt that smokers were them-
selves responsible for quitting, and did not need to be compensated since 
they saved money when they quit smoking.
tHE national Program of tobaCCo Control (nPt) 
(2005–2010)
Since the Netherlands had implemented a comprehensive Tobacco Act, 
an important political question became whether this is sufficient for the 
time being or is more needed? In December 2004 Health Minister 
Hoogervorst started a round of consultations.87 A total of 47 organisa-
tions from the tobacco industry network and the health network received 
invitations to comment on the way the government had tackled the 
tobacco problem so far, and to give suggestions for future steps. On 17 
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June 2005, Hoogervorst sent an evaluation of the government’s tobacco 
control policy to  parliament.88 It presented data showing that about 70% 
of businesses had implemented measures to protect workers from 
tobacco smoke, and that most employers were positive about the new 
law and had had little trouble implementing the new rules (VWA, 2005). 
The ministry concluded that the new regulations in the revised Tobacco 
Act, in combination with the price increase and intensive campaigns, had 
been successful, and that smoking rates were finally going down after a 
long period of stagnation.89 However, various breaches of the advertis-
ing and promotion ban had occurred as the tobacco industry continued 
to find loopholes. The report ended with the remark that other countries 
had much lower smoking rates and such results should be attainable in 
the Netherlands as well. However, instead of presenting a new govern-
mental tobacco policy agenda, Hoogervorst made new policy intentions 
contingent on the tobacco control efforts of civil society and in particu-
lar the efforts of the three charities: Cancer Society, Lung Foundation, 
and Heart Foundation.
On 15 June 2005, the directors of the three charities and Hoogervorst 
signed a statement that they would join forces to intensify tobacco con-
trol: the Nationaal Programma Tabaksontmoediging (National Program 
of Tobacco Control) (NPT) (VWS, 2006).90 STIVORO was appointed as 
the central coordinating organisation, responsible for implementing the 
programme. The government and the charities committed to a policy goal 
of 20% smokers in the population by 2010, even more ambitious than the 
goal of 25% in 2007, formulated in Hoogervorst’s prevention paper. The 
ambitious goal was taken over from the Nationaal Programma 
Kankerbestrijding (National Program to Combat Cancer) (NPK), a col-
laboration between the Ministry of Health and Dutch cancer control 
organisations that had also started in 2005 (Jongejan, Hummel, Roelants, 
Lugtenberg, & Hoekstra, 2003). With the NPK programme, the govern-
ment answered to calls from WHO and the European parliament to estab-
lish a national “comprehensive cancer control programme” geared towards 
optimisation of cancer control in the Netherlands.
Hoogervorst’s decision to share responsibility for national tobacco 
control with non-governmental organisations must be seen against the 
backdrop of the cabinet’s desire to reduce the role of the state, in line with 
the Balkenende II cabinet’s intent to reinforce personal responsibility and 
sovereignty in civil society. Hoogervorst formally justified this by referring 
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to a section in the text of WHO’s 2003 Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC), in which the role of civil society is mentioned 
briefly91:
The special contribution of non-governmental organisations and other 
members of civil society … to tobacco control efforts nationally and inter-
nationally and the vital importance of their participation in national and 
international tobacco control efforts. (WHO, 2003)
The Dutch government hoped that the cancer, lung, and heart charities 
would contribute financially to the NPT programme. A five-year plan was 
to be developed “that contained collective and reinforcing efforts that 
would optimise the current tobacco control policy.” Its main focus was 
smoking cessation, through how-to-quit campaigns and support for smok-
ers, including patients and smokers from low socioeconomic groups.92 
While the 20% goal was taken from the NPK programme, the list of con-
crete policy actions for the government was not.93 Instead, a number of 
optional measures were listed that were “possible” or “conceivable,” 
including increasing the price of tobacco, having pictorial health warnings 
on packs, developing mass media smoking cessation campaigns, increasing 
the age for tobacco sale to 18, enforcing smoking bans in the Horeca (the 
hotel, restaurant and café industry), and restricting tobacco sales to spe-
cialty shops (STIVORO, 2005).
In 2006, Hoogervorst announced an intention to put graphic health 
warnings on cigarette packs through an adaptation of the Tobacco Act.94 
In addition, the old idea to restrict the sale of tobacco to specialty shops 
(Socialist Party member Jan Marijnissen’s motion from 1996) was raised 
again. As a first step, Hoogervorst announced an increase in the legal age 
at which tobacco might be sold, from 16 to 18, and the ending of mobile 
tobacco sales at festivals.95 These were policy intentions that required par-
liamentary approval. Parliament was informed on 18 May 200696 and a 
first debate followed a few weeks later.97 The political reality was clear: the 
proposals had no chance. VVD, CDA, and LPF had a majority of 80 seats 
in parliament and were against. In June 2006, VVD parliamentarian Edith 
Schippers and Christian Democrat Siem Buijs tabled a motion condemn-
ing the government’s prevention policy.98 In it they wrote that current 
disease prevention policy was mainly based on “more control and repres-
sion, such as bans, commandments, reduction of selling points, increases 
in taxation on specific drugs and other matters that threaten the health of 
M. C. WILLEMSEN
 53
the people in the eyes of the government.” They demanded that the gov-
ernment base its policy on “positive proposals and less on repressive mea-
sures that increasingly affect people’s private life.” Their bill received 
support from a majority of the Parliament,99 signalling that there was no 
political support for tougher tobacco control.
From that moment the NPT programme was doomed. It was clear that 
the government had no political support for new policy measures, while 
the programme lacked a clear strategic plan and offered no ideas about 
how the ambitions and strengths of the four partners could best be accom-
modated and combined. The grim prospect of failing ambitions was con-
firmed when experts from the Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en 
Milieu (National Institute for Public Health and the Environment) 
(RIVM) calculated the likely impact of the NPT measures and concluded 
that even with very optimistic estimates, the 20% target could not be 
reached without new policy measures (Vijgen et  al., 2007). The target 
would only be obtainable when the government imposed yearly tobacco 
tax hikes (between 10% and 20%) and substantially increased the reach of 
efficacious smoking cessation support, and when both government and 
charities allocated substantial sums of money to mass media campaigns. It 
was clear that this would not happen. Around the same time, another 
report by the RIVM concluded that the Netherlands did not have a strict 
tobacco policy compared to other countries, and that smoking rates would 
not go down without further measures (Van der Wilk, Melse, Den Broeder, 
& Achterberg, 2007). Policy steps that had been successful in other coun-
tries were recommended, such as a smoking ban in the hospitality sector, 
higher tobacco taxes, and better availability of smoking cessation 
services.
Parallel Interests and the Fight Over Smoking in Bars
In 2007 the fourth and last Balkenende cabinet was installed. This was a 
coalition of Christian Democrats, the Labour Party and the small Christian 
Union Party. The Minister of Health was Ab Klink (CDA), a liberal 
Christian Democrat pur sang and an influential party ideologist, having 
worked for many years at the scientific bureau of the CDA (between 1984 
and 1992 as scientific staff member and from 1999 to 2007 as director). 
He re-introduced the idea of parallel interests as the leading concept for a 
prevention policy (Klink, 2007; VWS, 2007). This meant that such a pol-
icy was to be developed in concordance with the interests of societal 
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organisations, including businesses and manufacturers, seeing “health as a 
justified interest in close connection with other justified interests,” includ-
ing those that were economic and social (VWS, 2007). The downside of 
this principle was that Klink de facto opened the door for tobacco industry 
lobbyists—and was far more receptive to industry contacts than previous 
ministers (see Chap. 8 for a detailed account of industry influence).
In 2007, the Netherlands was falling more and more behind other 
countries in Europe, as far as a policy to restrict smoking in pubs and bars 
was concerned. Seventeen countries had some kind of ban installed, 
including Germany (three states) and Belgium (albeit restricted to bars 
that serve food).100 In February 2007, at his first public appearance a few 
days before the first cabinet meeting, Minister Ab Klink (CDA) surprised 
everyone by proclaiming that the hospitality sector must become smoke 
free within a year. This was not in line with the coalition agreement, which 
had 2011 as the final date (the end of the cabinet period), while former 
Minister Hoogervorst had agreed with the sector that the period of self- 
regulation would last until 2009. Klink saw injustice in the fact that work-
ers in this particular sector were not yet protected against tobacco smoke 
while workers in others sectors were. His proclamation was headline news, 
framed in newspapers as revealing his “true nature.” Klink was depicted in 
the media as a patronising Christian moral crusader, an image he detested 
since he regarded himself as a dyed-in-the-wool liberal. He was also an 
occasional smoker of cigars himself. However, he kept his promise under 
pressure from a strong health lobby, and in June 2007 the cabinet 
announced that it wished to make the sector smoke-free within 
12 months.101 The sports canteens and coffee shops, which also were still 
self-regulated, would be covered by the ban.
In the following months Klink set out to get approval from parliament. 
Between March and July the ministry organised consultation talks with 
representatives from the tobacco industry network, the hospitality sector, 
employer and employee organisations, the sports sector, and health organ-
isations.102 Parliament further  requested a written consultation round, 
which was organised in September. While the health organisations unani-
mously applauded the ban, the industry-related network of organisations 
raised concerns, most of which were rebutted by the ministry; however, 
some resulted in a weakening of the ban, such as a more lenient definition 
of a smoking section as a room “specifically” dedicated to smoking instead 
of “exclusively” dedicated to smoking. This opened the possibility of hav-
ing attractive smoking sections in pubs, receiving the same services as non- 
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smoking sections. The only difference was that personnel could not serve 
drinks and food at a table.103
Parliamentarians from different parties attempted to soften the ban. 
For example, VVD parliamentarian Edith Schippers tabled (unsuccessful) 
motions to allow bar owners to eliminate tobacco smoke through ventila-
tion techniques, and to exempt small pubs and bars with no personnel.104 
D66 and the Green–Left party drafted unsuccessful motions to exempt 
coffee shops from the ban.105 In July 2008, the smoking ban was imple-
mented in the hospitality sector, accompanied by a tax increase of €0.29 
per pack of cigarettes, which translated to a consumer price increase of 
€0.35 per pack (including a price increase by the industry).
The Dutch bar smoking ban was one of the friendliest for smokers in 
Europe. Smoking was still allowed in designated areas with closed doors 
where personnel did not serve, and on covered terraces as long as one side 
was open. Smokers were not fined for non-compliance, only the bar owner. 
The ban was accompanied by a government-run mass media campaign that 
failed to explain the rationale for the ban. The campaign merely reinforced 
the image of pitiful smokers who were no longer welcome in cafés, and 
fanned the flames of discontent among bar owners and smokers’ right groups. 
When the campaign was evaluated, it turned out that the proportion of peo-
ple who were positive about a smoking ban in bars and restaurants (only 51% 
of the public) had not increased.106 Despite its inept implementation, compli-
ance to the ban was high at first, despite the low level of fines: first a warning, 
then €300 for the first violation, which was doubled for each repeated offence 
up to €2400. In the first three months, the Netherlands Food and Consumer 
Product Safety Authority (NVWA) undertook 7264 inspections and found 
that 94% of the hospitality sector complied.107 This proportion was lower in 
pubs and bars, but was still 74%, with 15% having a smoking section.
With support and legal advice from the tobacco industry, small pubs 
began to deliberately provoke the government by openly showing disobe-
dience (Baltesen & Rosenberg, 2009; Gonzalez & Glantz, 2013). The 
NVWA started to impose fines from October 2008 onwards and the pub-
lic prosecutor began criminal prosecution for obstinate offenders. In two 
months 821 fines were imposed.108 Tougher inspections, often accompa-
nied by police officers, resulted in emotional responses from the smoking 
clientele of a small number of pubs. Some collected money from regular 
consumers to help pay fines. Newspapers ran headlines such as “Klink 
declares war on smokers pubs.” The hospitality industry was quick to gen-
erate reports suggesting that the smoking ban had damaged the food and 
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drink sector, which, it claimed, had suffered serious revenue declines and 
bankruptcies, leading to a series of parliamentary questions.109
In response to the pressure, parliamentarians from all parties declared 
themselves willing to explore pragmatic solutions to accommodate pub 
owners’ concerns. Fleur Agema from the populist Partij voor de Vrijheid 
(Freedom Party) (PVV), the daughter of pub owners, called for several 
urgent debates on the matter, in which she attacked Minister Klink vehe-
mently, demanding an end to the smoking ban for small pubs. Klink gave 
in to a request from the CDA to explore the possibility of using innovative 
air systems (such as curtains of air that prevented tobacco smoke from 
drifting from a smoking section to a non-smoking section) in bars, as an 
alternative to a full smoking ban.110 VVD and CDA, with support from 
most other parties, convinced Minister Klink to attempt to define exact 
norms for air quality in pubs that would be acceptable for public health.111 
Until that moment, the government’s stance was that there is no safe limit 
for exposure to second-hand smoke, in line with recommendations from 
the WHO and the RIVM. Chapter 8 discusses the industrial lobby for 
ventilation as an alternative to a smoking ban in more detail.
In the spring of 2009, successful legal procedures against the state by 
two small cafés (Victoria in Breda and De Kachel in Groningen) led to 
legal vagueness and uncertainty about whether the ban applied to small 
bars without personnel. Dutch courts considered the law discriminatory 
towards small bars without personnel on the grounds that the legislation 
was intended to protect employees from passive smoking, not visitors. 
This led to a new storm of media attention on the issue, and an escalation 
of the problem. Many pub owners reacted by replacing ashtrays on tables. 
In July 2009 Minister Klink responded by promising to rephrase the text 
of the Tobacco Act so that both employers and visitors would be pro-
tected.112 Pending these alterations, smoking in bars without personnel 
was condoned and no fines were imposed, and existing penalties were put 
on hold. In November 2009 the industry organised a public protest in 
The Hague to put more pressure on the government to withdraw the ban; 
VVD and PVV added fuel to the flames by calling for an urgency debate 
on the issue.113
In December 2009, Klink presented the results of an assessment of the 
remaining issues and problems with the smoking ban.114 The conclusion 
was reassuring: the ban was not responsible for reduced revenue for pubs 
and bars or for bankruptcies, as such effects could be explained by the 
long-term downward trend caused by the 2007–2008 global financial cri-
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sis, and financial compensation was therefore out of the question. Other 
potential problems, such as that small bars faced more technical obstacles 
in constructing smoking sections than did larger bars, and street 
 disturbances when smokers went outside, remained within reasonable 
boundaries. About one-third of pubs had some sort of smoking section.115 
In the same month, further results of studies commissioned by the Ministry 
of Health and sent to parliament116 showed that the smoking ban in bars 
and restaurants had improved the air quality (the concentration of fine 
dust particles), reduced exposure to second-hand smoke, had a beneficial 
effect on smoking cessation, and did not lead to more smoking in private 
homes (Dekker, Soethout, & Tijsmans, 2009). The government appealed 
the court decision and in March 2010 the Dutch Supreme Court ruled 
that the legislation was not discriminatory and applied to all bars, includ-
ing those without personnel. By that time, however, compliance had 
dropped to the point where a little over half of all bars and cafés had 
replaced their ashtrays (Intraval, 2010).
In line with his policy focus of approaching the tobacco problem in a 
positive manner, and his wish to not be accused of paternalism, Klink 
approved the introduction of financial reimbursement for smokers who 
need smoking cessation counselling.117 This would become available to 
smokers through the mandatory health-care insurance in the beginning of 
the next year (2011). This was a positive outcome, after a period of no less 
than 10 years of political hassle and many studies and advisory reports on 
this issue. The process had started in May 2001 with a motion by Labour 
and Socialist Parties (Rob Oudkerk and Agnes Kant) which requested the 
government to provide smokers with cessation support free of charge.118
Failure of the NPT Programme
Minister of Health Ab Klink put most of the NPT policy intentions initi-
ated by Hoogervorst on ice.119 He ignored the directors of the three 
health charities, who asked him to consider necessary measures such as 
pictorial health warnings on cigarette packs, increasing the age of sale to 
18 years, and reducing the number of selling points (Rutgers, Hanselaar, 
Stam, & Van Gennip, 2007). Klink formulated his tobacco control strat-
egy in 2009 as follows: “if it comes to tobacco control, I want to focus 
mainly on positive incentives.”120 He distanced himself from the previous 
government’s intent to implement graphic health warnings on cigarette 
packs (unattractive warnings were “bad taste”),121 said he did not want 
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further regulation of tobacco sale outlets such as reducing their numbers 
or banning mobile sales of tobacco, and did not wish to pursue national 
regulations banning tobacco additives that increased attractiveness or 
addictiveness.122 There was hardly a protest from parliament, which was 
too preoccupied with the issue of smoking bans in small pubs.
In 2010, by the end of the five-year NPT period, smoking prevalence 
was still high (27%) and had hardly decreased from when the NPT pro-
gramme had started (28% in 2006). Smoking among women had gone up, 
and youth smoking had not gone down. Despite clear messages from 
experts that the NPT goals were unrealistic without new tobacco control 
measures, the government under the leadership of Klink remained unwill-
ing to take the necessary steps. The charities were disappointed and were, 
in turn, not prepared to contribute sufficient sums to campaigns, leading 
to a complete failure of the NPT programme and tremendous feelings of 
disappointment among the health organisations  (Zeeman & De Beer, 
2012). STIVORO, which was responsible for execution of the pro-
gramme, was scapegoated, and the three charities started to withdraw 
their financial support (further discussed in Chap. 9). Meanwhile, there 
was brief discussion within the government bureaucracy about starting a 
new five-year NPT programme, from 2011 to 2015 (Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken, 2010), but this was abruptly discarded when the 
Rutte cabinet came to power.
suDDEn rEvErsal of tobaCCo Control PoliCy 
(2010–2012)
On 20 February 2010, the Balkenende IV cabinet fell, over a dispute 
between the Labour Party and the Christian Democrats about continuing a 
military mission in the Afghan province of Uruzgan. The issue of smoking 
in pubs was declared controversial by the parliament, which meant that the 
resigning minister had to leave it to his successor to handle. In October 
2010, the first Rutte cabinet took office. This was a minority cabinet formed 
by the VVD and the CDA, and had been made viable by support from the 
populist-libertarian PVV, which had enjoyed a tremendous election victory 
(from 9 to 24 seats). Support from the PVV put the Populist Party in a 
strong position to influence the new government’s policy decisions, both 
through the coalition agreement and through parliament. Rutte’s coalition 
agreement with the motto “freedom and responsibility” included few words 
on tobacco policy, but these few had far-reaching consequences. The coali-
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tion agreement included a firm commitment to ease the smoking ban by 
exempting bars without employees from the obligation to implement smok-
ing restrictions. The criterion for a small bar was that it had less than 
70 square metres of surface, modelled after the German smoking ban.
The main challenge for the new government was to deal with the after-
math of the economic crisis through a huge project to reduce government 
spending. The coalition agreement included large cuts to the Ministry of 
Health, including a €50 million reduction of spending on health educa-
tion (Nagelhout & Fong, 2011). The new minister of Health was Edith 
Schippers (VVD) who since 2003 had been responsible for health issues as 
a member of the VVD parliamentary faction. Tobacco control advocates 
had long regarded her as one of their toughest opponents: she was known 
as a fighter for free-market principles and a strong adversary of the “nanny 
state,” had opposed virtually every proposal for governmental regulation 
in the field of tobacco, and had been successful in softening the impact of 
the Tobacco Act and in limiting smoking bans. Schippers now saw an 
opportunity to execute a conservative–liberal agenda and reduce the gov-
ernment’s involvement with tobacco to a minimum. She knew she had full 
support from the PVV, whose leader Geert Wilders was a smoker himself 
and had been a defender of tobacco industry interests in the Balkenende I 
cabinet when he was still a member of the VVD. When Schippers was the 
VVD spokesperson on tobacco in the Balkenende II cabinet, Minister 
Hoogervorst (also VVD) had repeatedly debated with her over tobacco 
and lifestyle. At one point Schippers characterised Hoogervorst’s policy as 
“lifestyle inquisition.”123 When Hoogervorst was no longer minister, he 
looked back and commented on Schippers: “Edith is against a nanny state, 
while I had come to the conclusion that strict measures had to be taken. 
That debate between the two of us was very harsh sometimes” 
(Niemantsverdriet, 2011).
Like Klink, Schippers politicised prevention policy by taking ideological 
values as a starting point. It did not come as a surprise that Schippers, in 
her maiden speech as minister in parliament on 28 October 2010, 
announced that there was going to be a radical change: “From my point 
of view, from my personal conviction, it is absolutely disastrous if the gov-
ernment forces people into a straitjacket by all sorts of regulations, do’s 
and don’ts, restrictions, images with doom scenarios, patronising and 
pedantic messages.”124 Schippers formulated the new political stance 
towards prevention as follows: “I don’t think the government is a happi-
ness machine, nor is it a lifestyle master. It is very important for me to 
 DUTCH TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY FROM THE 1950S TO THE PRESENT 
60 
make a change of policy which does justice to the motto of this cabinet, 
which is freedom and responsibility.”
During a debate in parliament the Socialist Party (SP) and Christian 
Union (CU) noted that the proportion of smokers had stagnated and the 
government’s aim to reduce smoking to 20% in 2010 had not been met.125 
They tabled two motions: one demanding that the minister present an 
effective package of measures to combat smoking as part of her prevention 
policy document, which was due later that year, and one requesting that 
the government take tobacco prevention seriously and reduce the number 
of tobacco sale outlets. Schippers rejected both. A few weeks later she 
confirmed the government’s intention to exempt small cafés from the 
smoking ban126; but enforcement was postponed immediately in anticipa-
tion of a revision of the applicable order-in-council. In July 2011 smoking 
was officially allowed in small bars. To support the new regulation, fines 
were doubled for those who did not comply with the law.
Soon after her appointment Schippers announced that she was going to 
cut subsidies to disease prevention institutes. In May 2011, Schippers’ 
health nota was published (VWS, 2011). Tobacco control was no longer a 
priority. She announced a three-year phasing down of subsidies to 
STIVORO, while smoking prevention was to be handed over to the 
Trimbos Institute (the Netherlands Institute of Mental Health and 
Addiction). This echoed parliamentary questions raised by Schippers in 
2004 criticising alleged wastage of subsidies by STIVORO,127 and again 
from 2008 questioning the necessity of the subsidies that STIVORO 
received and whether the government was financing its own political 
opposition.128 Reimbursement for smoking cessation support was to be 
discontinued in 2012. Mass media campaigns were described as paternal-
istic and completely discarded. These swift and dramatic shifts were an 
unprecedented reversal of tobacco control policy decisions, and met with 
indignation and astonishment both from Dutch health and medical advo-
cacy groups (NKI-AVL, 2012) and from international tobacco control 
experts (Arnott et al., 2011). The Network for Accountability of Tobacco 
Transnationals nominated the Dutch government for a “Marlboro Man 
Award,” a “less-than-prestigious price for a government that is furthering 
Big Tobacco’s interests and putting profit over people.”129 Ex-minister 
Hoogervorst commented: “Reversal of the smoking ban is a rear-guard 
action. The whole world is making its tobacco policy tougher, while the 
Netherlands is making its policy more lenient. I am a bit embarrassed” 
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(Niemantsverdriet, 2011). Schippers’ tough position led to a strong polar-
isation between the Ministry of Health and tobacco control groups, espe-
cially STIVORO. This was aggravated when public television broadcasted 
a documentary in October 2011 entitled “Minister of Tobacco,” revealing 
contacts between the Dutch tobacco industry network and Schippers.130
normalisation of rElationsHiPs (2012–2017)
In November 2012 the tension between government and health organ-
isations over tobacco lessened when tobacco control became the task of 
State Secretary Martin van Rijn (Labour party) in the new Rutte–Ascher 
cabinet (a coalition between VVD and Labour Party). The Populist PVV 
party was no longer needed to support the government, and with its 
retreat from power there was less support for an extremely restrained 
tobacco control policy. Van Rijn normalised relationships between the 
ministry and health organisations by promising to follow the path of 
reason and by examining what could be done to strengthen tobacco con-
trol. Van Rijn had struck a deal with VVD and Schippers, who was still 
health minister, that no new tobacco regulatory measures would be taken 
in the next four years. Van Rijn moved cautiously, evaluating the effec-
tiveness of a new measure before taking additional steps. He managed to 
retain this strategy until the end of the cabinet, arguing in parliament 
that he wanted policy measures that were enforceable, effective, based on 
science, consistent, and attracting sufficient societal support “while we 
constantly search for new methods to eliminate smoking.”131 In July 
2014, Van Rijn sent a number of reports to the parliament, which exam-
ined new policy options such as restricting the number of selling points 
and point-of-sale restrictions, and promised to present a plan at the end 
of the year (Van Rijn, 2014).
In December 2013, the European parliament reached an agreement 
with the EU Council of Ministers about a new Tobacco Product Directive 
(TPD-2), which included pictorial health warnings covering 65% of the 
front and the back of tobacco packs, restrictions on the use of flavourings 
and dangerous additives in tobacco, and a ban on slim cigarettes. The new 
directive came into force on May 2014, and most provisions were imple-
mented in the Netherlands by May 2016. Another policy measure that 
Van Rijn took did not follow his own initiative as well, but was the result 
of outside pressure: it had been decided that the age limit for drinking 
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alcoholic beverages would rise from 16 to 18, to come into effect on 2014, 
and the parliament wanted a similar regulation for tobacco. After a parlia-
mentary vote in October 2013, the legal age limit for selling tobacco was 
raised from 16 to 18, and went into effect in January 2014. Van Rijn fur-
ther amended the Tobacco Act, so that small cafés were included again in 
the general smoking ban. This followed a successful legal action by CAN 
against the state that obliged the government to reconsider the exemp-
tion, and a successful motion from the Christian Union (CU) party that 
received majority backing (77 votes) in parliament. The motion requested 
the government to bring small cafés back under the smoking ban.132 This 
came into effect in October 2014. In early 2017, parliament adopted an 
amendment to the Tobacco Act that included a ban on the display of 
tobacco products at point of sale, as part of the ban on advertising.
ConClusions
The main events of the narrative of how government and parliament 
shaped Dutch tobacco control policy are summarised in Box 2.2. The 
ambitions of the 1970s came to a virtual standstill in the 1990s, stuck in 
the political quagmire of the Dutch “polder.”133 Subsequent governments 
were reluctant to take decisive steps, sensing that this would meet with 
resistance from the tobacco industry, the business community, and the 
parliament, and they adopted a long-term approach of small steps. Tobacco 
policy was strengthened several times, often after long periods of self- 
regulation by the industry that was preferred over legally binding 
measures.
Box 2.2 Major tobacco control policy events in the Netherlands
Year Event
1957 –  Dutch Health Council advisory report Smoking and health confirms 
association between smoking and lung cancer
1965 – Start of “gentlemen’s agreement” among tobacco manufacturers
1974 –  Decision to create a national coordinating organisation for tobacco 
control, resulting in the foundation of STIVORO
1975 –  Dutch Health Council report Measures to reduce smoking proposes a 
comprehensive tobacco policy




1977 – State Secretary Hendriks presents the Tobacco Memorandum
1981 – STIVORO starts educational campaigns
1980 – Ban on tobacco advertisements on radio and television
1981 – Law on health warnings adopted
–  Industry-friendly advisory report from the second interdepartmental 
committee (ICBT) presented
1982 – Health warnings on cigarette packs (“Smoking threatens health”)
  – New advertising code of conduct initiated by industry
1984 –  Draft Tobacco Act (smoking ban in public places) presented to 
parliament
1988 – New advertising code of conduct (Reclame Code)
  – Tobacco Act adopted (smoking banned in public places)
1990 – First Health Council report on passive smoking
  – Tobacco Act implemented
1995 – “Healthy and Well” policy document (Minister Borst)
  – Advertising ban for billboards (self-regulation)
1996 – Advertising ban in cinemas (self-regulation)
  – “Nota Tabaksontmoedigingsbeleid” (Minister Borst)
1997 – The Netherlands supports the EU advertising ban
1998 – NSPH report advised on comprehensive national tobacco policy
2002 –  Amendment to Tobacco Act adopted: smoke-free workplaces (with 
exception for hospitality sector), advertising and promotion ban, age 
limit for sale of tobacco set at 16 years
  – Self-regulation for hospitality sector until 2009
  –  Large EU text health warnings on cigarette packs (30% front, 40% 
back)
2003 – Second Health Council report on passive smoking
2004 – Smoking ban in workplaces implemented
2005 – Netherlands ratifies FCTC
2006 –  Start of the National Program of Tobacco Control (NPT) 
2006–2010
2007 – Mister Klink announces to make hospitality industry smoke-free
2008 – Smoking ban extended to hospitality sector
2009 –  Temporary suspension of smoking ban in small bars without 
personnel
2010 –  Suspension overruled by supreme court (smoking ban again in place), 
then suspended again
2011 – Smoking cessation treatment reimbursed
  – Smoking again allowed in small bars with no personnel
  –  Minister Schippers stops subsidy to STIVORO while transferring 
tobacco education to the Trimbos Institute
2012 – Smoking cessation treatment no longer reimbursed
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The 1988 Tobacco Act did not contain measures strong enough to 
affect smoking rates, and until the end of the 1990s health considerations 
were subordinate to economic interests. This changed when Health 
Minister Borst amended the Tobacco Act in 2002 and brought it up to 
international standards. None of Borst’s successors has taken comprehen-
sive tobacco control initiatives remotely similar to hers.
The Dutch governments’ approach to tobacco control can be charac-
terised as reactive and cautious, resulting in incremental change instead of 
radical steps. With the exception of Health Minister Borst (1994–2002), 
none of the state secretaries or health ministers who were responsible for 
tobacco control took much interest in the topic; none showed strong lead-
ership. Official documents did not outline bold ambitions; nor did they 
testify to a vision of tobacco control that might inspire the nation. The 
bureaucracy seemed to react to incidents rather than initiate them, and to 
feel most comfortable with a technical, non-visionary approach. Even 
Minister Borst realised that she could not make great strides. During a 
debate in the senate in 2002, she lamented: “How does one handle things 
in such a way that individual freedom of adults is respected while at the 
same time trying to reduce the harm [of smoking]? It is a struggle. That is 
why we take it one step at a time and do not try to make some sort of 
enormous victory in one smash.”134
One important observation is that Dutch politicians and government 
officials consistently tried the least controversial option first and gradually 
progressed to more stringent measures. Policies often metamorphose in 
such a way. According to John (2012, p. 20), policy change is often lim-
ited to “minor variations in a pattern of continuity.” These have been 
called first, second, and third order policy changes (Hall, 1993). A first 
Year Event
2014 – Ban on tobacco sale extended to all under 18 years
  –  Smoking ban extended to all bars, including small bars with no 
personnel
2016 –  EU Tobacco Product Directive II implemented: pictorial warnings 
on cigarette packs




order change is when a policy remains the same but is adjusted to new 
circumstances and new experiences. In the case of the Netherlands, smok-
ing bans were broadened from public places to workplaces and eventually 
to the hospitality sector. Another first order change concerned the age 
limit for the sale of tobacco, which increased from 16 to 18 years.
Second order change is when the instrument of policy is altered while 
the overall goals remain the same. The oldest example was the realisation 
that education alone would not solve the problem, and that regulation of 
the product and how it was sold and marketed were necessary as well. 
Another second order change occurred when self-imposed advertising 
restrictions were broadened several times and eventually replaced by an 
advertising and promotion ban.
A third order change is characterised by a more radical shift in the goal 
of the policy. This is more politically or ideologically inspired than based 
on the appearance of new facts about what works or experiences with 
failed policy. The change from regarding tobacco use as an economic ben-
efit to seeing it as a public health threat can be regarded as a radical shift 
(Studlar & Cairney, 2014). In the Netherlands this process started in the 
1960s with the growing recognition of the seriousness of the health prob-
lems of tobacco, and eventually evolved into the current dominant public 
health perspective. The key alteration of the status quo occurred between 
2002 and 2004 when the Tobacco Act was amended and Minister Borst 
successfully took tobacco policy out of the sphere of influence of the trade 
ministry and under the control of the Ministry of Health, resulting in 
tobacco control measures that had a huge impact on society. However, 
this was not a guarantee of consistent strong tobacco control in subse-
quent years. Later health ministers assigned such low priority to tobacco 
control that it stagnated under Minister Klink (2007–2010) and even 
temporarily reversed under Minister Schippers (2010–2012).
In the next chapter, a comparison will be made between the trajectory 
of tobacco control in the Netherlands and those of other European coun-
tries. Subsequent chapters explore in more detail some of the explanatory 
factors that have already been briefly alluded to in the current chapter: 
changes in governance (decentralisation, power shift to Brussels), institu-
tional changes (more control ceded to the Ministry of Health at the 
expense of the Ministry of Economic Affairs), the importance of the judi-
ciary, the role of ideology (neo-liberalism and small government), rules of 
the game (polderen), and the influence of the anti- and pro-tobacco con-
trol lobbies.
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CHAPTER 3
The Tempo of Dutch Tobacco Control 
Policy
This chapter considers the tempo at which the Dutch government took 
steps to control smoking by comparing the moment of adoption of policy 
measures in the Netherlands with the United Kingdom and with the rest of 
Europe. Before we embark on comparisons, it will be useful to define what 
‘tobacco control policy’ is. It is not straightforward, since it refers to various 
actions that governments may take. Scholars (e.g., Birkland, 2011) distin-
guish between “types” of policy: laws, services, incentives (spending, grants, 
reimbursement), taxation, and persuasion (education, campaigns). These 
differ in effectiveness, timelines (a quick or a slow effect), cost, efficiency, 
flexibility, visibility, accountability, and degree of citizen choice (Levine, 
Peters, & Thompson, 1990). Effective tobacco control is comprehensive in 
that it is a combination of many policy instruments. At its core are laws that 
restrict the availability of and exposure to tobacco products. Such regula-
tions tend to become increasingly restrictive over time and are supported by 
various degrees of education, cessation support, incentives, and taxation.
Experts have identified elements of effective tobacco control policy by 
considering evidence from countries across the world (Warner & Tam, 
2012). There is international consensus that the main building blocks of 
comprehensive tobacco control are:
 1. Restrictions on the sale of tobacco to minors
 2. Health warning labels and package descriptors
78 
 3. Ban on tobacco advertising and promotion
 4. Smoke-free legislation
 5. Educational programmes to raise awareness
 6. Support for smoking cessation
 7. Taxation of tobacco products (WHO, 2003, 2004)
Note that the first four are regulations involving lasting improvements 
in tobacco control, requiring a process of law making that involves formal 
parliamentary voting, while 5 and 6 are more dependent on the political 
will to set aside the needed budgets. Measures 5, 6, and 7 may be adjusted 
every year. The building blocks are sometimes simplified to five measures 
plus monitoring of tobacco use and prevention policies, and referred to as 
the MPOWER package (WHO, 2008).
Policy cycles
In the previous chapter a detailed account was given of the stages that 
Dutch tobacco control policy has gone through. It is helpful to restruc-
ture the events according to the stages of the policy process. According to 
the “stages heuristics approach” (Moloughney, 2012; Sabatier, 2007), the 
following stages can be distinguished:
• Agenda setting (recognising a problem that requires government’s 
attention)
• Policy formulation (considering various policy options)
• Policy adoption (making the decision)
• Policy implementation (assuring that the policy decision is carried 
out, and establishment of rules and procedures)
• Policy evaluation (assessing whether the policy achieved its objectives)
The stages form cycles. A policy cycle starts when the problem is put on 
the political agenda and ends when impact is evaluated (Moloughney, 
2012). After evaluation, a new policy process starts, depending on the 
outcomes of the evaluation  or the recognition of a new or continued 
problem on the agenda.
The stages heuristic approach has been criticised for its simplistic depic-
tion of the policy process, which in reality rarely follows a linear course. A 
more realistic representation is that there is an ongoing process in which 
policymakers consider ideas, negotiate, try out, move away, and come 
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back when new opportunities arise. John (2012, p. 20) noted that “There 
is no beginning and end to public policy; for the most part there is only 
the middle.” Despite such critical comments I use the policy stages, 
because categorising the process into distinct stages is useful for descrip-
tive purposes in this chapter (Moloughney, 2012).
Tobacco control policy does not change gradually or evenly, but there 
are periodic bursts of activity, with intermediate periods where little seems 
to happen. To date the Dutch government has gone through a full policy 
cycle four times (Table 3.1); the cycles have become shorter over time. 
The first one lasted for 23 years, the next two for 10 years; the latest was 
7 years. There were interims of a few years when tobacco control was 
almost off the political agenda.
The first cycle began in 1954, when the government started to investi-
gate the health concerns of smoking. The first choice of policy was educa-
tion, and STIVORO was founded to coordinate and professionalise 
education. In the 1970s an ambitious policy agenda was brought to the 
attention of the government, but only one option, health warnings on 
tobacco products, was adopted and implemented, and when the right- 
wing Van Agt Cabinet came to power in 1977 tobacco control disap-
peared from the political agenda. The first policy cycle was terminated in 
1977 before it could come to blossom.
Table 3.1 Tobacco control policy cycles
Period Policy cycle Accomplished policies, initiated by government 
or parliament
1954–1977 1. Education • Educational programmes targeted at youth
• Health warnings on cigarette packs
1978–1980 Interim period
1981–1991 2. Self-regulation • Tobacco Act:
  – Smoke-free public places
1992–1994 Interim period
1995–2005 3. Regulation • Revision of the Tobacco Act:
  – Advertising and promotion ban
  – Smoke-free workplaces
  – Ban on tobacco sales to those under 16
2006–2007 Interim period
2007–2014 4.  Decentralisation and 
shared responsibility 
with civil society
• Smoking ban in pubs and restaurants
• Reimbursement for smoking cessation
• Ban on tobacco sale to those under 18
2014–present Interim period
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From 1981 until 1991 a second policy cycle emerged from proposals 
set out in the Interdepartementale Commissie Beperking Tabaksgebruik 
(Interdepartmental Committee for Reducing Tobacco Use) (ICBT) 
report. This was a long period in which anti-tobacco policy was success-
fully kept off the political agenda by the tobacco industry network, which 
had a strong presence in and around government. The government chose 
to rely on self-regulation by the industry. In this period economic interests 
trumped health interests. The cycle resulted in the adoption of the Tobacco 
Act in 1990 with smoke-free public places and ended when it was evalu-
ated in 1991.
The third policy cycle started in 1995, when the government realised 
that smoking rates were still high compared to other countries and were 
unlikely to go down without further measures. Minister Borst gave the 
reduction of tobacco-related harm high priority and accomplished an 
important institutional shift, giving the Ministry of Health a more central 
role in the policy process at the expense of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. The tobacco industry became foe instead of friend. Just before the 
end of her term in office, Borst succeeded in getting parliament to adopt 
a substantial amendment to the Tobacco Act, resulting in smoke-free 
workplaces, a full advertising and promotion ban, and a lower age limit for 
the sale of tobacco. This cycle ended in 2005 when Minister Hoogervorst 
evaluated the government’s policy and concluded that the goal of 28% 
smokers had been reached.
In 2007 Hoogervorst started work on a new tobacco control policy 
plan based on consultation with health organisations and the industry. 
He assessed the political viability of new measures and concluded that 
there was insufficient political support to achieve any of these. The 
process was abruptly terminated and replaced by the Nationaal 
Programma Tabaksontmoediging (National Programme of Tobacco 
Control) (NPT). His successor, Ab Klink, was occupied with securing 
a smoking ban in the hospitality sector, a headache “dossier” that he 
had inherited from previous governments. Instead of further regula-
tion, the government continued along the path of decentralisation and 
sharing responsibility with civil society. The policy cycle ended in 2014 
when all involved concluded that the NPT had failed. The government 
decided against starting a second NPT. As it has not yet committed to 




AdoPtion of tobAcco control Policy 
in the netherlAnds comPAred with the United 
Kingdom
The United Kingdom has not always been the leader in tobacco control. 
Scandinavian countries like Norway already had a Tobacco Act in 1975, 
requiring health warnings on tobacco packs and a ban on advertising of 
tobacco products, and banned smoking in workplaces in 1988. For many 
years the Netherlands and the United Kingdom roughly had the same tim-
ing for implementation of policies, as shown in Table 3.2, which compares 
the coming into force of key Tobacco Acts in both countries. For many 
decades the United Kingdom and the Netherlands relied on voluntary 
agreements with the industry instead of statutory measures. Both coun-
tries had a strong tobacco industry presence.
Table 3.2 Dates of coming into force of key tobacco control policies in the 
Netherlands and in the United Kingdom (bold indicates fastest date)
Netherlands UK
Ban on tobacco advertising on television 1980 1965
Ban on tobacco advertising on the radio 1980 1978 (voluntary)
“Smoking damages health” warning on cigarette 
packs
1982 (voluntary) 1971 (voluntary)
Smoking ban in public places 1990 1992 (voluntary)
Ban on tobacco advertising in cinemas 1996 1986 (voluntary)
Removal of misleading descriptors such as “light” 
and “mild” from cigarette packs
2002 (EU) 2003(EU)
Large-text health warnings covering 30% of the 
front and 40% of the back of cigarette packs
2002 (EU) 2003 (EU)
Ban on advertising and promotion (via billboards, 
direct mail, internet)
2002 (EU) 2003 (EU)
Ban on sales to those under 16 2003 1908, 1986
Ban on advertising in print media 2003 2003
Smoking ban in private workplaces 2004 2007
Smoking ban in the hospitality sector 2008 2007
Smoking ban in small bars 2014 2007
Ban on sale to those under 18 2014 2008
Picture warnings on cigarettes packs 2016 2008
Ban on sales through vending machines – 2011
Ban on tobacco displays in large stores – 2012
Ban on smoking in cars in the presence of children – 2015
Ban on tobacco display in small shops – 2015
Source for United Kingdom: ASH (2013)
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The Netherlands was slow in restricting sales to minors (2003), which 
the United Kingdom had implemented in 1908 and reconfirmed in the 
1986 Protection of Children (Tobacco) Act. The United Kingdom intro-
duced the first voluntary health warnings on cigarette packs in 1971, 
much sooner than the Netherlands, but the Dutch were faster to imple-
ment smoking bans in public places and private workplaces. When the 
Netherlands adopted its Tobacco Act in 1988, there did not yet exist an 
equivalent piece of legislation in the United Kingdom. From 1999 the 
United Kingdom made policy either for the kingdom as a whole (tobacco 
advertising) or separately for devolved governments (England, Wales, 
Scotland, Northern Ireland), as in the case of smoking bans. In 2005 the 
United Kingdom still had no ban on smoking in public places. The 2006 
UK Health Act governed smoking in workplaces, but its workplace smok-
ing ban, introduced in 2007, was comprehensive. The Netherlands 
retained an exemption for restaurants and bars until 2008, and for small 
bars until 2014, and still allows separate smoking sections.
Both countries have a long history of self-regulation by the industry of 
advertising restrictions, with England leading the way. In the United 
Kingdom, the industry banned advertising on radio already in 1978 and 
in cinemas in 1986. However, a comprehensive advertising and promo-
tion ban was discussed in the same year (2001) in both parliaments. By 
then no fewer than seven other EU countries had already adopted this 
regulation and, outside the EU, so had Norway, Iceland, Poland, and 
Hungary.1 The first European Advertising Directive stipulated that mis-
leading descriptors such as “light” and “mild” must be removed from 
packages, and large health warnings became mandatory. The Netherlands 
was a year faster in transposing this EU directive into national law (2002) 
than the United Kingdom (2003).
Table 3.2 only compares the coming into force of regulative measures 
that involved lasting improvements in tobacco control and require a pro-
cess of law making and formal voting in parliament, but not measures 
such as tax increases, campaigns, and smoking cessation support. In 2000, 
following the Smoking Kills white paper, the United Kingdom introduced 
smoking cessation services (Department of Health, 1998) and from that 
moment embarked on a different course than the Netherlands. A combi-
nation of high tobacco taxes (not included in Table 3.2), made reasonably 
enforceable by the United Kingdom’s island status, substantial invest-
ment into smoking cessation services and awareness-raising mass media 
campaigns, and consistent commitment by the government to reduce 
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tobacco’s appeal to children through legislation, propelled the United 
Kingdom into the league of world leaders in tobacco control. In contrast, 
the allocated budget for tobacco control in the Netherlands was cut by 
the government, after a relatively high level of spending in the beginning 
of the 2000s. It went from €0.93 per capita in 2003 to €0.12 in 2012 
(Heijndijk & Willemsen, 2015). The second UK white paper published in 
2010 (Department of Health, 2010) was an extension of the comprehen-
sive UK tobacco control strategy and resulted in several measures that 
have not yet been taken in the Netherlands.
the netherlAnds comPAred with eUroPe
Various attempts have been made to compare countries within Europe. 
Studlar and Cairney (2014) looked at the pace of tobacco policy adoption 
in 23 countries by identifying the average year by which 24 tobacco con-
trol instruments had been adopted. The Netherlands was relatively slow, 
with 1994 as the median year of adoption: 1986 was the median for the 
23 countries. Another attempt to compare progress across Europe was 
made by a group of experts in 2003 (Thyrian & John, 2006) who drafted 
a 40-item questionnaire which covered a long list of tobacco control mea-
sures that the group identified as having the most influence on smoking. 
Data was gathered from 142 participants from 14 EU member states to 
the World Conference on Tobacco or Health in Helsinki, who were asked 
to assess the level of tobacco control in their own country. Fourteen Dutch 
delegates participated. The assessment came very soon after the imple-
mentation of the amended Dutch Tobacco Act, and this was reflected in 
the data: the Netherlands came out higher than average, ranking just 
below Finland, Sweden, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. According to 
the 14 Dutch respondents, the Netherlands was particularly good at pro-
viding smokers with effective smoking cessation treatment (highest rank, 
together with the United Kingdom).
The most widely cited effort to compare the strength of tobacco con-
trol between countries in Europe was undertaken by tobacco control 
experts Luk Joossens and Martin Raw in 2004 (Joossens & Raw, 2006). 
Their Tobacco Control Scale (TCS) is a composite scale with points allo-
cated by a group of experts to the six tobacco policies considered most 
effective according to a report from the World Bank (World Bank, 2003): 
tobacco taxation level, smoke-free laws, public information campaigns, 
advertising bans, health warning labels, and cessation support (Joossens, 
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2004). The scoring reflected best practice at the time the scale was devel-
oped and did not capture early interventions considered ineffective, such 
as self-regulation by the industry and bans on tobacco sales to minors. 
Data have been published for six distinct years. The Netherlands ranked 
7th (among 28 countries) in 2004, 10th (30 countries) in 2005, 14th (30 
countries) in 2007, 13th (31 countries) in 2010, 13th (34 countries) in 
2013, and 9th (35 countries) in 2016 (Joossens & Raw, 2017). Since 
2006 the United Kingdom and Ireland have received the highest scores, 
mainly due to relatively high tobacco taxes and relative large budgets allo-
cated to media campaigns and smoking cessation treatment.
Various research groups have used the TCS to study different aspects of 
tobacco control policy change. Nguyen, Rosenqvist, and Pekurinen 
(2012) created a Tobacco Control Policy Index (TCPI) based on four of 
the six policy components of the TCS: smoke-free laws, bans on tobacco 
advertising, health warnings on tobacco packaging, and smoking cessation 
treatment services. They recalculated the TCS scores into a composite 
score ranging from 0 to 100.2 J.R. Bosdriesz, Willemsen, Stronks, and 
Kunst (2014) calculated TCPI scores for 11 European countries in each 
year from 1969 onwards. This showed that the cumulation of policy mea-
sures follows an approximate S-curve (Fig. 3.1). It also showed that the 
Dutch government managed to keep up with other countries in Europe, 














































































































control. However, it was a particularly slow starter. All countries had a 
zero score in 1969, but the Netherlands kept its zero the longest, after 
Austria. With the implementation of the Tobacco Act in 1990, the 
Netherlands caught up and received an average score. Between 1991 and 
2002, the Netherlands again was below average, but caught up through 
improvements in smoking cessation treatment in the middle of the 1990s. 
With the adoption of the amendments to the Tobacco Act in 2002, Dutch 
tobacco control strength was again on a par with other countries.
With respect to tobacco taxation levels, the Netherlands can be charac-
terised as a follower. Figure 3.2 shows TCPI scores for the level of tobacco 
taxation, indicated by the real price of cigarettes (Nguyen et al., 2012): 
this is the actual price corrected for purchasing power. Scores range from 
0 to 30, with 15 points for the highest price for a pack of Marlboro Red 
and 15 points for the highest rank regarding the price of a pack of ciga-
rettes in the most popular price category. Prices are relative to the highest 
score (30), which was allocated to the United Kingdom in 2007 (Joossens 
& Raw, 2011). The Netherlands consistently keeps its real price of 
 cigarettes in tandem with the European average, with a price level some-
what lower than average, while the United Kingdom and Ireland have the 
most expensive cigarettes.
Although Dutch cigarette prices are among the highest in the EU (only 









































































Fig. 3.2 Dates of coming into force of key tobacco control policies in the 
Netherlands and in the United Kingdom
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Leon, 2013), cigarettes in the Netherlands are more affordable to the 
average smoker than in most European countries (Blecher et al., 2013). 
While it took 28 minutes for the average Dutch smoker to work for one 
pack of cigarettes in 2010 (the same as in Germany and Belgium), it took 
42  minutes in the United Kingdom and as much as 61  in Hungary 
(Bogdanovica, Murray, McNeill, & Britton, 2012). Indeed, Dutch smok-
ers are less concerned about how much money they spent on cigarettes 
compared with smokers in other countries (23% compared with, e.g., 61% 
in France and 49% in the United Kingdom) (ITC Project, 2015).
conclUsion
Compared to most other high-income European countries, the Dutch 
government was relatively late in its move to regulate tobacco. It took 
until 2004 to catch up with the rest of Western Europe, and currently just 
manages to keep up with other EU countries, neither lagging nor trying 
to be a leader in the field. Tobacco taxation levels are kept in line with the 
EU average, with real price levels just below average.
notes
1. Proceedings II, 31 May 2001, 82–5212.
2. Changes in tobacco taxes were presented separately. The other missing com-
ponent of the TCS is spending on information campaigns. This was left out 
in the TCPI, because reliable information on spending was not available for 
each year for each country.
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Policy is not made in a vacuum. Disputes over tobacco control are fought 
within changing policy environments. This chapter explores key 
population- level factors that influence a national government’s decision to 
adopt tobacco control policy measures. These factors include social norms 
about smoking, the proportion of smokers in the population, societal sup-
port for tobacco control, and cultural values. These factors are interrelated 
in a specific way and to understand this, we will take a short detour into 
what is sometimes called “system thinking in tobacco control.” Ten years 
ago, the US National Cancer Institute (NCI) published a monograph on 
this topic (Best, Clark, Leichow, & Trochim, 2007), which acknowledged 
the complexity of tobacco control at the national level, involving as it does 
the interplay of factors over long periods of time, including feedback 
loops. According to experts from the NCI, a government’s willingness to 
acknowledge and address the smoking problem follows from its level of 
awareness that tobacco is a problem, and from the balance of lobbying 
forces that propose or hold back policy solutions. A government’s aware-
ness of the problems associated with tobacco is further affected by specific 
population factors that are amenable to change. A country’s smoking rate 
is one of these: as long as the proportion of smokers is high, the govern-
ment is more likely to be aware that there is a public health risk that needs 
to be addressed. Changes in the number of smokers also affect public sup-
port for tobacco control, which increases when adult smoking rates go 
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down—a process which was believed to be mediated by social norms. 
Reduced smoking (people quitting or fewer people starting) shifts the bal-
ance between smokers and non-smokers, increasing the level of anti- 
smoking norms and altering public opinion. There is also evidence for the 
reverse effect, in that people quit smoking when social norms become less 
accommodating. Together, these population factors determine the con-
text within which national tobacco control policymaking takes place. I 
have put the main factors together in a simplistic model, which I have 
called the flywheel model of tobacco control (Willemsen, 2011).
The flywheel model (Fig.  4.1) assumes that population-level factors 
interact in a circular feedback manner over long periods. The term “fly-
wheel” reflects the notion that the process that moves a population in the 
direction of a smoke-free society is difficult to set in motion but once 
begun continues for some time on its own until it loses speed and eventu-
ally comes to a stop in the absence of a new impetus (i.e., new tobacco 















Fig. 4.1 The flywheel model of Tobacco Control (TC)
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turning, either through new policy input or because the process of denor-
malisation of tobacco use in society continues, smoking rates will go down. 
It predicts that policymakers are more willing to introduce tobacco con-
trol measures when they are supported by politicians, when the general 
public and civil society are supportive, when the public thinks more nega-
tively about smoking, and when the prevalence of smoking is low. It 
assumes a gradual reduction of the proportion of smokers in the popula-
tion, but eventually will reach its “destination” when smoking rates are at 
a level that is acceptable to society and government.
Interest groups can influence each element of the flywheel model, with 
the exception of cultural values. Tobacco control proponents may give the 
wheel a spin by influencing any of its five sectors, while tobacco interest 
groups attempt to slow, stop, or reverse the wheel through the same access 
points. For example, the tobacco industry may develop campaigns to nor-
malise smoking, apply strategies to lower the price of cigarettes in an 
attempt to offset the effect of tax increases, or present arguments that 
reduce political support for tobacco control.
The reader is invited to compare the flywheel model with the general 
conceptual framework in Chap. 1, which includes the same long-term 
feedback loop as the flywheel model. The flywheel is another way of con-
ceptualising the dynamics of tobacco control, differing from the general 
conceptual framework in Fig. 1.1, in that it focuses on the population- 
level sociological factors that drive down smoking rates, resulting from the 
implementation of tobacco control measures, while ignoring the dynamics 
of the policymaking process itself.
The flywheel model starts with the implementation of tobacco control 
measures (TC). Depicted as one factor, in reality it consists of many pos-
sible policy solutions to the smoking problem. For example, tax increases 
make smoking less affordable, directly affecting tobacco consumption, 
while improvements in the smoking cessation infrastructure and smoking 
cessation campaigns build confidence in being able to quit and prompt 
smokers to quit. Tobacco control measures, when properly implemented, 
can have an impact on population smoking rates (Gravely et  al., 2017; 
Ngo, Cheng, Chaloupka, & Shang, 2017). Some measures work indi-
rectly through social norms (Rennen et al., 2014), particularly smoking 
bans (Betzner et al., 2012) and mass media campaigns that denormalise 
smoking (Durkin, Brennan, & Wakefield, 2012). A more detailed discus-
sion of the effectiveness of different tobacco control measures appears in 
Chap. 7. In the current chapter I discuss the four factors of the flywheel 
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that make up the sociological environment in which tobacco control poli-
cymaking takes place: cultural values, social norms, smoking rate, and 
public support for tobacco control.
Cultural Values
Some of the differences in acceptance and reaction to tobacco control 
between countries can be explained by cultural values (Hosking et  al., 
2009; Vogel, Kagan, & Kessler, 1993), which have been found to influ-
ence perceptions of tobacco products and smoking (Helweg-Larsen & 
Nielsen, 2009; Unger et al., 2003). Dominant cultural values and aspects 
of national culture are stable and relatively insensitive to outside influence, 
and are therefore located at the heart of the flywheel. Culture is revealed 
through a set of unique shared values and beliefs that exist for the majority 
of a population and distinguish it from other populations (Pasick, Onofrio, 
& Otero-Sabogal, 1996; Schwartz, 2006). According to S.  Schwartz 
(2006), cultural values “shape and justify individual and group beliefs, 
actions, and goals. Institutional arrangements and policies, norms, and 
everyday practices express underlying cultural value emphases in societ-
ies.” In our context, cultural values determine whether specific tobacco 
control policy initiatives may fall on fertile soil.
According to a landmark study by Geert Hofstede, who analysed cul-
tural values in more than 50 countries (Hofstede, 1980), Dutch national 
culture can be characterised as extremely individualistic. People value their 
freedom to make personal decisions. They expect people to look after 
themselves and be independent. Personal choice is highly valued. Dutch 
culture is also a typical example of a “feminine” cooperative culture, 
according to Hofstede’s research, meaning that negotiation and compro-
mise are considered more appropriate than conflict. The combination of 
high individualism and high feminism has been proposed as an explana-
tion for why the Dutch smoking ban in bars rested on the assumption that 
smoking customers would be cooperative, complying for the benefit of the 
employer who would be fined for non-compliance (feminine value orien-
tation), while resistance to the ban reflected a high individualistic value 
orientation (Dechesne, Dignum, & Dignum, 2013).
Interestingly, the Dutch also score high on the dimension of indul-
gence, defined as “the extent to which people try to control their desires 
and impulses” (Hofstede Centre, 2015). A high score means that the 
Dutch recognise and respect other’s desires to enjoy life and have fun, 
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which may help explain the recurring wish from policymakers to be con-
siderate to smokers. When Health Minister Ab Klink opened a British 
American Tobacco (BAT)-financed smoking area in the Dutch parliament 
building in September 2008, he announced, “this smoking area is a sym-
bol for our two-pronged policy. On the one hand, protection; on the 
other hand, we don’t want to go so far with regulating that we take away 
people’s pleasures.” The high score of the Dutch on individualism, femi-
ninity, and indulgence was confirmed by S. Schwartz (2006), who used 
similar orientations, albeit differently worded (respectively, intellectual 
autonomy, egalitarianism, and affective autonomy). The combination of 
these values is very alive today, illustrated by the still popular lines of the 
“alternative” national anthem Fifteen million people: “Fifteen million peo-
ple/On that tiny strip of earth/You don’t patronize them with laws/You 
take them for what they are.”1
The Dutch version of smoking bans further typify the libertarian and 
individualistic approach to smoking and the egalitarian, “feminine” value 
orientation. The bans are more smoker-friendly than in other countries. 
Many exemptions were included in early formulations, such as providing 
smoking rooms to accommodate smokers and setting up transitional 
regimes for sectors where smoking was considered more difficult to 
enforce. Smokers who disobeyed were not prosecuted, but instead the 
owner or administrator of the venue or property where the violation took 
place risked a fine. In one study we compared smoking bans in bars in the 
Netherlands, Germany, France, and Ireland (Nagelhout et al., 2011). After 
the implementation of the ban, reports of smoking remained fairly com-
mon in the Netherlands and Germany, two countries with lenient policies. 
In contrast, in Ireland and France where comprehensive bans were intro-
duced with no exceptions and where fines for smokers were in place, smok-
ing was reduced to almost zero, making these policies national successes.
soCial Norms
At the core of comprehensive approaches to tobacco control are attempts 
to “denormalise” smoking rather than merely “controlling” it. By posi-
tioning social norms between cultural values and the other factors in the 
flywheel model, I want to express that societal norms regarding smoking 
are central to tobacco control. They reflect the deeply held cultural val-
ues, and in turn determine the preferences of groups of people for types 
of policy (Dechesne, Dignum, & Tan, 2011). Tobacco control evolves 
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around how smoking is perceived in society. Normative factors explain 
why populations differ in their susceptibility to change (Chaiton, Cohen, 
& Frank, 2003). The famous British social epidemiologist Geoffrey 
Rose (1992) said, “Social norms rigidly constrain how we live. (…) We 
may think that our personal life-style represents our own free choice, but 
that belief is often mistaken. It is hard to be a non-smoker in a smoking 
milieu, or vice versa.” (p. 90) Smoking rates are indeed lower in con-
stituencies that have an unfavourable “smoking climate” (Kim & 
Shanahan, 2003).
Changes in social norms have been found to be a driver of tobacco 
control (Hammond, Fong, Zanna, Thrasher, & Borland, 2006). 
Denormalisation of smoking reduces tobacco consumption (Alamar & 
Glantz, 2006; Baha & Le Faou, 2010; Biener, Hamilton, Siegel, & 
Sullivan, 2010; Hosking et  al., 2009) and may result in more smokers 
quitting (Baha & Le Faou, 2010; Bosdriesz, Kunst, Muntaner, Willemsen, 
& O’Campo, 2017). Indeed, the second most frequently mentioned rea-
son to quit smoking (after health concerns) is social concerns (McCaul 
et al., 2006). Best et al. (2007) proposed a feedback loop between social 
norms and smoking rates to acknowledge an independent process whereby 
when smoking becomes increasingly unpopular within the wider society, it 
leads to more people quitting and fewer young people starting, which 
make smoking even less popular.
The crucial role of social norms in tobacco control was already recog-
nised in the 1970s. At the opening speech of the fourth World Conference 
on Smoking or Health in Stockholm in 1979, the director of WHO said 
that tobacco control advocates should try harder to reduce the social 
acceptance of smoking. Several tobacco industry representatives were 
present at the session. One of the industry observers wrote a memo, made 
public by the Norwegian Association on Smoking and Health, revealing 
that the centrality of social norms as mentioned by the WHO director was 
not new to the industry but was “just a confirmation of our own analysis 
that the social acceptability issue will be the central battleground on which 
our case in the long run will be lost or won” (Clairmonte, 1983, p. 85). 
More than a decade later, Philip Morris complained in an internal memo 
that smoking bans were not only hurting business, but that they had “a 
more important effect (…) on the social acceptability of smoking. Attempts 
to depict tobacco use as anti-social get a powerful boost when its use is 
banned in social settings. This impact on our business, whilst slower, is just 
as real” (Goldberg, 1999). Philip Morris’ PR firm formulated this in 1990 
as follows: “Social acceptability is ultimately the bedrock upon which the 
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industry’s long run survival depends” (Burson-Marstellar, 1990). Indeed, 
in the 1990s the tobacco industry fought relentlessly with governments 
over the right to smoke in public.
The centrality of social norms in tobacco control has long been known 
to Dutch policymakers as well. In 1975 the Dutch Health Council advised 
that “activities against smoking must primarily aim at the creation of a 
psycho-social climate in which smoking is perceived negatively and a new 
attitude towards smoking emerges” (Beernink & Plokker, 1975). In 2000, 
Health Minister Borst defined her approach to tobacco control in parlia-
ment as follows:
At the core of the [tobacco control] policy is the objective that few young 
people start smoking and that smoking is increasingly seen as an abnormal 
behaviour. Tobacco needs “denormalisation” in our society. This and other 
measures must lead to a social climate where non-smoking is the social norm 
and not starting or quitting smoking is the result.2
It is one thing to recognise that social norms are important, but it is 
another thing to have good data on how a country’s social norms compare 
with those of other countries. For decades the tobacco industry had an 
information advantage. The big tobacco multinationals were able to orga-
nise worldwide comparison studies, cleverly exploiting the fact that they 
were present in a large number of countries across the world. In 1979 
researchers who worked for tobacco manufacturer Philip Morris 
International analysed the social and political environment of that business 
in 27 countries (Unknown (Philip Morris), 1979). They remarked of the 
Dutch, “As the personal freedom concept is widely accepted and supported 
in Holland, the anti-smoking cause is not exceptionally strong. … Members 
of the medical profession and government appear to have highly individual 
opinions and the consensus is that smoking is a matter of personal choice.” 
Twenty years later, Philip Morris’ analysts remarked that “the Dutch resent 
government interference, [and] the public debate is more and more bal-
anced,” and they characterised opinion as tolerant towards smoking (Philip 
Morris, 1996). Population survey data collected for Philip Morris further 
showed that social acceptance of smoking in the Netherlands was still high 
in 1997 (GfK Great Britain, 1998). Only 19% of non-smokers believed 
there was any element of risk about being around smokers in bars or pubs, 
or of “living with a smoker” or “working with a smoker.” This was one of 
the lowest results in Europe. The report also noted the low demand for 
government action against smoking among the Dutch.
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It is only fairly recently that not only the tobacco industry but also the 
Dutch tobacco control community has come to realise that social norms 
regarding smoking are still more lenient than in other countries. Since 
2008 the Netherlands participates in the International Tobacco Control 
(ITC) evaluation study. ITC data revealed that Dutch smokers were less 
often aware of societal disapproval of smoking than smokers in other high- 
income countries, at 63% compared to between 72% and 89% (ITC 
Project, 2015). Furthermore, only 22% of Dutch smokers often thought 
about the harm they did to themselves, while 33% of smokers in Germany, 
and between 43% and 56% in other high-income countries, did. The per-
centage of smokers who often thought about the harm they might inflict 
on others was extremely low in the Netherlands too (9%), and the 
Netherlands had the second-lowest percentage (21%) of smokers with a 
“negative” or “very negative” opinion of smoking, among the 13 ITC 
countries where this was measured (the German figure was 20%). All other 
countries scored between 45% and 62%.
How can the low concern among Dutch smokers and relatively tolerant 
norms towards smoking be explained? One explanation is the previously 
discussed “feminine” cooperative culture in the Netherlands that supports 
a tolerant approach towards smokers, which does not go well with confron-
tational media campaigns. For example, in the 1980s, the “Meinsma 
approach” (relentlessly hammering on health risks; more on Lenze Meinsma 
in Chap. 9) was replaced by a “more positive approach, where the advan-
tages of non-smoking as part of an attractive lifestyle, are promoted” (WVC, 
1984). In 1986, the government stated that awareness campaigns were 
important, but it wanted non-governmental organisations to run them, 
because the government said it was “handicapped,” hinting to the societal 
and political sensitivity of paternalistic lifestyle campaigns (WVC, 1986, 
p. 174). Since the 1950s, when the serious health consequences of smoking 
became clear, only one health risk campaign has ever been run in the 
Netherlands. This was part of a EU-funded project that made it possible to 
adapt the Canadian campaign Joanne for use in Dutch cinemas, featuring a 
young girl looking in a mirror, watching in horror as her face wrinkles and 
turns grey because of lifelong smoking. This campaign made a tremendous 
impression on smokers, who still recalled the campaign, many years later, 
when asked to give examples of anti-smoking campaigns.
The lack of hard-hitting media campaigns to deter smoking is a remark-
able aspect of Dutch tobacco control, since many countries run confron-
tational anti-smoking media campaigns. They are an integral part of 
national tobacco control strategies and not regarded as particularly prob-
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lematic in other countries. There is abundant evidence that, at least in the 
field of tobacco control, campaigns that make an emotional appeal can be 
effective (Biener et al., 2006; Borland & Balmford, 2003; Durkin et al., 
2012; National Cancer Institute, 2008; Timmers & Van der Wijst, 2007; 
Wakefield, Loken, & Hornik, 2010). The Australian “Every cigarette is 
doing you damage” campaign targeted at adult smokers to quit is notori-
ous in this regard. Campaign exposure has been associated with increased 
negative thoughts about smoking (Borland & Balmford, 2003) and con-
tributed to reductions in smoking prevalence in Australia (Wakefield et al., 
2008). This campaign was adapted for use in other countries as well, for 
example, in 2003 in Norway. Box 7.1 (Chap. 7) discusses the Dutch gov-
ernment’s reluctance to run such national media campaigns to deter 
smoking, which has to do with the belief that media campaigns offer 
expensive but ineffective ways to influence lifestyle.
smokiNg rates
When the ratio of smokers to non-smokers changes in favour of non- 
smokers, public support for policy restrictions increases. For example, 
when Health Minister Els Borst introduced her revision of the Tobacco 
Act in the parliament, she legitimised this by referring to the fact that 
already  two-thirds of the adult population was non-smoking by then.3 
Countries with relatively few smokers, like Finland, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia, have the most comprehensive tobacco control policies. 
“Policy follows prevalence” said Kenneth Warner, an international tobacco 
control expert (quoted in D. J. Reid, Killoran, McNeill, and Chambers 
(1992)), and several ecological studies which used the country as a unit of 
analysis found that European countries with more stringent tobacco 
 policies have fewer smokers—although the association is not very strong 
(Martinez-Sanchez et  al., 2010; Willemsen, Kiselinova, Nagelhout, 
Joossens, & Knibbe, 2012). The direction of causality is not clear and 
obviously goes in two directions, as is captured in the flywheel model. In 
any case, within the problem stream of policymaking, data on the propor-
tion of smokers among adults and adolescents constitute a crucial element 
in policymakers’ appreciation of the tobacco problem (see Chap. 10 on 
problem identification).
From an epidemiological perspective, tobacco’s worldwide spread is, as 
depicted by WHO, an epidemic (Roemer, 1982). The tobacco epidemic 
took many decades to unfold and will take even more time to resolve. 
Countries progress through the various stages of the epidemic in remark-
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ably similar ways. A widely acclaimed model describes how the epidemic 
diffuses through populations (Lopez, Collishaw, & Piha, 1994; Thun, 
Peto, Boreham, & Lopez, 2012). In developed countries during the 
1950s and 1960s, more than half of the population smoked, while in the 
higher strata of these societies almost all men smoked. High-income and 
male subpopulations were the first to become addicted to smoking, fol-
lowed by lower income groups and females two decades later. After a 
period of gradual increase in smoking, prevalence reached a peak 
40–50  years after onset, then slowly diminished. This pattern is clearly 
discernible in the Netherlands. In 1958 the cigarette epidemic had already 
reached its peak in the male population: 90% of men and 29% of women 
smoked. The proportion of male smokers in the Netherlands was excep-
tionally high: for example, in the United Kingdom 60% of the male popu-
lation smoked in the 1950s and 1960s (Reid et  al., 1992). Figure  4.2 
shows how the proportion of smokers in the population has gone down 
since 1957.4 The decline follows a similar pattern as in other developed 












































Fig. 4.2 Smoking prevalence in men and women since 1958. Sources: STIVORO 
(2012); Verdurmen, Monshouwer, and van Laar (2015). Note: whether one is a 




decline from the 1980s onwards (OECD, 2014; Thun et al., 2012). In the 
Netherlands the percentage of women smoking peaked around 1970, fol-
lowed by a reduction and convergence to male smoking levels in later 
decades. Internationally, the steep decline in smoking between 1960 and 
1980 has been explained by widespread media attention to official govern-
mental reports which showed that smoking causes death and disease 
(Farquhar, Magnus, & Maccoby, 1981; Reid et  al., 1992). The Dutch 
public was confronted with similar messages in the media (see also Chap. 
10) and many quit smoking despite the lack of governmental campaigns, 
while tobacco lost its aura of innocence and politicians called on the gov-
ernment to act.
In the 1980s smoking prevalence in the Netherlands was relatively high 
compared to other EU countries (European Commission, 1987). While 
the EU average was 37% in 1987, 44% of the Dutch population still 
smoked; only Denmark was higher with 46%. Although the decline in the 
general smoking rate followed roughly the same path in the Netherlands 
as in other developed countries (see Fig.  4.3 for a comparison with 
England and Canada), there was a noteworthy increase in the proportion 
of smokers between 1988 and 1996 (from 32% to 35%) in the Netherlands. 
Four years later, in 2000, the smoking rate was still higher than in 1988. 
In those years the Netherlands was very much a smoker’s country. With 
2951 cigarettes consumed per adult per year, the Netherlands ranked 
third highest in the EU for consumption, comparable to Russia and 
Greece and much higher than neighbours Belgium, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom (Gallus, Schiaffino, La Vecchia, Townsend, & Fernandez, 
2006). The proportion of male smokers in 2002 was still slightly higher 
than the EU-25 average, while female smoking was among the five highest 
(Zaton ́ski, Przewoźniak, Sulkowska, West, & Wojtyła, 2012).
Figure 4.3 shows how smoking rates declined in the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and Canada. While smoking rates were about the same 
around 1988, in later years the United Kingdom and Canada did better. 
The long-term background rate fell by less than 0.5% per year between 
1990 and 2010 in the Netherlands (Willemsen, 2010), while prevalence 
fell by around 0.75% in Canada and 0.7% in the United Kingdom (Royal 
College of Physicians, 2016).
Some other countries (the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and 
the United States) also witnessed a faltering in the decline of smoking in 
the beginning to mid-1990s (Wakefield & Chaloupka, 1998), but not as 
distinct nor as prolonged as in the Netherlands, where it continued until 
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2000. It is no coincidence that this 12-year period of standstill coincided 
with a period of virtually no tobacco control interventions that might 
have impacted on smoking rates, while tobacco industry influence was 
strong both behind the scenes and in the media (Willemsen, 2017). 
Tobacco industry tolerance campaigns re-normalised smoking (see Chap. 
8). The tobacco control flywheel had clearly lost its energy. The period of 
stagnation ended when 800,000 smokers made a quit attempt during a 
large- scale mass media quit campaign at the turn of the millennium. The 
revised Tobacco Act in 2002 led to a further reduction of the smoking 
rate from 31% in 2002 to 28% in 2004, after which it continued to fall. 



















































Fig. 4.3 Trends in adult smoking prevalence (men and women combined) in the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Sources: United Kingdom: 
General Lifestyle Survey; Canada: Canadian Tobacco Use Monitoring Survey 
(CTUMS); Netherlands: Dutch Continuous Survey of Smoking Habits (COR). 
Note: The way smoking prevalence is measured differs slightly between countries. 
In the United Kingdom, all aged 16+ were asked, “Do you smoke cigarettes at all 
nowadays?” while in the Netherlands all aged 15+ were asked the question, “Do 
you ever smoke or do you never smoke?” In Canada all 15+ aged were asked, “At 
the present time do you smoke cigarettes every day, occasionally, or not at all?” 
Smokers are daily smokers and non-daily smokers combined
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almost the same as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) average reduction (−17.9%) (Bruggink, 2013). 
After the “correction” initiated by Minister Borst, the Netherlands was on 
a trajectory towards a non-smoking society at about the same pace as 
most other developed countries, but in more recent years smoking rates 
have seemed to rise again, from 24.5% in 2012 to 26.3% in 2015 (Van 
Laar & Van Ooyen-Houben, 2016).
Between 1992 and 1996 youth smoking increased (Fig. 4.4), despite a 
shift from daily smoking to less frequent smoking in this period (Willemsen, 
2005). Since 1996, youth smoking rates declined almost uninterruptedly. 
“Regular smoking” in youth (10- to 19-year-olds) is defined as having 
smoked at least once in the past month.
The reduction in adolescent smoking seems to follow the general trend 
seen earlier in the adult population, including a period of stagnation in the 
1990s. When adult smoking rates go down, youth rates follow; when 
adult smoking goes up, youth smoking again follows. Some have noted 
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Fig. 4.4 Trends in youth smoking (10–19 year olds) between 1992 and 2013 in 
the Netherlands. Sources: STIVORO (2012); Verdurmen, Monshouwer, and Van 
Laar (2014)
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(Chapman, 2007; Gielkens-Sijstermans et al., 2009; Hill, 1999). Young 
people are particularly sensitive to changes in what is regarded as “cool” in 
the wider society. Smoking has become less attractive since tobacco adver-
tising was banned in 2002, and smokers were increasingly seen as social 
pariahs when smoking was banned in workplaces in that same year. Part of 
the explanation may also be that when parents quit smoking, fewer chil-
dren are exposed to tobacco products at home and parents no longer are 
exemplars for smoking (Den Exter Blokland, Engels, Hale III, Meeus, & 
Willemsen, 2004).
PubliC suPPort for tobaCCo CoNtrol
The flywheel model assumes that, at least in modern democracies, the 
adoption of policies reflects what the broader society wants. Tobacco pol-
icy generally reflects shifts in public opinion (Kagan & Nelson, 2001). 
Empirical evidence from US states has shown that when public opinion 
becomes more supportive of smoking bans, states are more likely to adopt 
them (Pacheco, 2012). Politicians know this and push for more stringent 
measures when they feel that society is ready. The battle is thus fought first 
in society, after which it moves to the political arena. When public opinion 
changes, politicians follow. As one former civil servant put it, “It is a very 
slow process to get societal support. Politics usually follow trends in soci-
ety, because this assures that you remain in office and can come back again 
… it rarely happens that policy makers actively want to change public 
opinion.”5
The need to have support from the general public is well known 
among Dutch politicians and policymakers. They routinely refer to pub-
lic support when they defend or reject tobacco control policy proposals. 
For example, State Secretary for Health Joop van der Reijden (VVD) 
explicitly made decisions to intensify tobacco control contingent on the 
political discussion in parliament, which “shall made clear whether the 
climate is ripe for a really powerful policy” (WVC, 1986). In those days, 
the civil servants at the Ministry of Health who developed the first 
tobacco control policy measures complained that they did not feel sup-
ported by society or the medical sector.6 Twenty years later, when 
Health Minister Borst defended her tobacco control bill in the senate, 
she said, “I believe that exceptions [to the ban] can only disappear when 
we have a totally different culture in the Netherlands, a culture in which 
nobody, exceptions granted, smokes. … We must not make things look 
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nicer than they are. So we have to make exceptions for certain sectors.”7 
In 2005 the government looked back and remarked that the 1999 
revised Tobacco Act “attempted to catch up with the changes in how 
society regards smoking” (VWS, 2005). State Secretary Martin van Rijn 
said in 2014, “A basic assumption [of my policy making] is that I want 
to carry a consistent and effective policy that has support from society” 
(Van Rijn, 2014). Even Dutch parliamentarians who are vehemently in 
favour of stricter tobacco control cannot easily propagate policies that 
lack general support from the public. Carla Dik-Faber, parliamentarian 
for the Christian Union (CU), reacted to the idea of banning smoking 
on terraces: “This topic is very much debated in society. At the moment 
there is insufficient political support. I can imagine that at one point 
terraces will become smoke-free. However, it is still too early for this. 
Political decision making must follow developments in society” (Van 
der Laan, 2015).
In 1987, when most EU countries had not yet adopted major 
tobacco policy measures, the European Commission (EC) wanted to 
know how supportive Europeans were of tobacco control measures 
(European Commission, 1987). The Dutch population answered 
somewhat below average on all measures, with a relatively low level of 
support for an advertising ban. The low support for tobacco control in 
the Netherlands has become more pronounced in later years. A 
Eurobarometer poll from 2005 showed that the Dutch were not very 
supportive of a smoking ban in bars (TNS Opinion & Social, 2006): 
only 46% of the total population was “somewhat or totally in favour”—
one of the lowest ever levels of support in the EU. In 2009 when the 
EC conducted another poll (TNS Opinion & Social, 2010), the 
Netherlands emerged as a country with little general support for 
tobacco control measures, scoring the absolute lowest on plain packag-
ing and on banning the sale of tobacco via the internet. The poll was 
repeated in 2012 (TNS Opinion & Social, 2012) and showed little 
change in the Dutch position: the Netherlands still had the least sup-
port for plain packaging of all 27 EU countries.
What might explain such low levels of support? According to the 
flywheel model, public support reflects dominant social norms in soci-
ety. Social norms depend on knowledge about the problems associated 
with smoking (particularly from passive smoking) and level of accep-
tance of these problems by the public. Given that the level of concern 
is relatively low in the Netherlands, as was shown previously, one would 
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expect that support for tobacco control is also low. This is indeed the 
case. I already referred to the striking data from the ITC project about 
the relative lack of concern among Dutch smokers about tobacco and 
health. I found a strong correlation in Dutch national survey data 
between believing that passive smoking is harmful and support for 
smoking bans (Willemsen, 2006). This association was consistent 
among both highly educated and lower educated groups—an associa-
tion also found in other countries. With some colleagues I analysed 
Eurobarometer data from 2009, and what stood out was that smokers 
who lived in countries with comprehensive tobacco policies were more 
likely to support tobacco control measures, and such support was 
greater when they were more concerned about whether their smoking 
harms non-smokers (Willemsen, Kiselinova, et al., 2012). In an older 
study we had found that Dutch non-smoking employees were more 
likely to ask co-workers not to smoke when they had more negative 
beliefs about the health consequences of passive smoking (Willemsen 
& De Vries, 1996). Compliance with smoking bans is higher if smokers 
are more supportive of them and if they are more aware of the health 
consequences of passive smoking (G.  E. Nagelhout, de Vries, et  al., 
2012).
CoNClusioN
Smoking rates have declined following patterns similar to those in other 
developed countries, typified by a fast decline in the 1960s and 1970s and 
a slower decline from the 1980s onwards. However, during the 1990s 
smoking rates stagnated then rose again. In these years the Netherlands 
was a smoker’s country, with more cigarettes consumed than in almost 
every other EU country. Smoking was socially well accepted, which might 
be partially attributed to the success of tobacco industry’s tolerance cam-
paigns from 1970 until the end of the 1990s (see Chap. 8 for details about 
industry tolerance campaigns). These were exceptionally well received in 
the Netherlands, since the Dutch cherished the collective idea of being a 
tolerant people. There was a 12-year standstill in smoking rates 
(1988–2000), which coincided with virtually no action from the govern-
ment to regulate tobacco. Only after the revised Tobacco Act was imple-
mented in 2002 did people start to quit again. Smoking rates have 
continued to go down since then, and smoking among youth followed the 
example of the adults and also has gone down.
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Societal support for most tobacco control measures has been relatively 
low compared with other EU countries. Support was lowest for confron-
tational tobacco control elements, which might be explained by “femi-
nine” cooperative value orientations in Dutch national culture. The 
smoking bans implemented in 2004 were more smoker-friendly than 
those in other countries, reflecting such values. The Dutch government 
has been reluctant to run health awareness media campaigns, which are 
seen as ineffective, costly, and paternalistic. The lack of health awareness 
campaigns contributed to the relatively low levels of concern about smok-
ing and the less than optimal support for tobacco control in even today’s 
society.
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CHAPTER 5
Making Tobacco Control Policy Work: Rules 
of the Game
Tobacco policy is made by actors who operate in an institutional environ-
ment with specific characteristics (Scharpf, 1997), and differences in these 
characteristics can explain much of the variation in tobacco control 
between countries. Governments and parliaments, and their bureaucra-
cies, have formal and informal “rules of the game.” Informal rules include 
conventions, unwritten procedures, and expectations. Formal rules are 
official and legal procedures. While the contextual factors discussed in 
Chap. 4 are relatively dynamic and amenable to change by tobacco control 
interest groups, the rules of the game that are the subject of the current 
chapter are more static. In terms of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 
they are the constitutional structural factors (Breton, Richard, Gagnon, 
Jacques, & Bergeron, 2008; Sabatier, 2007) which determine how coun-
tries differ from each other—less about how countries change over time, 
although institutional factors and conditions can gradually change. 
Knowledge of these factors is not only key to understanding why tobacco 
policymaking is most of the time a tedious and slow process; it also helps 
to understand how tobacco interest groups may influence policymaking 
and why some groups are more successful at this than others.
Groups of countries that are politically and culturally similar and have 
comparable institutional arrangements are sometimes referred to as “fami-
lies of nations”. Policies in countries that are similar with respect to cul-
ture, institutional make-up, and economic development tend to converge 
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(Lenschow, Liefferink, & Veenman, 2005). Convergence between coun-
tries within the same family has been shown to occur for tobacco control, 
with similar countries choosing similar policies and adopting policies at 
roughly the same tempo (Studlar, 2007). The Netherlands is considered 
part of the continental (Western European) family, consisting of countries 
like Belgium, Germany, and Austria (Castles & Obinger, 2008; Obinger 
& Wagschal, 2001). Other families are an Anglo-Saxon (English-speaking) 
group (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United 
States), a cluster of Scandinavian countries, and a peripheral group of 
European countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece). The continental fam-
ily, to which the Netherlands belongs, is characterised by the central posi-
tion of Christian Democrats, a “politics of the middle way” (combining 
social democratic and liberal principles), and political cultures that are ori-
ented towards bargaining and compromise seeking. This chapter describes 
this system. It starts with a discussion of the two most important aspects 
of Dutch policymaking: corporatism (pressure groups incorporated into 
the policymaking process) and the continuous need to seek consensus in a 
multi-party political system. The reader’s attention is directed to the ten-
sion between party ideology and tobacco control policymaking. Separate 
sections deal with the process of drafting new legislation and the opportu-
nities available for advocates to influence this process through lobbying, 
either directly (targeting civil servants of the ministry), or through parlia-
ment. Finally, our attention turns to two long-term processes that gradu-
ally undermined the position of the central government as the main 
producer of tobacco control: deregulation and decentralisation.
Corporatism
Dutch pragmatic policymaking is sometimes called interactive governance, 
but most often it is referred to as corporatism (Van Tulder, 1999). The 
Netherlands has a conservative-corporatist model of the welfare state 
(Fenger, 2007) and is a prime example of a corporatist country, where 
policymakers incorporate interests of legitimate stakeholders into the 
decision- making process. In a review of 23 studies that assessed the level 
of corporatism in developed countries, the Netherlands ranked fourth on 
corporatism after Austria, Norway, and Sweden (Siaroff, 1999).
Corporatism has been defined as “institutionalized and privileged inte-
gration of organized interests in the preparation and/or implementation 
of public policies” (Christiansen et al., 2010). In a corporatist structure, 
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government and interest groups cooperate rather than compete (Andeweg 
& Irwin, 2009). Pressure groups do not need to influence the govern-
ment from the outside since they are incorporated in the policymaking 
process—hence the name “corporatism.” If the government formulates a 
new policy, parties such as trade unions, business representative organisa-
tions, and societal organisations—with an obvious interest in the policy—
are routinely invited into the policymaking process. Some groups obtain a 
privileged monopoly over a policy topic, and these chosen few enjoy close 
relationships with state representatives. The government bargains and 
seeks compromise with these groups, trusting that this will result in “bet-
ter” policy outcomes—more equal, flexible, or more effective. In corpo-
ratist systems a government is most likely to consult the tobacco industry 
on new tobacco control initiatives. This contrasts with pluralistic democ-
racies, where interest groups freely interact with each other and compete 
for power (a “may the strongest party win” approach) and influence policy 
from the outside. Sometimes the term “lobbyism” is used for pluralist 
systems (Rommetvedt, Thesen, Christiansen, & Nørgaard, 2012). 
Outsider anti-tobacco lobbying groups thrive best in open and competi-
tive pluralist environments (Studlar, 2007). Countries with strong plural-
istic characteristics are New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, 
Italy, Ireland, Canada, and the United States (Siaroff, 1999).
A feature of the corporatist system is that interest groups are more or 
less routinely invited by the government to comment on policy proposals. 
In the Netherlands, involvement of stakeholders is historically organised 
in an informal manner. Consultation is confidential and open only to 
invited stakeholders. This practice has benefitted the tobacco industry tre-
mendously in the past (see Chap. 8 for examples), but is currently chang-
ing. In 2011, the cabinet announced that it wanted to use open internet 
consultation rounds more often, in addition to the traditional practice of 
invitation-only consultation—although the ministries are still only com-
mitted to submit 10% of their regulatory proposals for internet consulta-
tion. Recent consultations on tobacco covered the implementation of the 
European Union (EU) tobacco product directive, adaptations of tobacco 
taxation, and an intended ban on the display of tobacco products.1
In the Netherlands corporatism is grounded in Christian Democratic 
values and associated political principles, two of which are particularly rel-
evant. The first is subsidiarity: the principle that decision-making should 
take place at the lowest possible (administrative) level. It means that regu-
lation by the state is only appropriate if it is not possible to solve matters 
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at regional or local levels. The second principle is the idea that het 
maatschappelijke middenveld (civil society) is needed for political support 
and to have effective policies (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, pp. 177–178). 
This goes back to the nineteenth-century Calvinist doctrine of soevereinit-
eit in eigen kring (sovereignty in one’s own circle), the idea that organisa-
tions determine their own fate independent of government. Christian 
Democrats believe that organisations such as churches, unions, welfare 
institutions, and voluntary organisations must not become too dependent 
on government support but must retain responsibility and have their own 
decision-making powers, and that this will benefit social cohesion. These 
historical principles were re-introduced by Prime Minister Balkenende—
an influential ideologist in the Christian Democratic Party’s think tank—. 
His idea that government must work together in partnership with business 
and society was a guiding principle in the 2002–2010 cabinets. In 2007 
Health Minister Ab Klink, former director of the think tank of the Christian 
Democratic Party and co-author with Balkenende on CDA position 
papers, introduced it as the cornerstone of his prevention policy. During 
the debate on the Tobacco Act on 31 May 2001, Siem Buijs of the 
Christian Democratic Party (CDA) debated with Rob Oudkerk (Labour 
Party) on the need for an advertising ban instead of continued self- 
regulation. Oudkerk attacked Buijs for hiding behind self-regulation and 
being naïve about the real intentions of the industry: “Keep on dreaming, 
CDA, this is not how it works,” Buijs replied:
You keep on dreaming, Mister Oudkerk, that we can influence behaviour in 
this country through laws and regulations. Forget it! We see this in many 
places. This is not what the CDA wants with shared responsibility. … We 
want behaviour to be influenced from the bottom up. It should not be con-
trolled from the top down through laws, after which you can relax because 
everything is settled. I believe that is a sham. … I want to say this to you: “I 
have a dream.” It is a nice dream and I want to make it true. It assumes 
behavioural change and attitude change and not an iron rod and a stick.
In corporatist arrangements, if an interest group is not recognised by 
the government as a legitimate negotiation partner, it can be a voice in the 
wilderness. This is what happened to the Cancer Society’s director Dr 
Meinsma in the 1970s, and explains why the confrontational, more aggres-
sive lobbying strategy that was adopted around 2008 by the Dutch tobacco 
control coalition was ultimately ineffective and eventually contributed to 
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the downfall of STIVORO (see Chap. 9). The national corporatist charac-
ter explains why the Netherlands does not have a strong tradition of the 
type of grass roots activist movements that were crucial to advancing 
smoke-free legislation in the United States and Australia. This is not to say 
that civil lawsuits and citizens’ initiatives play a marginal role in the Dutch 
system. They have an important role in voicing societal concerns and may 
occasionally succeed in putting tobacco on the political agenda, especially 
when they use the weapon of legal action (see the section on venue shop-
ping, later in this chapter).
Consensus seeking
The Netherlands has long been one of the purest examples of a consensus 
democracy (Lijphart, 1999). This means that the political landscape is so 
fragmented that no single party is likely to achieve a majority position in 
parliament. This sets the Netherlands apart from majoritarian democracies 
such as the United Kingdom and the United States, where governments 
can impose policy in a top-down manner as they do not need to obtain 
consensus from rival political parties (although this has changed somewhat 
in the United Kingdom in more recent years). The fragmented Dutch 
political landscape has its origins dating back to times when the Netherlands 
was divided into the four religious or ideological “pillars”: Catholics, 
Protestant-Christians, Socialists, and liberals or neutrals. Because no group 
was large enough for a majority, they needed to cooperate to maintain a 
stable and viable society. This was done by a process of consultation 
between spokespersons from the four groups. Specific but mainly informal 
“rules of the game” were developed and abided by to safeguard demo-
cratic stability (Lijphart, 1999).
The four pillars no longer exist, but the political landscape is still frag-
mented. After the Second World War the lower chamber of parliament 
consisted of six political parties roughly conforming to the traditional pil-
lars, but the number of parties had increased to 13 by 2017. Since govern-
ments prefer to have a majority in both chambers of parliament, they 
usually need two or three parties, sometimes even four, to form a 
government.
Minority cabinets are rare in the Netherlands. Coalitions are constructed 
in such a way that the government has an obedient majority and a relatively 
powerless minority in parliament. This can work in two ways. If the govern-
ment presents a coalition agreement that includes a strong tobacco control 
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paragraph, parliament can only delay its passage as the paragraph is accepted 
by the parties that make up the majority. Parliament cannot vote against it 
without risking the fall of the cabinet. On average, less than one govern-
ment bill is defeated by parliament per year (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009). 
However, if a strong tobacco control paragraph is missing from the coalition 
agreement and the government is unwilling to advance tobacco control, the 
power of the parliament to push for tobacco control is extremely limited 
because it has little chance to obtain sufficient votes to reach a majority.
Because of its multi-party nature, the cabinet must seek approval from 
a coalition of parties for important decisions, especially about sensitive 
matters. Because of the continuous need to secure support from parties 
that have different ideologies and interests, yes or no decisions are avoided 
and politicians go to great lengths to avoid having identifiable winners and 
losers, since this could create resentment and would cause problems for 
future decisions where one might need support from the opponents of the 
day (Koopmans, 2011). The Dutch version of consensus-based policy-
making became widely known as the polder model during the late 1990s, 
when employer organisations, trade unions, and the government made 
compromises regarding wages and social security, and the astonishing pos-
itive effect on the national economy attracted international attention. 
Nowadays polderen is used more broadly, referring to the process of find-
ing compromises between political parties or between government and 
civil society. The first policy reflex to a new social problem is still to find a 
solution that does right by as many stakeholders as possible.
The Christian Democratic ideals of subsidiarity and the reliance on sup-
port from civil society and the associated tradition of polderen mean that 
informal self-restraint and self-regulatory agreements with industry and 
other interested parties are preferred. The government feels most comfort-
able with voluntary agreements by the sector as the first policy option, 
before eventually proposing and trying legislation. This has happened time 
and again in tobacco control policy making, and continues to be the first 
reflex of Dutch politicians, many of whom believe it has advantages. These 
were summarised in 1996 by the minister of economic affairs in a debate 
in parliament over tobacco policy:
Self-regulation certainly has advantages: it makes it possible to have tailor- 
made solutions for each sector, it creates flexibility, and changes in agree-
ments can be made relatively quickly because it is not necessary to come to 




In a parliamentary debate in 2001 about the Tobacco Act, Minister of 
Health Els Borst called self-regulation “the royal way” for government.3 
The preference for self-regulation is held by political parties in the centre 
and on the right flank of the Dutch parliament (who usually hold the 
majority of seats), while parties from the left question it as they are more 
suspicious of the intentions of businesses.
Consensus Seeking in the Cabinet
Dutch ministers wear two hats, one as a minister who has tasks, responsi-
bilities, and challenges unique to his or her department, the other ideo-
logical, resulting from representing a political party. After the breakdown 
of the ideal of pillars, consensus seeking became concentrated more and 
more within the cabinet itself, where departmental ministers compete and 
negotiate with their ministerial colleagues and political ideologies are 
taken into consideration. From the 1960s on, the cabinet became increas-
ingly politicised (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, pp. 142–145). A state secre-
tary and a minister in the same department are often from different 
political parties, so that the coalition parties are represented in a balanced 
manner in the cabinet. Health ministers were most often from liberal or 
Christian parties (Table 5.1). Few have had a background in health: from 
1967, this has been the case in only 6 of 15 instances, and none has had a 
medical profile since 2002 (Table 5.1). Another point to note is that until 
1994 tobacco control was handled by state secretaries (junior ministers). 
This gave tobacco control a none too strong negotiating position, because 
state secretaries are not present at the weekly cabinet meetings and do not 
have the right to vote. They attend only when a topic in their area is being 
discussed.
The cabinet is further politicised through the practice of holding party 
meetings of political parties’ ministers and state secretaries with their lead-
ers and party chairpersons in the second and first chamber the day before 
each weekly cabinet meeting to prepare for next day’s agenda. Party disci-
pline may be enforced so that ministers vote along party lines.
Coalition agreements
After an election, the political leaders of the parties of a new ruling coali-
tion draft a set of policy intentions. As in other multi-party countries, such 
coalition agreements are the result of a sometimes long and difficult nego-
tiation between party leaders and are subject to extensive lobbying from 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































interests groups. The outcome is “a register of policies that coalition par-
ties wish ministers to implement” (Moury, 2011). About two-thirds of 
pledges formulated in Dutch coalition agreements are transferred into 
government decisions, according to one study that examined this for two 
cabinets (Lubbers III, 1989–1994; Kok II, 1998–2002) (Moury, 2011). 
Coalition partners tend to negotiate policy intentions for the next four 
years at a rather high level of detail so that there is little room for the new 
government to decide on new policy except for unexpected issues and 
responses to crises. If we disregard decisions about things such as crises, 
Dutch ministers make less than 20% of policy decisions spontaneously. 
They must promise to adhere to the coalition agreement before they are 
sworn in, and they sometimes refer to it as their “Holy Bible” (Andeweg 
& Irwin, 2009).4 Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Labour Party politician and former 
Minister of Finance, described such a coalition agreement as “a sad thing. 
It lists many far-reaching policy intentions, intentions that are devised and 
negotiated by a small group of political insiders behind closed doors. Civil 
society and science are not taken into consideration, so that it has no non- 
political checks and balances” (Slob & Staman, 2012).
Tobacco control was mentioned three times in the coalition agree-
ments of the 15 cabinets since 1972 (Elsevier, 2010; Van den Braak & 
Van den Berg, 2017). The first was in the second cabinet of Labour 
Party Prime Minister Kok (1998–2002). Tobacco policy was called a 
priority: tobacco control was to be intensified and it was announced that 
when the code of conduct regarding tobacco advertising ended (in May 
1999), the European directive on tobacco advertising would be imple-
mented. This gave Health Minister Els Borst a strong mandate to realise 
her Tobacco Act, since it meant that the Liberal–Conservative Volkspartij 
voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) 
(VVD), part of the ruling coalition, was committed to the agreement 
and could not put up much of a fight. The second time that tobacco was 
mentioned was in the fourth cabinet of Christian Democratic Prime 
Minister Balkenende (2007–2010), in which the Labour Party also par-
ticipated. The tobacco control lobby succeeded in getting a sentence 
about a smoke-free hospitality sector in the coalition agreement that said 
that, in collaboration with the hospitality sector, the government would 
work towards a smoke-free hospitality sector. The next coalition between 
VVD and CDA (Rutte I) announced in 2010 in its coalition agreement 
that the smoking ban for bars would be relaxed because “in many small 
pubs, where there is no personnel employed, there is no need for a 
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smoking ban.” Rutte explained it in his public statement about the coali-
tion agreement: “We give responsibility back to the people in this coun-
try. No patronising, no untenable smoking bans in small cafés, and 
furthermore no unnecessary regulations” (Elsevier, 2010, p. 176). This 
was the outcome of a deal between the VVD and the CDA. The CDA 
would give up its wish for smoke-free bars in exchange for an assurance 
that it would be compensated in other dossiers.5
seCuring long-term tobaCCo Control poliCy
Dutch tobacco control policymaking is a drawn-out process. The 
Ministry of Health pushes for a stricter and more effective tobacco pol-
icy, supported by tobacco control organisations. This is most effective 
when there is sufficient collective memory and capacity within the 
bureaucracy to support long-term policymaking, independent of the 
whim of the day and the ever-changing ideologies of Dutch govern-
ments. However, this capacity is restricted. In the past, institutional pol-
icy continuity was supported by the fact that high-level officials remained 
at their posts when governments changed, so that policy knowledge was 
preserved. However, since the emergence of the Algemene Bestuursdienst 
(senior civil service) at the end of the 1990s, top-level bureaucrats (sec-
retaries-general, directors-general, and inspectors-general) are supposed 
to change position every four or five years in order to reduce compart-
mentalisation. This has led to the emergence of career civil servants: 
managers with little affinity for the subject matter. According to one 
person, “that’s the big story of these top levels who rotate faster and 
faster so there’s less and less collective memory. This plays into the hands 
of the industry.”6 In more recent years, institutional memory within the 
tobacco control unit of the Ministry of Health has been further ham-
pered when civil servants from lower levels also changed positions. 
Between 2008 and 2013 there was much turnover, with civil servants 
“doing” tobacco control for short periods of time.7
One way of overcoming problems of such institutional amnesia is to 
rely on organisations and individuals outside the governmental bureau-
cracy to provide continuity and the preservation of knowledge (Smith, 
2013). In the Netherlands, STIVORO traditionally fulfilled this role, and 
new civil servants in the Ministry of Health could quickly become familiar 




One mechanism that supports policy continuity from one administra-
tion to the next is the practice of introductory dossiers, presented to a new 
minister on the first day in office. They are written by high-level civil ser-
vants and are a list of policy intentions, unresolved issues, and pressing 
matters that need to be solved in the short- and mid-term. Introductory 
dossiers are also an attempt by the bureaucratic system to assure that a 
minister stays as close as possible to mid- and long-term policy issues.
Compromises between ministries
While tobacco control policy is subject to compromises between political 
parties and between the government and interest groups, compromises 
are also sought between different ministries: particularly between the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, which protects business interests, and the 
Ministry of Health, which protects public health. Until the mid-1990s 
tobacco policy was jointly determined by these two departments, after 
which it became the prime responsibility of the Ministry of Health. Health 
Minister Borst’s tobacco policy document in 1996 was the last one co- 
signed by both ministers. This signified an important transformation from 
an economic to a public health-dominated perspective on the tobacco 
problem. A similar handing over of responsibilities from trade to health 
has occurred in other high-income countries (Cairney, Studlar, & 
Mamudu, 2012): in the United Kingdom, for instance, such a shift took 
place in 2003 (Cairney et al., 2012), six years later than in the Netherlands. 
In the Netherlands, despite this shift in formal responsibilities, the trade 
ministry continues to have a say in tobacco control policy (see Chap. 8). 
For one thing, the health minister, like every other minister, has to have 
support for plans and budget proposals from the full cabinet.
Proposals for new tobacco policy are usually made after frequent con-
sultation between civil servants from the Ministry of Health and their 
counterparts from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, but may also involve 
the Ministry of Social Affairs (in the case of smoking bans), the Ministry 
of Education (e.g., regarding youth prevention programmes and smoke- 
free schools), and the Ministry of Finance (for taxation of tobacco and 
requests for a larger budget). Tobacco taxation, which is the most effective 
tobacco control measure, is still firmly in the hands of the Ministry of 
Finance. Ministers do not want issues to be discussed in the cabinet while 
they are in their infancy, so civil servants from ministries negotiate with 
each other until a compromise is reached. By the time an issue is brought 
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to the cabinet meeting for approval, it has been thoroughly discussed and 
reworked by the bureaucracy.
Disputes that cannot be solved by civil servants at the highest level are 
negotiated in cabinet meetings. The practice of consultation with other 
ministries encourages slow decision-making and compromises. Minister Els 
Borst reflected on the long time it took to realise a new tobacco policy:
There are 15 different ministers in this cabinet, with different opinions, 
often based on personal beliefs about tobacco and alcohol policy. They fur-
ther have a specific political stance and these three political parties [which 
form the government] have different views on the matter. It is not the case 
that the minister of health and the minister of economic affairs can decide 
on tobacco policy quickly on their own. These discussions on tobacco con-
trol policy (…) have taken much time within the full cabinet.9
When debating in parliament, the minister is supposed to speak on 
behalf of the cabinet. Ministers mask disputes with colleague ministers. 
When Borst was trying to get her proposal for revision of the Tobacco Act 
adopted, she was in constant conflict with Minister of Economic Affairs 
Annemarie Jorritsma, who vigorously defended tobacco industry interests 
and sent Borst so-called blue letters10 urging her to tone down her policy 
intentions. In 2000 MP Jan Marijnissen (Socialist Party) initiated a debate 
in a fruitless attempt to get to the bottom of this.11
lobbying the bureauCraCy of the ministry
After a minister or state secretary has instructed the bureaucracy to draft a 
bill, civil servants go to work on it. The start of the creation of new legisla-
tion “is the most relevant part of decision-making, where most influence 
can be exerted” (Scheltema Beduin & Ter Weele, 2015). The process usu-
ally involves talks with stakeholders. Lobbying at this stage, before any 
formal public consultation may be organised, is regarded as the most 
important and opportune moment to influence decision-making, and this 
lobby is completely unchecked in the Netherlands (Scheltema Beduin & 
Ter Weele, 2015)—although this improved for tobacco control since the 
implementation of Article 5.3 of the FCTC (more on this in Chap. 6). As 
one Dutch tobacco industry lobbyist put it, “You need to sit with the 
person who has the white paper sheet in front of him” (Van der Poel & 
Gutter, 2011). In 2000 Socialist Party parliamentarian Jan Marijnissen 
questioned the fact that civil servants from the Ministry of Economic 
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Affairs gave suggestions about the wording and content of the proposal 
for the new Tobacco Act after being prepared by officials from the Ministry 
of Health—that had led to textual changes.12 Marijnissen suggested that 
the tobacco industry had influenced the policymaking process through the 
trade ministry. The health minister replied that “there are constantly con-
tacts about tobacco prevention policy between the Ministry of Health, 
Economic Affairs, sometimes Finance and sometimes Social Affairs. (…) 
These are normal, common contacts.” However, it is clear that these 
interdepartmental contacts gave the tobacco industry ample opportunity 
to influence tobacco control policy via contacts with civil servants.
Approval from other ministries is also sought at this stage. When the 
civil servants have written a draft legislation, it gets “in the  line” for 
approval and amendments by ever higher echelons of bureaucracy until it 
receives a paragraph of approval from the minister. It is then discussed in 
a small committee with the involved ministers. After that, it is discussed in 
the cabinet before being sent for advice to the Council of State and to a 
commission that checks whether the proposal imposes administrative bur-
dens to society and businesses. Only when it has passed these hurdles is it 
sent to the second chamber of parliament. It is then discussed in an expert 
committee of the parliament with the minister, after which it is subject to 
a plenary debate in parliament. Only then does the bill become public. 
The parliament can, and most often does, propose further amendments. 
Amendments need a simple majority vote. This process of amending and 
rewriting may take several years in the case of politically controversial 
issues such as tobacco policy, after which it is sent back to the second 
chamber for a final vote. After approval it is sent for scrutiny to the first 
chamber (the senate).
In the Netherlands about 250 bills are introduced each year, and they 
take on average 14 months to reach the adoption stage in the senate, but 
there have been cases where the process took more than 20 years (Andeweg 
& Irwin, 2009). The first Tobacco Act took four years (1984–1988) from 
presentation of the first draft to the second chamber and approval by the 
first chamber, but the preparatory work had started already around 1981. 
The second (amended) Tobacco Act took two years (1999–2001), but the 
political and bureaucratic process had already started in 1996 when the 
government presented its tobacco control policy intentions for scrutiny 
and debate in parliament.
It is a peculiarity of the Dutch legislative process that bills do not die 
with a change of government, as is the case in some countries. Despite the 
fact that drafting a piece of legislation does not stop when a cabinet resigns, 
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ministers are keen to complete the legislation process while they are still in 
power, since the survival of a bill is uncertain when a new majority coali-
tion takes over. It was crucial to the realisation of the second Tobacco Act 
that Minister of Health Els Borst remained in office for two full cabinet 
periods (1994–2002). In the last year she and her bureaucracy put much 
pressure on the process, supported by the tobacco control network, and 
she managed to get the act through the senate just before the cabinet 
resigned.
After legislation has been approved, the government can issue regula-
tions for the implementation phase. Governmental decrees (orders-in- 
council)13 and ministerial decrees14 are part of a higher-order legislative 
act, and are used for fine-tuning legislation during implementation. 
Formal approval by vote from the parliament is not necessary. This so- 
called delegated legislation was extensively used while working on the 
Tobacco Act and postponed the most controversial elements of the legisla-
tion to a later date. Decrees are often used since they make legislation 
possible while at the same time functioning as a big stick to put pressure 
on self-regulatory trajectories, for example, with the various temporary 
exceptions to the workplace smoking ban under the revised Tobacco Act.
lobbying parliament
The drafting of legislation is the joint constitutional responsibility of gov-
ernment and parliament. The second chamber of parliament (lower house, 
house of representatives) may take the initiative to draft a law and has the 
right to amend pieces of legislation that are proposed by the government, 
while the first chamber (upper house, senate) can only adopt or block 
proposals. It does not have the right to amend laws, although it can force 
the minister to reconsider a law, withdraw it, or send a revised version to 
the senate. In practice, the second chamber of parliament rarely uses its 
right of initiative (Van Outeren & Pergrim, 2015). New legislation stems 
mainly from the governmental bureaucracy, but this may be, to various 
degrees, adjusted and amended in parliament.
There is a strict party discipline in parliament. Votes on a proposal are 
by show of hands. Normally only the hands of the leaders of the parlia-
mentary factions are counted, since it is assumed that party members vote 
uniformly. A recent count revealed that in a period of four years 
(2008–2012), there were 11,000 cases where parliamentarians had to 
vote (Okhuijsen, 2012). Only in 64 cases was there a roll-call vote, where 
individuals were counted, and in only 25 of the 11,000 cases did members 
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of parliament cross the floor. In tobacco control policymaking, only once 
was there a situation where a member of parliament went against party 
discipline: when the lower house voted on the amendments to the Tobacco 
Act in 2002 by show of hands. Erica Terpstra broke VVD ranks and voted 
in favour of the bill.
Despite its relatively weak power position, opposition in the parliament 
has influenced tobacco control policy considerably. The main way parlia-
ment may influence legislation is to adopt resolutions (motions) during 
debates. In order to be tabled, draft resolutions have to be seconded by at 
least four other MP’s. The purpose is to urge a minister to act or to change 
intended legislation, for example, to come up with a new or additional 
proposal. Resolutions are not binding, but when a parliamentary majority 
approves them, ministers are expected to carry them out. Most resolutions 
introduced in the Dutch parliament to strengthen tobacco legislation have 
been defeated because of majority support for the government’s position. 
However, in some cases, resolutions received backing from both ruling 
and opposing parties, and were influential. For example, parliament 
strengthened tobacco control by including the worksite smoking ban in 
the amended Tobacco Act. On the other hand, it diluted or delayed 
tobacco control by opting for an age key system instead of a ban on 
tobacco vending machines, by setting the age limit for the sale of tobacco 
at 16 instead of 18 years, by demanding exemptions to the smoking ban 
and by rejecting new policy ideas such as graphic health warnings in 2006 
(discussed in Chap. 2). Box 5.1 presents more examples of resolutions that 
influenced tobacco control, illustrating how the parliament is an  important 
lobbying venue for both sides of tobacco control. On balance, the indus-
try lobby seems to have been most successful.
Box 5.1 Important pro- and anti-tobacco control parliamentary 
resolutions
In 1996 Marijnissen (Socialist Party) received a majority vote with 
backing from the Christian Democrats.15 The resolution requested 
that the government come up with a plan to restrict the sale of 
tobacco to specialty shops. To this day the government has not exe-
cuted the motion, but it is still occasionally referred to and in that 
manner continues to plague the government such as in 2013 when 
State Secretary Martin van Rijn was challenged by parliament to 
come up with a proposal to reduce the number of points of sale.16
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As in other democracies, Dutch parliamentarians have the right to ask 
oral or written questions to ministers, who are obliged to answer within 
three weeks to written questions. Questioning is therefore an important 
additional means for parliamentarians to control government and, through 
friendly members of parliament, for lobbyists to put pressure on the gov-
ernment. See Chap. 10 for a further discussion of parliamentary 
questions.
parliamentarians: targets for lobbyists
In the Netherlands lobbying is part of day-to-day politics. It is less regu-
lated than in many other countries in Europe (Scheltema Beduin & Ter 
Weele, 2015). At best, Dutch parliamentarians have only one personal 
staff member to help them with their complex tasks. They are among the 
least equipped parliamentarians in Europe, making them particularly vul-
nerable to lobbyists (Korteweg & Huisman, 2016, p. 17). Parliamentarians 
often rely on interest groups to help them control the government or draft 
In 1997 the VVD (with support from D66 and CDA) was success-
ful in weakening the advertising and promotion ban by exempting 
the brand names or trademarks of tobacco product already in use for 
non-tobacco merchandise before the law went into effect.17 The 
industry could continue circumventing the ban by promoting its 
brand through clothes, shoes, and the like.
In 2001 the Labour Party, together with the Socialist Party, man-
aged to round up a majority for a resolution demanding that the gov-
ernment make effective smoking cessation support eligible for financial 
reimbursement through the national health insurance plan.18 This 
eventually contributed to the adoption of the current reimbursement 
system, although it took ten years to be implemented.
In 2002 CDA Senator Werner received full support for a resolu-
tion that requested that the government find the necessary budget 
for media campaigns to help smokers quit smoking as an accompani-
ment to the workplace smoking ban.19 It was contingent on this 
condition that the senate was prepared to approve the Tobacco Act.
In 2005 conservative parties, with support from the Socialist and 
the Green-left parties, forced the government to consider ventilation 
as an alternative to smoking bans.20
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initiative laws, as they lack both the specialised knowledge and the time to 
gather all the facts and figures they need. How they process information 
they receive from lobbyists is at their own discretion—they do not have to 
declare or make this public.
There is increasing demand for lobbying transparency in Dutch society 
and the media. In 2012 the Algemene Rekenkamer (Court of Audit) noted 
that the information possessed by the tobacco sector is better than that of 
specialised parliamentarians (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2012).21 When for-
mer Health Minister Elco Brinkman became a lobbyist for Philip Morris 
and in this capacity contacted the state secretary for finance about a 
European taxation matter, this was exposed in the media. Soon afterwards 
Lea Bouwmeester, a Labour Party parliamentarian, announced that she 
was preparing a bill that would make it mandatory for the government to 
include a “lobbyists paragraph” in each proposal for new legislation.22 
Such a paragraph would require disclosure of lobbying contacts that 
occurred in the drafting process of laws and give details about who, on 
behalf of which organisation, visited which policymaker, with what inten-
tions; similar requirements exist in other jurisdictions, including the 
United States, England, and the European Union. Three years later the 
initiative law had still not been introduced. According to Bouwmeester, 
“writing such a proposal is complicated and the parliament has too little 
support for it” (Meeus, 2015).
In 2016 journalists revealed that one quarter of ex-politicians (minis-
ters and parliamentarians) had become lobbyists (Huisman, Kooistra, & 
Korteweg, 2016). In 2017 the cabinet responded for the first time to calls 
from the Labour Party for more transparency, and decided that there 
would be a restriction on ex-ministers and state secretaries accepting lob-
bying positions in their field of expertise for two years after leaving office. 
It has also become more difficult for tobacco industry lobbyists to contact 
government officials directly due to a stricter adherence by the govern-
ment to Article 5.3 FCTC (more on this in Chap. 6).
lobbying through Different Venues
The Netherlands is not a federal state like Canada, Australia, or the United 
States. Federal states offer interest groups ample opportunity to place 
tobacco control on the political agenda. In Australia, it has been noted 
that “Australian states are like dominos, and when one state takes the first 
step, the others will likely follow shortly after” (Bryan-Jones & Chapman, 
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2008). In the United States when tobacco control activists have no success 
at the central federal level, they simply turn their attention to local and 
state policymakers. The advantage of such “venue shopping” has been 
suggested as a reason why the United States has stronger tobacco control 
than Denmark, which has a single-venue system like that of the Netherlands 
(Albæk, Green-Pedersen, & Nielsen, 2007). While there seems some truth 
in the single/multiple venue explanation, it is overly simplistic, since 
counter-examples can be found easily. Germany has a federal system but is 
a tobacco control laggard, while a leader like New Zealand is a single- 
venue country. The next chapter will explore the increasing importance of 
European and global legislation for tobacco control and lobbying oppor-
tunities for venue shopping in an international context.
A special “shopping venue” is the judicial system. This has frequently 
been used by both sides (pro- and anti-tobacco advocacy groups) in the 
Netherlands, and has forced breakthroughs when policymaking was slow. 
A case that received much media exposure was the Nanny Nooijen case of 
2000: an employee of the Dutch postal office won a court case against her 
employer, who had failed to protect her from exposure to second-hand 
smoke from her colleagues. A few more court cases were needed before 
the workplace smoking ban finally made the legal route redundant, and 
one of these was in 2003, where the court forced Isala Clinics to finan-
cially compensate an employee with asthma for health damage as a conse-
quence of exposure to tobacco smoke.23 In March 2002, during the debate 
in the senate about the Tobacco Act, senator Ruers (SP) said, “I want to 
point out that the only real breakthrough in the Netherlands regarding 
the smoke-free workplace was the court case the previous year. An 
employee had the courage to start a lawsuit, which she won. This caused 
a tremendous change in the Netherlands. (…) A civilian accomplished 
more for society than all [other] measures taken together.”24 Another 
example of the importance of the legal system involved the non-smokers’ 
rights group Clean Air Netherlands (CAN), which won an important 
court case against the state in 2014. CAN successfully pleaded that small 
bars must not be exempted from the workplace smoking ban, referring to 
Article 8 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) 
treaty. But not only did the health network successfully use the legal venue: 
four years before the CAN ruling, small bar owners, with help from the 
industry, won court cases where local judges ruled that small bars without 
personnel had to be exempted. Chapter 8 gives some further examples of 
the tobacco manufacturers’ use of the court system to frustrate tobacco 




This chapter about institutional factors has to include a discussion of the 
process of deregulation, which started in the 1980s. Later Dutch cabinets 
followed a neo-liberalist agenda that aimed at less government, less 
bureaucracy, and more free market. This section discusses the conse-
quences for Dutch tobacco control.
The first Lubbers Cabinet (1982–1986), which consisted of CDA and 
the liberal–conservative VVD, wanted to reduce administrative burdens 
on businesses and initiated a regulatory “reform” programme, informed 
by similar deregulation initiatives in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. An important motive for this so-called deregulation operation 
was to overcome the economic crisis by improving business competitive-
ness, but it also had ideological motives. Deregulation was one of six ele-
ments in a substantial programme aimed at reducing high unemployment 
rates and central budget deficits. Other elements were reconsideration of 
the role of the government (making it smaller), decentralisation, reorgan-
isation of the governmental bureaucracy, reduction of the number of civil 
servants, and extensive privatisation (Van der Voet, 2005).
Proposals for new laws had to be submitted to a deregulation commis-
sion. This “Commission Van der Grinten” advised on whether regulation 
was necessary and, if so, how it could be simplified. Not all proposals were 
sent to this commission: the cabinet decided on a selection. Among these 
was the proposal for a Tobacco Act, and the involvement of this commis-
sion was one of the reasons why the process of drafting the initial act took 
four years.25 The commission’s advice was not to impose smoking bans 
but to leave this to industry self-regulation.26 Cabinet ignored the advice, 
but adopted the commissions’ wish not to ban the sale of cigarettes to 
minors (16-year-olds) nor to ban cigarette sales through vending machines 
and self-service outlets. The draft Tobacco Act was adjusted to reflect 
these amendments before it was sent to parliament.
Commission Van der Grinten was active until 1995, when a new form 
of regulatory impact assessment, called the Marktwerking, Deregulering en 
Wetgevingskwaliteit Operatie (market competition, deregulation, and 
quality of legislation) (MDW Operation), replaced it. This was the new 
answer to the government’s continued desire for a simplified regulatory 
environment offering fewer hurdles to businesses. Formal top-down inter-
ventions had to be constrained, and self-regulation by industry and citi-
zens was the default. MDW was operative until 2003, when the second 
Balkenende cabinet (VVD, CDA, D66), which had as a motto “more 
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participation, more work and less regulation,” introduced its own version 
under the heading “B4.”27 Tobacco industry lobbyists regularly referred 
to the cabinet’s wish to minimise bureaucracy and reduce administrative 
burdens for business, which had been estimated at €16.4 billion per year.
Since 1998 new regulation has been subject to scrutiny from ACTAL.28 
This independent advisory board assesses whether new legislation is suit-
able for decision-making in the cabinet (Hoppe, Woldendorp, & Bandelow, 
2015) and requires policymakers to provide specifications of the exact 
administrative burden it will impose on businesses. In order to do this, 
civil servants may contact industries for information about the expected 
costs of new legislation to their sector. Only after a stamp of approval from 
ACTAL can a proposal for new legislation be sent to the cabinet.
The Dutch experience with deregulation for businesses has been consid-
ered an example to other nations making attempts to reduce bureaucracy in 
the EU (see Box 5.2). The tobacco industry, with support from other mul-
tinational corporations such as the oil industry, pharmaceutical companies, 
and the food and alcohol industry, lobbied successfully to introduce such 
business-friendly adaptations of legislation making in the Brussels bureau-
cracy, making it more difficult to pass legislation that protects public health 
(Smith et al., 2010; Smith, Fooks, Gilmore, Collin, & Weishaar, 2015).
Box 5.2 Dutch inspiration for a business-friendly policy agenda in 
Europe
Around 1994 British American Tobacco (BAT) started to lobby for 
regulatory reforms in the EU similar to what was common practice 
in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (Smith et al., 2010). 
The Netherlands was one of the strongest supporters of “better reg-
ulation” in the EU, after Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
Ireland. When the Dutch assumed the EU presidency in 1997, BAT 
recognised an opportunity as “The Dutch appear even more com-
mitted to the principles of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment 
… and would support a treaty amendment to achieve this objective” 
(BAT, 1996). BAT, with support from other multinationals, pro-
moted the idea that the EU would be more competitive when legis-
lation was simplified and when proposals for new legislation, 
including those that protect health, were subject to rigorous cost- 
benefit analyses and impact assessments. As a consequence of BAT’s 




Governments choose the path of decentralisation for ideological and 
financial reasons (De Vries, 2000). Since the 1980s the Dutch govern-
ment has decentralised a great number of tasks, including health promo-
tion, to local governments and the private sector assuming that this will 
improve operational efficiency and that in this way central government can 
downsize and reverse its growth (De Vries, 2000). This had direct conse-
quences for how government approached national tobacco control policy 
making, since responsibility was increasingly given to the local level.
Decentralisation of public health policy began in 1986 with Nota 2000, 
a 600-page memorandum on public health (Dekker & Saan, 1990). It 
outlined new ambitions in the field of public health and a political com-
mitment to WHO’s global strategy, “Health for All by the year 2000” 
(WVC, 1986). WHO called on governments to improve health through a 
strategy encompassing not only individuals but also their environment, all 
levels of society, and all sectors that might influence health. The new idea 
of an intersectoral approach and organising health promotion at the low-
est level caught on. Health policy and prevention was to be restructured 
as part of a broader administrative reform of retreating government and 
liberalisation of public tasks, initiated by the Lubbers cabinets (1982–1994) 
(WVC, 1991). The idea was that the Ministry of Health would continue 
to coordinate, set targets, and monitor, but that execution would devolve 
to the local level. The Netherlands is not unique in this: many EU coun-
tries decentralised in the 1990s and later (Marks & Hooghe, 2003).
With the Wet Collectieve Preventie Volksgezondheid (Public Health 
Collective Prevention Act) (WCPV) of 1990, prevention of disease became 
a responsibility that the national government shared with municipalities. 
datory impact assessment of new legislation and requirements to 
consult industry at an early stage of the policymaking process was 
implemented as part of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) (Smith 
et al., 2010). This achievement was heralded by BAT as “an impor-
tant victory” for the company (BAT, n.d.). It helped the industry 
prevent the introduction of EU-wide public smoking restrictions 
and delay tobacco advertising restrictions.
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According to law, every four years all municipalities (there were 393  in 
2015) have to develop a public health policy document in which they 
outline priorities for the next four years. Local policymakers are free to 
choose priorities and targets based on regional epidemiological data and 
are expected to make use of evidence-based interventions—although this 
is not mandatory. Municipalities have to finance health promotion from 
the general municipality budget, which shrank over the years due to bud-
get cuts by the central government, and are thus required to look for 
additional financial means, such as applying for competitive grants or ini-
tiating private–public partnerships with insurance companies or commer-
cial businesses. Municipalities increasingly take the lead in public health at 
the local and regional level, and receive support from Gemeentelijke 
Gezondheidsdienst (Regional Public Health Services) (GGD) with this 
task. Officials of the Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg (Inspectorate for 
Health Care) (IGZ) visit the GGDs every year to assess the execution of 
their duties within the law.
In 2003 an amendment to the Public Health Collective Prevention Act 
made local governments’ periodic status reports on disease prevention 
mandatory by law. Local municipalities were also required to play a spe-
cific role in what became known as the “prevention cycle” (VWS, 2011b). 
In 2008 the WCPV was integrated in a new public health act (Wet Publieke 
Gezondheidszorg (WPG)), another step towards strengthening the preven-
tion cycle and handing responsibility to the local level. According to a 
recent national health policy document, health promotion is now a decen-
tralised task and the joint responsibility of local government and health 
insurers (VWS, 2011a). Although the formal responsibility for tobacco 
policy remains with the cabinet, because Article 22 of the national consti-
tution stipulates that the government has a legal obligation to protect and 
promote public health, municipalities are expected to coordinate tobacco 
control activities at the municipal level and by doing so contribute to the 
reduction of national smoking rates.
Tobacco Control Lost Between the National and the Local Level?
The responsibility for municipalities in the field of public health is daunt-
ing, for there are great complexities and small budgets. Many municipali-
ties are not sufficiently equipped to develop and implement prevention 
strategies. On 25 March 2010, IGZ reported on the lack of effectiveness. 
The day of publication was chosen carefully, because on the same day the 
Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu (National Institute for Public 
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Health and the Environment) (RIVM) published its new Volksgezondheid 
Toekomst Verkenning (Public Health Status and Foresight) (VTV) report 
(see Chap. 10 for more about the RIVM and VTV reports). Both reports 
came to the devastating conclusion that the prevention cycle was not func-
tioning and that local health promotion policies do not contribute to 
reductions of obesity, smoking, alcohol abuse, or depression at the national 
level (Inspectie van de Gezondheidszorg, 2010). The message was that 
the central government must take back control. At an unusually frank 
press conference, Marc Sprenger, director-general of the RIVM, com-
mented to the press that “the government must have the courage to firmly 
and normatively take up its role. It is one thing to distribute nice folders 
in schools, but that is not enough. One must also be prepared to take 
tough measures … that support local programmes” (NRC, 2010).
The government may promote decentralisation and citizen participation 
when it simply wants to cut spending. At such times Dutch tobacco policy 
risks getting lost between the national and the local level: the national gov-
ernment may delegate responsibility to lower levels and emphasise citizens’ 
own responsibility, while municipalities evade responsibility and point back 
to the government. The potential advantages of decentralisation, such as 
tailoring policies to local circumstances, encouraging citizen participation, 
and being more efficient, are questionable if they are not adequately facili-
tated by the central government. The current attempt by the Dutch govern-
ment to stimulate local initiatives in public health through the National 
Prevention Program (NPP) is not supported by the necessary budget. 
Instead, the government assumes that societal and commercial organisa-
tions will pay for the health promotion programmes themselves. This may 
work for some issues, but is problematic for tobacco control. Municipal 
councillors have many other more pressing concerns than tobacco, and 
tobacco prevention is not a topic that will earn them credit from the public 
(see Box 5.3). In addition, they have to overcome resistance from local 
functionaries who feel uncomfortable interfering in a private habit such as 
smoking (Van der Meer, Spruijt, & De Beer, 2012).
These problems have been recognised by the Raad voor de Volksgezond-
heid en Zorg (Council for Public Health and Health Care) (RVZ), an inde-
pendent advisory body. It urged the government to take a stronger lead, 
to set quantifiable targets, and to resume coordination and control (RVZ, 
2010). In one report RVZ concluded that national public health tasks can 
only be effectively administered by municipalities if they are supported by 
a complementary central policy, and if the minister has voiced a clear nor-
mative standpoint (RVZ, 2011). The advice echoes the call for action 
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from the director-general of the RIVM, Mark Sprenger, the year before. 
RVZ recognised that “there are political–ideological arguments against 
applying the most effective interventions (especially supply side restric-
tions). … These have to do with the prime responsibility that a citizen has 
for the choices it makes, an opinion that seems to have more supporters in 
the Netherlands than elsewhere.” The council was critical about the gov-
ernment’s weak prevention policy and its inertness, and recommended 
that the shift towards local health policy be accompanied by strong mea-
sures such as higher tobacco taxes and a larger budget for prevention.
Box 5.3 Municipalities and national tobacco control goals
A 2011 study among health policy officers of 151 municipalities 
revealed that 39% had not included tobacco control in their policy 
intentions (Huijsman, van der Meer, de Beer, van Emst, & Willemsen, 
2013). Of those who did, only 41% indicated that they had a distinct 
tobacco reduction programme. In most cases this was part of a 
broader addiction or lifestyle programme. The concrete activities 
were related to education, mostly smoking prevention programmes 
in schools, and occasional organised cessation support for smokers 
wanting to quit. The main reason for not implementing local tobacco 
control policy was that it is too labour intensive (especially for smaller 
municipalities) and that they felt that tobacco policy could best be 
tackled at the national level. One officer was quoted saying: “With 
the restricted means and time that we have, we want to make a 
choice in what to do in our health policy. It is better to do a few top-
ics well, than many badly. Because tobacco control can be done 
much more effectively at the national level (smoking bans, smoking 
cessation support through national health insurance) we choose to 
do other topics [than tobacco].” In 2013, the low priority given to 
tobacco control by local authorities was confirmed in an inventory 
by the national organisation of community health services. This 
showed that one-third of the municipalities did not tackle smoking 
(GGD Nederland, 2013). Alcohol prevention was given more prior-
ity. A more recent study found that tobacco control is still virtually 
non-existent at the local level. Local decision makers see few advan-
tages, because they “are not familiar with the possibilities they have 
to control smoking. Smoking is such a small issue for them that they 
do not take the time to get to grips with it” (Mulder, Bommelé, 




Several aspects of the Dutch policy environment work against expeditious 
adoption of tobacco control. For many years Christian Democratic prin-
ciples of subsidiarity, coupled with the corporatist tradition of policymak-
ing and consensus seeking, combined to make it “logical” for policymakers 
to invite representatives of the tobacco industry to present their views on 
tobacco control, with business-friendly solutions (self-regulation instead 
of legislation) as the outcome. Dutch policymakers tried to avoid polarisa-
tion and conflicts between groups, and informal stakeholder consultation 
became a popular strategy to this end—which presented ample opportu-
nity to the tobacco industry to influence and delay tobacco control. This 
was facilitated by calls to reduce the administrative burden to businesses 
during periods of economic recession, resulting in extensive deregulation 
operations in the 1980s and later. Another aspect of the policy environ-
ment not conducive to tobacco control was the neo-liberalist agenda of 
most cabinets, which preferred a limited role by the government.
Given the multiple-party nature of Dutch politics, the drafting of new 
policies must follow the specifics laid out in a coalition agreement, which 
is the end result of intense negotiations between the co-ruling political 
parties. The tobacco control coalition has only been successful twice in 
getting tobacco control proposals into coalition agreements.
In the Dutch system, where ministers are politically appointed and 
rarely have a background in health or medicine, the chance that ministers 
will become tobacco control champions is small. The political make-up of 
the cabinet is crucial, but the political orientation of the majority in parlia-
ment is also important. Parliament will usually support the government, 
but its opposition may amend or delay government proposals and influ-
ence the political agenda through the presentation of resolutions and par-
liamentary questions. Parliament is an important venue for lobbyists from 
both sides, but the industry has been most successful, since delaying or 
adapting policy intentions is easier than getting new legislation on the 
agenda in the first place. The inside lobby for many years has been 
unchecked and barely accountable in the Netherlands, and less regulated 
than in many other democracies, although this is now improving. Dutch 
parliamentarians are understaffed and depend on lobbyists for information 
and support with drafting bills and motions. For years the industry has had 
an advantage as their lobbyists stayed at their posts for decades, while both 
the civil servants who specialised in tobacco control experienced regular 
turnover.
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A long and gradual process of decentralisation of public health tasks 
away from the central government to the municipal level increased the risk 
that tobacco control will be lost between the national and local levels, as it 
made it easier to escape responsibilities. Municipalities have little means 
and lack the motivation to take on national tobacco control tasks. The 
judicial system has become increasingly important as the corporatist ele-
ments of Dutch policymaking diminish, and the court has been responsi-




2. Proceedings II, 1996–1997, 24743, nr. 12, p. 7.
3. Proceedings II, 31 May 2001, 82–5234.
4. Dutch decision makers feel equally constrained by coalition agreements as 
their colleagues in Belgium, but somewhat more than in Germany and 
much more than in Italy (Moury & Timmermans, 2013).
5. Proceedings II, 2010–2011, 32,011, nr. 15.
6. Interview, 6 November 2015.
7. This is in contrast with the industry sector, where lobbyists such as Jan-
Willem Roelofs for the SSI, Jan Willem Burgering for NSO, Alexander van 
Voorst Vader for VNK, Niek Jan van Kesteren for VNO–NCW, Ton Wurtz 
for SRB, and Robert Wassenaar voor for Philip Morris were more or less 
permanent factors of influence for decades.
8. With the termination of STIVORO in 2013, the continuity of historical 
knowledge and expertise was affected, although much of it was taken over 
by the Trimbos Institute.
9. Proceedings II, 1999–2000, 12 October 2000, 834–847.
10. Blue letters are letters or notes between two ministers, not open to public 
scrutiny.
11. Proceedings II, 1999–2000, 12 October 2000, 834–847.
12. Proceedings II, 1999–2000, TK12, 12 Oktober 2000, pp. 834–847.
13. In Dutch: Algemene Maatregel van Bestuur (AMvB).
14. Examples are decisions regarding how many grammes of tobacco should 
be in a pack of cigarettes or roll-your-own tobacco, or yearly adaptations of 
tobacco taxation levels.
15. Motie Marijnissen, 1996, nr. 5 (24743).
16. Motie Dik-Faber, 2015, nr. 38 (32011).
17. Motie Kamp, 1997, nr. 28 (21501–21519).
18. Motie Oudkerk, Kant, 2001, nr. 19 (26472).
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19. Motie Werner, Stekelenburg, Van Schijndel, Van den Berg, Ruers, Hessing 
en Van de Beeten, 2002, nr. 59e (26472).
20. Motie Schippers, Buijs, Van der Ham, Hermans, Kant, 2005, nr. 109 
(29800-XVI).
21. Not only parliament, but government also can have information disadvan-
tages compared to the industry. For example, officials from the Ministry of 
Finance rely on information on tobacco market prices and effects of tax 
increases provided by the industry.
22. Bouwmeester had already declared in 2009 that she wanted to develop a 
code of practice for lobbyists after she had learned that the group of small 
bar owners who fought against a smoking ban in small pubs and bars was 
financed and supported by the tobacco industry.
23. http://www.cer-leuven.be/passiefroken/rechtszaken/zaakriphagen.htm
24. Proceedings I, Tabakswet 26 maart 2002, 24–1253.
25. Parliamentary Papers II, 1985–1986, 18749, nr. 6, p. 6.
26. Parliamentary Papers II, 1984–1985, 17931, nr. 61.
27. B4 = “Beter Bestuur voor Burger en Bedrijf” (better governance for citizen 
and enterprise).
28. ACTAL = “Adviescollege Toesting Administratieve Lasten” (Advisory 
Board on Administrative Burden Reduction).
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CHAPTER 6
The International Context: EU and WHO
Since the 1960s, governments around the world have been developing 
policies to control tobacco. Countries have employed different combina-
tions of measures (World Bank, 1999), taking national circumstances into 
account. For example, the United Kingdom attached importance to build-
ing a national infrastructure of smoking cessation support in combination 
with having the highest cigarette prices in Europe, while Australia invested 
in mass media campaigns and was at the forefront of pictorial health warn-
ings and plain packaging, in addition to high tobacco taxes. In contrast, 
the United States combined strong smoking bans to protect non-smokers, 
with restrictions on the sale of tobacco to youth and a long history of liti-
gation against the tobacco industry, but has relatively low cigarette taxes, 
modest health warnings on cigarette packs, and weak advertising restric-
tions (Kagan & Nelson, 2001). Despite such differences, there is an 
increasing convergence of strategies across countries (Studlar, 2006). 
There are two aspects to this. The first is the process of governments and 
tobacco control coalitions becoming inspired by countries that lead the 
way, facilitated by increased levels of corporation and coordination of 
tobacco control advocacy at the international level. The second is the 
emergence of “hard” international law to which national governments 
need to abide. This is facilitated by supranational legislation from the EU 
and WHO forcing countries to adopt similar policies. In Europe these 
processes add two extra layers of governance above the national and 
146 
 sub- national levels, and as a result tobacco control policymaking has 
become the outcome of a continuous negotiation among nested govern-
ments at several tiers, a process which has been described as multi-level 
governance (Asare, Cairney, & Studlar, 2009; Marks & Hooghe, 2003).
The previous chapter discussed the division of responsibilities between 
the national and the local levels. The current chapter examines the rela-
tionship between the national and international levels. I start with EU 
policymaking, followed by an account of the emergence of WHO’s 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and what this meant 
for Dutch national policymaking. A key part of FCTC is Article 5.3, which 
was included to assure that the tobacco industry is kept away from the 
process of making tobacco control policy.
EuropEan Tobacco conTrol policy
The EU developed several mechanisms to coordinate and develop policy-
making across EU countries.1 Nowadays tobacco control laws are part of 
the EU acquis communautaire, the body of laws by which countries that 
join the EU must abide.
During the first decades of tobacco control, no supranational coordina-
tion or legislation existed. The formulation of an EU tobacco control 
policy began in 1984, when tobacco control was mentioned for the first 
time as a potential EU task, next to drug addiction and prevention of 
infectious diseases (European Commission, 1984). The EU regarded it as 
its task to coordinate the various programmes and actions that individual 
member states were already taking against tobacco. In 1985 the European 
Council of Health Ministers announced a programme against cancer, in an 
attempt to bring the European project closer to the real concerns of 
Europeans—for cancer was a great concern to many. Smoking was given 
high priority within this programme, and the Europe Against Cancer pro-
gramme became a catalyst for EU-initiated tobacco control (Gilmore & 
McKee, 2004).
The EU developed various ways of controlling tobacco, and it is 
important to understand the differences. Directives, Decisions, and 
Regulations are legally binding, while Recommendations and Resolutions 
are not. Directives must first be transposed into national law and be 
adjusted to member states’ particular circumstances, while Regulations 
have the immediate force of law. For tobacco control, Directives have 
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been most important. The European Commission (EC) enforces 
Directives by  sending notifications, then issuing warnings, and finally 
referring to the European Court of Justice when member states do not 
implement them in their national legislation (Asare et al., 2009). Non-
compliance is punished by financial sanctions (“hard law”). Other 
tobacco control measures such as protection of non-smokers, education, 
and smoking cessation support are dealt with in Recommendations and 
Resolutions, which are not legally binding (“soft law”). In addition to 
hard and soft laws, the EU initiated and funded various tobacco control 
capacity building activities, such as the European Network of Smoking 
Prevention (ENSP) and media campaigns to discourage smoking in 
youth. The Europe Against Cancer programme consisted mainly of edu-
cational measures like media campaigns, but it inspired the EC to develop 
and adopt no less than six Directives, one Regulation, and one Resolution 
between 1989 and 1992.
The swift adoption at the beginning of the 1990s of so many binding 
EU measures to control tobacco was possible because the tobacco indus-
try had not yet developed a strong lobbying position in Brussels (Gilmore 
& McKee, 2004) and the proposed measures were no real threat to indi-
vidual EU countries since most had already implemented them—such as 
bans on tobacco advertising on television and text warnings on cigarette 
packs. In the course of the 1990s the tobacco lobby became more organ-
ised. It had some success in delaying or watering down EU initiatives, 
including tobacco advertising Directives and tobacco product Directives 
(Costa, Gilmore, Peeters, McKee, & Stuckler, 2014; Hastings & Angus, 
2004; Peeters, Costa, Stuckler, McKee, & Gilmore, 2016). However, its 
effectiveness should not be overrated. For example, in the case of the first 
Tobacco Product Directive (TPD-1), the industry was unable to prevent 
the directive from coming into force nor did it manage to dilute it, despite 
intensive lobbying (Mandal et al., 2009).
The EU’s Competence in Tobacco Control
The 1986 Single European Act recognised, albeit in vague terms, health 
as a factor to take into account when strengthening European economic 
integration and building a single market, but the EU has never acquired 
a mandate to issue regulations solely for the sake of public health 
(Duina & Kurzer, 2004). The EU’s public health competence is laid 
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down in article 152 EC (formerly Article 129), which requires that 
public health be protected in all EU policies and activities. However, 
the article excludes harmonisation of hard laws and Regulations and 
therefore cannot serve as a legal basis for tobacco control laws (Boessen 
& Maarse, 2008; Mandal et  al., 2009; Verschuuren, 2011). In the 
absence of a legal base to regulate smoking, the EU had to fall back on 
the creative use of other EU treaties (Boessen & Maarse, 2008). After 
much debate it finally based its competence on tobacco control through 
EU jurisdiction concerning the internal market (Article 95 EC, for-
merly Article 100a). All EU tobacco legislation regarding labelling, 
advertising, and product regulation are founded on the EU’s jurisdic-
tion to ensure the free movement of goods and services throughout the 
EU (Verschuuren, 2011). This is not a clear-cut matter, since it requires 
the EC to show that tobacco control interventions, which in essence 
restrict markets, have at least an element that improves internal markets 
(Boessen & Maarse, 2008). The EC argued that a uniform EU-wide 
tobacco advertising ban was necessary to end distortion of competition 
across borders, which might be the result if one country gave advertis-
ing agencies more freedom to promote tobacco in magazines and news-
papers than did another.
EU’s legal competence to control tobacco has frequently been dis-
puted by the tobacco industry, and by some governments. The most 
notorious example was when the German government challenged the 
EU’s jurisdiction to enforce tobacco advertising restrictions, resulting in 
an annulment by the European Court of Justice of the advertising 
Directive, after which the EC was forced to be content with a less com-
prehensive advertising ban (Mandal et al., 2009). The ban was proposed 
in 1989 and supported by several countries, notably Italy and France, for 
whom such a ban would confirm existing national legislation, while the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands opposed 
and successfully vetoed proposals (Bitton, Neuman, & Glantz, 2002) 
(see Box 6.1). Duina and Kurzer (2004) argue that these four countries 
shared “national traditions of libertarianism characterised by minimal 
state intrusion in the private sphere of consumption,” (p. 65) and that 




Box 6.1 The Dutch blockade of the EU tobacco advertising ban
In 1990 Philip Morris intensified its lobbying efforts against the 
European advertising Directive (Dollisson, 1990) and very soon 
“the largest and best financed lobbying campaign ever mounted by 
tobacco and advertising companies” descended on the members of 
the European Parliament (Boessen, 2008, p. 77). Because the ban 
would be based on the EU’s jurisdiction over the internal market 
(Article 95 EC), it was subject to qualified majority voting. For a 
minority to veto the ban, 26 or more votes were required. The 
minority at the time consisted of Denmark (3 votes), Germany (10), 
Greece (5), the Netherlands (5), and the United Kingdom (10). The 
Netherlands blocked the EU advertising ban for many years, for eco-
nomic reasons and because it preferred self-regulation, but formally 
on the grounds that the EC had no legal competence in the field of 
public health (Boessen & Maarse, 2008). According to a German 
civil servant, “most legal arguments, especially those regarding com-
petence, were just smoke screens for countries who wanted to block 
the ban” (Boessen & Maarse, 2008). Philip Morris tried to preserve 
Dutch opposition through “contacts with the trade ministry to keep 
the health minister from undermining the Dutch position” and 
planned to “continue lobbying all country EC ambassadors and 
health attachés” (Philip Morris, 1993a). In 1993 the Dutch govern-
ment decided it would reconsider its blocking position only in the 
event that the Dutch vote became decisive.
A few months after the inauguration of the new Purple cabinet in 
August 1994, a resolution of the Ninth World Conference on 
Tobacco or Health in Paris condemned the Netherlands and two 
other countries for blocking EU advertising legislation (Slama, 
1995). Blocking the implementation of the directive was “an inter-
national scandal and is detrimental to the health of all citizens of the 
European Union, and by example of the citizens in all developing 
regions of the world who look to the European Union for leadership 
in public health policy” (Tubiana, 1994).
In November 1995 the official position of the Dutch government 
was still that as long as an EU decision on advertising ban did not 
depend solely on the Dutch vote, the Dutch national policy was to 
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Impact of the EU on Tobacco Control
The importance of the EU for tobacco control should not be underval-
ued. Very influential were the second Tobacco Advertising Directive 
(Directive 2003/33/EC or TAD-2), and the two Tobacco Product 
Directives (2001/37/EC (TPD-1) and 2014/40/EU (TPD-2)). 
Nowadays cross-border advertising and promotion of tobacco products is 
banned throughout the EU. TPD-2 mandated pictorial health warnings, 
which are now implemented throughout the EU. Other Directives har-
monised tobacco taxes across the EU by setting minimum taxation levels, 
which led to higher prices in southern European countries and in those 
EU member states that joined in 2004 (ASPECT Consortium, 2004).
Implementation of Directives
Transposition of EU tobacco regulation into national law is more or less a 
formality, since EU law supersedes national law. However, the tobacco 
industry may influence the interpretation of an EU law. Since both cham-
bers of the parliament need to approve changes in existing national laws, 
this offers possibilities for lobbying. In the case of TPD-1, there were 
continue to trust the industry that it could restrain its  advertising 
and promotion efforts without needing direct governmental intru-
sion.2 This changed in 1997 after Tony Blair’s landslide election vic-
tory in the United Kingdom. The new UK Labour government 
decided to support the ban. Without the United Kingdom in the 
blocking group, the Dutch vote was no longer crucial. In November 
1997 Health Minister Borst joined the United Kingdom in support 
of the EU proposal. The next month, at the EU Health Ministers’ 
Council meeting, a majority of countries supported the advertising 
ban, paving the way for the EU to proceed. However, the industry 
managed to have the advertising Directive annulled by the European 
Court of Justice, after which a watered down version was adopted in 
2003, resulting in Directive 98/43/EC. Denmark, the United 
Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands choose to use the original, 
more comprehensive, version of the advertising Directive as the basis 
for its national tobacco advertising and promotion ban (VWS, 2005).
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lengthy discussions in both houses of parliament about interpretations of 
the text, fuelled by claims from the industry that the Dutch interpretation 
was more far-reaching than strictly necessary. One issue was whether the 
black border around the new health warnings should be included or 
excluded from the warning space (Lie, Willemsen, De Vries, & Fooks, 
2016). Ultimately the Dutch government agreed to the industry’s inter-
pretation, against the advice of the EC. Other issues were the requirement 
for tobacco manufacturers to hand over lists of ingredients, and a ban on 
misleading wordings on cigarette packs such as “light” and “mild.” There 
were long debates between both houses of parliament and the cabinet in 
2002, the result of intensive lobbying by the tobacco industry network 
through the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for 
Freedom and Democracy) (VVD) and Christen-Democratisch Appèl 
(Christian Democratic Party) (CDA). Member of parliament  Geert 
Wilders (then still with the VVD) questioned the government’s interpre-
tation that the ban on misleading descriptors such as “light” and “mild” 
implied that colouring associated with lightness and mildness must also be 
restricted, so that light shades would be prohibited.3 He argued that this 
did not directly follow from the English text of the EU directive, although 
it might be derived from a strict choice of words in the Dutch translation. 
Health Minister Bomhoff agreed with Wilders that the Netherlands had 
no ambition to be a pioneer in Europe, since other countries did not seem 
to follow the more strict Dutch interpretation. The government asked the 
EC if they could “correct” the Dutch official translation, confirmed that 
the English text was leading and that differences in colours within the 
same brand were thus allowed.
EU Recommendations
EU’s Recommendations are less committal than Directives, and are there-
fore perceived as less important by national policymakers. The EC has 
issued two Recommendations on tobacco control. The first, in 2003 
(Recommendation 2003/54/EC), urged EU countries to develop com-
prehensive approaches to tobacco control, including measures to prevent 
tobacco sales to children, restricting access to vending machines, remov-
ing tobacco products from self-service displays, prohibiting alternative 
forms of tobacco promotion not covered by Directive 2003/33/EC, and 
implementing tax measures to discourage consumption. Since the 
Netherlands had just implemented its revised Tobacco Act, the EU 
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Recommendation was hardly noted. The second Recommendation was 
about the protection of non-smokers and smoking cessation (in line with 
FCTC article 8), and dated from 2009 (2009/C296/02). It asked mem-
ber states to optimise protection from exposure to tobacco smoke in 
workplaces, public places, and public transport. It also called on govern-
ments to provide smokers with adequate treatment for tobacco depen-
dence, and to consider plain packaging of tobacco products. This latter 
idea was particularly threatening to the industry, which lobbied intensively 
to tone it down. Dutch civil servants were targeted as well (see Box 8.3 in 
Chap. 8 for a detailed account of how the industry tried to get plain pack-
aging out of the Recommendation).
The Principle of Subsidiarity
In 1992 the EU introduced the criterion of subsidiarity, which means that 
the EU may only intervene by means of a Regulation or Directive if it can 
act more effectively than individual member states are able to. This prin-
ciple made it harder to implement EU-wide tobacco control regulation 
and was explicitly used in industry argumentation. According to Philip 
Morris, “in order to delay EU action we shall dialogue with supportive 
governments (the United Kingdom, Germany, Holland and Denmark) to 
encourage their opposition to EU legislation on the grounds of subsidiar-
ity” (Philip Morris, 1993b). This strategy was indeed frequently applied in 
the Netherlands, where it resonated well with Christian Democratic prin-
ciples. Already, in the beginning of the 1990s, the Dutch government had 
rejected the proposal for a tobacco advertising Directive on the grounds 
that this could better be resolved at a national level.4 Box 6.1 talked about 
the Dutch government’s opposition to the EU advertising ban. An inter-
nal industry document emphasised that “the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands are the two member states which are the most opposed to the 
proposal, on the grounds of subsidiarity and proportionality. They believe 
that the means are too strong to achieve the objectives, and that the mem-
ber states should regulate the situation themselves” (BAT, 1996). The 
same reasoning was heard in 2007 when the government replied to con-
sultation from the EC about the best policy to protect Europeans from 
tobacco smoke (the green paper Towards a Europe free from tobacco smoke: 
Policy options at EU level (European Commission, 2007)). The advice of 
the government was to leave it to member states to decide on smoking 
bans, a decision motivated by increased  negative public opinion of the 
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Brussels bureaucracy in the Netherlands (De Goeij, 2007). Since 2006 
not only the government but also both chambers of parliament have tested 
new EU regulations by conducting a “subsidiarity check,” in response to 
increased calls from society to reduce the power of Brussels.
Coordination of Tobacco Control Policy Across the EU
In 2001, across country coordination between national- and EU-level 
tobacco control was strengthened by the establishment of a regulatory 
committee for tobacco control, under Article 10 of Directive 2001/37/
EC. Once a year officials from the European national health ministries met 
in this committee, coordinated by the EC’s Health Directorate. They dis-
cussed the progress of implementation of EU regulations in the various 
countries and were informed by the EC of the next steps towards EU 
tobacco control. The Netherlands was a steadfast participant at these 
meetings, which were also attended by the Rijksinstituut voor 
Volksgezondheid en Milieu (National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment) (RIVM) and sometimes by the Nederlandse Voedsel en 
Waren Autoriteit (Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety 
Authority) (NVWA) (European Commission, 2017b). In 2014 the com-
mittee was replaced by an “expert group”; it has basically the same civil 
servants, but meets about four times per year (European Commission, 
2017a). There are subgroups on issues such as tobacco ingredients and 
electronic cigarettes. This is an important network for civil servants who 
work on tobacco control, because this is where they exchange experiences 
and can support each other over practical and legal problems related to the 
implementation of EU tobacco control regulations. It is also a platform 
where country representatives discuss measures that member states may 
take that go beyond minimum EU requirements, such as tobacco product 
display bans, higher age limits for sales, and plain packaging. According to 
a Dutch participant in these meetings, “international cooperation increases 
our knowledge and offers new insights to reduce tobacco use further” 
(Mackay, 2017). Tobacco control has also been an important topic during 
most of the meetings of the European health ministers, who convene 
about twice a year in Brussels. The influence of the European Health 
Council thus goes beyond the adoption of new regulations or recommen-
dations: the ministers exchange ideas and may learn from colleagues how 
to advance tobacco control at the national level (ASPECT Consortium, 
2004, p. 115).
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ThE World hEalTh organizaTion
WHO is a specialised agency of the United Nations concerned with inter-
national public health. It is the main driving force for global tobacco con-
trol (Mamudu, Cairney, & Studlar, 2015). National tobacco control 
initiatives are increasingly developed in response to WHO recommenda-
tions and, after the FCTC treaty was adopted in 2015, following FCTC 
requirements. The FCTC treaty was the end station of a long process by 
experts and WHO officials working towards a global tobacco control 
treaty (Mamudu, Gonzalez, & Glantz, 2011). According to WHO, the 
main pillars of a comprehensive tobacco control approach include mea-
sures that reduce the supply of tobacco (bans on tobacco advertising and 
promotion, and the use of taxation to increase tobacco prices), the demand 
for tobacco (mass media awareness campaigns and providing effective 
smoking cessation support to quitters), and the protection of non- smokers 
through smoking bans. These elements were already well known in the 
Netherlands in the 1980s (Baan, 1986) and are reminiscent of the recom-
mendations from the earlier Health Council’s report (Beernink & Plokker, 
1975). In this respect, the FCTC treaty did not offer novel ideas about 
how to tackle smoking for Dutch tobacco control advocates and 
Dutch government officials.
In 1994, the World Health Assembly adopted the “International 
Strategy for Tobacco Control” resolution, which finally, after a long pro-
cess of negotiation between individual states, led to the FCTC. The treaty 
came into force in 2005, after the required 40 countries had ratified it. 
Since then the number of ratifying countries has risen to 180, covering 
89% of the world’s population (Framework Convention Alliance, 2017). 
WHO initiated a process of negotiation between participating countries 
through a series of Conferences of the Parties (COPs) in which guidelines 
were developed with details on how FCTC articles should be interpreted 
and implemented.
The Netherlands was among the countries in the EU (others were sup-
posedly Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Slovakia) that were 
reluctant to sign the FCTC treaty.5 Only because Dutch civil servants 
downplayed the consequences for the national tobacco policy, emphasis-
ing that WHO had no sanctioning power and that the treaty did not con-
tain strict obligations for the state, and by treating it as a low-key topic, 
was it possible to get it through the Dutch bureaucracy. The government 
presented the treaty for tacit approval to both chambers of parliament in 
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December 2004.6 It did not go completely unnoticed, for CDA, VVD, 
and LPF raised concerns about how the treaty would affect the national 
cigar manufacturing industry.7 Furthermore, the Dutch Antilles and Aruba 
did not want to be subject to the treaty, because they were afraid that it 
could not be implemented and enforced in their part of the kingdom.8 
Nevertheless, on 27 January 2005 the Netherlands ratified FCTC and the 
treaty came into force one month later.
Importance of WHO’s FCTC Treaty for the Netherlands
The FCTC did not play a significant role in the Netherlands in the first 
years after ratification, although there was a passing reference to it in the 
National Tobacco Control Plan 2006–2010 (STIVORO, 2005; VWS, 
2006) and the Partnership Stop Smoking9 identified FCTC as setting 
“minimum norms for an effective policy to reduce the harm from tobacco” 
(Partnership Stop met Roken, 2004). It seldom surfaced during the regu-
lar talks between the Stichting Volksgezondheid en Roken (Dutch Smoking 
or Health Foundation) (STIVORO) and civil servants from the Ministry 
of Health, where mutual tobacco control campaigns and activities were 
discussed. Officials from the ministry were content that they had suc-
ceeded in having the Netherlands sign and ratify the FCTC, without 
opposition from parliament. They avoided discussions about whether the 
Netherlands was sufficiently compliant. Dutch officials, including the 
Council of State, had taken a close look at the text of the treaty and con-
cluded that, strictly speaking, the Netherlands was already complying with 
the main FCTC requirements. They felt they could argue that the govern-
ment was compliant, although they knew that there were many areas 
where the FCTC text went further than the Tobacco Act—certainly in its 
spirit.10 One ex-civil servant commented: “We felt that we had already 
accomplished a lot at the time: the smoke-free workplaces and advertising 
bans. We had the feeling that it [FCTC] was too late and superfluous.”11 
There also was an understanding among bureaucrats that FCTC was 
mostly relevant to third-world countries, who could use the treaty as lever-
age to improve tobacco policy, but that it was less relevant in the Dutch 
context.
Around 2010 the FCTC was finally given more consideration, after the 
first Rutte cabinet announced that finance for tobacco control would be 
cut and tobacco control measures were to be reversed. STIVORO 
responded by emphasising the government’s neglect of its FCTC require-
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ments. STIVORO became a member of the international lobbying organ-
isation Framework Convention Alliance (FCA), set up in 1999 by the 
United Kingdom’s Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) with support 
from WHO as a central coordinating network of tobacco control advo-
cates during FCTC negotiations and to push governments to implement 
the FCTC (Gneiting & Schmitz, 2016; Mamudu & Glantz, 2009).
Implementation of the FCTC Treaty
By signing and ratifying the FCTC, a country commits to implementing 
the policies that are part of the treaty. Many elements in the FCTC are 
mandatory and even legally binding under international law. Governments 
are required periodically to report to WHO about progress in implement-
ing the FCTC. Every two years, governments meet at a Conference of the 
Parties (COP)12 where details of guidelines for implementation and inter-
pretation of the treaty are discussed and established. COPs are opportuni-
ties for extensive lobbying, both on the part of the tobacco control 
community (organised by the Framework Convention Alliance), and the 
tobacco industry lobby (Kalra, Bansal, Wilson, & Lasseter, 2017). Before 
and during COP meetings, governments try to come to agreement over 
the final text of new guidelines, which often requires compromises. This 
creates difficult situations in cases where the subject matter of the guide-
line is also on a national policy agenda, and government representatives 
may abstain from voting, in order not to undermine the (oftentimes more 
important) negotiations at the national parliament.
The Role of NGO’s
Although FCTC is legally binding upon governments, just like in other 
UN treaties there are no effective enforcement mechanisms. It is therefore 
left to civil society to make governments accountable, and even challenge 
them in court in the case of non-compliance. In some countries, tobacco 
control non-governmental organisations (NGOs) published “shadow 
reports” that told a more critical story than the periodic implementation 
progress reports that governments have to send to the WHO. Inspired by 
a shadow report from Canada (Global Tobacco Control Forum, 2010), 
STIVORO published an FCTC shadow report in March 2011 on behalf 
of the Cancer Society, the Heart Foundation, and the Lung Foundation 
(Rennen & Willemsen, 2012). The report gave a detailed account of 
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shortcomings regarding the Dutch government’s FCTC obligations. 
Member of parliament Esmé Wiegman (Christian Union party) ques-
tioned the health minister on the issue and tabled a motion that the gov-
ernment should develop a comprehensive tobacco control policy in line 
with FCTC.13 The Alliantie Nederland Rookvrij (Dutch Alliance for a 
smoke-free society) (ANR) presented a second shadow report in January 
2015, which again pointed to the huge gap between current tobacco con-
trol policy in the Netherlands and full implementation of the FCTC treaty, 
although it acknowledged that the government was getting back on track 
(Heijndijk & Willemsen, 2015).
The correct implementation of one of the FCTC Articles (8.2) was put 
to the test in a court case by Clean Air Netherlands (CAN) against the 
Dutch State. In October 2014 the Supreme Court ruled that the Dutch 
government’s decision to exempt small cafes from the smoking ban ran 
contrary to FCTC Article 8.2, which states that countries shall adopt leg-
islation in order to protect citizens from exposure to tobacco smoke in 
indoor workplaces and other public places, and should therefore be con-
sidered binding. The government responded by reinforcing the smoking 
ban in all cafes. This was the first time anywhere in the world that a national 
court decided that an FCTC requirement outranked a contradictory 
national law (Campaign for smoke-free kids, 2014).
FCTC’s Article 5.3: Excluding the Industry from Tobacco Control 
Policymaking
A key element in the FCTC treaty is Article 5.3, which aims to exclude 
tobacco industry lobbyists from the policymaking process. WHO FCTC 
Article 5.3 states: “In setting and implementing their public health poli-
cies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these poli-
cies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in 
accordance with national law”(WHO, 2003). In 2008 at the third 
Conference of the Parties in Durham, South Africa, further guidelines for 
the implementation of Article 5.3 were approved (WHO, 2008). A few 
weeks later in a personal meeting in December, Dutch Health Minister 
Klink talked with the Stichting Sigaretten Industrie (Dutch Cigarette 
Manufacturers Association) (SSI) and Vereniging Nederlandse 
Kerftabakindustrie (Dutch Fine Cut Tobacco Industry Association) 
(VNK) about the consequences of the outcomes of the COP. Klink con-
firmed that the Netherlands had expressed reservations about the imple-
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mentation of the guidelines, declaring that because the sale of tobacco is a 
legal economic activity, it must remain possible to have contacts with all 
stakeholders, including the tobacco industry. According to a summary of 
the meeting written by the industry, Klink referred to the principle of sub-
sidiarity, a central element in CDA ideology and central in EU regulation: 
“The Netherlands (…) should not have to implement FCTC guidelines if 
it already has a good prevention policy in place” (SSI & VNK, 2009). 
Klink affirmed that he was happy to continue talking with the industry and 
hearing their side of the argument regarding tobacco control policy 
proposals.
Following frequent media attention and parliamentary questions about 
contacts between the government and the tobacco industry at the end of 
2011 and the beginning of 2012, the Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd 
(Youth Smoking Prevention Foundation) (SRJ) took the State to court 
for violating Article 5.3. Under the Dutch Freedom of Information Act, 
it had obtained hundreds of documents revealing contacts between 
Dutch government officials and the tobacco industry over the period 
2009–2014. Although the case was lost in court, the government did set 
up rules to clarify Article 5.3 requirements (Youth Smoking Prevention 
Foundation, 2015). This was facilitated by a report commissioned by 
ANR, which outlined to the government how it should implement the 
article (Oude Gracht Groep, 2015), and technical instructions from 
WHO on implementation of Article 5.3 (WHO, 2012). In September 
2015 State Secretary van Rijn sent a letter to both chambers of parlia-
ment outlining the government’s policy regarding contacts with the 
tobacco industry,14 and in March 2016 a protocol was published and sent 
to all levels of government (ministries, provinces, municipalities) (VWS, 
2016). Government officials were required to be restrained in their con-
tacts with the tobacco industry “to prevent the industry from having 
influence on policy. That is why contacts (…) must be restricted to mat-
ters of technical execution.” Regular meetings were no longer allowed, 
contacts had to be transparent, and notes of meetings were to be pub-
lished on the internet, including letters and email contacts.15 Cooperation 
with the industry as part of corporate social responsibility activities was 
regarded as subject to Article 5.3 as well. Since then, it has become sub-
stantially more difficult for industry representatives and lobbyists to get 
an appointment with a government official (Scheltema Beduin & Ter 




Tobacco policy is no longer the exclusive domain of the national govern-
ment. Sovereignty is shared with supranational legislative bodies, espe-
cially the EU and WHO. The EU has a notoriously weak tobacco control 
regime, with restricted jurisdiction (only binding regulation if it contrib-
utes to free movement of goods and services across the EU), a slow policy 
formation process subject to intensive industry lobby, and a tendency to 
adopt policies after they have been implemented at the national level by 
most member states. The Dutch government is generally critical of EU 
interference with national tobacco control policy, and weighs EU propos-
als against subsidiarity criteria. However, once an EU directive is adopted 
by the European parliament, the government must transpose it into 
national law and implement it. In this way, EU regulation has become an 
important aspect of national tobacco control policy. Most important are 
EU requirements regarding tobacco packaging and the product itself 
(tobacco product Directives). In addition to such “hard law,” the European 
tobacco control community has become important as an inspiration and 
example for national policy efforts, facilitated by coordination from 
Brussels-based tobacco control advocacy organisations such as the ENSP 
and the Smoke Free Partnership (SFP), and the fact that government offi-
cials (including ministers) frequently confer with colleagues from other 
EU countries.
It took some time before WHO’s FCTC Treaty, which was ratified by 
the Dutch government in 2005, became influential in the Netherlands. In 
the first five years after ratification, the treaty had no impact whatever, 
mainly because it was not recognised by health organisations as a powerful 
advocacy tool. Since WHO has no mechanism to enforce through sanc-
tions, the main value of the FCTC is that national advocacy organisations 
can use it to put moral or legal pressure on the government to do more. 
Only when the Dutch government reversed tobacco control in 2010, and 
it became clear that the government was on a path of weakening its FCTC 
commitments, did the FCTC become the benchmark for tobacco control 
advocacy groups in the Netherlands.
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CHAPTER 7
Scientific Evidence and Policy Learning
Scientific evidence plays an important role in the policymaking process. 
Facts about the seriousness of a problem need to be accepted before a 
problem will be fully addressed, and evidence needs to be available for 
policymakers to decide about solutions. The Netherlands is among those 
countries where an evidence-based public health policy is best developed 
(CHRODIS, 2015; Smith, 2013, p. 4). When the evidence-based move-
ment in public policy reached its apotheosis in the United Kingdom in 
1997, with the new Labour government declaring “what matters is what 
works” (Davies, Nutley, & Smith, 2000), this was already common in the 
Netherlands. However, sometimes the call for more evidence may paralyse 
the policy process. There are also limits to the power of evidence. While a 
prerequisite for current policymaking in the field of public health is that 
important policy choices are “evidence based,” in practice this often means 
that policy is at best “evidence informed” (Slob & Staman, 2012).
Political scientists make a distinction between ambiguity and uncer-
tainty (Cairney & Oliver, 2017; Cairney, Oliver, & Wellstead, 2016; 
Majone, 1992; Zahariadis, 2007, pp. 66–67). When considering policy 
options, ambiguity refers to a state of ambivalence: there are various ways 
of thinking about an issue (efficacious, moral, ideological, economic) lead-
ing to confusion about what to do. This is different from uncertainty. 
Uncertainty refers to inadequate knowledge and precision to determine 
whether something is likely to work or not, or about what the exact 
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 magnitude of a problem is. Scientists and research institutes regard their 
role primarily as a source of uncertainty reduction, producing evidence 
about the size of a problem and the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of 
policy options. Collecting more data will reduce uncertainty but not nec-
essarily ambiguity. Ambiguity is resolved by argument. The process of 
agenda setting (discussed in Chap. 10) is primarily about resolving ambi-
guity through issue framing: drawing attention to one specific way of per-
ceiving the problem so that policymakers feel more comfortable with a 
solution. Even in the field of tobacco control, which is widely regarded as 
a field with abundant scientific evidence—and there are many examples 
where scientific evidence has played a key role in policy debates—merely 
producing evidence with scientific rigour is not enough. International 
experts ranked the availability of scientific evidence as “having had a ‘sub-
stantial’ impact on the adoption of clean indoor air policy, taxation and 
cessation treatment policy, and a ‘modest’ effect on all of the other policy 
areas” (Warner & Tam, 2012). Advocates need to find ways to combine 
the scientific evidence with effective messages that appeal to policymakers 
(American Cancer Society, 2003).
This chapter takes a closer look at how the Dutch government 
responded to scientific facts about the health risks associated with active 
and passive smoking. It describes how and when the health risk definitely 
became accepted as “scientific fact” by the government. This happened 
somewhat later in the Netherlands than in leading countries. Attention 
will be paid to the diffusion of ideas and knowledge, from the interna-
tional tobacco control community to the national setting. Since tobacco 
control policy does not automatically follow best evidence, I also explore 
the mediating role of ideology on knowledge diffusion and emulation.1
EvidEncE About thE Risks of smoking
The Dutch Health Council noted already in 1957 that lung cancer rates 
had increased to an alarmingly high level and that this was associated with 
smoking (Wester, 1957). However, the members of the council could not 
reach consensus about whether the association was causal, and “from a 
psychological standpoint, focusing too much on a possible causal relation 
between smoking and lung cancer has great disadvantages.” Following 
advice from the council, the government made an official warning through 
the media to young people not to smoke, but phrased in a way that would 
not distress older, addicted smokers. The government responded to the 
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Health Council’s advice by instructing a second Health Council commit-
tee to make a plan for how youth should be approached, and some general 
warnings through the media (Bouma, 2001). The passive Dutch govern-
mental response was in contrast to the US government, which quickly 
mandated warning labels on cigarettes and initiated a ban on broadcasting 
cigarette advertisements.
When a new compelling report from the UK Royal College of Physicians 
came out in 1971, this was quickly translated and widely distributed in the 
Netherlands by the Dutch Cancer Society (Meinsma, 1972). However, 
while in the United Kingdom health warnings appeared on cigarette packs 
in 1971 and the government allowed their health education committee to 
run explicit media campaigns to confront the public with the devastating 
harm that smoking inflicts, the Dutch government needed more than ten 
years of further study and deliberation before cigarette packs were pro-
vided with health warnings.2 Media awareness campaigns showing the 
health damage to smokers did not appear in the Netherlands.
Instead of taking action, State Secretary for Health Roelof Kruisinga 
commissioned the Health Council to write a new (the third one) 
report, this time on how to address the tobacco problem. The report 
(discussed in Chap. 2) called for an integrative set of policy measures 
(Beernink & Plokker, 1975). However, the report was not as outspo-
ken about the gravity of the risks of smoking as US and UK reports. 
The council estimated that smoking causes about 12,000 deaths per 
year, but it did not elaborate on specific health damages (Beernink & 
Plokker, 1975). The section discussing the evidence about health con-
sequences was barely more than four pages long. The subsequent 
report by the Interdepartementale Commissie Beperking Tabaksgebruik 
(Interdepartmental Committee for Reducing Tobacco Use) (ICBT) 
(discussed in Chap. 2), issued to formulate proposals for regulative 
measures, was even more vague: “the starting point for the commission 
has been that, based on scientific studies, it is certain that the use of 
tobacco products, particularly cigarettes and roll-your-own tobacco, 
has a harmful effect on the health of the user” (ICBT, 1981). Both the 
ICBT report and the Health Council report noted that the effects 
depended on factors such as number of cigarettes smoked per day, the 
choice of tobacco, use of filters, way of smoking, and number of years 
of smoking. Mainstream thinking about smoking in these years, even 
among Dutch academics, was that it was possible to smoke “sensibly,” 
(Drogendijk, 1978). In an interview in 1999, Borst said that the Health 
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Council should have sent out a more powerful message about the 
health risks of smoking between 1956 and 1975 (Bouma, 1999). With 
some understatement, she remarked about the late introduction of the 
health warnings that “a little late might … be defendable, but much 
later is not very nice.”
dEbAtEs About sEcond-hAnd smokE
At the end of the 1970s the government contemplated the need to protect 
non-smokers from exposure to tobacco smoke. The main motive was to 
accommodate the wishes of non-smokers; health concerns did not yet play 
a role.3 There was considerable disagreement about the seriousness of health 
risks for non-smokers. Dutch Cancer Society’s director Lenze Meinsma, the 
main health activist at the time, did not believe that the risks of environmen-
tal tobacco smoke (ETS) were important enough for government interfer-
ence. In the 1980s the government regarded passive smoking as problematic 
because it caused hindrance and discomfort. Complaining non-smokers 
could suffer social isolation or conflict at work, while vulnerable groups like 
babies and asthma patients might suffer from direct exposure.4
The year 1986 is generally regarded as the year that the public percep-
tion of second-hand smoke risks changed worldwide. Two reports from 
the United States presented comprehensive and authoritative scientific 
accounts of the health risks (National Research Council, 1986; US 
Surgeon General, 1986). In addition, the WHO-affiliated International 
Agency for Research on Cancer concluded that “passive smoking gives rise 
to some risk of cancer” (IARC, 1986). In an effort to estimate the health 
risks for the Dutch population, State Secretary for Health Dick Dees 
ordered the Health Council in 1989 to critically examine the existing 
international scientific evidence, taking the international reports as their 
starting point. The Dutch Health Council reviewed the reports and con-
cluded that it was very likely that prolonged exposure to ETS increased 
the risk of lung cancer (Gezondheidsraad, 1990). However, the report 
was more restrained than the US reports. The Surgeon General Report’s 
major conclusion that “involuntary smoking is a cause of disease, includ-
ing lung cancer, in healthy non-smokers” (US Surgeon General, 1986) 
was re-formulated by the Dutch Health Council as “it is likely that long- 
term exposure to tobacco smoke may increase the lung cancer risk of non- 
smokers,” emphasising that the increase “could be partly due to flaws in 
the design of the epidemiological studies.” Although the US National 
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Research Council experts did recognise misclassification problems and 
methodological difficulties in estimating the number of cancer cases, they 
felt confident enough to conclude from the evidence that about 21% of 
the lung cancers in non-smoking women and 20% in non-smoking men 
were attributable to exposure to tobacco smoke (National Research 
Council, 1986). The Dutch Health Council was more cautious and con-
cluded that a quantitative estimation of the risk was not possible.
In the 1980s the evidence about the health consequences of prolonged 
exposure to second-hand smoke were thus less definitive in the Netherlands 
than in the United States. The Dutch tobacco control health network 
realised that the issue of involuntary smoking was key to getting public 
and political support for stronger tobacco control. The Stichting 
Volksgezondheid en Roken (Dutch Smoking or Health Foundation) 
(STIVORO), on behalf of the three charities which sat on their board and 
with support from the ministry, started campaigns to educate the public 
about the risks. This brought STIVORO into direct conflict with the 
industry, which continued to cast doubt on the established scientific 
knowledge (see Chap. 9).
In 1992, a report from the US Environmental Protection Agency 
declared tobacco smoke a human carcinogen, and concluded that second- 
hand smoke is a cause of lung cancer in non-smoking adults (EPA, 1992). 
Epidemiologists from the Dutch Cancer Institute estimated, based on the 
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) report, that in the 
Netherlands each year between 110 and 270 people died because of expo-
sure to ETS (Jansen, Van Barneveld, & Van Leeuwen, 1993). When the 
EPA’s conclusions about the causal effect of exposure to ETS and lung 
cancer were attacked by the tobacco industry through a high-profile 
advertising and public relations campaign (Oreskes & Conway, 2010), the 
EPA quickly set the record straight with a decisive rebuttal (EPA, 1994). 
Despite the endorsement of the EPA for the conclusions of the Dutch 
scientists, it took another ten years before the Dutch Health Council felt 
confident enough to quantify the risk.
Involuntary smoking continued to be the subject of debate, ignited by 
tobacco industry think tanks, smokers’ rights groups, and industry- 
sponsored scientists. Surveys among Dutch employees in 1993 found that 
only 49% of non-smokers and 25% of smokers believed that non-smokers 
had more chance of getting cancer because of exposure to tobacco smoke 
in the workplace (Willemsen, De Vries, & Genders, 1996). In the United 
Kingdom the matter was more or less settled in 1998 with a meta-analysis 
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of the evidence by the Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health 
(SCOTH, 1998). In 1996 researchers commissioned by Philip Morris 
reviewed the available evidence from industry-led studies worldwide about 
public perceptions of the risks of environmental tobacco smoke. They 
reported that the belief that ETS was “a serious health risk” was lowest in 
the Netherlands (21% agreed), compared with other European countries 
surveyed (e.g., Germany 30%, Ireland 30%, the United Kingdom 42%, 
France 52%, and Italy 53%) (Philip Morris, 1996).
The Dutch Health Council finally concluded in 2003 that exposure to 
ETS increased the risk of lung cancer by 20%, resulting in “several hun-
dreds of lung cancer deaths” per year and an additional “several thou-
sands” of deaths as a result of heart disease (Gezondheidsraad, 2003). 
This was more than 15  years after US reports had come to similar 
conclusions.
thE EvidEncE bAsE foR tobAcco contRol Policy
Nowadays international scientific knowledge about what works best to 
reduce smoking, and how it works, is immense. Hoffman and Toan 
(2015), in a review of reviews, identified 59 systematic reviews covering 
1150 primary studies of the likely population impact of measures that are 
part of the Framework Convention of Tobacco Control (FCTC). Evidence 
was most robust for the effect of smoking bans (they improve population 
health outcomes through reduced exposure to tobacco smoke, and 
reduced smoking) and raising tobacco prices (they decrease cigarette con-
sumption, stimulate smoking cessation, and lower population smoking 
rates). Increasing the price of tobacco was by far the most effective policy 
instrument to reduce tobacco consumption (Chaloupka, Straif, & Leon, 
2011; Chaloupka, Yurekli, & Fong, 2012; IARC, 2011). Positive results 
were also found for health warnings on cigarette packs and mass media 
campaigns, which are most effective as part of larger multicomponent 
programmes (Hoffman & Toan, 2015). Far more studies have been done 
on the effects of anti-tobacco media campaigns than on any other health- 
related topic, so that the evidence base is exceptionally strong (Wakefield, 
Loken, & Hornik, 2010). The US National Cancer Institute made an 
extensive review of the scientific literature and identified no less than 25 
controlled field experiments with youth media campaigns, 40 with adult 
targeted campaigns, and 57 population-based state/national mass media 
campaigns (National Cancer Institute, 2008). Carefully planned and 
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sustained mass media campaigns can change smoking behaviour across 
large populations (Bala, Strzeszynski, Topor-Madry, & Cahill, 2013; Sims 
et al., 2014; Wakefield et al., 2010), provided they are adequately bud-
geted (Durkin, Brennan, & Wakefield, 2012). However, the Dutch gov-
ernment did not invest in national media campaigns to raise awareness of 
the health consequences of smoking (see Box 7.1). Evidence for advertis-
ing bans is less conclusive, but strong enough to conclude that they 
remain important.
WHO officials and experts who collaborated in drafting the FCTC 
took as their starting point that the treaty must be evidence-based and fol-
low best practices from leading countries (WHO, 2003; World Bank, 
1999). Most of the treaty’s articles are grounded on a well-developed 
evidence base (Warner & Tam, 2012). The main tobacco control building 
blocks for the global treaty were already laid out in a report from a WHO 
expert committee in 1979 (WHO, 1979) and were fine-tuned in subse-
quent WHO reports (Roemer, 1982; WHO, 1998, 2004a, 2004b), sub-
stantiated by scientific evidence collated in reports from the US government 
(CDC, 1999; IOM (Institute of Medicine), 2007; U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2000).
WHO understood very early that governments need support and 
encouragement to implement FCTC measures. One of the strategies was 
the promotion of “MPOWER,” a user-friendly way to single out and 
bring the six most important “proven policies” to the attention of policy-
makers (WHO, 2008). These are monitoring smoking and prevention 
policies (M), protecting people from second-hand smoke (P), offering 
help to people who want to quit (O), warning about the dangers of 
tobacco (W), enforcing bans on advertising (E), and raising taxes (R). The 
MPOWER package was brought to the attention of Dutch politicians and 
policymakers in 2010 (STIVORO, 2010).
Box 7.1 Confrontational media campaigns to deter smoking
For long,  Dutch officials have been  sceptical about the ability of 
media campaigns to influence health behaviour. Scepticism can be 
traced to a critical report from the Dutch Court of Audit in 1991 that 
concluded that most government media campaigns were conducted 
without proper evaluation so that effects were not demonstrable or 
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thE intERnAtionAl tobAcco contRol EPistEmic 
community
The spread of knowledge from one country to another is facilitated and 
accelerated by “epistemic communities,” “networks of professionals 
with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain” 
(Stronks, van de Mheen, Looman, & Mackenbach, 1997). In the past 
50 years, a worldwide tobacco control network has emerged. Its mem-
bers share a common understanding of the science base for effective 
tobacco control, shaped after years of interaction and participation in 
scientific debates about the best way forward (Mamudu, Gonzalez, & 
Glantz, 2011). A study based on interviews with 181 members from 39 
countries between 1999 and 2006 revealed that the international tobacco 
control network consists of four types of actors: scientists who are also 
negligible (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1991). Parliament demanded 
immediate cuts in government spending on campaigns and a more 
critical reflection about their use to influence unhealthy lifestyle. 
Despite improvements in the general quality of campaign designs, 
the Health Council concluded 15 years later that mass media cam-
paigns “have, at best, only a modest effect on behaviour,” although 
it was acknowledged that they can be important as part of compre-
hensive approaches (Gezondheidsraad, 2006).
Tobacco risk awareness campaigns are seen by some as “fear mon-
gering.” Ten years ago, the Dutch Health Council advised that fear 
appeals were not an effective means to influence behaviour and 
should therefore be avoided (Gezondheidsraad, 2006). There was 
some debate among Dutch researchers from different scientific 
backgrounds about the usefulness of this type of campaign for 
tobacco control (Ruiter & Kok, 2006; Van der Kemp & Bekker, 
2007; Zeeman, Willemsen, & van Gennip, 2007). Researchers from 
different scientific backgrounds may reach different but equally 
legitimate conclusions when they study the same phenomenon 
(Sarewitz, 2004), but when this happens, it makes it more difficult 
for policymakers to reach a decision.
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advocates; pure advocates; pure scientists; and expert government offi-
cials (Mamudu et al., 2011). To a large extent, they share a “consensual 
knowledge” about what works best in tobacco control: for example, they 
view tobacco control as a public health issue, regard tobacco use as an 
addiction, recognise the strength of the tobacco industry lobby, and 
advocate a comprehensive approach to tobacco control. This epistemic 
community is linked through e-mail networks, social media, confer-
ences, international research projects, and international non-govern-
mental organisations, and is dominated by experts from the United 
States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Dutch experts play a role, 
through  collaborations with international research networks, such as 
through the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Policy Evaluation 
Project (ITC Project, 2015).
The Netherlands is an open country, with one of the highest levels of 
inhabitants speaking English as a second language. Dutch policymakers 
are more steered by international developments than politicians in large 
autarkic societies like the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and France. There are few barriers in the Netherlands to prevent the quick 
diffusion of new ideas and evidence from abroad to policymakers. The 
process of policies spreading from one government to another is known as 
“policy diffusion” (Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 2012): when a policy has 
been proven effective in one country, others learn from its success and 
adaptation may follow. Policy diffusion can be better understood if we 
again consider the concept of a “family of nations” (discussed in Chap. 5). 
The Netherlands belongs to a group of Western-European “continental” 
countries including Belgium, Germany, and Austria: countries that share 
similar cultural values and political arrangements. This means that Dutch 
politicians and policymakers are more likely to look at best practices from 
these countries and might be sceptical of examples from other families of 
nations. For example, Health Minister Klink was known to get ideas about 
tobacco control from German newspapers and magazines. Dutch govern-
ment officials indeed seem most comfortable looking for best practices 
within Europe, since tobacco control has more and more become a 
European Union (EU) affair and the civil servants working in tobacco 
control meet frequently with their European colleagues (see Chap. 6). 
Civil servants from the Ministry of Health learn from their colleagues 
from other European countries at regular, sometimes monthly, meetings 
in Brussels where they prepare and discuss tobacco legislation. During 
meetings, European countries look up to countries that are most active 
 SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND POLICY LEARNING 
174 
during discussions and have most knowledge to share. The Netherlands is 
in this active group, as are the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and 
Scandinavian countries.5 While the government orients towards European 
tobacco control, national tobacco control advocacy organisations often 
look for wider inspiration, particularly to the English-speaking countries 
which dominate the global  tobacco control epistemic community (the 
United Kingdom, Australia, the United States), sometimes ignoring the 
fact that these countries have different tobacco control environments and 
institutional arrangements and might not share the same cultural values.
A second important source for the government is through national 
knowledge “broker” organisations. These are governmental or semi- 
governmental expert centres and scientific advisory boards, tasked with 
producing scientific evidence on which to base policy. It has been shown 
that the existence of national organisations for scientific knowledge bro-
kering facilitate the uptake of evidence by policymakers (Liverani, Hawkins, 
& Parkhurst, 2013). In the Netherlands, the Rijksinstituut voor 
Volksgezondheid en Milieu (National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment) (RIVM) and the Netherlands Expertise Center for Tobacco 
Control (NET) at the Trimbos Institute are currently important knowl-
edge brokers for the government on tobacco control policy. The RIVM 
provides expertise and advice on risks of existing and novel tobacco prod-
ucts, estimates the population impact of measures, and does cost-benefit 
analyses. The Trimbos Institute’s NET reviews the effectiveness of tobacco 
control measures and monitors national smoking prevalence rates.
Nowadays the EU is an important driver of tobacco control policy con-
vergence and a source of policy learning (see also Chap. 6). Policy learning 
between tobacco control advocacy groups within Europe takes place 
through various European tobacco control organisations. The most 
important ones are the SFP (Smoke Free Partnership), ENSP (European 
Network of Smoking Prevention), the EHN (European Heart Network), 
and the ECL (the Association of European Cancer Leagues). Over the 
years the three Dutch charities (Cancer Society, Heart Foundation, Lung 
Foundation) built lasting contacts with these groups and organisations. 
The absorption of tobacco control policy knowledge is further facilitated 
through the World Conferences on Tobacco or Health (WCToH) and 
their European equivalents (ECToH). STIVORO and Dutch civil servants 
from the Ministry of Health visited these international tobacco control 
conferences, but it is unusual for high-level Dutch government officials, 
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let alone ministers, to attend. One exception occurred in 1983 when State 
Secretary for Health Joop van der Reijden made a personal visit to the fifth 
World Conference on Tobacco or Health in Winnipeg, Canada, accompa-
nied by STIVORO’s director.
sciEncE And idEology
Rigorous science is crucial for the establishment of effective tobacco con-
trol policy. Simply put, policy that is based on incomplete, incorrect, or 
bad science is not likely to be effective. However, it is seldom that a new 
research finding directly alters the way policymakers approach a problem 
such as tobacco. Rather, according to some scholars, research findings 
influence policy through a slow process where knowledge eventually filters 
into policymakers’ decisions, a process which has been called “knowledge 
creep” or “percolation” (Radaelli, 1995; Weiss, 1980). Research findings 
cumulatively build towards a solid knowledge base, which policymakers 
use to legitimise their decisions.
For policy change to come about, the science to support the policy 
must be available the moment that an issue is discussed as part of the poli-
cymaking agenda (Schwartz & Rosen, 2004). It is important to under-
stand that evidence is more likely to be used when it informs policymakers 
about how to implement something, rather than whether they should 
(Schwartz & Rosen, 2004). The latter type of decision more likely reflects 
political preferences (Liverani et al., 2013; Warner & Tam, 2012). As one 
ex-civil servant explained to me, “Research can never replace policy.”6
Ideological preferences are likely to determine what policy solutions are 
selected. Paul Huijts, director-general at the Ministry of Health, said:
The Health Council does not consider the societal acceptance of a measure 
in her advice. Of course the ministry has to take that into account. When we 
expect much resistance against a measure, this can mean that we will not 
implement that measure—despite the fact that implementation would be 
scientifically rational. (Slob & Staman, 2012)
He added, “Sometimes a scientific standpoint can clash with the political 
responsibility that a minister feels.”
Ideological differences in the Netherlands tend to centre around three 
issues. First, whether the government believes that it is able to make the 
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best choices for its citizens—believe in a modifiable society versus regard-
ing state interference as paternalism. Second, whether the government 
believes that it is always best to start from the notion of own responsibility, 
respecting citizens’ freedom of choice. Thirdly, the importance the gov-
ernment attaches to solidarity between demographic groups. These pref-
erences are explicitly mentioned in an influential Dutch advisory report as 
the appropriate starting point for the government when it must choose 
between policy instruments (Werkgroep IBO Gezonde leefstijl, 2016). 
The first step is to identify which measures have proven effectiveness; the 
second to select from those the ones that best satisfy  the ideological 
preferences.
Sometimes bureaucrats use evidence for strategic purposes. Seeking 
advice from an official expertise centre or advisory board is a political act 
in itself: it signals that the issue at hand is under consideration. It is 
revealing that the last time the government asked for an official expert’s 
advice about tobacco control was in 1998 (Roscam Abbing, 1998) and 
it was a report by the Netherlands School of Public Health (NSPH) 
which became the bedrock on which the revised Tobacco Act was built. 
Another strategic motive is that policymakers need evidence to show 
that they have selected the best policy solution. One study from the 
United Kingdom interviewed policymakers and found that many are 
sceptical about the importance of research such as systematic literature 
reviews, impact assessments and health impact modelling to inform pol-
icy selection (Stewart & Smith, 2015). Many regard the usefulness of 
research more for its symbolic value: as a sign of good decision-making, 
and as a tool to convince proponents and the public that the chosen 
policy is sensible and responsible.
The role of ideology was particularly evident during the first years that 
Minister Schippers (2010–2012) was responsible for tobacco control. She 
consistently used libertarian arguments to underscore that tobacco control 
is not an issue that the government should be concerned with. When ideo-
logical considerations dominate, fact-free politics is often the result. She 
said in her maiden speech to parliament in 2010, when talking about 
tobacco control policy, “We are politicians. We are no technocrats who 
say: this is a list of measures which work best, so this is what we will do 
automatically. You might then just as well leave it up to a computer.”7 





From the start, Dutch tobacco control policy lacked strong governmental 
commitment and firm backing by scientific authorities. Reports by the 
Health Council were hesitant and vague about the dangers of active smok-
ing, despite the availability of alarming authoritative reports from the 
United States and the United Kingdom, which were very explicit about 
health risks. The government left it to civil organisations such as the Dutch 
Cancer Society to communicate about health risks, but these organisations 
were not in a position to put the issue convincingly on the societal and 
political agenda, as the government would have been. This has probably 
contributed to the slow start of the process of tobacco control policy mak-
ing, relative to other European countries, as concluded in Chap. 3, which 
examined the tempo of tobacco control efforts in the Netherlands.
Commissioned experts from the Health Council were slow in process-
ing the international body of knowledge about the health risks of second- 
hand smoke and came to more cautious conclusions than US experts. 
Disbelief about the health risks of passive smoking was reinforced by tar-
geted actions by the tobacco industry to cast doubt on the science behind 
the claim that passive smoking causes serious disease and death. This 
might have contributed to a delay in the adoption of smoking bans—but 
this was not unique to the Netherlands. The United States and the United 
Kingdom, where the most authoritative and influential reports were pro-
duced, also witnessed a substantial lag between the time that the scientific 
knowledge on second-hand smoke was “set in stone” at the beginning of 
the 1990s and the time that the first comprehensive smoking bans were 
implemented. This was 1995  in California and early to mid-2000s for 
most other US states, and 2007 in the United Kingdom (two years later 
than in the Netherlands). Years after the international scientific commu-
nity had reached consensus, press coverage in most countries continued to 
proclaim that the research was controversial, quoting industry spokesper-
sons who criticised the epidemiological methodology.
Being from an open country with English as a second language, Dutch 
tobacco control groups are well connected with the international tobacco 
control community, dominated by English-speaking countries, particu-
larly the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Dutch gov-
ernment officials tend to look for best practice examples in Europe, as 
tobacco control is increasingly decided in Brussels. The Dutch govern-
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ment has ample access to information on what works best, including data 
from semi-governmental expert centres such as the RIVM and the Trimbos 
Institute. The general level of knowledge about tobacco control policy 
options is high, but health ministers tend to base their policy choices on 
political considerations, sometimes disregarding evidence about what is 
most efficacious and cost-effective. Considerations of deregulation, decen-
tralisation, and budget control are competing issues, and at times more 
important.
notEs
1. Emulation may be defined as “borrowing ideas and adapting policy 
approaches, tools or structures to local conditions” (Stone, 2001).
2. This happened in 1982.
3. Proceedings II, 1977–1978, 14,800, hoofdstuk XVII, nr. 34.
4. Proceedings II, Tabakswet 23 juni 1987, 90–4570.
5. Interview, 29 October 2015.
6. Interview, 1 February 2017.
7. Proceedings II, Preventieve gezondheidsprojecten 28 October 2010, 
15–14.
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The origins of the tobacco market can be traced back to the seventeenth 
century. The famous Dutch golden age was an era of prosperity for tobacco 
merchants. They traded not only in spices and slaves but also in tobacco, 
and made Dutch towns extremely wealthy and financed the famous grand 
houses lining the canals of Amsterdam today. The habit of smoking 
tobacco spread from the New World and from England to the Dutch har-
bours. The act of smoking can be seen on many Dutch paintings from the 
seventeenth century. According to historian Schama (1987, p. 189), in the 
Golden Age “the smell of the Dutch Republic was the smell of tobacco.” 
He referred to accounts by visitors to the Netherlands who were struck by 
the omnipresence of tobacco smoke in inns and towing barges, and the 
common sight of men and women smoking in public. Dutch clay pipes 
became an important export product. In the first half of the seventeenth 
century, tobacco was imported from the Americas, processed in 
Amsterdam, and exported to Russia and the Baltic. Amsterdam was the 
biggest staple market for Virginia and Maryland tobacco. The Dutch 
tobacco trade received a further boost when merchants set up tobacco 
plantations on Dutch soil, especially in the middle of the country, around 
the city of Amersfoort, and in the province of Gelderland. Around the year 
1700 the total volume of exported mixed tobacco to Denmark, Sweden, 
Russia, and the Baltic states was about 10–15 million pounds per year, 
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much larger than the 1.2 million that England exported to the Nordic 
countries (Roessingh, 1976).
Tobacco was still a thriving local agricultural and manufacturing sector 
in the Netherlands in the nineteenth century, after which the country 
gradually became the playground of a few multinational companies in the 
twentieth century. By the 1980s the Dutch tobacco industry had become 
an oligopoly, with two companies (Imperial Tobacco and British American 
Tobacco) dominating the roll-your-own market and four companies 
(BAT, Imperial Tobacco, Japan Tobacco International, and Philip Morris) 
dominating the cigarette and cigar market. They had selected the Low 
Countries as an international stronghold, and the Netherlands became 
one of the largest tobacco exporting countries in the world. This made the 
industry difficult to regulate because it was relatively powerful: it did not 
stand alone in its fight against regulators, but was supported by a network 
of allies with a common interest in protecting the status quo concerning 
selling tobacco, or who shared a common libertarian ideology. In this 
chapter I describe how the tobacco industry organised its lobbying appa-
ratus, followed by a discussion of tobacco industry media advocacy to sway 
public opinion about passive smoking and attempts at influencing tobacco 
control through the ministries and the parliament.
Tobacco ManufacTurers Join forces
Organised national tobacco industry lobbies developed sooner than 
organised tobacco control lobbies. In 1952 the manufacturers of roll- 
your- own tobacco joined forces and founded the Vereniging Nederlandse 
Kerftabakindustrie (Dutch Fine Cut Tobacco Industry Association) 
(VNK). Three years later cigarette manufacturers followed their example 
and founded the Stichting Sigaretten Industrie (Dutch Cigarette 
Manufacturers Association) (SSI). VNK and SSI shared the same lobbying 
apparatus, including communal office space in The Hague. Both employed 
one lobbyist and one supporting staff member. In 2017, VNK and SSI 
merged into one organisation: the Vereniging Nederlandse Sigaretten- en 
Kerftabakfabrikanten (Association for Dutch Cigarette and Fine Cut 
Tobacco Manufacturers) (VSK). The interests of Dutch cigar manufactur-
ers are represented by the Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Sigarenindustrie 
(Dutch Cigar Industry Association) (NVS), established in 1971. Important 
allies of the tobacco manufacturers who share an economic interest in 
tobacco are the retail, wholesale, and vending machine sectors. Tobacco 
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lobbyists sometimes refer to their closest allies as belonging to “the 
tobacco family” (Philip Morris, 1979). For many years the tobacco retail 
sector had two interest groups: a general and a Catholic. They merged in 
1974 into the Dutch tobacco retail organisation Nederlandse 
Sigarenverkopers Organisatie (Dutch Cigar Sale Organisation) (NSO). 
Since 1996, motivated by the threat of legal restrictions on the sale of 
tobacco, the tobacco distributers and exploiters of tobacco vending 
machines united in a separate lobbying group, Landelijke Belangenvereniging 
van Tabaksdistributeurs Nederland (National Association for Tobacco 
Distributors) (LBT) (Van Oosten, 1996). Around that time the tobacco 
retailers also set up an organisation to coordinate activities related to 
implementing age of sale restrictions (the PVT).
VNK, SSI, NVS, and NSO were (and still are) natural allies when it 
came to the wish to normalise smoking and to prevent government regu-
lation, but they were also competitors, driven by material self-interest. The 
VNK wanted to retain low taxation levels for roll-your-own products, 
while the SSI and Philip Morris, with little interest in the roll-your-own 
market, lobbied to reduce the tax gap between roll-your-own and factory 
made cigarettes. The NSO fought with BAT over the size of the retail 
margins on tobacco products sold in shops. The individual manufacturers 
have divergent interests and different views on lobbying strategy. Philip 
Morris stepped out of the SSI in 2005 because as market leader it could 
protect its interests better without needing to consult with the other 
tobacco producers.1
scienTisTs for Hire
In 1964 the SSI set up the Wetenschappelijke Adviesraad Roken en 
Gezondheid (Scientific Advisory Council on Smoking and Health) (WARG) 
to counteract the health concerns that emerged after the first reports on 
smoking and health from the United States and the United Kingdom. 
WARG received large sums of money from the SSI to initiate scientific 
research into the effects of tobacco smoke on the lungs, much of it carried 
out at the CIVO in Zeist, part of Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast 
Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Netherlands Organisation for applied 
scientific research) (TNO). Some research money was also accepted by the 
Dutch Cancer Institute at the Antoni van Leeuwenziekenhuis (Emmelot, 
1979; RJ Reynolds, 1978); in these years the tobacco industry was not yet 
widely regarded as morally “bad.” After 15 years, WARG had published 
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some 34 reports, 17 international scientific articles, and 1 PhD disserta-
tion. Most of the research by WARG scientists was about reducing the 
carcinogenicity of tobacco smoke and determining acceptable threshold 
levels for exposure (Vossenaar, 1997). From 1973 onwards WARG oper-
ated a documentation centre that collected international scientific papers 
on smoking and health issues. Lists of selected publications with photo-
copies and summaries were widely distributed, finding their way to offi-
cials at the Ministry of Health (Emmelot, 1979). In 1979 alone, 46 such 
lists were distributed. WARG was disbanded in 1997, one year after the 
British Medical Journal and The Lancet declared that research funded by 
the tobacco industry would no longer be published. We do not know 
exactly how effective industry publications were in influencing the attitude 
of politicians and government officials towards the smoking problem, but 
it is likely that they contributed to some of the hesitance to act in these 
early years.
Recruitment of scientists continued after the disbandment of 
WARG. Philip Morris wanted to hold off smoking restrictions and started 
a concerted campaign “to prevent the imposition of smoking restrictions 
(…) based on the asserted health hazards of ETS to non-smokers. To real-
ize this objective, three audiences had to be convinced that the health 
claims by anti-smoking forces concerning ETS were groundless. Those 
three audiences were the scientific community, regulatory authorities, and 
the general public” (Remes, 1988, p. 1). The strategy was to find scientists 
“who can attack the studies relied on by the anti-smoking forces to justify 
smoking restrictions on health grounds” (Remes, 1988, p. 1). At the core 
of the Philip Morris strategy was “mobilising in each market a corps of 
scientific consultants and engineers who can make the scientific case 
against smoking restrictions through articles in scientific journals and pre-
sentations at scientific conferences and symposia, through articles and 
interviews in the mass media, and through meetings with and appearances 
before regulatory authorities” (Remes, 1988, p. 2).
Philip Morris had some success in recruiting Dutch scientists. In 1993 
a report from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 1992) 
attracted attention in the Netherlands. Toxicologist Freek de Wolff criti-
cised the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) report (De Wolff, 
1994b). De Wolff had served as an expert witness for Philip Morris, testi-
fying against proposed rules on indoor air quality in the United States (De 
Wolff, 1994a), and had produced a report for Philip Morris with argu-
ments against a European Union (EU) Directive that obliged the Dutch 
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tobacco industry to declare the ingredients in their products (Wigand, 
2005). Publications such as this made it easy for politicians to ignore the 
call for a workplace smoking ban, since they could label it a controversial 
issue with no apparent consensus on whether it was a problem important 
enough for the government to address.
Another attempt to normalise smoking was through Associates for 
Research into the Science of Enjoyment (ARISE), an industry-funded 
group of researchers. ARISE, active between 1988 and 1999, produced 
scientific papers and academic books promoting the idea that smoking is a 
harmless “everyday pleasure” comparable to drinking coffee or eating 
chocolate, improving the quality of life and reducing everyday stress 
(Elizabeth A.  Smith, 2007). In 1995 ARISE held a conference in 
Amsterdam (ARISE, 1995b). The closing recommendation included the 
text, “people should live a life of moderate hedonism, so that they can live 
to the full the only life they are ever likely to have.” The call to enjoy plea-
sures such as smoking without guilt received some positive press coverage 
in Dutch newspapers (ARISE, 1995a).
How THe indusTry PrevenTed sMoking bans
By far the toughest battle between tobacco control advocates and the 
tobacco industry network was over smoking bans, a fight that started 
some 30 years ago. By the end of the 1980s most of the epidemiological 
evidence from international research supported the claim that passive 
smoking is harmful and causes lung cancer. Reports by the federal govern-
ment of the United States, Australia, and WHO fuelled calls for better 
protection of non-smokers (National Research Council, 1986; O’NeillI, 
Brunnemann, Dodet, & Hoffmann, 1987; US Surgeon General, 1986). 
It was crucial for the industry’s marketers to understand in which coun-
tries the threat of smoking bans was most imminent. In 1997 and 1998 
Philip Morris collected public opinion data in all 57 countries where they 
were active. Representative samples of people in each were asked what 
they thought about the harm from passive smoking and whether they sup-
ported government regulations (GfK Great Britain, 1998). The research-
ers found that respondents were much more likely to support smoking 
restrictions when they were living in countries where there was more pub-
lic concern about the health risks of ETS. The correlation coefficient was 
0.72, quite high for this type of research. They also found an association 
between annoyance from second-hand smoke and the belief that smoking 
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in public places is seen as a priority for governments. The level of felt 
annoyance in the Netherlands ranked remarkably low among the 37 coun-
tries where this item was measured: only 26% of Dutch non-smokers were 
“very annoyed” by people smoking around them. This suggested a high 
level of tolerance to smoking. Only Denmark was more tolerant (16%). 
The least tolerant were Greece (62%), Italy (57%), Ireland (45%), and the 
United Kingdom (45%). The industry used such data to tailor its normali-
sation efforts on a country-to-country basis. For the Netherlands, as toler-
ance was already high, it only needed to be boosted by tobacco normalising 
campaigns. In 1985 the SSI established a small professional communica-
tion bureau, the Voorlichtingsbureau Sigaretten en Shag (Cigarettes and 
Roll-your-own tobacco Education Bureau), renamed Bureau Voorlichting 
Tabak (Tobacco Education Bureau) (BVT) in 1994. This bureau was 
responsible for campaigns designed to influence public opinion about pas-
sive smoking (Table 8.1).
Through these campaigns, year after year, the public and politicians 
were bombarded with a simple message: smokers have the right to enjoy 
smoking and this should be tolerated and respected, not repressed. Such 
messages were well received by the Netherlands’ pluralistic and permissive 
society.
In addition, Philip Morris ran programmes to accommodate smokers 
by either setting up smoking sections (“courtesy of choice” programmes) 
or promoting ventilation technology when separation was not possible. 
This started in 1995  in an effort to prevent smoking bans in public 
 transport, the hospitality sector, and workplaces. In an internal memo, 
Table 8.1 Tobacco industry tolerance campaigns in the Netherlands
Year Campaign (translated from Dutch)
1978 Poster campaign “friendly smoking” targeted at city councils
1984 Campaign “There are smokers and non-smokers. Take each other into 
consideration”
1984 Letter campaign to parliamentarians and city councils “Smoking … a 
matter of give and take”
1984 Brochure to family physicians “Information about smoking and society”
1985–1987 Campaign “Smoking must be permitted”
1991 Campaign “Smoking? We work it out together”
1992 “Smoking as usual. Or not. We keep it sociable”
1995 Campaign “Enjoyment must be permitted”
1999 Campaign “Smoking? Ask for permission!”
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industry representatives wrote that by 1999 such programmes had been 
rather successful:
By any measure, the International Accommodation Program is very effec-
tive. This programme operates in 46 countries and more than 6600 estab-
lishments, is growing at 50% per year, has been used repeatedly to prevent 
or modify smoking restrictions, has generated no negative reaction, and 
effective coalitions have been built with the hospitality industry. (Goldberg, 
1999b, p. 2074399558)
The memo further mentioned that the programmes in the Netherlands 
were “used by the Dutch hospitality industry to maintain a reasonable 
attitude. Courtesy of Choice is in operation in the Dutch Parliament in 
The Hague” (Goldberg, 1999b, p.  2074395548). Philip Morris had 
indeed organised smoking sections in the restaurant of the Dutch parlia-
ment building. This was a deliberate attempt to get to politicians, “another 
simple, yet very effective, strategy … to target places of influence” 
(Goldberg, 1999a, p. 2). What is remarkable is that the memo mentioned 
only the Dutch, Belgian, and EU parliament buildings in Brussels and 
Strasbourg, suggesting that the Dutch parliament was either an easy or an 
important target, or both.
While industry campaigns were well received in the 1980s and strength-
ened societal norms that smoking in public must be tolerated in the 
Netherlands, in the 1990s they were gradually losing the fight over smok-
ing in public. Box 8.1 gives an example of how Philip Morris unsuccess-
fully attempted to sway public opinion on the risks of passive smoking 
during a time that passive smoking was already widely regarded as 
harmful.
Box 8.1 Philip Morris’ failed “cookies campaign”
In June 1996 Philip Morris launched a Europe-wide attack on the 
growing concern about passive smoking. It ran large newspaper ads 
in nine European countries with the headline, “Second-hand tobacco 
smoke in perspective.” Page-wide advertisements downplayed the 
risk from passive smoking by comparing it to presumed risks associ-
ated with drinking chlorinated tap water, consuming cookies, or eat-
ing hot pepper. The campaign was strongly condemned by Padraig 
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Flynn, the EU commissioner for health matters, and international 
health organisations challenged the campaign in court. The Union 
for International Cancer Control, a main European tobacco control 
lobbying organisation, faxed a document with a warning regarding 
the press release of the Philip Morris campaign and a detailed rebut-
tal of the claims that Philip Morris made in the advertisement to the 
Stichting Volksgezondheid en Roken (Dutch Smoking or Health 
Foundation) (STIVORO) (UICC, 1996). STIVORO was thus well 
prepared when Philip Morris presented the campaign at a press con-
ference in The Hague, and on the day the campaign was launched 
issued a press statement in which STIVORO’s director criticised the 
campaign to the press outside the conference room, claiming that 
the campaign was misleading (Nellen & De Blij, 1999). Health 
Minister Borst communicated the same message in reply to ques-
tions by parliament and through a press statement.2 Dutch health 
organisations complained to the Advertising Control Board. Two 
weeks after the campaign started, Philip Morris had to withdraw the 
campaign prematurely.
Although it resulted in bad publicity for Philip Morris, and even 
brought them in conflict with other tobacco manufacturers, the 
“cookies campaign” still had some effect on Dutch public opinion 
regarding harm from passive smoking. According to survey data col-
lected by STIVORO, before the campaign 60% of the Dutch believed 
that ETS could cause lung cancer, and this was 57% after the cam-
paign (Nellen & De Blij, 1999). Research commissioned by Philip 
Morris showed that the proportion of Dutch who believed that envi-
ronmental tobacco smoke was “a serious health risk” had gone 
down, from 21% to 18% (Wirthlin Group, 1996). However, the 
STIVORO survey showed that general public support for smoking 
bans had significantly increased, suggesting that the main goal of the 
campaign had failed. According to STIVORO, the campaign had 
“antagonised the Dutch government and the Health Commission of 
the European parliament … it is likely that the campaign helped to 
reduce the tobacco industry’s political and public support” (Nellen 
& De Blij, 1999, p. 222).
M. C. WILLEMSEN
 191
THe eMPloyers’ organisaTion vno–ncw
A key supporter of the tobacco industry was the national employers inter-
est organisation Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen en Nederlands 
Christelijk Werkgeversverbond (Confederation of Netherlands Industry 
and Employers) (VNO–NCW). It was and is arguably the most powerful 
Dutch lobbying organisation. The three main Dutch tobacco lobby organ-
isations (SSI, VNK, and NVS) have seats on its general board (Braam & 
Van Woerden, 2013) and its director is widely considered one of the most 
influential people in the country. According to Hans Hillen, former 
Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Party) (CDA) sena-
tor, ex-minister for defence, and former advisor to British American 
Tobacco, “Everyone at a high position needs at least ten years to under-
stand how Dutch governance works. Very few people have really mastered 
this and Niek Jan [van Kesteren] controls it to perfection. He is the spider 
in the web” (Van de Wetering, 2010). Some have called him the emperor 
of the polder (Korteweg & Huisman, 2016). In an interview, van Kesteren 
disclosed that all branch organisations in the tobacco sector regularly meet 
at VNO–NCW to discuss lobbying strategies (Braam & Van Woerden, 
2013): “We are one of the few friends the tobacco industry has.” VNO–
NCW has a Brussels office and played a major role in opposing the revised 
Tobacco Products Directive (TPD-2). VNO–NCW preferably lobbies 
“through the inner line. The more silently, the better” (Andeweg & Irwin, 
2009, p. 15). The Truth Tobacco Industry Documents database3 contains 
many examples of letters from VNO–NCW on tobacco policy to Dutch 
government officials, including ministers. One example is a set of personal 
letters from VNO–NCW’s Chairman Alexander Rinnooy Kan4 to the min-
ister for economic affairs and the minister for health in 1994 and 1995, 
pleading for self-regulation instead of a ban on tobacco advertising 
(Rinnooy-Kan, 1994, 1995a, 1995b).
indusTry-friendly PoliTicians
Lobbying through parliament is known as “the royal way,” since it involves 
the instruments of democracy. CDA parliamentarian Wim van de Camp 
said in 1999, “The professionalism of the tobacco lobby in The Hague is 
remarkable. A strong, polished lobby, not obtrusive, very well organised. 
They monitor everything that is happening in the parliament quite well” 
(Bouma, 2012). If direct lobbying through contacts within the  bureaucracy 
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does not work, the industry puts pressure on the government through 
industry-friendly politicians who are willing to ask parliamentary ques-
tions. The one party that the industry can rely on to be generous in voic-
ing concerns is the conservative–liberal Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) (VVD). VVD 
connections with the industry have been, and still are, close: for example, 
Ferry Houterman, political advisor to several VVD ministers, was supervi-
sory director at Philip Morris for some years (Luyendijk, Verkade, & Heck, 
2010). In the past VVD motions have often been supported by other 
liberal factions in parliament, especially the Partij voor de Vrijheid 
(Freedom Party) (PVV), and sometimes by Democraten 66 (Democrats 
66) (D66) and the CDA as well. These parties are in many ways different, 
but they share the values of preserving individual lifestyle choices and con-
cerns that reducing the tobacco sector might result in negative conse-
quences for (small) businesses.
The position of the CDA, a party occupying the middle of the politi-
cal spectrum, is nuanced. Typical for the CDA approach is to advance 
tobacco control in small steps, taking the interests of small businesses 
into consideration. The CDA is ideologically conservative in that it usu-
ally opposes too much government interference, especially if it feels that 
an issue can be resolved by other means. The CDA played a key role in 
the tobacco industry lobby against legislation until the mid-1990s, and 
because it held strategic positions in ruling coalitions for many years it 
was an ideal vehicle for the industrial lobby. The CDA was always part of 
ruling coalitions, except in the Purple cabinets (1994–2002) and the 
Rutte II cabinet (2012–2017). Prominent CDA politician Joost van 
Iersel is often quoted for his remark in the 1980s: “We just run this 
country.” One former civil servant remarked about the CDA in the 
1980s and first half of the 1990s, “That was the old CDA of Lubbers 
and Brinkman who had close ties with VNO–NCW and Philip Morris, 
and who were against legislation.”5 Many key persons in the tobacco 
industry network were prominent members of the CDA. VNO–NCW 
Director Niek Jan van Kesteren and the various chairs of VNO–NCW 
were influential CDA members, and allowed the tobacco industry direct 
access to other powerful CDA people such as Fons van der Stee (Minister 
for Finance 1973–1982), Elco Brinkman (Minister for Health 
1982–1989), Ab Klink (Minister for Health 2007–2010), and Prime 
Ministers Ruud Lubbers (1982–1994) and Jan Peter Balkenende 
(2002–2007). One ex-civil servant remembered how Health Minister 
M. C. WILLEMSEN
 193
Ab Klink was played: “Niek-Jan van Kesteren phoned at the merest trifle. 
He had a hotline with Ab Klink, so to say. And what was the effect? That 
Ab inserted the idea of the parallel interests into the [tobacco] nota. 
That was all the doing of Niek-Jan van Kesteren.”6
Former Health Minister Elco Brinkman was leader of the CDA faction 
in the second chamber of parliament from 1989 until 1994, and has been 
in the senate since 2011. Brinkman is a firm free-market proponent, very 
well connected in the business world. He explained in an interview why he 
believed that smoking should not be regulated: he was brought up “with 
a way of thinking that emphasises people’s individual responsibility. I 
believe that smoking is a personal decision. Moreover, tobacco is a legal 
product.”7 These convictions reflect the core beliefs that are binding fac-
tors for the various parties in the tobacco network. Later in his political 
career he became commissioner for Philip Morris and vice president of 
VNO–NCW. In 2009 Brinkman helped the industry to change the official 
standpoint of the minister for finance about minimum cigarette prices in 
Europe.8 There were also links between the industry and the CDA in 
Parliament. For example, Jan Schipper, a former director at Philip Morris, 
was a prominent CDA member and helped draft the list of members for 
CDA seats at the general elections in 1998 (Bouma, 2012).
Even when the CDA was in opposition between 1994 and 2002, the 
industry could still fall back on its connections to tone down the govern-
ment’s tobacco control policy intentions. In these years, advocates and 
left-wing politicians frequently accused the CDA of protecting tobacco 
industry interests. During the famous debate in the second chamber on 31 
May 2001 about the amendments to the Tobacco Act, Labour Party poli-
tician Rob Oudkerk complained at one point, “When I hear the CDA, I 
hear the droning of the tobacco lobby. That is not a nice sound.” At 
another moment in the debate, Agnes Kant (Socialist Party) remarked 
about the position of CDA and VVD, which tried to remove advertising 
and smoking bans from the Tobacco Act, “I must say that when I hear 
their position and their argumentation, I can still hear the tobacco lobby 
resounding in this house.”
sMokers’ rigHTs grouPs
It was not only direct contacts with the government and politicians that 
helped the industry ward to off legislation. At times it is more effective to 
“speak as the smokers” (Smith & Malone, 2007). The main purpose of 
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smokers’ right groups was to keep smoking socially acceptable by framing 
the issue as one of individual rights, not health, and positioning smokers 
as defenders of freedom (Smith & Malone, 2007). In 1992 a Dutch 
national smokers’ rights group Stichting Rokers Belangen (SRB) was 
founded by Philip Morris, with Ton Wurtz as chair and spokesperson. 
Philip Morris had high expectations of the group. The Dutch SRB formu-
lated its aims in 1998 as follows: “We believe strict smoking bans and laws 
infringe on our individual rights, impede our society’s principle of free-
dom of choice and reduce tolerance and respect within our society” 
(Forces USA, 1998). Philip Morris listed as one of the key issues for the 
Netherlands in 1994, to “continue to support and exploit to a maximum 
the Smokers’ Rights Club. In doing so, develop regional chapters and 
make the Club a very active group and ally to the industry” (Philip Morris, 
1994). According to Philip Morris corporate affairs experts, the SRB was 
an important media player in 1996, boasting huge numbers of members, 
and had some success in preventing smoking bans in workplaces and pre-
venting higher tobacco taxes (Philip Morris, 1996a).
It is interesting to contrast this industry-led group with another group 
that was spontaneously founded on 7 January 1990 as a short-lived pro-
test against the smoking ban that came into force on 1 January of that 
year. The group Rokers Belangen Vereniging (Smokers’ Interest Society) 
was a colourful mix of Amsterdam-based artists, journalists, and intellec-
tuals.9 Its founders wanted to promote the image of the smoker as a “gen-
tle, tolerant, freedom-loving, independent, undogmatic individualist” 
(Van Gelder, 1990). The group was disbanded soon after it was founded 
because of incompatible opinions about strategy and lack of interest from 
smokers.
The Dutch tobacco industry manages to keep the SRB alive to this day, 
which is remarkable since most smokers’ right groups do not survive very 
long due to lack of support from smokers (Smith & Malone, 2007). While 
Philip Morris ceased to lobby against smoking bans in the Netherlands 
and lost interest in SRB, SSI and VNK continued to financially support 
SRB. Compared with similar organisations in Europe, the Dutch SRB has 
been a long-lasting force, more or less a one-man project of its director, 
Ton Wurtz. Wurtz’s most successful initiative was when he, with help 
from the SSI, founded the small interest group Stichting Red de kleine 
horecaondernemer (Save the small hospitality entrepreneur) (Baltesen & 
Rosenberg, 2009). This foundation of bar owners played a crucial role in 
masterminding the revolt by pub owners against the smoking ban in 2008, 
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which undermined legislation for several years. It was an example of 
 astroturfing—the practice of deliberately staging activities that give the 
impression of spontaneous grass roots initiatives. The group received sup-
port from Wiel Maessen, chair of the Dutch libertarian group Forces, 
which fights against what it calls the “anti-tobacco industry”—a conspir-
acy theory in which “Big Pharma” is an omnipotent industry that pulls the 
strings in the tobacco control network.
THe MinisTry of econoMic affairs
For many years representatives from the tobacco sector were natural and 
undisputed consultation partners for the Ministry of Economic Affairs on 
tobacco policy issues. The trade ministry was a long-time supporter of the 
tobacco sector because of the promise of employment and commerce: the 
industry promoted itself as major investor and job provider.10 In 1969 
Philip Morris established a company in Eindhoven and in 1981 opened 
the world’s largest and most advanced cigarette production plant in 
Bergen op Zoom, conveniently close to Vlissingen and Rotterdam—
Dutch harbours with facilities for the warehousing of tobacco from over-
seas. It is also close to Antwerp, the largest port for raw tobacco in 
mainland Europe. Bergen op Zoom was an economic development zone, 
which meant that the Ministry of Economic Affairs could offer attractive 
investment conditions. Through the Investment Account Act11 the gov-
ernment subsidised the new production facility with 6.2 million guilders.12 
According to one civil servant, “The plant in Bergen op Zoom was con-
structed with enormous support from the government. The Ministry of 
Economic Affairs wanted that factory, because this would bring with it a 
lot of employment for people in the province of Brabant, where unem-
ployment was high. So there was always a sort of understanding between 
Philip Morris and the trade minister.”13 Other tobacco producers (mainly 
located in the Northern provinces) also advanced the argument of being 
important to local employment and economy.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs was more powerful than the Ministry 
of Health. According to one former government official:
If the minister for Economic Affairs wanted something to be done in these 
days, it just happened. And when the state secretary for Health wanted 
something, it did not happen. Economic Affairs tried to hold back all aspects 
of the tobacco dossier. So there was a continuous, big clash regarding 
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tobacco policy between the two ministries. There was minister Andriessen.14 
He was a real powerful trade minister. We wanted to get rid of the principle 
of self-regulation, but State Secretary for Health Hans Simons could not 
realise that as long as there was minister Andriessen. Andriessen was just 
more powerful. So we had to make do with what we had. Hans Simons had 
to go for the possible, for what was attainable.15
For the trade ministry, frequent contacts with the tobacco industry 
were business as usual. A civil servant from the trade ministry wrote a new 
year’s wish to his contact with the VNK at the beginning of 1992: “There 
is no doubt that in the new year the branch organisations and Economic 
Affairs will again have to respond promptly to developments that may 
cause problems for the tobacco processing and cigar industries. Hopefully 
we will find each other again in a good cooperative spirit in 1992” 
(Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 1992).
Concrete threats that Philip Morris might withdraw its economic activi-
ties from the Netherlands were frequently voiced in the 1990s. For exam-
ple, in 1995, when Health Minister Els Borst presented her public health 
policy intentions, the industry immediately argued that her plans would be 
devastating to the local and national economy (Vonk, 1995). In 1996 
Philip Morris threatened not to expand its factory in Bergen op Zoom if the 
government’s intention to increase tobacco taxation by 50 cents per pack 
was achieved.16 Philip Morris organised an intimidating lobby, part of which 
was concerned letters to Prime Minister Wim Kok from a wide range of 
organisations, including labour unions in the tobacco processing sector 
(Philip Morris, 1996b), the municipality of Bergen op Zoom where the 
Philip Morris plant was located (Gemeente Bergen op Zoom, 1996), the 
local chamber of commerce (Hamers & Vermeulen, 1996), the governor of 
the province of Overijssel, and the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation 
(FNV) (Kok, 1996). The industry lobby could not stop the tax increase, 
but it did manage to have it spread over three years (1997, 1998, 1999), a 
much better outcome for the industry than the original plan.
Until 1996 it was normal practice that the ministers from Economic 
Affairs and the Ministry of Health, supported by top civil servants, met in 
person with the highest-ranking representatives from the industry (direc-
tors, CEOs). These were called executive meetings17 and took place twice 
a year. In addition, administrative consultations,18 where civil servants dis-
cussed and negotiated with the industry about the implementation of cur-
rent policy and ideas for future policy, were held on a regular basis. Such 
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meetings gave the industry a tremendous advantage to organise their lob-
bying apparatus in case the outcomes of negotiations were not to their 
liking. Box 8.2 describes how the tobacco industry was able to eliminate 
the most effective elements from the first Tobacco Act.
Box 8.2 How the industry crushed the first Tobacco Act
In 1979 the Interdepartementale Commissie Beperking Tabaksgebruik 
(Interdepartmental Committee for Reducing Tobacco Use) (ICBT) 
was set up by the government to draft a Tobacco Act. In December 
1980 the ICBT committee organised confidential meetings with 
representatives from the tobacco sector to solicit their comments on 
two core elements of the proposed act: tobacco advertising and sales 
restrictions (Van Londen, 1980). Objections raised by the industry 
were acknowledged by the state secretary for economic affairs, and 
in particular objections against limiting tobacco sales to specialty 
shops.19 The industry argued that the reduction of tobacco selling 
points must occur in a phased manner so that the market could 
slowly adjust, and argued that the number of specialty shops would 
be too small to accommodate the national demand for tobacco. 
After the ICBT report was presented, the government frequently 
organised meetings of the Werkgroep Afspraken Tabaksbeleid 
(Working Group on Agreements about Tobacco Policy) (WAT) to 
ensure that stakeholders from the tobacco industry sector could give 
further inputs and eventually endorse the Tobacco Act. The full 
tobacco sector was represented in WAT meetings: from retail organ-
isations, the hospitality sector, tobacco wholesalers, and industry 
lobby organisations (NVS, SNK, SSI, NSO). The WAT meetings 
continued until at least 1995 and aimed at “making clear agreements 
on tobacco advertising, tobacco taxation, selling points, and smok-
ing bans” (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 1995). They were 
not open to representatives from health organisations. 
In March 1982 the Ministry of Economic Affairs sent a confiden-
tial first concept of the Tobacco Act to the Economic Institute for 
small- and medium-sized enterprises with the request to produce 
data that demonstrated the economic impact on businesses if the 
number of tobacco points of sale were drastically reduced (Ministerie 
van Economische Zaken, 1982b). In October 1982 the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs sent confidential letters about the government’s 
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The obvious route of industry influence through the trade ministry 
was disrupted in 1996, when tobacco control became the prime respon-
sibility of the Ministry of Health. This was possible because Minister of 
Economic Affairs Hans Wijers sided with Minister of Health Els Borst 
(both D66) after a collision with the industry—when the government’s 
policy intentions regarding the Tobacco Act to WAT members, with 
an invitation to give feedback and comments (Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken, 1982a). They also met in person to hear their 
concerns. At that point the government still wanted to reduce sales 
to specialised tobacco retailers. In January 1983, in a meeting with 
the new State Secretary for Health Joop van der Reijden, SSI offered 
to remove cigarette vending machines from outdoor venues. In 
February 1983, WAT members met with the state secretaries for 
health and economic affairs to discuss the matter further,20 and SSI 
and others were allowed to continue to make suggestions for change 
until the end of that month (SSI, 1983). This was all well in advance 
of the moment that the proposal for the Tobacco Act was presented 
to the cabinet for approval (July 1983) and to parliament (end of 
1984). The drafting of the proposal was further delayed because the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs demanded that the text be scrutinised 
by the Commission Van der Grinten, a new commission that advised 
on how regulation could be streamlined in such a way as to “reduce 
legal regulations that hamper the recovery of the economy.”21,22 This 
gave the industry more time to organise its lobby. Business organisa-
tions involved with selling tobacco united and presented a study on 
the economic consequences of reducing the number of selling ven-
ues (Roos, 1985). The study suggested there would be damage to 
the food retail sector, especially small supermarkets, and argued that 
many would not survive without the sale of tobacco. This was reason 
for the Van der Grinten Commission to advise against the idea of 
restricting tobacco to specialty shops, and this was subsequently 
removed from the draft act (SSI & SNK, 1984). The other hot 
potato, a ban on tobacco advertising, was removed after several 
rounds of talks in which the industry and the state secretaries for 
health and economic affairs settled for a continuation of self- 
regulation by the industry (Evenhuis, 1988; Marres & Toet, 1987).
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new tobacco control policy paper was extensively negotiated by Wijers 
and Borst in a confidential meeting with a broad representation of the 
industry sector (Borst-Eilers, 1996). Part of the negotiations was an 
agreement to set up a new “Platform Prevention of Youth Smoking,” 
financed by the industry (Roelofs, 1996a). This would be a sort of clear-
ing-house of scientific information about effective ways to tackle youth 
smoking. This platform turned out to be  merely window dressing, a 
strategy to get more leverage over the government. The industry lob-
bied to prevent majority support in the parliament for Borst’s policy 
intentions, and threatened that they would not finance the youth pre-
vention platform if the major tax increase, announced by Borst soon 
after her tobacco control policy “nota” was issued, went ahead 
(Volkskrant, 1996). The industry regarded the tax increase as unjust and 
threatened to disband their “part of the deal” (Roelofs, 1996b; Van de 
Mortel & Roelofs, 1996), claiming that, in return for the industry’s 
cooperation with the tobacco control intentions, the cabinet had prom-
ised not to increase tobacco taxes. This led to a quarrel between both 
ministers and industry lobbyists. On 2 September a large delegation 
from the industry discussed the disagreement with the two ministers, 
and the next day SSI issued a press statement with the title “Government 
breaches agreement” (Van Ronkel, 1996). SSI accused the government 
of having caused a breach of trust with the tobacco sector. Minister for 
Economic Affairs Hans Wijers was not amused, since in his eyes a deal 
with the industry to refrain from tax increases had not been made, and 
he threatened them: “There is always an alternative, which is regula-
tion.” In a snappy letter to the chairman of VNO–NCW he wrote, 
“Regarding the meeting with the industry I want to repeat what was said 
in parliament: there were no deals about tobacco taxes to which this 
cabinet could in any way be committed” (Wijers, 1996). From that 
moment, Wijers no longer opposed Borst’s wishes for effective tobacco 
control (Van der Bles, 1996) and it became easier for the tobacco con-
trol officials at the health ministry to get tobacco control proposals 
approved in the cabinet, since they only had to try to get the health 
minister’s signature for approval.
In the beginning of 1999, after the second Kok Cabinet was installed, 
Philip Morris contacted the new Minister of Economic Affairs Annemarie 
Jorritsma (VVD) to get her support in preventing Health Minister Borst 
from banning tobacco advertising altogether: “I thank you for your assur-
ance that you will make sure that the interests of the concerned industries 
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will be optimally protected when the European guideline concerning 
tobacco adverting will be implemented” (Schipper, 1999b). In June 
Jorritsma and Borst had an executive meeting with tobacco industry CEOs 
to discuss the industry’s wish to resume “constructive dialogue” with the 
government (Schipper, 1999a). According to the industry, the ministers 
had promised to reinstall “regular executive level meetings,” but two years 
later this had not yet occurred (SSI, 2001). In the meantime, employers 
organisation VNO–NCW complained to the minister of economic affairs 
that it was not doing enough to restrain Borst’s plans for a revision of the 
Tobacco Act, which had just been sent for approval to parliament: “We 
find it difficult to understand that this kind of measures can be proposed 
with the support of the ministry of Economic Affairs, and cannot be 
stopped by Economic Affairs” (Blankert, 1999). Jorritsma wrote several 
“blue letters” (direct confidential letters between ministers) to Borst to try 
to restrain her, without success (Bouma, 2001, p. 94). When Borst asked 
the state attorney to study the possibility of suing the industry for the 
public health damage it had incurred, inspired by major court cases in the 
United States which had led to the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement,23 
the hostile attitude of the health minister and her staff was of great con-
cern to the industry (discussed in more detail later in this chapter).
Despite tobacco control now being firmly in the hands of the Ministry 
of Health, and regular top-level meetings with the health minister had 
been terminated, the industry still tried to influence the ministry’s tobacco 
control policy through the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Email exchanges 
between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Health, 
found in the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents database,24 reveal that 
the industry continued to maintain contact with officials from the trade 
ministry. An example of this, presented in Box 8.3, describes how the 
industry used the Ministry of Economic Affairs to extract information 
from the Ministry of Health about the Dutch position regarding the 
European Commission (EC) proposal for a council Recommendation on 
smoke-free environments in that year. The example illustrates how persis-
tent and intensive the industry lobby at times was, even regarding what 
was initially thought to be a relatively unimportant matter such as a 
 non- binding EU Recommendation. The industry was more up to date on 
the position of the various EU countries about upcoming legislation from 




Box 8.3 How the industry influenced the Dutch position on an EU 
Recommendation
The Recommendation on smoke-free environments (2009/
C296/02) included the advice to support national smoking bans 
with specific additional measures. One of these was health warnings 
on cigarette packs. Much to the dismay of the industry, France pro-
posed to turn this into a recommendation to consider plain packag-
ing, and this led to a massive industry lobby both in the European 
arena and directed at national governments. The Netherlands was 
seen as crucial for a blocking minority, since the industry knew that 
Health Minister Klink (2007–2010) objected to graphic health 
warnings on cigarette packs, and would probably also not endorse 
the idea of plain packaging. In the Netherlands, civil servants at the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, as well as at the Ministry of Health, 
and the health ministry’s permanent representative in Brussels were 
approached by telephone and email, and letters were sent directly to 
Health Minister Klink, reminding him of his former statements 
about health warnings. Industry lobbyists asked Klink to object in 
the European Council of Health Ministers to the plain packaging 
advice. In reply to an email in which a lobbyist from Philip Morris 
pointed out industry concerns, a senior policy officer from the trade 
ministry replied, “Thank you for your mail. I appreciate very much 
that I am being informed about such signals from the business com-
munity. I will discuss this at short notice with my colleague at the 
Health Ministry. I’ll give you an update afterwards” (Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken, 2009b). The official then did discuss the indus-
try’s concerns with his colleague at the Health Ministry, but from 
the emails it is clear that the official was uncertain if the issue was 
important enough for the trade ministry to act, since it was not 
immediately clear whether employment and cigarette production 
would be harmed (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2009a). The 
industry then contacted the state secretary for economic affairs 
directly, bypassing the civil servant: “I would appreciate it very much 
if you could have the matter looked into and if possibly take action 
against including plain packs in the proposed recommendation” 
(Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2009c). In October the pres-
sure was increased through a series of letters from industry stake-
holders (SSI, VNK, VNO–NCW, PVT) directed at ministers and 
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Insistent industry pressure is very difficult for government officials to 
ignore. The example in Box 8.3 illustrates how the industry engages 
simultaneously at different levels: bureaucratic (targeting civil servants), 
political (targeting MPs), and governmental (targeting ministers); and 
that it does so in a coordinated fashion. It is unclear as to what extent this 
has changed, despite recent efforts from the government to improve the 
implementation of Article 5.3 FCTC, which aims to prevent industry 
interference with tobacco control policymaking (discussed in Chap. 6).
state secretaries for health, economic affairs, and finance, all urging 
the government to remove references to plain packs from the EU 
Recommendation. Philip Morris mobilised its contacts in parlia-
ment, resulting in an MP from the VVD asking parliamentary 
questions.25
Industry concerns increased when the plain packaging text was 
approved by the Working Party in the Public Health Commission 
(which prepares texts for the EU Health Council), despite objec-
tions by a minority of countries including the Netherlands. Next the 
proposal was to be discussed in the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER), the highest preparatory body for 
meetings of the European Council of Ministers. The Dutch trade 
ministry considered taking extra steps to use its own network to 
influence EU countries which were neutral or still positive about 
plain packs: “Currently the Ministry of Economic Affairs examines 
(other) possibilities to change the minds of proponents of the 
Recommendation, for example through our economic diplomats 
network or by exploiting the argument of intellectual property” 
(Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2009c).
At the COREPER meeting there was an intense debate between 
member states for or against an advice on plain packaging, with the 
Netherlands still against. Because this threatened the survival of the 
Recommendation, COREPER finally reached a compromise, which 
was to remove the advice to member states to implement plain pack-
aging—a victory for the industry lobby. It is difficult to determine 
how influential the industry lobby was in achieving the end result, 
but it is reasonable to assume that, without its insistent pressure, 
countries such as the Netherlands might have given in to countries 
that were in favour.
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Around 2010, at the end of the ministership of Ab Klink, VNO–NCW 
made a stab at returning to the days when the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs had formal shared responsibility over tobacco control. It wrote to 
the ministry: “we would like to offer our help to increase the effectiveness 
of your department on several [tobacco] issues. … VNO–NCW will take 
the initiative for a further meeting to prepare for strengthening of the role 
of your ministry” (VNK, NVS, SSI, & Philip Morris Benelux, 2010). In 
December 2010, soon after Health Minister Schippers entered office, 
VNO–NCW presented a memo by SSI in which it pleaded for a “strong 
and balanced role” for the trade ministry in the future formation of 
tobacco control policy, and asked that the trade minister once again co- 
sign new tobacco, alcohol, and food legislation and be consulted by other 
ministries on these topics (VNO–NCW, 2011b). VNO–NCW’s director 
asked its high-level contact at the trade ministry to discuss this with 
“Maxim” [Minister for Economic Affairs Maxime Verhagen] and pointed 
out that the alcohol and tobacco industry had suffered from the “one- 
sidedness of policy and the failure to understand their position. Would it 
not become time to restore the influence of the trade ministry to its old 
splendour?” (VNO–NCW, 2011a). Despite these attempts, Economic 
Affairs was content that the Ministry of Health handle the difficult tobacco 
policy dossier, as long as Economic Affairs was allowed to play a role from 
the side-line—that is, as long as it was consulted by the Ministry of Health 
about the impact of tobacco policy on the business sector through inter-
departmental consultations.
Vanished Employability in the Tobacco Sector
While employment arguments might have been valid in previous decades, 
they have become hollow in recent years. Cigarette manufacturing is 
highly mechanised in the Netherlands, contributing little to the number of 
jobs. Throughout the twentieth century employment in the Dutch 
tobacco production sector became less and less important (Fig. 8.1). BAT 
produced cigarettes in Zevenaar until 2008, when the factory was closed 
and production moved to Eastern Europe. The Philip Morris facility was 
as good as closed in 2014, resulting in more than 1200 job losses. After 
the closing of this one factory, a civil servant at the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs confirmed that the importance of tobacco employment in the 
Netherlands had become “actually negligible” (Rijsterborgh, 2017).
With the disappearance of the huge production and export volumes of 
manufactured cigarettes of the past, the industry lost one of its leverages: 
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its contribution to the national trade balance. In the mid-1980s the con-
tribution of the Dutch tobacco industry to the national trade balance was 
still greater in the Netherlands than in other EU countries 
(Voorlichtingsbureau Sigaretten en Shag, 1986), but nowadays this is 
modest. Macro-economic considerations in relation to the tobacco manu-
facturing sector have therefore become unimportant to the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. However, other arguments, such as threats to intellec-
tual property as in the case of plain packaging, may still be used to get the 
ministry on its side.
agreeMenTs wiTH THe MinisTry of finance
The tobacco sector has been cherished by the Ministry of Finance for 
many years because of the secure contribution of tobacco tax to the 
national state income. At the end of the 1970s, Philip Morris was pleased 
with the protection it enjoyed: “The strong influence of the Ministry of 
Finance and the complexity of the legislative process in Holland have 
aided in forestalling legislation to date” (Philip Morris, 1979). One for-
mer civil servant characterised the relationship that the government had 
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Fig. 8.1 Number of workers employed in tobacco production in the Netherlands 
since 1939. Sources: Van Proosdij (1957, p. 186) (data 1955), (Mantel & de Wolf, 
1983) (data 1939, 1964, 1982), (De Steur) (data 1998), (Rijsterborgh, 2017) 
(data 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2015, based on Statistics Netherlands StatLine)
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finance ministry. The Ministry of Health had to keep its mouth shut. If 
there is no tobacco control policy, all the better, because the incoming 
flow of money must not be disturbed.”26 He continued:
The cheapest patient is a dead patient. That was what the industry told 
Finance and Economic Affairs, I am sure of that. … It is better for the state 
to do nothing. This will give you more revenues from tax. Smokers live 
shorter so we will have fewer costs. So for the state it is cheaper to do nothing 
against smoking. I have heard such points of view often when we had inter-
departmental meetings. So it was always David against Goliath [the Ministry 
of Health against the other ministerial departments] in these early days.
When we look at the proportion of state income that comes from 
tobacco, we see a remarkably stable trend: tobacco tax revenues provide a 
steady state income, which has been between 0.5% and 1% of the total 
state income since 1995 (Fig. 8.2).
Despite the weak price elasticity, major price increases through substan-
tial and frequent tobacco tax hikes are widely considered the most effec-
























































Fig. 8.2 State revenues from tobacco taxation (excl. VAT) as a proportion of the 
total state income per year. Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands): http://statline.
cbs.nl/Statweb/?LA=en
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et al., 2012). However, the levying of excise duties originates from the Wet 
of de Accijns (Excise Duty Act) administered by the Ministry of Finance.27 
This means that the single most effective way to address the smoking 
problem is not under the direct control of the Ministry of Health—and 
the act does not mention health as a reason for tobacco tax increases. In 
2014 representatives of the Tax and Customs Administration confirmed 
that the act’s primary purpose is to raise revenue for the government 
(Loubeau, 2014). The positive effect of tobacco taxation on public health 
is regarded by most Dutch politicians as “a politically interesting side- 
effect” (Van Baal, Brouwer, Hoogenveen, & Feenstra, 2007). The 
Ministry of Health has to negotiate with the Ministry of Finance if it wants 
to use tobacco taxation as a way to protect health. This is what an ex-civil 
servant from the Health Ministry had to say: “Very often we tried to push 
for tax increases. But this was only possible when they [the Finance minis-
try] deemed that the time was right. I have always experienced this as very 
troublesome. A dialogue with the deaf.”28
Tobacco manufacturers meet regularly with officials at the Ministry of 
Finance for “tobacco deliberations” (Ministerie van Financiën, 2011, 
p.  6). Because of the divergent interests of the various manufacturers 
regarding taxation, there are also separate contacts between individual 
businesses and the ministry.29 According to one former Dutch industrial 
lobbyist, “The tobacco industry has much more knowledge about how 
taxation works. It is all very technical and quite a few people at the Ministry 
of Finance retired. So concerning technical knowledge, they had an infor-
mation shortage. … The industry is very capable of showing how specific 
types of taxation [e.g., gradual instead of abrupt] will be more effective for 
the treasury.”30
For long, the Ministry of Finance has been receptive to suggestions by 
the industry on how tax increases might best be realised, as long as the end 
result is the same for the treasury (Philip Morris, 1989; SSI, 1991; VNK, 
1991). Indeed, changes in taxation initiated by the government usually 
occur after consultation with the industry.31 At irregular intervals, the gov-
ernment adjusts the taxation level if it temporarily needs to fill holes in the 
state budget. This requires changes to the taxation law, and parliamentary 
approval. This happened in 1991 (three gradual increases in 1992 and 
1993), 1996 (three small increases from 1997 to 1999), 2001, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013, and 2015. With the exception of 2004, 
2008, and 2013,32 the tax increases were small and intentionally imposed 
in a gradual manner, to minimise their effect on tobacco consumption. 
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The fact that tax increases are usually gradual rather than abrupt is a major 
success for the industry. For example, in 1991, at the height of national 
austerity measures, the government needed 500  million guilders extra 
income. The SSI made extensive preparations and presented a report with 
a proposal to realise the needed revenue for the state in an industry- 
friendly manner. The proposal was presented by industry representatives 
to the minister for finance (Klijn & Toet, 1991) and extensively discussed 
in parliament.33 Although the tax was higher than the industry wanted, 
most of their other recommendations were adopted and tax levels were 
increased gradually (in three six-months intervals) to minimise behav-
ioural effects that would undermine the net effect on the coffers or reduce 
industry profits.34
The industry had some other notable victories with the Ministry of 
Finance. Because the consumption of roll-your-own tobacco products 
increased dramatically between 1975 and 1985, while the consumption of 
the much more expensive manufactured cigarettes went down (Mindell & 
Whynes, 2000), cigarette manufacturers complained that the economic 
crisis affected them disproportionally, employment in their sector was 
threatened, and they needed a greater profit-earning capacity in order to 
survive. After lobbying from the cigarette manufacturers, a motion by 
VVD parliamentarian Jos van Rey supported by the Ministry for Economic 
Affairs (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 1984) resulted in a decision 
by the Minister of Finance to reduce the tax on manufactured tobacco in 
1984 (from 74% to 72%).35 This enabled the industry to increase the price 
of a pack of cigarettes by 15 cents without the risk of losing customers. 
The industry was so pleased with this result that it organised an informal 
diner party at the high-class Hotel Des Indes in The Hague, inviting 
industry business organisations who benefited from the price increase and 
all involved officials from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Ministry 
of Finance, including the state secretaries who helped to make it possible 
(SSI, 1984).
Tax increases are thus carefully fine-tuned after consultation with the 
tobacco sector. The industry frequently takes advantage of tax increases by 
increasing their wholesale price, while minimising the effect of tax increases 
on sale volumes. For example, the effect of the 2006 tax increase on smok-
ing behaviour was neutralised by the industry, which simply reduced the 
number of cigarettes in a standard pack from 20 to 19. On other occasions 
the industry adjusted the volume of tobacco in roll-your-own pouches 
downward, to camouflage tax increases: in 2009 the weight of tobacco in 
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roll-your-own packs was reduced from 50 grammes to 45 grammes. In 
2011 it was 42.5 grammes and in the next year it was further reduced to 
40 grammes of tobacco. Parliamentarians have repeatedly asked for a sys-
tem where tax level is directly related either to the weight of tobacco, so 
that cigarettes and roll-your-own tobacco are equally taxed, or to the 
harmfulness of the product, so that products with higher tar and nicotine 
levels become more expensive.36
Dutch industry lobbyists not only put their stamp on national tax pol-
icy, but at times also use their contacts at the Ministry of Finance to 
 influence European policy. For example in 1991, when the EU decided on 
a minimum tariff of 57% for tobacco products (Philip Morris, 1989), the 
Dutch Minister of Finance Wim Kok, who was chair of Ecofin (the Council 
of Ministers of Economic Affairs and Finance of all EU countries), was 
heavily lobbied on this issue by Philip Morris, which presented doomsday 
scenarios of job losses and negative effects on national trade balances 
(Philip Morris, 1989). The Minister of Economic Affairs asked Kok if he, 
in his capacity as chairman, could give ample speaking time and opportu-
nity to the UK delegation to question the 57% tax ruling during the Ecofin 
meeting (Philip Morris, 1989). Afterwards the industry thanked the offi-
cials from the Ministry of Finance “for the efforts by the minister, the state 
secretary and yourself to bend the decision in, for the Dutch business 
community, a more acceptable direction” (Philip Morris, 1989). Another 
example of industry lobbying occurred between September 2008 and 
April 2009, when lobbyists visited the finance ministry nine times and also 
had a meeting with the State Secretary for Finance Jan Kees de Jager. The 
topic of the talks was the EC’s wish to abandon minimum taxation levels 
for cigarettes (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2012). At first the government was 
in favour of the EC proposal, but after industry’s lobbying efforts, it 
changed its position to neutral.
TargeTing THe MinisTry of HealTH
Civil servants responsible for tobacco control policy in the Ministry of 
Health were main targets of tobacco industry lobbyists. In the 1980s and 
1990s, there were only two civil servants dealing with tobacco control, 
and they had to divide their attention with other issues such as alcohol 
control and drugs. One government official described the government’s 
relationship with the industry during these years: “There are frequent 
meetings between government and tobacco industry because of parallel 
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interests … the government requests the industry to do certain activities 
(for example, self-regulation of advertising) and the same happens the 
other way around. The activities of the tobacco industry are important for 
the success of governmental policy regarding smoking” (Wever, 1988). It 
was normal practice that ideas for new tobacco legislation were discussed 
with sparring partners from the industrial sector. This suggests it was very 
much an insider game. Only when proposals had reached a certain level of 
incontrovertibility were broader consultation meetings organised. 
Symptomatic of the type of relationship was the fact that when two lead-
ing civil servants who were responsible for tobacco policy left the Ministry 
of Health in 1992, industry representatives were present at their farewell 
reception.37
The government continued to allow self-regulation of tobacco adver-
tising by the industry well into the 1990s. As government officials needed 
to have contact with the industry to discuss details of the advertising code 
of conduct, this developed into a habit of seeing and meeting each other 
on a regular basis, which was a great advantage for the industry. At such 
meetings all aspects of tobacco control could be raised, and it became 
normal practice that proposals for new tobacco policy made by the 
Ministry of Health were sent directly, or through the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, to the industry for scrutiny and comment, before they were sent 
to parliament (NVS, VNK, & SSI, 1990). Small steps in regulation and 
restrictions, especially regarding the many versions of the self-imposed 
code of conduct regarding tobacco advertising, were discussed endlessly 
with the industry, which treated these talks as if they were negotiations, 
while the government regarded them more as consultations. The industry 
presented their contributions as “concessions” and “giving in” to wishes 
of the government (Marres & Toet, 1987). In 1992 the code had to be 
renewed, and the Health Minister, Hans Simons, wanted it substantially 
improved, with fewer loopholes for the industry and termination of adver-
tisements promoting positive images of smokers. This involved many 
meetings with the industry between 1992 and 1994 about the exact con-
tent of the new code. The industry’s full support from the trade ministry, 
gave it a strong position during these talks, evidenced by the fact that they 
could get away with refusing to end tobacco advertisements. They contin-
ued advertising at the important international Formula 1 races in 
Zandvoort and at TT motorcycle events in Assen, a trade-off for the rela-
tively unimportant termination of tobacco promotion through billboards 
at motorways.38
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During the 1990s civil servants in the Ministry of Health became 
increasingly agitated by the arrogant attitude of the industry: “There is 
very little progress in the talks with the tobacco industry about reducing 
advertising through self-regulation. We do everything in our power to get 
concrete results, but the tobacco industry manages to sabotage every-
thing, both regarding the content and regarding the process” (Wever, 
1992). Another civil servant complained, “The tobacco advertising dos-
sier has become rather extensive. The lobby by the (inter)national busi-
nesses (worldwide tobacco manufacturers, VNO–NCW, European 
employers, advertising agencies, publishers, media exploiters etc.) is 
immense” (Engelsman, 1992).
When Hans Simons was state secretary for health in the Lubbers III 
cabinet (1989–1994) the relationship with industry representatives began 
to stiffen, because Simons wished to intensify tobacco control. In 1994 he 
sent a summary of the outcomes of negotiations with the industry about 
the new advertising code to parliament, and received a prompt letter from 
SSI. The industry was outraged by what they saw as false representation of 
their intentions: “The industry is seriously disappointed and feels unjustly 
treated during the contacts with your department. This is all the more 
troublesome since this has happened already several times in the recent 
past” (Toet, 1994).
Industry Contacts During the Ministership of Els Borst
One year after Health Minister Borst (D66) began preparations to revise 
the Tobacco Act in 1994, she received an unambiguous signal from 
Alexander Rinnooy Kan, chairman of employee organisation VNO–NCW, 
that she was on a collision course with VNO–NCW (Rinnooy-Kan, 1995a, 
1995b), and she was warned not to proceed with her intended plans. He 
wrote that VNO–NCW would not take it lightly if she dismissed self- 
regulation (“an agreement is an agreement”) or if the advertising code 
was not continued for the full period of five years: “It must be clear to you 
that we do not accept a more paternalistic government.”
The industry was intensely involved in the process of drafting the 
ministry’s tobacco control policy document, which contained detailed 
proposals for a revised Tobacco Act, and industry spokesmen even made 
concrete suggestions for text changes (Van de Mortel, 1996)—the health 
sector was not consulted. Only after the text had been leaked to the press 
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was STIVORO able to join in (Boudewijn De Blij, 1996a). In a letter to 
parliament, STIVORO’s director Boudewijn de Blij noted, “It strikes 
me that the industry has been involved in every phase of the realisation. 
I expect STIVORO to be involved in such important decision making 
processes as well” (Boudewijn De Blij, 1996b). Parliamentarian Rob 
Oudkerk (PvdA) responded, “The tobacco industry relies on excellent 
lobbyists. They have accomplished a lot during 14 meetings with the 
cabinet, without any involvement from parliament. Cabinet and parlia-
ment have only debated about [the bill] twice” (Bruinsma, 1996).
As was discussed previously in Chap. 2 of this book, in 1996 routine 
meetings between the industry and the government to discuss tobacco 
policy were abandoned and the Ministry of Economic Affairs stepped back 
in favour of a more dominant role from the Ministry of Health, so the 
industry sought new ways to improve and strengthen communication 
with the tobacco policy officers at the Ministry of Health. They were not 
very successful. The relationship between industry representatives and the 
Ministry of Health at the time could best be characterised as distant and 
reserved, certainly not warm and welcoming.
In 1997 the ministry agreed to have “broad regular meetings” to 
which “other interested parties would also be invited, so that all aspects 
of comprehensive tobacco control policy could be discussed” (Van 
Hoogstraten, 1997a). This implied that not only would the tobacco 
industry be invited, as had been previous practice, but also representa-
tives from the health sector. After the cabinet made its tobacco control 
policy intentions public, the Ministry of Health organised a broad con-
sultation session in September 1997 (Van Hoogstraten, 1997b). The 
health sector including STIVORO, the Heart Foundation, Cancer 
Society, Medical Alliance Against Smoking, Clean Air Netherlands 
(CAN) and the Gemeentelijke Gezondheidsdienst (Association of 
Community Health Services) (GGD) was to be heard in the morning. 
Representations from civil society such as VNO–NCW, labour unions, 
NOC-NSF (the national sports federation), consumer organisations, the 
advertising sector, and the hospitality sector could present their argu-
ments in the afternoon, followed by the tobacco industry sector, repre-
sented by lobbyists from LBT, SSI, VNK, NVS, and NSO.  Soon 
afterwards Health Minister Borst received a letter from SSI, complaining 
that the Ministry of Health did not seem to take industry arguments 
seriously: “During these talks we brought a great number of concerns to 
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the table. It is now clear that in no way whatsoever did you include any 
of our concerns in your policy” (Roelofs, 1998). VNO–NCW sent a 
critical letter to Borst demanding that “the wish list of this cabinet can 
be and must become considerably shorter” (Blankert, 1997). From these 
and other letters at the end of the 1990s it is clear that the industry had 
completely lost its inside grip on tobacco control policy and fell back on 
intimidation and external pressure.
For many years the tobacco team at the Ministry of Health was under-
staffed. Until 2000, only two public servants dealt with tobacco. They 
were not full-time dedicated staff, since they also had to deal with alco-
hol. In 1998, Minister Borst was asked in parliament why it took her so 
long to implement the tobacco control initiatives that she had presented 
two years earlier. She explained that the new tobacco control policy 
“contains in total more than 50 initiatives, intentions, projects and 
actions. … All this work, in addition to the complete alcohol control 
policy, has to be done by just a few workers at my department.”39 Her 
predecessor, State Secretary Hans Simons, had also complained that he 
was so understaffed that negotiations with the industry about the adver-
tising code of conduct were difficult and took too much time.40 Sometime 
around 2000 the tobacco team was reinforced with three dedicated civil 
servants and a liaison officer from STIVORO to help adopt and imple-
ment the new Tobacco Act. Inspired and protected by Minister Borst, 
these officials were dedicated tobacco control advocates. The team worked 
closely with health organisations and kept contact with tobacco industry 
spokespersons to a minimum, but this did not mean that contact was 
rare. Officials and industry representatives continued to meet frequently 
to discuss technical aspects of regulation (such as specific allowances 
regarding advertising at points of sale), and industry representatives were 
given the opportunity to present their concerns and problems to the civil 
servants and sometimes to the director-general. A tobacco control officer 
said,
You just wanted to allow all concerned parties to have their say. Did we write 
the correct text, are there any other ideas? Yes, you cannot write a product 
regulation proposal without ever having talked about it with the industry. … 
It was common practice. … I believe it is appropriate that we do it like that. 
This is sort of the consensus model that we have in the Netherlands: pol-
deren and deliberating until we have a good outcome.41
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VNO–NCW continued, unsuccessfully, to lobby for periodic regular 
meetings with the Ministry of Health (Schraven, 2001b).
Minister Borst Turns Her Back on the Tobacco Industry
In May 2000 the relationship between the industry and the Ministry of 
Health reached a dramatic low. Borst, in an interview with morning news-
paper De Telegraaf, announced “rigorous measures” against tobacco and 
declared there was no future for tobacco in the Netherlands. The industry 
reacted furiously. Immediately the next day they sent an angry letter to 
her, with carbon copies to the ministers for social, economic, and financial 
affairs, and to parliament (Roelofs, 2000a), and a separate letter to prime 
minister Kok (Roelofs, 2000b). They blamed Borst for not talking with 
the industry: “This is not the first time that you have unilaterally launched 
proposals and ideas in public without first engaging in a constructive dia-
logue with us. … Your approach to repeatedly confront the tobacco indus-
try through the media with new measures and unfounded accusations is 
unacceptable to us.” They demanded that the prime minister call Borst to 
account for “the way she chooses to deal with the tobacco and related sec-
tors … letters are not replied to, appointments are not kept and requests 
for executive meetings are ignored. … We assume that you are willing to 
call upon your colleague from the Ministry of Health to normalise rela-
tionships with our sector.”
A few weeks later, a meeting was indeed organised between VNO–NCW 
and Borst, accompanied by her top-level civil servants (Schraven, 2001a). 
They reached a compromise: there would be a dialogue between the 
Ministry of Health and the industry under independent chairmanship. Since 
this did not happen, VNO–NCW brought the matter up again a year later 
and proposed the possibility of an executive-level meeting once or twice per 
year between the industry and the ministers for health and for economic 
affairs (Schraven, 2001a). In addition they proposed regular tobacco policy 
expert meetings, open to both industry experts and experts from all involved 
societal organisations, ranging from STIVORO to smokers’ right groups. 
However, Borst, who wanted to finalise her revision of the Tobacco Act 
before the end of her time in office, continued to hold off contact with the 
industry sector, despite many letters from the industry complaining that 
they were not heard. She allowed her civil servants to push the bill forward 
with limited opportunities for the industry to be consulted about the timing 
of its implementation (Horeca Nederland, 2002; Kalis, 2002).
 TOBACCO INDUSTRY INFLUENCE 
214 
Health Ministers Keep the Industry at a Distance
The SSI approached Borst’s successor, Eduard Bomhoff, soon after he 
started work as the new minister for health. Bomhoff, a university profes-
sor in economics, had been a member of the Labour Party for many years, 
but was asked by the populist Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn List) (LPF) 
to take up the position of health minister in the first Balkenende Cabinet. 
SSI wrote him a long letter complaining about the “unacceptable way the 
Ministry of Health currently does not give meaning to a decent dialogue 
with the concerned industry sectors,” demanding a resumption of “con-
structive dialogue” and requesting that the implementation of the Tobacco 
Act be put on hold (Monkhorst, 2002; SSI, 2002). Bomhoff replied in 
unmistakable terms that he wanted no personal contact with the industry, 
and was not willing to consider a respite in the implementation process 
(Bonhoff, 2002).
Bomhoff was minister for a very short period in 2002. Because of a 
fight between him and the Minister for Economic Affairs Herman 
Heinsbroek (LPF), the cabinet resigned. When his tasks were tempo-
rarily taken over by State Secretary Clémence Ross-van Dorp (CDA), 
VNO–NCW recognised an opportunity to bring the idea of regular 
executive meetings to her attention (Schraven, 2003a). Instead of 
granting the request, the ministry sent a short questionnaire to a large 
number of societal and business organisations with a stake in tobacco 
policy, asking them whether they were interested in being part of regu-
lar broad meetings about tobacco control policy (Kalis, 2003). When 
it became clear that these had also been sent to health organisations, 
the industry stepped down, not liking the prospect of having meetings 
with the ministry in the presence of tobacco control advocates. The 
ministry received replies from 26 of 67 organisations, insufficient for 
regular meetings (Hoogervorst, 2003b), and instead decided to con-
tinue the habit of granting meetings with individual stakeholders as 
circumstances required.
In the meantime, the industry and civil servants at the Ministry of 
Health had various meetings to discuss the ramifications of the transposi-
tion of the EU Tobacco Product Directive (TPD-1). The most difficult 
issue was the requirement that manufacturers submit lists of all additives 
used in the manufacture of their products, specifically at the level of each 
brand. The industry was not prepared to do this without a fight, claiming 
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that the requirement infringed on company secrets. They tried to offer 
alternative formats that would entail a far smaller level of detail. State sec-
retary Clémence Ross did not give in to their pressure, and after numerous 
letters and fruitless meetings between industry and government officials 
she published the regulation in the Bulletin of Acts and Decrees in April 
2003.
Not only ministers Borst and Bomhoff but also their successor Hans 
Hoogervorst (health minister from 2003 to 2007) resented industry lob-
byists. Hoogervorst made it clear that he had no intention of reinstalling 
the executive meetings (Hoogervorst, 2003b) and was not prepared to 
discuss the decision to make public the ingredients of cigarette brands 
(Hoogervorst, 2003a). A few weeks later the industry summoned the 
Dutch state to argue the ingredients matter in court.
Just after Hoogervorst took office, the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC) treaty was signed by the Netherlands. This 
meant that the government was expected to refrain from interactions with 
the tobacco industry unless it was “strictly necessary to enable them to 
effectively regulate tobacco industry and tobacco products.”42 While 
Hoogervorst was minister, VNO–NCW was frustrated that regular meet-
ings were not reinstated (Schraven, 2003b). Hoogervorst’s policy regard-
ing interaction with the industry was in line with the FCTC requirement: 
he only allowed contact about technical issues of implementation of 
tobacco regulation, of which he gave this example: “The government does 
not talk with the industry about whether there must be graphic health 
warnings on tobacco packages, but the government can initiate contact 
with the industry about practical matters such as the transition period that 
is necessary to adjust the packs.”43 Throughout his term in office 
Hoogervorst refused cooperation or meetings with the industry about 
general policy, explicitly referring to the FCTC (Dortland, 2005; 
Hoogervorst, 2006a, 2006b). However, the Ministry of Health allowed 
industry representatives to have bilateral contact with civil servants to dis-
cuss “concrete policy matters” (VWS, 2003). It is clear from the email 
correspondence published in the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents 
database44 that the bureaucrats from the ministry did this reluctantly until 
around 2008, often using the formal “u” to address the recipient in emails, 
keeping the language aloof and business-like, while the industry used the 
informal “je” and was more direct and, at times, intrusive and pushy.
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The Ministry of Health Resumes Contact with the Industry
In contrast to the three previous ministers, health ministers Ab Klink 
(2007–2010) and Edith Schippers (2010–2012) did not regard contact 
with the industry as inherently problematic. At first the ministry told the 
industry that the policy of the previous ministers, that there could be no 
collaboration between government and the tobacco sector regarding pol-
icy, would be continued (De Goeij, 2006), but this changed when Klink, 
after four months in office, granted a personal meeting with industry 
CEOs (Smid, 2007), followed by an “exceptionally constructive” (in SSI/
VNK’s words) meeting with SSI and VNK (SSI & VNK, 2007). Further 
meetings were planned to discuss industry ideas about such things as 
youth smoking prevention and new safer cigarettes (Klink, 2007). 
Minister Klink set the example and the norm for how government officials 
should communicate with the industry, and the number of contacts 
increased and emails between officials and industry representatives had a 
friendlier tone. Civil Servants fell back on the familiar habit of involving 
and consulting the sector. Symptomatic of the desire not to step on indus-
trial toes was a reassuring response from one of Klink’s tobacco control 
officers to a letter in which SSI expressed its concerns about the drafting 
of the guidelines to WHO Article 5.3, which could lead to full exclusion 
of the industry from the policymaking process: “First of all, I want to 
stress that it concerns non-binding guidelines. … Secondly, it is certainly 
not a matter of excluding the industry” (De Jager, 2008).
In March 2009, halfway through Klink’s ministership, Director-General 
Hans de Goeij, who had a solid track record in tobacco control, was 
replaced by an economist who had less affinity with public health. The 
new Director-General for Health Paul Huijts, a former employee of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, set out to restore the dialogue with the 
industry that had gone astray under previous ministers. On 24 August 
2009, after a meeting with the industry, Huijts looked back on “a useful 
and positive meeting, in which mutual interests and differences were well 
covered. … Future meetings … will have to contribute to mutual informa-
tion exchange and the building up of mutual trust” (Huijts, 2009). Soon 
afterwards, the industry confirmed that it shared with the ministry the 
wish to come to a better understanding and was grateful that the ministry 
was again “open to any contacts, interventions, signals or questions” 
(NVK, NVS, SSI, & Philip Morris Benelux, 2010).
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In 2009 Ministry of Health officials accepted an invitation from VNK 
to attend a “company day” (VNK & Ministry of Health, 2009). In the 
past, the industry had organised yearly small conferences around a specific 
theme, sometimes combined with a visit to a company or factory, for small 
groups of government officials. These meetings had been abandoned dur-
ing the previous cabinets, but were reinstated under Huijts’ leadership. 
The meeting took place in September 2009 and was attended by officials 
from three ministries (finance, economic affairs, and health) (VNK & 
Ministry of Health, 2009). In 2011 officials from the ministries of health, 
finance, and economic affairs visited a tobacco factory (VNK, 2011).
The responsive attitude towards the tobacco industry continued when 
Edith Schippers (VVD) became minister for health in October 2010. In 
reply to a congratulatory letter, Schippers confirmed to SSI and VNK, “I 
appreciate the intention to invest more in the coming time in an open and 
constructive exchange of thoughts about different international topics” 
(Schippers, 2010). The government’s “generous” interpretation of the 
FCTC commitments, and in particular Article 5.3, lasted until 2016, 
when it felt obliged by a court case initiated by the Youth Smoking 
Prevention Foundation to rethink its policy regarding Article 5.3 and to 
settle for an implementation more in line with the spirit of the FCTC (dis-
cussed in Chap. 6).
conclusion
In the first decades of tobacco control policymaking, the situation in the 
Netherlands was similar to that of the United Kingdom in the 1980s, 
where the tobacco industry survived, despite health concerns, under the 
protection of a “smoke ring” of tobacco-friendly individuals and organisa-
tions (Taylor, 1984). Such “iron triangles” were close-tied networks of 
lobbyists, advisory bodies, parliamentarians, and government officials who 
shared specific values and political ideology in line with industry 
 arguments.45 The industry felt protected through gentlemanly networks, 
able to lobby through direct contacts with ministers.
In the mid-1970s the iron triangle was challenged in the publication 
of the Health Council report Measures to Reduce Smoking. From then 
onwards, the industry had to defend its interests more proactively, to 
prevent the balance of power from shifting in an undesirable direction. 
This chapter has presented many examples of how the Dutch tobacco 
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industry lobbied. Continued conflict with the industrial sector over reg-
ulation versus self-regulation was the main reason why it took until 2002 
to revise the Tobacco Act. Until the mid-1990s the industry lobbied 
through direct contacts with ministers, while the health organisations 
had to rely on an outside lobby, most of the time relying on politicians 
who could not gather majorities in parliament. Well-known lobbyists 
who had worked for the industry for many years knew the ins and outs 
of tobacco policy better than most government officials, giving them an 
information advantage. Information asymmetry and dependence on 
information from the industry make it more difficult for the government 
to make independent, balanced policy decisions (Coglianese, Zeckhauser, 
& Parson, 2004). 
What stands out is the perseverance of the industry lobby, which relent-
lessly voiced the same arguments and concerns over and over, exploiting 
diverse routes of influence. These included politicians, bureaucrats in vari-
ous ministries, and third party contacts, especially the powerful employers’ 
organisation VNO–NCW. They knew whom to contact at which point, 
and they approached policymakers at all levels, from low-ranking civil ser-
vants to ministers, and even the prime minister. The lobbying game was 
sometimes played simultaneously at national, European, and global 
levels.
Around 1996, when Health Minister Els Borst distanced herself from 
the tobacco industry, the industry lost some of its grip on the government, 
and moved to expand its influence through other parties. It forged coali-
tions with Royal Dutch Hospitality, smokers’ rights groups, and the ven-
tilation industry to fend off hospitality bans, and with supermarket and 
retail organisations to prevent sale restrictions. In later years VNO–NCW 
tried to normalise contacts with the Ministry of Health and to reinstate 
the practice of involving the industry in conceptualising and drafting 
tobacco control policy. They were somewhat successful between 2007 and 
2012 under the ministerships of Klink and Schippers, but more recently, 
public outrage over the many violations of Article 5.3 FCTC tarnished the 
reputation of the Dutch tobacco industry and made direct contact between 
the government and the industry increasingly difficult. One former 
tobacco industry lobbyist lamented about more recent years, “the anti- 
tobacco lobby was much more effective than the tobacco lobby, much 
more effective, mainly because they have been very successful in holding 




1. Philip Morris, producer of best-selling brand Marlboro, became the mar-
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the Netherlands in the years 2007–2009.
5. Interview, 6 November 2015.
6. Interview, 6 October 2015.
7. Vrij Nederland, 23 November 2002.
8. Another example of the importance of the CDA to the industry was Rob 
Koreneef. He started in 1991 as political assistant to a CDA member of 
parliament. After that, he followed a similar career path as Wilhelmus: first 
working as public affairs consultant at Burson-Marsteller and then moving 
on to do similar work for tobacco manufactures (Imperial Tobacco and 
Philip Morris).
9. For example, Martin Bril, Drs. P., Max van Rooy, Martin van Amerongen, 
Jan Mulder (a non-smoker), and Theodor Holman.
10. This argument has become hollow over the years, as the Netherlands no 
longer had a noticeable cigarette manufacturing industry (see Chap. 5 for 
more details).
11. In Dutch: Wet op de Investeringsrekening (WIR). It was set up in 1978 by 
the Ministry for Economic Affairs to stimulate businesses to invest in com-
pany assets such as machines, and was in force until 1988.
12. Comparable to a sum of about €6 million in 2016.
13. Illustrative of the close links with the trade ministry is the fact that Jules 
Wilhelmus, information officer for that ministry between 1982 and 1987, 
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bureau, and continued his career as director of corporate affairs for Philip 
Morris from 1995 until 2005.
14. Minister of Economic Affairs from 1989 to 1994.
15. Interview, 26 April 2016.
16. Proceedings II, 1996–1997, 24743, nr. 3, p. 8.
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27. The Dutch Excise Duty Act dates from 1921 and has been modernised in 
1961 and 1991.
28. Interview, 6 November 2015.
29. See for examples of such contacts in 2008 and 2010: https://www.indus-
trydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=xkxb0191
30. Interview, 22 February 2017.
31. See (SSI & Toet, 1972–1996) for a collection of correspondence between 
the industry and the government on tobacco taxation.
32. In 2004 there was a larger tax increase to support the workplace smoking 
ban. In 2008, with the introduction of the smoking ban in bars and restau-
rants, another higher-than-usual increase was realised. In 2013, tax 
increases resulted in consumer price increases of more than 10% for both 
cigarettes and roll-your-own tobacco.
33. Proceedings II, 1991–1992, 22351, nr. 4.
34. Parliamentary Papers II, 1991–1992, 22351, nrs. 5 and 7.
35. Proceedings II, 1983–1984, 18139, nr. 4.
36. Proceedings II, 24743, nr. 3, p. 4.
37. Interview with a former civil servant on 1 February 2017.
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39. Proceedings II, 1997–1998, Annex 891.
40. Proceedings II, 1993–1994, 23400 XVI, 78, p. 6.
41. Interview on 18 November 2015.
42. Recommendation 2.1 of the implementation guidelines for Article 5.3 
FCTC.
43. Parliamentary Papers II, 2005–2006, 22894, nr. 83.
44. https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/
45. Such powerful networks that protect business interests are common in the 
Netherlands, not only in tobacco but in other areas such as education and 
agriculture as well (Trappenburg, 2005).
46. Interview on 22 February 2017.
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CHAPTER 9
The Tobacco Control Coalition
Tobacco is the main contributor to three groups of disease: cancer, lung 
disease, and heart disease. Everywhere in the world, health charities fight-
ing these illnesses became natural leaders in the field of tobacco control. 
The Netherlands is no exception. The Dutch Cancer Society, the Dutch 
Heart Foundation, and the Lung Foundation Netherlands have been 
fighting tobacco from the start of the Dutch tobacco control advocacy 
movement. The Dutch Cancer Society holds the oldest track record in 
tobacco control advocacy and has the largest financial resources.
This chapter describes the emergence, transformation, and accomplish-
ments of the Dutch tobacco control coalition1 and how it adapted to 
changes in the policy environment. It narrates how the three charities 
developed a tobacco control coalition with the Stichting Volksgezondheid 
en Roken (Dutch Smoking or Health Foundation) (STIVORO) as their 
main vehicle. STIVORO’s accomplishments are described, with particular 
attention to its successes in the field of health education and smoking ces-
sation and as the central tobacco control advocacy organisation in the 
Netherlands. It will also discuss the contribution to the tobacco control 
coalition of the medical community, the academic community, and gov-
ernmental organisations. From the 1970s until the end of the 1990s the 
coalition fought a strong tobacco industry-dominated government, 
 followed by a period in which tobacco control was supported by an activist 
tobacco control elite within the Ministry of Health. STIVORO and the 
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charities collaborated with the ministry on its wish for stronger tobacco 
control. This changed around 2007 when new governments appointed 
health ministers who were more lenient towards the tobacco industry and 
several committed civil servants left the tobacco control team at the 
Ministry of Health, resulting in a temporary wakening of national tobacco 
control. The health charities later resumed their lead role, and recent years 
have seen a resurgence of a strong tobacco control coalition.
Early Days of Dutch tobacco control
The tobacco control movement in the Netherlands had a curious start in 
the 1960s, with two public figures who dominated the media: Robert 
Jasper Grootveld (Box 9.1) and Lenze Meinsma.
Box 9.1 Robert Jasper Grootveld, “anti-smoke magician”
One of the first activists was an initiator of the Provo youth counter 
movement in Amsterdam. Paradoxically, this well-known cult-figure, 
Robert Jasper Grootveld, started a crusade against the tobacco 
industry, but not against smoking, being a tobacco smoker and pro-
moter of marihuana use. As a self-proclaimed anti-rook magiër (anti- 
smoke magician), he regarded the cigarette as the ultimate symbol of 
oppression by multinationals and their marketers, and provoked the 
tobacco industry and the Amsterdam police by writing the word 
“cancer” on tobacco billboard advertisements, for which he was 
repeatedly arrested—and once sentenced to jail (Duivenvoorden, 
2009). Grootveld initiated famous weekly provocative “happenings” 
in Amsterdam, part of which was a purifying ritual involving the 
mass smoking of cigarettes and loud coughing. Other public protest 
performances were around a small bronze statue in the centre of 
Amsterdam dedicated to poor Amsterdam boys, called “Het 
Lieverdje”—a local tobacco manufacturer had donated the money 
for it. Grootveld used the statue as a symbol for the modern addicted 
consumer. These happenings, where participants were enticed to 
smoke collectively as a protest against smoking and the tobacco 
industry, were a commentary on the prevailing ethos, which was 
regarded as hypocritical. For decades, many who agitated against 
tobacco and the tobacco industry had been easily set aside as being 
anti-rook magiërs: fools not to be taken seriously.
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The Dutch Cancer Society started tobacco education activities in the 
1960s, years before the government took responsibility. Lenze Meinsma, 
director of the Cancer Society from 1953 until 1978, was a physician 
with a passion for the fight against tobacco. Meinsma became a public 
figure in 1963 through frequent appearances on television and other 
media, where he relentlessly warned against the dangers of smoking. He 
conducted campaigns aimed at teachers and pupils (known as Actie 
Roken Jeugd), which ran from 1964 to 1975. He also presented the first 
ideas about how tobacco should be tackled. He condemned the govern-
ment for not doing enough, in the process turning into a well-known 
anti-tobacco activist.
In 1969 Meinsma published a small booklet, Smoking and Risks 
(Meinsma, 1969), which became known as Meinsma’s “red book.” In it, 
he presented a rough sketch of a comprehensive approach to the smoking 
problem. In addition to educating young people, he proposed that the 
government substantially increase tobacco taxation, put health warnings 
on cigarette packs, ban tobacco vending machines, restrict the sale of 
tobacco to specialty shops, initiate a ban on tobacco advertisements and 
promotion, ban smoking in government buildings and workplaces, ban 
smoking in restaurants and cinemas, ban smoking during sports events, 
and ban the sale of duty-free tobacco in airplanes and to military person-
nel. All in all, it was an ambitious package that proved to be far ahead of 
its time, despite the implicit endorsement of the state secretary from the 
Ministry of Health who in the preface to the book wrote that smoking was 
a “serious public health problem” responsible for about 30 daily deaths in 
the Netherlands.
Meinsma suffered the same fate as Robert Jasper  Grootvelt. His 
activities received negative reactions from the public and experts, who 
felt his tone was too harsh and confrontational. He had become a lone 
wolf, howling in the dark. The charities learned from this that the fight 
against smoking could not be carried out by individuals, but required 
coordinated efforts from dedicated organisations and a cautious and 
diplomatic approach. In 1971 Meinsma negotiated with the Lung and 
Heart Foundations about collaboration with the Cancer Society—no 
easy task, as the three organisations were natural competitors in the 
charity market. Meinsma also approached medical specialist organisa-
tions. This resulted—in January 1971—in a letter from the scientific 
associations of four medical professional organisations appealing to the 
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state secretary for health to take action and not leave tobacco solely to 
the charities. This led to a recommendation from the Health Council 
in 1975 to set up a national tobacco control organisation which 
became Stichting Volksgezondheid en Roken (Dutch Smoking or Health 
Foundation) (STIVORO), the national tobacco control organisation. 
The Health Council wrote, “Considering the number of yearly deaths 
caused by tobacco … and the fact that smoking will continue to be a 
considerable problem for the coming 15 or 20 years, the creation of a 
dedicated institute to reduce smoking is justified” (Beernink & 
Plokker, 1975).
thE founDation of stiVoro
In contrast to other countries, notably the United States and the United 
Kingdom, the health charities in the Netherlands wanted the government 
to take the lead in controlling tobacco.2 However, the Dutch Health 
Council realised the danger of being too dependent on the government 
and advised that a national institute for the reduction of smoking should 
be set up in such a way that it could develop its own policy and be reason-
ably independent of its financers (Beernink & Plokker, 1975). It noted 
that the government had to weigh up multiple interests when it came to 
the smoking issue, including economic interests, so that it was undesirable 
that the government be solely responsible for the new institute, and 
advised that private organisations be the financial supporters and driving 
force. It also advised that the Dutch Cancer Society, Heart Foundation, 
and Lung Foundation take up this responsibility. These three organisa-
tions founded STIVORO on 24 December 1974, but were not willing to 
fully finance and remained dependent on governmental co-funding.
The foundation of STIVORO did not immediately result in a working 
organisation. During its first three years it was barely active, lacking the 
funds to appoint even a director, and the three founding charities could 
not agree on the best course of action to tackle the complex smoking 
problem.3 In the first three years, STIVORO’s activities were limited to 
distributing Meinsma’s educational materials to schools, for which it 
received a governmental subsidy. As the government was accountable for 
STIVORO’s activities to parliament, the state secretary assured critical lib-
ertarian politicians that each activity proposed by STIVORO would be 




Three years after its foundation, STIVORO finally secured enough 
money to appoint a director and a small staff. It started to build up a net-
work of academics who could advise on the scientific development of cam-
paigns and overall strategy. A Wetenschappelijke Adviesraad (Scientific 
Advisory Council) was set up and in February 1978 Albert Pontfoort, the 
first director, presented STIVORO’s policy programme to the press 
(STIVORO, 1978). The approach was to stimulate smokers to change 
their behaviour through campaigns that could be tailored to smokers’ psy-
chological determinants, applying methods and insights from psychology 
and the new fields of communication sciences and health education. Until 
then, STIVORO’s activities had been restricted to informing the public 
about the health risks of smoking. The new approach was a direct transla-
tion of State Secretary Hendriks’ Tobacco Memorandum (see Chap. 2). A 
comprehensive, long-term approach was proposed that included contin-
ued education of youth, protection of non-smokers against environmental 
tobacco smoke, and development of behavioural support for smokers who 
wanted to quit. Exposing tobacco industry strategies and lobbying for 
regulatory measures from the government were not explicitly mentioned.
At first the Ministry of Health did not want to structurally finance the 
new organisation, and limited subsidies to specific activities and ad hoc 
campaigns under more or less formal grant proposal conditions. In this 
way the government could control educational measures, which it regarded 
as its main responsibility in the fight against tobacco, without being 
responsible for a new semi-governmental organisation. This must be 
understood against the backdrop of a process in which the ministry 
explored ways to organise health education in the Netherlands. Health 
education was a new profession, and while the government wanted a 
national institute for the coordination of national and local health educa-
tion activities, it had not yet decided if tobacco was going to be a part of 
this. Pending this decision, it was not prepared to structurally support 
STIVORO. It took three years before a compromise was reached, in which 
the three charities equally financed half of the bureau and the other 50% 
was financed by the government, but still in the form of project finance. 
The total budget for the organisation was one million guilders.5 This 
understanding lasted until 1991, when the government began to finance 
STIVORO on a structural basis, not at 50%, but by the same amount that 
the three “mothers” each paid: 350,000 guilders. From 1991 onwards 
STIVORO was a semi-governmental organisation with one quarter of its 
core finance flowing from the Ministry of Health.
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For many years the charities were not prepared to publicly operate as 
activist organisations. They were concerned that a too radical or confron-
tational approach would backfire, jeopardising the goodwill of donors (De 
Jong, 1989), remembering that Meinsma’s rhetorical style had prompted 
negative reactions. Public opinion was antagonistic to a paternalistic 
approach, and the three organisations depended on private donations. By 
supporting STIVORO they could fight tobacco without standing directly 
in the spotlight.6 The downside was that STIVORO had to walk a tight-
rope, balancing interests from three charities and the government.
Over the years STIVORO became more and more dependent on gov-
ernmental subsidies. The Ministry of Health was on the management 
board, although it had no voting power. Internationally, the arrangement 
was unique, and typically Dutch: compromises between government and 
civil society were woven into the fabric of the organisation. Because of the 
collective financing arrangement, the three “mothers” and one “step-
mother” (the state) held each other hostage, making it very difficult for 
any partner to withdraw its support. If one organisation wanted to pay less 
(or more), it had to convince the others to do the same, and if one wanted 
to withdraw altogether, the remaining three were unlikely to agree since 
they would then have to cover the costs of the dropout. However, this 
assured STIVORO of secure core funding for several decades, which can 
be considered as one reason for its success.
thE tobacco control coalition ExpanDs
At the end of the 1970s the core of the Dutch tobacco control advocacy 
coalition consisted of the three charities, united in STIVORO, and their 
counterparts at the Ministry of Health. From the start it collaborated with 
Clean Air Netherlands (CAN; discussed in the next paragraph), which was 
founded in the same year as STIVORO.  Over the years STIVORO 
expanded its network, mainly in the medical sector: in the mid-1990s 
through the Dutch Medical Alliance Against Smoking, and from the 
beginning of the 2000s through the Partnership Stop Smoking.
Clean Air Netherlands
The Club for Active Non-smokers, later dubbed Clean Air Netherlands 
(CAN), is a grass roots interest group founded in 1974 to protect the 
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rights of non-smokers. From the beginning it received material and a 
small financial contribution from STIVORO, and in the first years the 
two organisations shared a post office box. It survived on donations 
and gifts from members and supporters. In 1979 analysts from the 
tobacco industry identified CAN and STIVORO as the two main 
Dutch anti-tobacco organisations (Unknown (Philip Morris), 1979). 
In their eyes CAN was immature, and “due to their inability and their 
rather passive attitude, they have played a non-effectual role.” 
STIVORO was the “most active and serious anti-smoking group at this 
time, [but] as the personal freedom concept is widely accepted and 
supported in Holland, the anti-smoking cause is not exceptionally 
strong.”
Despite its dismissal by the industry, CAN played a significant role in 
the fight for smoking bans. STIVORO collaborated with CAN if it needed 
an activist approach to put issues on the agenda, which it could not do 
under its own name. CAN exists to this day and has at times been an effec-
tive grass roots advocacy organisation, operating fairly independently of 
the broader STIVORO-led tobacco control coalition. It does not shy 
away from taking the government or companies to court. In 1995 CAN 
campaigned against national airlines (Transavia, Martinair, KLM) to ban 
smoking during flights. After 2004 it campaigned for a smoke-free hospi-
tality sector. A major accomplishment was that they were the first organ-
isation in the Netherlands to make use of a new right to citizens’ initiative: 
anyone who can present 40,000 supporting signatures can put an issue on 
the official agenda of parliament. CAN handed in about 62,000 signatures 
to the president of parliament in May 2006, in an attempt to implement a 
smoking ban in bars and restaurants on the agenda. Parliament, however, 
did not discuss the topic because it had already debated several times on 
the smoke-free issue, and the citizens’ initiative is not valid if the topic has 
been debated before. In 2007, in a collaborative action with STIVORO, 
CAN presented 60,000 letters from citizens who asked for a smoke-free 
hospitality sector, and presented these to the negotiators during the for-
mation of the Balkenende IV cabinet, which contributed to the smoke- 
free hospitality sector becoming part of the coalition agreement of the 
cabinet. CAN’s biggest success was the court case against the state over 
Minister Schippers’ one-sided decision to exclude small bars from the 
smoking ban. The judge overruled the minister, who was defeated in the 
high court in 2013.
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The Medical Sector
A remarkably weak link in the Dutch tobacco control health coalition was 
the passive stance of the medical community. After the initiative from 
medical specialist organisations in the beginning of the 1970s that resulted 
in the foundation of STIVORO, the medical establishment was happy to 
leave tobacco control advocacy to STIVORO. This may be because in the 
1970s and 1980s smoking among physicians was very common. About 
half of all general practitioners smoked, and smoking rates were higher 
than in the general male population and much higher than what was nor-
mal in the higher social classes (Adriaanse, Van Reek, & Metsemakers, 
1986; Vandenbroucke, Kok, Matroos, & Dekker, 1981). While in many 
countries smoking rates decreased earlier in the medical professions than 
in the general population, this was not the case in the Netherlands. In a 
review of data from 31 countries, only in France, Portugal, and the 
Netherlands did more physicians smoke than in the general population 
(Adriaanse, Van Reek, & Van Zutphen, 1986).
The passive stance of doctors may be further attributed to active lobby-
ing by the tobacco industry. In 1979 the industry’s Tobacco Education 
Bureau (BVT) began to distribute Rookspectrum, a periodical with “scien-
tific information” on the smoking and health issue, to all Dutch family 
practitioners. Rookspectrum presented a selection of scientific news about 
smoking, downplaying the health risks of smoking and passive smoking. 
Its aim was “to defend issues concerning passive smoking” (RJ Reynolds, 
1979). This free “service” to doctors continued for at least four years. In 
1985 the industry boasted that, based on a survey they carried out among 
more than 1200 doctors, 70% said they were readers of the journal and 
54% believed that Rookspectrum provided a meaningful contribution to 
the smoking and health discussion (SNK & SSI, 1985).
Surveys in the 1980s showed that Dutch general practitioners did not 
regard their exemplary role as particularly important (Adriaanse, Van 
Reek, & Metsemakers, 1986; E. Dekker, 1981). One in four family physi-
cians smoked in the presence of patients (Dekker, 1981). Dutch physicians 
considered smoking a private lifestyle choice for which they were not 
responsible, were stoic about the need to fight the tobacco epidemic, and 
ignored the important role they could play (Knol, 1997).
The main medical organisation in the Netherlands is the Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst (Royal Dutch 
Medical Association) (KNMG), established in 1849. The KNMG repre-
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sents all medical professions. In an editorial, the scientific journal of the 
KNMG called on the medical profession to become more actively involved 
in the political lobby (Van Es, 1987), but this did not result in a more 
activist role. In 2005 KNMG was asked to give its views on the govern-
ment’s tobacco control agenda. It briefly mentioned the need for a smok-
ing ban in the hospitality sector, but emphasised the importance of 
smoking cessation, which they regarded as the main contribution the 
medical community could make (Rijksen, 2005); it did not mention 
tobacco control in its 2007 prevention policy document (KNMG, 2007). 
For decades the KNMG has not taken a particular interest in tobacco con-
trol advocacy and confined itself to being a member of the Partnership 
Stop Smoking. This situation lasted until 2016 when the KNMG felt cer-
tain enough to step forward with a distinctive and explicitly formulated 
tobacco control agenda, urging the government to do a better job of 
implementing WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC) measures (KNMG, 2016). The same lack of activism by the 
Dutch medical community was noticeable in the unremarkable role that 
the powerful Landelijke Huisartsen Vereniging (Dutch General 
Practitioners Association) (LHV)—established in 1946 to defend the 
interests of general practitioners—played in Dutch tobacco control.
In 1993, medical specialists founded the Medische Alliantie tegen het 
Roken (Medical Alliance Against Smoking), a Dutch branch of the 
European Medical Association Smoking or Health. The secretariat was 
provided by STIVORO. For many years the Medical Alliance was the only 
active medical tobacco control advocacy organisation, but it had no real 
political power, being a voluntary organisation with no resources, and 
dependent on the goodwill of a small number of engaged doctors and 
retired medical professors. Despite this, on various occasions the organ-
isation was able to highlight failings in the self-regulation of tobacco 
advertising (Knol, 1995, 1996a, 1996b), sometimes together with the 
KNMG (Lanphen & Van Berkestijn, 1995). The most notable activity 
was a petition to the parliament, signed by 185 medical professors, asking 
for an advertising ban (Hilvering, Knol, & Wagener, 1995). This sup-
ported Health Minister Borst, who endeavoured to get a ban on tobacco 
advertising in the Tobacco Act. The Medical Alliance remained active 
until 2008 when it was dissolved, partly due to lack of interest from the 
medical community.
The Dutch doctors’ passivity is in contrast with the important role that 
the medical community played in the United Kingdom. Early on, the UK 
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Royal College of Physicians published influential reports on the health 
risks of smoking and advocated for tobacco control measures, such as in 
their Smoking and Health report (Royal College of Physicians, 1962). It 
founded Action on Smoking and Health (ASH UK) in 1971 to lobby for 
better tobacco control by the government. Another strong medical force 
was the British Medical Association (BMA). In 1984, the BMA started an 
unprecedented attack against the tobacco industry in an attempt to eradi-
cate tobacco advertising and promotion (BMA, 1986). Voluntary agree-
ments to restrict advertising, comparable with those in place in the 
Netherlands, were not working, and the BMA realised that something had 
to be done to break the deadlock. The campaign carried the weight of the 
BMA’s prestige and infrastructure (representing the majority of practising 
doctors in the United Kingdom), and one of the most highly organised 
professional bodies in the country, directly into a fight with the industry. 
It was a tremendous help for ASH UK, which, like STIVORO at the time, 
was a small organisation with only three full-time officials and five support 
staff. David Simpson, ASH’s director, more than welcomed the help of the 
BMA, which had a reputation as one of the country’s most powerful lob-
bying organisations: “It was like the Americans entering the Second World 
War” (BMA, 1986, p. 7). The campaign lasted several years, permeated 
the media with a general anti-tobacco climate, and put pressure on minis-
ters to take the smoking problem more seriously. No such help from the 
medical community materialised in the Netherlands.
A Public–Private Partnership to Support Smoking Cessation
In 2000 STIVORO formed a coalition of organisations with expertise and 
interest in the treatment of smokers, under the name Partnership Stop met 
Roken (Partnership Stop Smoking). This was at the request of Health 
Minister Borst, who wanted to improve the quality of the treatment of 
tobacco addiction. The new coalition was launched in January 2002 as a 
public–private partnership and received financing from the Ministry of 
Health (€550.000 for the first two years).7 The Partnership Stop Smoking 
included the KNMG, the Dutch Medical Alliance against Smoking, the 
Association of Doctors for Lung Disease and Tuberculosis, the Dutch 
Cardiology Association, the Dutch Institute for Psychologists, various 
addiction treatment organisations, health charities, scientific organisa-
tions, and several pharmaceutical companies. STIVORO initiated and 
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coordinated the Partnership. Its main activity was to develop the first clini-
cal guidelines for the treatment of tobacco dependence, following exam-
ples from the United States and the United Kingdom. It was hoped that 
such guidelines would encourage Dutch health-care professionals to moti-
vate patients to quit smoking and also to engage more doctors in tobacco 
control activism. The Partnership identified its mission as placing the grav-
ity of tobacco addiction and the urgent need to tackle this problem higher 
on the political agenda. Advocacy goals were a smoke-free workplace and 
hospitality sector, and reimbursement for smoking cessation, including for 
pharmaceutical treatment. The Partnership was the Dutch representative 
in the European Network for Smoking Prevention (ENSP). With support 
from the Partnership, the lobbying strength of the three charities and 
STIVORO improved considerably, because they were able to mobilise a 
much broader group of organisations.
In the first year of the Partnership, when STIVORO looked for over-
seas examples of how a network of tobacco control professionals could be 
organised, it identified Canada as a model. In November 2000 the 
Canadian activist Heidi Rathjen gave a workshop in the Netherlands to 
inspire the new Dutch coalition. Rathjen had founded the Quebec 
Coalition for Tobacco Control in 1996, a coalition of about 700 organisa-
tions that successfully pushed the government to make haste with drafting 
a Tobacco Act (Rathjen, 1999). In 2004 STIVORO, through the 
Partnership, called on the government to ratify the FCTC (Partnership 
Stop met Roken, 2004), which it did in 2005. In 2011 the Partnership 
campaigned for continuation of the national reimbursement for smoking 
cessation support, presenting a petition to politicians in the spring of 2011 
and organising a press lunch with politicians at the end of that year. After 
this was accomplished, the Partnership Stop Smoking became an indepen-
dent foundation which focused on further improving the quality of smok-
ing cessation treatment in the Netherlands (see also Box 10.1 in the next 
chapter). The Partnership Stop Smoking was the first European organisa-
tion to develop clinical guidelines for the treatment of tobacco addiction, 
after the United Kingdom.
The Scientific Community
How much support did the Dutch tobacco control lobby get from the 
scientific community? Academics can have much influence on policymak-
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ing when they become media personalities, by appearing on radio and 
television, writing opinion pieces and popular books, and using the author-
ity of scientific papers to tell their story (Chapman, 2017). Dutch academ-
ics did  sporadically speak out for more effective tobacco control in the 
media, sometimes attracting attention from politicians. For example, the 
fact that the implementation of the Tobacco Act in 1990 was not followed 
by a noticeable impact on smoking rates (Dresscher, Elzinga & Koldenhof, 
1991) led to critical remarks from prominent Dutch scientists about the 
national tobacco control policy (Barneveld, Dalesio, & van Leeuwen, 
1992; Roscam Abbing, 1992). Johan Mackenbach, professor of public 
health at Erasmus University, regularly criticised the government for insuf-
ficient disease prevention and its weak tobacco control policy (Mackenbach, 
2006, 2009, 2016; Mackenbach, Klazinga, & Van der wal, 2004). My 
own inaugural lecture was a catalyst for heighted attention to failed Dutch 
tobacco control policy (Willemsen, 2011, 2012; Willemsen, De Vries, & 
Van Schayck, 2009).
Over the years, STIVORO developed collaborations with various uni-
versities, predominantly concerned with building an evidence base for 
education, campaigns, and smoking cessation interventions—tobacco 
control advocacy was seldom the topic. The Netherlands has fewer research 
activists in the field of tobacco control than in some Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries. For example, the American tobacco control movement included 
notorious academic tobacco control advocates, committed to getting 
tobacco multinationals on their knees (Derthick, 2005). Tobacco control 
advocacy, at least when it is done through extensive and public media 
advocacy, is regarded by many in the Dutch academic community as dif-
ficult to reconcile with the scientific enterprise. When academics become 
too involved in activism, they may be perceived as pushy and stepping over 
the fine line of relationships in the Dutch corporatist system, where one 
needs to be part of the system to have influence.
Support from Governmental Agencies
The role of state agencies as an integral part of the tobacco control move-
ment has been limited in the Netherlands. Dutch national governmental 
agencies such as the Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu (National 
Institute for Public Health and the Environment) (RIVM) and Nederlandse 
Voedsel en Waren Autoriteit (Netherlands Food and Consumer Product 
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Safety Authority) (NVWA) were (and are) not tasked to actively support 
and promote tobacco control activism at the state or local level. This con-
trasts with the United States, where federal governmental agencies such as 
the office of the Surgeon General, the National Cancer Institute, and the 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention played crucial roles. These 
organisations spent millions of dollars to fund advocacy efforts, dissemi-
nated scientific research findings in support of the health lobby, and pro-
vided training and technical assistance to advocates at local, state, and 
federal levels (Wolfson, 2001). For example, the National Cancer Institute, 
with support from the American Cancer Society, initiated and funded the 
multi-state project American Stop Smoking Intervention Study for Cancer 
Prevention (ASSIST), providing a massive injection of federal resources 
into state and local tobacco control advocacy (Wolfson, 2001).
thE GolDEn yEars of Dutch tobacco control
In 1987, parliament insisted that educational efforts to discourage smok-
ing be intensified.8 The goal of 20% smokers in 2000 could not be reached 
without more money for education, as tobacco promotion by the industry 
was still completely unregulated. The government agreed and brought 
together a group of experts to develop a multi-annual action plan. The 
proposal consisted of a comprehensive approach to youth education, 
smoking cessation, special attention to high-risk groups and protection of 
non-smokers, with yearly smoking cessation media campaigns as a core 
element, all to be coordinated and organised by STIVORO. This signified 
a change in STIVORO’s focus, as it now became responsible for coordina-
tion and execution of national tobacco control action plans for the gov-
ernment. Its main activity was to organise yearly nation-wide smoking 
cessation campaigns in collaboration with national and local health 
organisations.
STIVORO’s campaigns were highly successful and contributed to sig-
nificant reductions in smoking in the Netherlands (see Box 9.2). Between 
1986 and 2011, STIVORO organised 16 campaigns around smoking 
cessation. While the campaigns in the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s still had an educational character (e.g., the 1986 campaign 
informed smokers about how misleading light cigarettes were), the cam-
paigns after 1996 also went on to inform smokers about cessation 
support.
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Box 9.2 STIVORO’s great “smoke-outs”
Betweewn 1990 and 2008, STIVORO organised four large-scale 
media campaigns that involved entertainment-education strategies 
(such as  TV shows) and stimulated between 20% and 30% of all 
smokers to make quit attempts (Willemsen, van Kann, & Jansen, 
2012). The campaigns were accompanied by the introduction of 
cessation methods that were innovative for their time, such as a tele-
vision cessation clinic (Teleac) in 1990–1991, a national telephone 
quit line and entertainment-education (TV entertainment shows) in 
1999–2000, and a self-help cessation kit in 2003–2004.
The 1990–1991 campaign “Quit smoking together” featured a 
series of informative and entertaining television programmes show-
ing celebrities trying to quit smoking, a TV cessation clinic, 73 ces-
sation clinics conducted at the local level, a national quit line staffed 
by trained counsellors, and a comprehensive publicity campaign 
(Mudde & De Vries, 1999). The campaign contributed to a reduc-
tion in the proportion of smokers from 35% in 1990 to 34% in 1991. 
This seems modest at first glance, but is impressive when one consid-
ers the fact that between 1990 and 1991 the tobacco industry 
increased its expenditure on tobacco promotion and advertisements 
by 72% (from $66 to $113 million) (Mudde & De Vries, 1999).
The “I Can Do That Too” “millennium” campaign ran in 
1999–2000 and was made possible through an extra subsidy by the 
Dutch Cancer Society, celebrating its 50th anniversary. During the 
period of the campaign more than 600,000 smokers attempted to 
quit: four times more than usual (Op de Weegh & Willemsen, 2003; 
Westerik & Van der Rijt, 2001). The campaign contributed to a 
reduction in national smoking prevalence from 34% to 33%.
The “Netherlands Start Quitting” campaign in 2003–2004 was 
financed by the Ministry of Health and aimed to accelerate the natu-
ral quitting that was expected to occur with the implementation of 
the workplace smoking ban. It was associated with a reduction in 
smoking prevalence from 27% to 25%, with more than a million quit 
attempts at or around New Year’s Eve (Van den Putte, Yzer, Ten 
Berg, & Steeveld, 2005). In the same period, STIVORO ran cam-
paigns to inform employees about the workplace ban and to moti-
vate smoking parents to quit (“Kinderen Kopiëren”).
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At the end of the 1980s, STIVORO began to coordinate smoking ces-
sation initiatives at the local level through collaboration with municipal 
public health services and regional cancer centres. It set up a national 
council with representatives from municipal health services, home nursing 
organisations, and experts from several universities to coordinate and pre-
pare annual cessation campaigns. In addition, it organised national meet-
ings where scientists exchanged information on research findings. Over a 
period of three decades, STIVORO steadily extended and improved its 
repertoire of smoking cessation support. It became an internationally 
acknowledged example for other countries of how evidence-based cessa-
tion support can be integrated with yearly mass media cessation cam-
paigns, and how to offer cessation support through the internet. An 
important feature of the Dutch system was that government funding 
allowed STIVORO to offer cessation support free of charge. Through 
close collaboration with the University of Maastricht, STIVORO became 
an international pioneer in evidence-based smoking cessation methods. 
These included self-help manuals; computer-tailored cessation materials; 
cessation protocols for use by general practitioners; specialised protocols 
for use with cardiac patients, lung patients, and pregnant women; and 
special programmes to motivate and support smoking employees to quit 
smoking at the workplace. Sometime around 2000 STIVORO set up a 
well-staffed smoking cessation telephone quit line. It was one of the lead-
ing partners of the European Network for Quitlines and, alongside 
The last large campaign was the “In every smoker there is a quit-
ter” campaign in 2008, financed by the three charities as part of the 
Nationaal Programma Tabaksontmoediging (National Programme 
of Tobacco Control) (NPT): the idea was that the implementation 
of the smoking ban in the hospitality sector in July 2008 would 
result in many smokers wanting to quit. The campaign ran between 
April 2008 and January 2009 and stimulated smokers to take the 
opportunity to quit. It is estimated to have contributed to between 
1.1 and 1.4 million quit attempts, twice the number that would have 
quit normally during the same period (Nagelhout, Willemsen, van 
den Putte, Crone, & de Vries, 2009; STIVORO, 2009). Smoking 
prevalence dropped by 0.8% (STIVORO, 2009).
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Sweden, the only quitline organisation that conducted scientific research 
to improve quitline counselling.
When the economy improved, the money that STIVORO could spend 
on campaigns was allowed to grow. It increased almost exponentially 
between 1993 and 2004, while the structural budget for the organisation 
remained fairly constant (see Fig. 9.1). The campaign budget reached a 
peak in 2003 with a total of €16 million. This large sum followed the reso-
lution from Senator Werner that was key to getting approval for Minister 
Borst’s Tobacco Act in the senate (discussed in Chap. 2). In 1996 
STIVORO was already the best staffed and funded tobacco control organ-
isation in Europe (Boucher, 2000), but the period from 1999 until around 
2004 is considered by some to be the golden years of STIVORO, and 
Dutch tobacco control in general, as this period coincided with the adop-
tion and implementation of the revised Tobacco Act.9 STIVORO’s size 
grew from around 9 employees in 1989, to 18 in 2000, and 46 in 2004.10 
The large number of employees from 2000 onwards reflected the many 
smoking cessation counsellors who worked in STIVORO’s advice centre 
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In the years between 2000 and 2008, the tobacco control team at the 
health ministry, which collaborated closely with STIVORO, was also 
rather large, and there was a strong team spirit, according to all interview-
ees. The team was supported by specialists from the ministry for such 
things as juridical and financial matters, and occasionally increased to a 
team of six to ten people.11 In later years the team was downsized.12
cracks in thE national tobacco control coalition
In the 40 years of its existence, STIVORO struggled with its mandate in 
tobacco control, trying to strike a balance between the sometimes com-
peting interests and expectations of its three “mothers” and the govern-
ment. The government and parliament regarded health education as 
STIVORO’s sole task, but civil servants from the ministry and the chari-
ties expected STIVORO to lobby in parliament for better tobacco control 
policy, despite the fact that it had no professional lobbyists. A civil servant 
explained: “The lobby that the health organisations put up in the direction 
of the parliament was rather amateurish in our eyes. That was no reproach 
to anyone. We found that quite normal, since the business community was 
so much better in lobbying.”13 When judging the limited lobbying capac-
ity of STIVORO, another civil servants observed: “STIVORO’s people 
were of course constantly busy with education, with producing materials 
etc. They did not have the time, day in, day out, to gain skills in lobby-
ing.”14 The more STIVORO became dependent on large subsidies from 
the government, the more difficult it was to criticise the government. 
Similar worries were felt in other countries. For example, ASH UK 
(STIVORO’s counterpart in the United Kingdom) depended in the 1980s 
for 90% of its annual grants on the Department of Health. ASH “felt itself 
to some extent constrained in what it could say or do” (BMA, 1986).
Political parties opposing tobacco control criticised STIVORO’s lobby-
ing activities. For example, during a debate with parliament about the 
Ministry of Health’s budget, the liberal–conservative representative of the 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy) (VVD) criticised an advertisement that STIVORO had dis-
tributed protesting against tobacco advertising. The VVD argued that 
STIVORO must refrain from lobbying on the ground that taxpayers’ 
money was being used for lobbying instead of health education. However, 
State Secretary for Health Hans Simons supported STIVORO as a matter 
of principle: “I think that subsidised organisations must have a large degree 
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of liberty. … I believe that such organisations must be able to critically 
express themselves about governmental policy. I firmly support that.”15 At 
the end of the 2000s, when such support from ministers was missing, 
 criticism about the fact that STIVORO lobbied while it received govern-
ment subsidies continued to be voiced by industry-friendly parliamentari-
ans and eventually contributed to the government’s withdrawal from the 
organisation.
The Three Health Charities Stepping Out of the Shadows
The adoption of the Tobacco Act in 1988, which led to more societal sup-
port for tobacco control, signified a first breach with the charities’ taboo 
on tobacco control activism (De Jong, 1989). However, the largest change 
was with the implementation of the amended Tobacco Act in 2002. The 
successful smoking ban and advertising restrictions profoundly changed 
social norms about smoking in society. The charities began to feel more 
confident and stepped out of the shadows, hoping that their contribution 
to tobacco control would become more visible to the general public. 
Between 2001 and 2003, the Cancer Society started several high-profile 
smoking cessation campaigns targeted at pregnant women, and experi-
mented with popular national “Quit & Win contests,” where smokers 
who quit smoking would be eligible for a prize.
The year 2005 signified a major change within the health coalition. The 
three charities were no longer willing to give STIVORO carte blanche to 
play an advocacy role in tandem with civil servants from the Ministry of 
Health. The governing board of STIVORO (which consisted of represen-
tatives from the three charities, including their directors and representa-
tives from the Ministry of Health) stepped down and was replaced by a 
board of trustees. The three charities could each nominate one candidate 
to the board. Former Health Minister Els Borst was one of the seven mem-
bers; the ministry itself had no seats on the board. This allowed the chari-
ties to pursue their own agenda. In June of that year the directors of the 
three charities and Hoogervorst put their signatures to an intention docu-
ment to collaborate closely in the National Programme Tobacco control 
(NPT 2006–2010). STIVORO’s role was restricted to execution of the 
NPT, as “knowledge and expert centre, service and support provider and 
educator in the field of tobacco control” (Hoogervorst, Zoun, De Blij, & 
Hanselaar, 2005). In addition, the charities began to make STIVORO 
more accountable for the money they spent on tobacco control.
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In Search of a New Strategy
During the four years that the NPT lasted, it became increasingly clear 
that the NPT coalition did not function well and that the goal of 20% 
smokers by 2010 would not be met (a more detailed discussed of the NPT 
programme can be found in Chap. 2). The three charities lacked a com-
mon vision on how tobacco should be tackled and the Ministry of Health 
lacked political support to pursue new tobacco control initiatives. In 
January 2007 the three charities desperately called on the government to 
make more money available for smoking cessation campaigns (STIVORO, 
2007), but this was to no avail. Since Minister Klink was unwilling to 
deliver regulative measures, both STIVORO and the charities began to 
look out for other ways to advance tobacco control, trying to escape the 
deadlock. They explored new ways to denormalise the tobacco industry 
and tobacco use, to create a more coherent national policy, and to build 
societal support, inspired by best practices from California, Australia, 
Canada, and Finland (STIVORO, 2010a, 2010b). STIVORO presented 
its new vision in June 2010 at a symposium where it commemorated its 
35-year anniversary. Reports presented to the press emphasised that Dutch 
smokers were still relatively unconcerned about smoking (ITC Project, 
2010) and that more must be done, which led to headlines in the media 
such as “Are the Dutch too soft on smokers?.”
In 2010 the NPT’s goal of 20% smokers was not reached. With the 
failure of the NPT programme, the three charities decided to start a new 
alliance, and began preparatory talks. In December 2010 they announced 
that they wanted to withdraw their finances from STIVORO.  On 6 
January 2011 a small group of individuals from the three charities, 
STIVORO, CAN, Trimbos Institute, the Association of Municipal Health 
Services, and the Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd (Youth Smoking Prevention 
Foundation) (SRJ) came together to discuss the next steps in Dutch 
tobacco control. There was an agreement that this time a proper coalition 
should be built, with the three charities taking the lead but supported by 
a wide range of organisations, and coordinated by a professional bureau. 
There should be ample room for grass roots initiatives, and the core activi-
ties would be empowerment, lobbying, and alliance building. The other 
existing alliance, the Partnership Stop Smoking, became an independent 
foundation in that same year and was destined to become part of the new 
alliance because of its important role in the quality assurance of smoking 
cessation treatments. STIVORO would be given the role of expert centre 
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on tobacco control, but not lobbying, advocacy, and communication, 
which would be handled by the three charities.
In March 2011 STIVORO and the Dutch Cancer Society hosted the 
European Conference on Tobacco Control in Amsterdam. At the confer-
ence, the results of the Tobacco Control scale were presented. The 
Netherlands ranked 13 of 28, one place down from the previous measure-
ment (Joossens & Raw, 2011). This supported the idea that the Dutch 
government could and should do more in terms of its FCTC require-
ments. In the aftermath of the European Conference, STIVORO organ-
ised a national “inspirational conference” to explore how the Dutch health 
network could be transformed into a more effective tobacco control alli-
ance (Van Emst & Willemsen, 2011). Experts from Sweden and Ireland 
presented successful tobacco control alliances from their countries.
The End of STIVORO
On 25 May 2011, STIVORO received notification from the Ministry of 
Health that its structural subsidy would be cut by 25% in 2013 and by 50% 
in 2014. A month later another letter confirmed that all subsidies would 
end by 2013 and tobacco control would be integrated into the alcohol 
and drug prevention activities of the Trimbos Institute. This decision took 
STIVORO out of the equation, and paved the way for a new coalition. In 
the summer of 2011, after a study tour to the United Kingdom to find 
inspiration from how the British organised tobacco control advocacy, the 
charities understood that they had to broaden the fight for tobacco con-
trol by including societal organisations in a broad coalition. The alliance 
was to become a coalition of autonomous organisations that collaborated 
for a common goal with preservation of each one’s identity and responsi-
bilities. It was recognised that success was dependent on mutual trust and 
respect for each other’s interests, a set of common goals that bound and 
unified, and formal and informal rules for mutual cooperation, including 
how to embed the alliance into the internal workings of the three charities. 
A professional management consultant was hired to lay the foundation.
At the end of 2013 STIVORO was officially disbanded. In January 
2014 the Alliantie Nederland Rookvrij (Dutch Alliance for a Smokefree 
Society) (ANR) began to coordinate the tobacco control advocacy activi-
ties of the three charities, while STIVORO’s budget and tasks regarding 




thE youth smokinG prEVEntion founDation
The failure of the NPT programme and the chaos in which the tobacco 
control coalition with STIVORO as centrepiece had found itself opened 
the way for other initiatives. In 2009 Wanda de Kanter and Pauline 
Dekker, two chest physicians, founded the SRJ, motivated by the fact 
that they were treating lung patients every day who were seriously sick 
or dying from smoking, while the cause (the tobacco industry) went 
unchallenged and the government failed to take appropriate measures 
to discourage new smokers. The two lung specialists built a coalition of 
organisations and individuals that became an inevitable new activist 
lobbying force in the Netherlands, operating fairly independently of the 
main tobacco control coalition. The group included journalists, law-
yers, scientists, and influential people from the medical and political 
elite (Youth Smoking Prevention Foundation, 2014). De Kanter and 
Dekker became increasingly influential through media advocacy activi-
ties, including appearances in high-profile television shows and a strong 
presence in social media. In January 2011 they presented a manifesto, 
“Keep our youth smoke-free,” co-signed by hundreds of physicians and 
sympathisers, to Health Minister Schippers, in which they called on her 
“to do all in her power to make tobacco addiction a thing of the past 
for future generations” (Youth Smoking Prevention Foundation, 
2014). When Schippers rejected their proposals, they decided it was 
time for a more confrontational approach. In 2013 they began to 
explicitly name and shame tobacco industry representatives and people 
associated with the industry network through the website www.
tabaknee.nl, and set out a programme for revealing tobacco industry 
tactics; for example, through investigative journalist pieces in Dutch 
magazines. Some of the revelations led to questions in parliament, put-
ting more pressure on Schippers, who eventually in the second cabinet 
Rutte handed over the “hot” tobacco control dossier to State Secretary 
Martin van Rijn. See also Chap. 6, where the SRJ’s successful attempt 
to take the State to court for violating Article 5.3 FCTC was described. 
In 2016 the Youth Smoking Prevention Foundation filed charges on 
behalf of lung cancer patient Anne Marie van Veen and Chronic 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) patient Lia Breed, against 
four tobacco manufacturers, accusing them of attempted murder and 
manslaughter, the first criminal case against the tobacco industry any-
where in the world (SRJ, 2017).
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accomplishmEnts of thE tobacco control aDVocacy 
coalition
The preceding account might suggest that the tobacco control coalition 
led by STIVORO was not particularly effective in advocacy and lobbying 
since it was financially tied to the government and was preoccupied with 
educational and smoking cessation activities. Although its main contribu-
tion to reducing smoking rates was undoubtedly through mass media 
campaigns and the implementation and coordination of education and 
smoking cessation interventions, during its almost 40 year of existence its 
advocacy activities, which sometimes brought it in direct collision course 
with the tobacco industry, did have impact on the government’s tobacco 
control policy as well.
Lobby and press contacts were the responsibility of STIVORO’s direc-
tors, who had to combine these responsibilities with management tasks, so 
success with lobbying very much depended on the capacity and personal 
affinity of each director. STIVORO has had six directors since it was 
founded in 1974. The charities allowed them to decide lobbying strategy. 
Each director put a unique mark on the organisation and on the way the 
health network functioned. In the remainder of this section, I describe 
STIVORO’s lobbying accomplishments, organised according to the lead-
ership of the last four directors who left distinct marks on Dutch tobacco 
control.
Roch de Jong (1981–1995)
While the cabinet persisted in its unwillingness to regulate tobacco adver-
tisements during the 1980s and 1990s, STIVORO just as persistently 
tried to keep the need for a tobacco advertising and promotion ban on the 
political agenda. STIVORO was a critical and persevering watchdog of the 
various centre–right-wing cabinets that did not invest in tobacco control. 
The driving force was Roch de Jong, director from 1981 until 1995.
De Jong had been a colonel in the TRIS, the former Dutch armed 
forces in Surinam. He was a strong personality, not afraid to confront the 
government or the industry. He transformed STIVORO from a passive to 
an active lobbying organisation. Jean Nelissen, a former marketer with the 
multinational Unilever, was hired for public relations. “With Nelissen, we 
took in a streetfighter,” recalled Roch de Jong (Bouma, 2001). In 1983 
Nelissen bought a pirated tape of the documentary Death in the West, an 
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anti-Marlboro documentary that for many years was kept out of public 
view by lawyers from Philip Morris. Nelissen showed the film to State 
Secretary for Health Joop van der Reijden, who was impressed and said in 
an interview that the film should be broadcast in schools, and that he 
intended to take further measures against tobacco advertising (Bouma, 
2000).
In the 1980s the government had no tobacco control policy to speak 
of. According to one former official,
A real policy? I wouldn’t even know. There might have been a letter to par-
liament on tobacco, but it rained incidents. The driving force was the 
dynamic coming from STIVORO’s Jean Nelissen. Roch de Jong was also on 
my back all the time. He was often at the Department. But the Ministry of 
Health itself was non-existent on the tobacco dossier.16
Illustrative of STIVORO’s approach in these years is a letter from De 
Jong in 1984 to parliament and cabinet, in which he criticised the govern-
ment’s long-awaited proposals for a Tobacco Act (De Jong, 1984; De 
Jong & Nelissen, 1984). He meticulously criticised the fact that the pro-
posal did not include elements that would harm the industry. It was instead 
in line with the prevailing spirit of reducing the state deficit and putting 
sole priority on stimulating the economy. He demanded that the govern-
ment abandon its passive stance, arguing that the current proposals would 
in no way contribute to effective tobacco control. Instead he listed the 
things that should be done: reducing the sale of tobacco to specialty shops, 
regulating tobacco advertising, substantially increasing the government’s 
subsidy to STIVORO (he suggested reserving 0.1% of the tobacco tax 
revenues), increasing tobacco taxation, and involving STIVORO in all 
future preparation for a new tobacco policy.
Ben Baan, STIVORO’s scientific officer, published a paper in the Dutch 
Medical Journal, criticising the weak draft to the Tobacco Act, in the same 
spirit as his director. Baan complained that STIVORO’s educational 
efforts could not compete with tobacco advertising because the tobacco 
companies had enormous budgets while STIVORO was insufficiently 
funded by the government (Baan, 1986). He was transparent and open 
about STIVORO’s new strategy: the former neutral focus on merely edu-
cation was replaced by a more confrontational approach aimed at 
 influencing the societal acceptance of smoking through media campaigns, 
targeted not only at smokers but also at the public and policymakers, so 
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that they would take the issue of second-hand smoke more seriously. The 
new approach did not shy away from attacking the tobacco industry, or 
from political lobbying. In 1987, the year that parliament approved the 
Tobacco Act, STIVORO’s lobby concentrated on influencing members of 
both houses of parliament and government officials through meetings and 
letters. STIVORO’s 1987 annual report summarised the success of these 
lobbying efforts: “Much of our efforts can be found in parliament’s pro-
ceedings.” However, this did not lead to concrete improvements to the 
Tobacco Act. While the whole tobacco industry family had been inten-
sively consulted and involved in the drafting of the act, STIVORO and 
other health organisations were left out.
In the 1980s STIVORO fought an uphill battle against the industry on 
the passive smoking issue. In 1981 it ran the campaign “Who smokes is 
not seen,”17 on behalf of the Ministry of Health. The campaign morally 
supported non-smoking employees who longed for a smoke-free work 
environment. This reflected the cabinet’s wish not to impose regulations 
but to leave it to employees and employers to work out solutions together. 
The industry’s Stichting Sigaretten Industrie (Cigarette Manufacturers 
Association) (SSI) complained that STIVORO suggested in the advertise-
ments that smokers endangered the health of non-smokers, and STIVORO 
was ordered by the Advertising Code Committee, which oversaw the 
appropriateness of advertisements, to refrain from similar advertising 
(Board of Appeal, 1982).
STIVORO was not intimidated and in 1984 ran another media cam-
paign with large advertorials in the four main newspapers: “Ten million 
non-smokers ask for less.”18 The advertisement included an explicit state-
ment that passive smoking is harmful to health. The SSI again filed a com-
plaint, arguing that a causal association between passive smoking and 
disease had not been proven. The Advertising Code Committee requested 
STIVORO to refrain from similar statements in the future, but STIVORO 
refused. A similar complaint in 1985 by SSI and the Vereniging Nederlandse 
Kerftabakindustrie (Dutch Fine Cut Tobacco Industry Association) 
(VNK) was declared unfounded, and the industry appealed and won. 
STIVORO concluded publicly that the committee was not impartial, since 
members received tobacco industry advertising money.
In 1985 STIVORO published a blacklist summarising the tobacco 
industry’s advertising and tobacco promotion tactics (STIVORO, 1985). 
Two years later it launched another campaign, “Who will relieve the 
non- smoker from smoking?”19 The campaign consisted of newspaper 
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advertisements and letters to employers aimed at swinging public opin-
ion towards support for smoking bans, explicitly stating that passive 
smoking is harmful to health. STIVORO and civil servants from the 
Ministry of Health regarded this as a crucial campaign, because once it 
was recognised and broadly accepted that passive smoking is not merely 
a nuisance but damaging to health, it would open the way to smoking 
bans in the public domain. The tobacco industry reacted furiously and 
launched a counter- campaign, “Who will relieve the workplace from a 
discussion?” casting doubt on the causal link between passive smoking 
and disease. SSI and VNK filed a successful complaint about STIVORO 
with the Advertising Code Committee. STIVORO neglected the com-
mittee’s demand to cease and continued its campaign into 1987 and 
1988. The industry, in a collaborative action of 14 tobacco manufactur-
ers, took STIVORO to court, leading to a three-year legal battle that put 
a strain on STIVORO’s resources and challenged the determination of 
its board. In 1991 STIVORO won the case convincingly, since it could 
prove that exposure to second-hand smoke does cause disease. However, 
deterred by the prospect of continued legal battle in a higher court (legal 
costs had already reached 400,000 guilders, paid by the government), 
STIVORO’s board accepted an offer by the industry to settle the case. 
Much to their dismay, the industry immediately sent out a misleading 
press statement claiming victory and proclaiming that “The Court of 
Justice at The Hague concluded that scientific investigations have not 
established which facts concerning passive smoking are correct and which 
are incorrect. The matter is a controversial one and opinions about it dif-
fer” (Cigarette shag information bureau, 1991).
In 1991 at a press conference, STIVORO called on the government to 
support the European Commission’s (EC) proposal for a tobacco adver-
tising directive. The director of the Dutch Heart Foundation, who was 
chair of the European Heart Network at the time, wrote a letter to minis-
ters and parliament, asking them to adopt the advertising ban and arguing 
that health and wellbeing must prevail above economic interests (Vermaat, 
1995). In September 1993 STIVORO’s director De Jong visited the lead-
ers of the main factions in parliament to further lobby for the ad ban, and 
in December STIVORO published a large newspaper advertisement with 
the title, “Where is our politicians’ common sense? Eight million Dutch 
say ‘no’ to tobacco advertising.” The ad featured a cartoon of a Marlboro- 
type cowboy riding an ostrich with its head in the sand. The three health 
charities and the newly founded Medical Alliance Against Smoking wrote 
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letters to the parliament. At the 9th World Conference on Tobacco or 
Health in 1994 in Paris, the governments of the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany were called upon by conference organisers to give 
up their blocking minority position in the European Union (EU): “Their 
governments’ action in blocking the implementation of the Directive on 
Tobacco Advertising in the European Union is an international scandal” 
(Tubiana, 1994).
Boudewijn de Blij (1994–1999)
STIVORO’s director Boudewijn de Blij had experience with Dutch poli-
tics in a former position as secretary of the supporting organisation of the 
Labour Party’s faction in the Dutch parliament. He eschewed the con-
frontational and activist style of De Jong, convinced that it was better to 
entertain good contacts with representatives from the ministry:
We trusted each other. We collaborated. If they needed a critical letter from 
us, we immediately produced that. But at the time no one was allowed to 
know this arrangement. I think that we were calling each other two or three 
times per week. I wanted to know what was happening at the ministry, or he 
[his counterpart at the ministry] needed something from me, sometimes 
just information.20
De Blij was successful in securing money from the ministry because he 
knew exactly when and how to ask for more through his contacts. “I found 
this much more effective than publicly picking fights with your friends. 
That is how I did it.”21 A civil servant, when contemplating STIVORO’s 
different directors, commented, “I think Boudewijn  manoeuvred most 
cleverly of all. He operated as much as possible in a low profile 
manner.”22
De Blij regularly wrote letters to the government to ask for improve-
ments in tobacco control: for example, in 1996 he made a plea to the cabi-
net to limit tobacco sales to specialty shops and to ban vending machines 
(Boudewijn De Blij, 1996). He personally wrote amendments to the new 
Tobacco Act that were put forward by Labour politicians in parliament 
because “that was my old profession, so I was quite familiar with how to 
do it.”23
On one occasion De Blij agitated the industry by commissioning a report 
examining how much money the industry spent on tobacco advertising and 
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checking on whether it was correctly paying taxes. This resulted in a remark-
able finding: the industry was allowed substantial permanent interest-free 
sums of money (more than a million euros free to re-invest) because there 
was a larger time delay then necessary between the delivery of cigarettes to 
the market and having to pay tax and VAT to the Ministry of Finance 
(Okkerse, 1997). The report led to media attention, parliamentary ques-
tions, proposals from parliament to amend the tobacco taxation law,24 and 
even protests from the tobacco retail sector NSO about unfair treatment of 
the manufacturers at the cost of the retailers. Although the Ministry of 
Finance reconsidered its agreement with the industry, not much 
changed. Nevertheless, a few years later the matter still bothered the indus-
try, which again had to deny that it received “state finance” (Roelofs, 2001). 
When Minister Els Borst came into office in 1994, the first tobacco con-
trol proposals were not very innovative, especially concerning tobacco 
advertising. STIVORO intensified its lobby, calling on the new minister to 
come up with the strongest possible tobacco control programme. When 
Borst presented her prevention nota to parliament, De Blij wrote her a let-
ter, copied to the minister of economic affairs, remarking that the European 
Advertising directive was not mentioned in the nota and that Borst must 
support an EU advertising ban (De Blij, 1995). In addition, the chair of the 
KNMG wrote a letter to cabinet and parliament urging them to support the 
ad ban proposal (Lanphen & van Berkestijn, 1995), and the Dutch Medical 
Alliance Against Smoking called on the cabinet to regulate tobacco advertis-
ing in a petition signed by 185 professors. When the Dutch industry distrib-
uted a report highlighting the negative economic consequences of 
advertising and marketing restrictions (it claimed that 651 jobs would be 
lost in the marketing and advertising sector), STIVORO quickly replied by 
commissioning the research firm Science & Strategy to list the many mar-
keting activities that the industry uses to reach young people (Science & 
Strategy, 1996). Other organisations were also rounded up by De Blij to put 
more pressure on the government. For example, in 1996 the youth organ-
isations of the Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Party) 
(CDA), the Green–Left Party, the Labour Party, D66, and the small 
Christian parties, wrote a long letter to the leaders of their factions in the 
parliament arguing for an advertising ban (De Poorter, 1996). They gave 
many examples of how the industry continued to target students (through 
university magazines and sponsoring activities on campus, for instance), and 
called on their parties to ban tobacco advertising in addition to increasing 
taxation levels and reducing the number of tobacco selling points.
 THE TOBACCO CONTROL COALITION 
258 
The following year, Borst said she had changed her position regarding 
tobacco advertising. The new Labour government in the United Kingdom 
had stopped resisting the ban, releasing the government from a commit-
ment dating back to 1993 to oppose the EU advertising ban as long as the 
British voted against it (see also Box 6.1). This paved the way for national 
legislation in the Netherlands. The intensified lobbying for an advertising 
ban by the national tobacco control coalition led by STIVORO  was 
important, but what ultimately made the difference was the change in the 
United Kingdom’s position, which opened up a window of opportunity 
for Borst to give the advertising ban its final push.
De Blij did not shy away from direct confrontations with the industry. 
Inspired by news from the United States that the industry had known for 
years that tobacco was addictive and had lied about it, De Blij explored the 
costs and viability of taking the tobacco industry to court in a product 
liability court case, claiming incurred damage to society because of tobacco 
use (Geus & Van der Lee, 1997). However, considering the enormous 
cost, necessary perseverance, and other constraints on the organisation, 
STIVORO’s board decided against legal action.
Trudy Prins (1999–2006)
Trudy Prins had a background in public relations at the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Her biggest distinguishing element was that she used the 
media as a lobbying tool. Most often she did this in tandem with civil ser-
vants at the ministry. Critique through the media on the slow working of 
the bureaucracy helped her counterparts at the ministry speed things up or 
come up with stricter regulative proposals than might have been possible 
without such public attention.
One of Prins’s first actions was to have STIVORO organise a lobby 
campaign to support the governments’ intention to increase tobacco taxa-
tion in 2004 by at least 10%. Directors of six national institutes for public 
health co-signed the letter to the minister of Finance (Prins, 2003). The 
Ministry of Health simultaneously pleaded with the finance minister to 
increase taxation for public health reasons. It is unclear how instrumental 
the lobbying was to this, but in 2004 tobacco taxation increased by 14%.
During Prins’ time as director, STIVORO had its biggest success. Prins 
with help from STIVORO’s network succeeded in securing majority sup-
port in parliament for an amendment by the Green–Left party to include 
the workplace smoking ban in the new Tobacco Act in 2002. Part of the 
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reason for Prins’ success was that STIVORO, together with CAN and the 
Lung Foundation, had supported post office employee Nanny Nooijen 
about her right to work in a smoke-free environment. The fact that Nanny 
Nooijen won her case convincingly was important in encouraging politi-
cians to support the ban.
With Health Minister Els Borst the government was committed to 
stronger tobacco control STIVORO was given an important role in exe-
cuting the governments’ tobacco control agenda, and the organisation 
grew considerably to handle its new tasks. STIVORO transformed into a 
national expert centre on tobacco education and cessation support, with a 
staff fully dedicated to developing evidence-based education, cessation 
interventions, and campaigns. These were STIVORO’s ‘golden years’.
Lies van Gennip (2006–2012)
At the time that Lies van Gennip, a biologist with a PhD and management 
experience in health research organisations, began working as director of 
STIVORO, the three charities were reconsidering their relationship with 
STIVORO and were already experimenting with their own tobacco control 
activities. The governing board of STIVORO was replaced by a board of 
trustees and the health ministry no longer had a seat on the board. STIVORO 
was given the task of executing the NPT programme and the charities began 
to make STIVORO more accountable for the money they spent on tobacco 
control. Van Gennip was charged with the task of reorganising the organisa-
tion and making STIVORO more efficient and accountable.
At the request of the charities, STIVORO hired Van Oort & Van Oort 
Public Affairs, a professional lobbying firm, to support advocacy activities. 
At that time the third Balkenende cabinet had just fallen, and new elec-
tions were called. Van Oort organised a broad lobby to get three goals 
into party programmes and into  the coalition agreement: a smoke-free 
hospitality sector, a tax increase, and reimbursement of smoking cessation 
support. In a few months STIVORO was able to secure support from 40 
societal and medical organisations around one united call for political 
commitment to a smoke-free hospitality sector. In addition, it supported 
CAN to initiate the first civil society initiative to get smoke-free bars and 
restaurants on the political agenda, by helping CAN collect 62,000 
signatures.
In 2007, when the smoking ban in the hospitality sector was to be 
discussed in the cabinet, van Gennip sent a letter to Prime Minister 
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Balkenende with arguments as to why a smoking ban was good for pub-
lic health (Van Gennip, 2007). The letter was accompanied by a DVD 
featuring interviews with experts from several European countries, all of 
whom testified to the successes and positive experiences with similar 
bans in their home countries. The lobbying effort was successful, and the 
introductory dossier for the new minister of health listed all three goals 
(Bekker, 2007), and a smoke-free hospitality sector was included in the 
coalition agreement of the fourth Balkenende cabinet to fast track the 
smoking ban in bars and restaurants. Van Gennip and the directors of the 
three charities met with the new Health Minister Ab Klink, but this did 
not result in further commitments from the government to initiate new 
tobacco control measures (Rutgers, Hanselaar, Stam, & Van Gennip, 
2007). The clumsy and  ambiguous implementation of the smoking ban 
in cafés by Minister Klink unleashed an unprecedentedly aggressive 
response by groups and individuals who regarded the ban as an infringe-
ment on individual liberties. They took their anger out on STIVORO, 
which was confronted by angry smokers, sometimes fuelled by organisa-
tions such as pro-smokers group Forces and the smokers’ rights group 
Stichting Rokers Belangen (SRB), but also from anonymous sources on 
the internet.
Gradually the unwillingness of the government to take further action 
on tobacco control, coupled with the determination of Lies van Gennip to 
obtain results, led to polarisation and a hostile atmosphere. The charities 
were not comfortable with this because it jeopardised the relationship they 
enjoyed with the government. As a lobbyist from one of the charities said, 
“We were very much bothered by the unpleasant and harsh tone of voice 
that STIVORO was using. As a result, the government was closing its 
doors to us.”25
STIVORO’s successes and the tight connections between STIVORO 
and the tobacco control officers at the health ministry did not go unno-
ticed. According to an ex-civil-servant:
The industry was horrified by all this … Eventually with other ministers, 
with another political winds of change, it began to affect STIVORO. I belief 
that STIVORO was ultimately judged on this; the questions that were raised 
in parliament by MP Schippers… At a certain moment it also began to 
vibrate within the ministry, especially under ‘minister] Klink: STIVORO 
was no longer allowed to run campaigns … STIVORO began to be seen as 
patronising and as the ‘anti’s’.26
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In May 2009 Van Gennip received a phone call from the indus-
try’s VNK with the threat that if STIVORO continued its assertive lob-
bying, VNK would use its influence at the ministry through VNO–NCW 
to make sure that STIVORO was harmed. Soon afterwards a civil servant 
from the Ministry of Health told STIVORO’s director that it must cease 
advocacy activities because STIVORO was losing its support from the 
ministry. A month after the threat from VNK, in June 2009, STIVORO 
received a letter from the ministry that its yearly subsidy would be cut.
One example of the intensive lobbying activities that STIVORO was 
capable of during this time were letters delivered personally to the offi-
cials responsible for forming a new ruling coalition in July 2010 
(Bensing, Brand, & Borst, 2010). The letter was co-signed by 34 
national and international experts, and informed the officials that the 
previous government had invested too little in tobacco control, causing 
a stagnation of the decline in smoking prevalence rates, and that they 
advised the new government to adopt a tobacco control policy based on 
three pillars: a substantial tobacco tax increase, allocation of the reve-
nues to more education, and making the denormalisation of tobacco use 
a central issue.
When Health Minister Schippers entered the arena in 2010 and tobacco 
control was reversed, STIVORO fired up its advocacy activities while 
fighting for its own survival—a move that distanced it even more from the 
three charities. STIVORO tried to win an increasingly lost cause by con-
tinuing the strategy of presenting facts and science against ideology, using 
the public health frame to emphasise tobacco’s deathly effects. For exam-
ple, it launched a website where statements by Schippers about tobacco 
and tobacco policy were rebutted. The website was introduced with these 
lines:
Every year tens of thousands of people die because of smoking. Smoking is 
the number one cause of death in the Netherlands. One in two dies from its 
addiction. It is harsh to put it this way, but it is a policy choice. Choosing for 
no policy or a minimal policy is choosing for these numbers. That is what 
this website is about.
STIVORO was determined to fight the reversal of the smoking ban and 
to push for a California-inspired activist model: “clearly, the challenge for 
the public health community is to stand firm and continue to press for the 
successful model already working so well in many other countries. Where 
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the protection of non-smokers is at stake, “going Dutch” is simply not an 
option” (Van Bladeren, 2011). But by now STIVORO’s cause was lost, 
for it had lost its support from the charities, which wanted to re-organise 
tobacco control advocacy and take the lead themselves.
conclusion
The Dutch tobacco control coalition was organised in a unique way. The 
core of the advocacy network consisted of the three charities that financed 
STIVORO to fight smoking on their behalf, while the Ministry of Health 
was also on the board of the organisation. The organisations were united 
in a joint fight against the tobacco industry. The arrangement was typically 
Dutch: compromises between government and civil society were locked 
into the fabric of the organisation of STIVORO.  For many years this 
worked well: especially under Minister Els Borst, the relationship between 
STIVORO and the tobacco control unit at the Ministry of Health was 
very good and mutually reinforcing, and STIVORO was allowed to pros-
per and grow into an internationally acclaimed tobacco control expert 
centre, while ever-increasing subsidies from the government and occa-
sional large donations from the charities made it possible to organise large- 
scale smoking cessation media events that motivated many smokers to quit 
smoking. The flip side was that, since the government was accountable for 
STIVORO’s activities to parliament, the tobacco control coalition was 
unable to set up a professional lobbying apparatus. Professional lobbying 
was not integrated into the overall action plans of the organisation until 
around 2006, when a professional lobbying firm was hired to coordinate 
advocacy activities.
Over time the tobacco control coalition expanded, in the mid-1990s 
through the Dutch Medical Alliance Against Smoking and at the begin-
ning of the 2000s through the Partnership Stop Smoking. Despite the fact 
that this strengthened the coalition’s advocacy capacity, help from the 
broader medical community did not materialise in the Netherlands as it 
did in the United Kingdom, where medical organisations were key to cul-
tivating a social climate more conducive to tobacco control while putting 
pressure on ministers to take the smoking problem more seriously.
During periods when the government opposed or delayed tobacco 
control, the lobby led by STIVORO was more assertive towards the gov-
ernment. This happened in the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s (Van 
Agt and Lubbers cabinets), and between 2007 and 2012 when Klink and 
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Schippers were ministers of Health. During periods when the government 
showed more willingness to control tobacco, the collaboration with 
STIVORO relaxed. The tobacco control coalition had several important 
lobbying successes. Most important probably was its support of the small 
understaffed tobacco control unit at the ministry of health leading up to 
the revised Tobacco Act. Notable was the inclusion of the important 
workplace smoking ban in the revised Tobacco Act, which was a direct 
result of coordinated lobbying of parliamentarians by STIVORO.  In 
2007, STIVORO was successful in pushing the government to extend the 
workplace smoking ban to bars and restaurants, but it failed to prevent the 
tobacco lobby from sabotaging the implementation, leading to a tempo-
rary reversal of the ban.
Around 2005 a major shift took place in the Dutch tobacco control 
coalition when the three charities were no longer willing to play second 
fiddle and wanted a more proactive tobacco control advocacy role. 
However, it took another 8 years before STIVORO, which had been the 
central tobacco control organisation since 1975, was disbanded, during 
which time the three charities gradually increased and professionalised 
tobacco control advocacy.
notEs
1. “Coalition” is used here in terms of the Advocacy Coalition Framework.
2. The three big charities in the United States built the “Coalition on 
Smoking OR Health,” in which lobbyists from the charities worked 
together under a single coordinator, independent from the government 
(Derthick, 2005).
3. Parliamentary Papers II, 1977–1978, 14,800, XVIII, nr. 34.
4. Proceeding, II 1976–1977, 14,360, nr. 2.
5. About €910,000 at current monetary value.
6. This was not a typical Dutch concern at the time. For example, in the 
United States, the health charities faced similar constraints. They felt that 
they needed to protect their image as a mainstream, legitimate organisa-
tion, which limited the way they could lobby openly for controversial goals 
(Wolfson, 2001).
7. Proceedings I, 26 March 2002, EK 24–1263.
8. Proceedings II, 24 June 1987, 91–4639.
9. Interview on 16 June 2016.
10. Source: STIVORO’s annual reports.
11. Interview on 20 October 2015.
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12. Interview on 29 October 2015. The current size of the core team is three 
officials: one team leader (who may also be responsible for other issues), 
and two officers—one responsible for international-level tobacco policy 
and one for national-level tobacco policy. It is supported by trainees or 
officials from “flex pools.”
13. Interview on 16 April 2016.
14. Interview on 26 April 2016.
15. Proceedings II, 9 December 1993, 36–2773.
16. Interview with a former civil servant on 6 October 2015.
17. In Dutch: “Wie rookt is niet gezien.”
18. In Dutch: “10 miljoen niet-rokers vragen of het wat minder kan.”
19. In Dutch: “Wie helpt de roker van het roken af?”
20. Interview 17 June 2016.
21. Interview 17 June 2016.
22. Interview 26 April 2016.
23. Interview 17 June 2016.
24. Tweede Kamer, 2000–2001, 26,472, nr. 23.
25. Interview on 15 March 2017.
26. Interview, 6 November 2015.
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CHAPTER 10
Problem Identification and Agenda Setting
Tobacco is a highly contested topic. Lobbyists present their policy solutions 
to politicians and government officials who weigh the evidence against 
what they believe is feasible or desirable, much like solving a complex puz-
zle (Kingdon, 2003). Such puzzles take considerable time. In the mean-
time, the many other concerns that a government is confronted with 
compete with tobacco control for a place on the policy agenda. The public 
policy literature distinguishes different stages of agenda setting: issues move 
from the public agenda to the political agenda, move again to the formal 
(sometimes called institutional or governmental) agenda, and finally reach 
the decision agenda. The public agenda consists of issues that have achieved 
a high level of public interest and visibility, while the formal agenda lists the 
topics that decision makers are actually working on (Cobb, Ross, & Ross, 
1976). For an issue to reach the formal agenda, decision makers must be 
aware of the underlying problem, and consensus must be reached that act-
ing upon the problem is possible and necessary and that the solution falls 
within the government’s responsibility.
This chapter starts with an examination of the process of problem iden-
tification, which is the first step in agenda setting. Problem definition is 
central to understanding agenda setting, and refers to what Rochefort and 
Cobb (cited in Cairney (2012)) describe as “what we choose to identify as 
public issues and how we think and talk about these concerns.” Attention 
from the government is often drawn to an issue when new statistics surface 
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which show that the issue is problematic. This will be explored for Dutch 
tobacco control by looking at the presentation of four-yearly data from the 
Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu (National Institute for Public 
Health and the Environment) (RIVM) on the public health status of the 
population and how successive governments translated this into quantita-
tive national targets for tobacco control. I then consider why tobacco con-
trol seems to be a “low issue” topic most of the time and explore the 
reasons for this. Is it not seen as urgent? Is smoking not regarded as a 
legitimate target for state interference? This brings me to consider if the 
low urgency for tobacco control might be explained by the political orien-
tation of Dutch governments (left/progressive vs. right/conservative), 
and whether it might be further explained by a related factor, which is how 
governments deal with times of economic recession. I present evidence 
that the Dutch governments least active in tobacco control were at the 
time preoccupied with economic crises.
Government attention is not automatically directed at what the facts tell us, 
but depends on how successful various interests groups are in drawing atten-
tion to an issue. This chapter therefore closes by discussing how framing 
of the smoking issue influenced agenda setting. Framing is “a strategy that 
interest groups employ to further their interests by generating powerful beliefs 
and ideas which function as a framework for the public’s way of thinking” 
(Grüning, Strünk, & Gilmore, 2008). How was smoking framed by tobacco 
control organisations and by the tobacco industry, and which was most suc-
cessful? Some attention will also be paid to the role of media advocacy as an 
important tool in communicating specific frames and in setting agendas.
Problem IdentIfIcatIon
For something to become a policy issue, it must first come to the attention 
of policymakers. This may be triggered by the publication of new statistics 
(Kingdon, 2003). Main statistical indicators in our case are the proportion 
of smokers in the adult and youth population and smoking-related mor-
bidity and mortality statistics. The Netherlands was one of the first coun-
tries to build its public health policy in a systematic manner on epidemiologic 
data. Following the Public Health Act, every four years the Rijksinstituut 
voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu (National Institute for Public Health and 
the Environment) (RIVM) publishes Volksgezondheid Toekomst Verkenning 
(Public Health Status and Foresight) reports (VTV). Since 1992 these 
comprehensive and detailed reports have outlined the public health priori-
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ties of the next four years for the Ministry of Health.1 The first was Health 
Minister Els Borst’s Healthy and well policy document (VWS, 1995), 
which identified specific conditions that must be met before a topic may 
be identified as a policy priority: the health problem must concern a seri-
ous problem that concerns a large group of people, it must be preventable 
and modifiable, efficacious prevention methods must be available, preven-
tion must result in improvement in public health, and the policy methods 
must be legally, ethically, and societally acceptable.
To date, six VTV reports have been issued. Table 10.1 summarises the 
main statements about the tobacco problem.
In the first three RIVM reports smoking was singled out as a public 
health problem to be addressed urgently. These reports included alarming 
messages, since adult and youth smoking was not going down and com-
pared unfavourably with other countries. RIVM experts warned that the 
Netherlands had lost its top position regarding general life expectancy in 
Europe and was facing the possibility that life expectancy might decline for 
the first time in history (RIVM, 2002). Later VTV reports noted a decline 
in tobacco use following the implementation of the revised Tobacco Act 
in 2002, and characterised trends in adults and youth in a less alarming 
manner, although smoking rates were still regarded as high compared with 
those of other countries and smoking remained the most important pre-
ventable cause of death and disease. A consequence was that the feeling of 
urgency for tighter tobacco control became less poignant.
natIonal targets for tobacco control
The Ministry of Health’s policy documents with intentions in the field of 
public health and disease prevention, listed in Table 10.2, carry political 
weight and are discussed in parliament. The first was the Nota 2000 of 
1986 (WVC, 1986). The report recognised that the Dutch tobacco policy 
lagged behind other countries, especially Scandinavian countries. Despite 
smoking being recognised as the number one cause of death, and the set-
ting of an aspirational target of reducing the smoking population to 20% in 
2000, tobacco control was not yet mentioned as a national policy priority. 
The government was hesitant, wanting to wait until the Tobacco Act was 
implemented in 1990 in the hope that this would increase public support 
for new measures. In 2003 the prevention documents included a list of 
unhealthy lifestyle behaviours that were the priority targets for the next 
four years: smoking was listed next to obesity and diabetes (VWS, 2003). 
In 2006 the list was extended to include alcohol and depression (VWS, 
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a “Ambition” is the intended reduction in percentage of smokers per year
b The 2013 prevention document does not mention a concrete target, but in response to questions from 
parliament, a long-term goal of 30% reduction in smoking prevalence in adults in 2025 was mentioned, 
referring to a voluntary agreement with WHO at the 66th World Health Assembly (WHO, 2013). This 
amounts to 18% smokers in 2025
c Proceedings II, 2013–2014, 32,793, nr. 114
Table 10.2 (continued)
2006b). These five topics were repeated in the two following prevention 
documents (VWS, 2007a, 2011). The most recent document added physi-
cal activity and emphasised the importance of exercise, diluting the relative 
importance of tobacco control as a public health policy goal despite the fact 
that smoking continued to have the greatest impact on the disease burden 
in the Netherlands (RIVM, 2014). While smoking continues to be listed in 
the prevention policy documents as one of the priorities, this has not 
yet  resulted in new action plans for tobacco control since the failed 
Nationaal Programma Tabaksontmoediging (National Program of Tobacco 
Control) (NPT) of 2006 (VWS, 2006a). Time will tell if this well happen 
with the upcoming 2018 prevention policy document.
Of the nine public health policy documents since 1986, six stated quan-
titative targets for tobacco control but only one has ever been reached. 
Table 10.2 includes the tobacco control policy goals as stated by the gov-
ernment. Levels of ambition should be compared with the long-term 
trend of a declining smoking rate, which was on average −0.7% per year 
between 1958 and 2006 and less than −0.5% between 1990 and 2010 
(Willemsen, 2010). Health Minister Borst was able to accelerate this to a 
staggering −1.3% per year, from 33% in 2000 to 28% in 2004. She was the 
only minister who ever succeeded in reaching a tobacco control target. 
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The NPT programme during the office of Minister Hoogervorst aimed at 
an unrealistic reduction of 1.6% per year, more an aspirational target than 
a realistic one, but one of the reasons why the NPT programme was des-
tined to fail. Such unrealistic short term ambitions inevitably lead to disap-
pointment. More recent cabinets did not want to set targets or resorted to 
extremely unambitious goals, with a projected trend which did not even 
challenge the naturally occurring downward trend (VWS, 2011).
The most recent Everything is health prevention policy programme pro-
jected that the proportion of smokers would be 19% in 2030 (from 23% in 
2012) if no new initiatives were undertaken (VWS, 2013). It aimed to 
improve this “significantly” but did not mention a concrete goal, despite 
an explicit and urgent call in August 2010 from the Raad voor de 
Volksgezondheid en Zorg (Council for Public Health and Health Care) 
(RVZ)2 that “the cabinet [should] commit to a quantifiable target … and 
a balanced mix of instruments with which it can obtain visible results in 
2020” (RVZ, 2010, p. 39). The RVZ report referred to data from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that 
showed that the prevalence of smoking in the Netherlands was higher than 
the OECD countries average, which signalled a need for the government 
to initiate a tobacco control policy with concrete targets. Another report 
from the RVZ emphasised that setting quantifiable targets for smoking 
is certainly feasible, given the high quality level of monitoring data avail-
able in the Netherlands (RVZ, 2011). The tobacco control coalition had 
started to collect reliable yearly population data about smokers in 1978, 
through the Stichting Volksgezondheid en Roken (Dutch Smoking or 
Health Foundation) (STIVORO). The fact that smoking rates were col-
lected from the 1970s onwards, and that they were conducted with suffi-
cient statistical power to be able to detect increments of 1% in the yearly 
adult smoking rate, was unique.
The absence of targets in tobacco control in the Netherlands seems 
symptomatic of the lack of political will in recent years. Through ambi-
tious but realistic targets, governments can show leadership and provide a 
sense of strategic direction and focus to the policy domain, while they can 
be held politically accountable (Van Herten & Gunning-Schepers). A pre-
requisite “is political will and daring. Without political commitment and 
the will to execute a health target approach, a policy will be doomed to 
fail” (Van Herten & Gunning-Schepers). Political will and daring are 
indeed crucial, since setting quantifying targets in public health is some-
times seen as “political suicide” (RIVM, 2006). Political will is linked to 
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ideology: whether one believes in the idea of a malleable society and 
whether one believes that achievement of a goal is sufficiently under the 
control of the state (Maarse, 2011).
tobacco a “low PolItIcs” Issue
As shown in Chap. 3, tobacco control follows policy cycles that may last 
for a decade or more, so the policy process is slow, complex, and con-
tested. There is continuous tension between the recognition that smoking 
remains a public health problem for each new government, evidenced by 
VTV reports that the government cannot ignore, and the realisation that 
there is no easy, quick fix.
The issue of smoking slumbered in the background of day-to-day con-
cerns of politicians and policymakers ever since it became a societal issue 
in 1964. It is rare that Dutch politicians identify tobacco as an urgent 
problem: the notable exception was the administration under the leader-
ship of Health Minister Els Borst, who was confronted with stagnating 
smoking rates and increased smoking among young people. Smoking does 
not involve fundamental or key questions relating to the state’s national 
interests or security. Issues such as the national economy and urgent for-
eign political matters are sometimes referred to as “high politics” (Walt, 
1994), while smoking is a typically “low politics” concern.
Although the smoking rate is regarded as a chronic condition, it is rela-
tively insensitive to policy measures and remains a low-profile issue on 
governmental agendas (Studlar, 2007b). In the eyes of policymakers, the 
chance that a “condition” will turn into a problem is greatest when there 
is a crisis (Kingdon, 2003, pp. 94–100). There is the perception of a crisis 
when policymakers feel that failure to act will lead to an even greater disas-
ter. With tobacco control, policymakers rarely feel that this is the case. 
Smoking rates tend to go down most of the time, giving policymakers the 
impression that doing a little bit is good enough. There was a downward 
trend between 1960 and the end of the 1980s, and again between 2000 
and 2014. However, the flywheel model of tobacco control (see Chap. 4) 
predicts that the decline in smoking rates will slow and stop in the absence 
of new impactful tobacco control measures. This is indeed what happened 
in the long period in the 1990s when no measures were taken and what 
we also seem to witness in most recent years.
The time lag between cause and effect is decades, so the benefits of 
policy measures only become noticeable long after a cabinet has resigned. 
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This has been mentioned as one explanation for the Dutch administra-
tions’ lack of enthusiasm in dealing with smoking (Meijerink & Vos, 
2011). The treatment of smoking-related, life-threatening illness such as 
heart disease has steadily improved, and this may have further reduced any 
feeling of urgency in controlling tobacco (Meijerink & Vos, 2011).
A related reason why politicians and policymakers tend to underesti-
mate the seriousness of the smoking problem is that smoking kills quietly: 
deaths of smokers go relatively unnoticed. People who have a chronic 
smoking-related disease such as emphysema hardly get out of the house, 
and out of sight is out of mind. This is why many people, including politi-
cians, find it hard to imagine that smoking causes suffering on the grand 
scale as the statistics indicate.
legItImacy
One of the main reasons why governments are unwilling to address certain 
topics may be a lack of perceived legitimacy (Hall, Land, Parker, & Webb, 
1975). This means that the government feels an issue is not something 
that the state should be involved in. The line between what the Dutch 
government sees as its responsibility and what is not is subtly drawn, but 
most of the time in the background is the wish not to interfere with free-
dom of choice. For example, when the government defended her proposal 
to ban smoking in private workplaces (31 May 2001), Health Minister 
Borst said about cultural venues and theatres:
It doesn’t necessarily need to be totally smoke-free. Ideally yes, but through 
self-regulation theatres can make arrangements so that there will be no com-
plaints. Dressing rooms are not open to the public. Men who sing as Louis 
Armstrong can continue to sing with a nice hoarse voice. That is not some-
thing that we want to interfere with.
On another occasion, when she defended her bill in the senate, she tried 
to reassure liberal–conservative politicians:
One of our guiding principles is that grown-ups, people who are well edu-
cated and who know the risks but want to smoke anyway, should be left in 
peace as long as they don’t bother other people. The [proposed] measures 
are aimed at protecting youth against the temptation to smoke. They are 
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further aimed at protecting the non-smoker. A third goal is to help those 
who wish to quit smoking.3
In 2007 an influential advisory report in the Netherlands analysed 
whether and how prevention policy can be made more efficient (Werkgroep 
IBO preventie, 2007). The report, written by an interdepartmental work-
group, the Interdepartementaal Beleidsonderzoek (Interdepartmental 
Policy Research) coordinated by the Ministry of Finance,4 identified two 
rationales that legitimise governmental interference in unhealthy lifestyles. 
The first is if an information shortage leads to a situation in which people 
cannot make informed decisions. The second is if a person’s unhealthy 
behaviour affects other people. In the case of smoking, the workgroup 
noted that the information shortage is less relevant, as the message that 
smoking is harmful is widely known. It concluded that the only time the 
government may intervene is to protect non-smokers from passive smok-
ing (protection from an external threat), to protect young people or to 
target low-educated smokers if the government considers the existence of 
health inequalities a problem. Indeed, in liberal societies such as the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, “an important dimension of public 
health policy is … to balance the liberal emphasis on choice and autonomy 
with the imperative to support those who do not have the opportunities to 
choose, because of, for instance, poverty or dependency” (Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics, 2007). The government took the report by the workgroup 
as its starting point for prevention policy from 2007 onwards (VWS, 
2007b). It relied heavily on citizens’ self-reliance and ability to make good 
choices, and stressed that “a free lifestyle choice must not be impaired, the 
balancing of positive (pleasure) with negative (cost and health) aspects is 
surely a personal one to make” (VWS, 2008, p. 14). However, the govern-
ment was criticised by the Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeerbeleid 
(Scientific Council for Government Policy) (WRR), an independent think 
tank of the government, for having unrealistic expectations about citizens’ 
coping capabilities and self-control (WRR, 2017). The WRR argued that 
the government is especially legitimate in helping young people’s determi-
nation not to smoke by limiting the instances when they are confronted 




If ideology is important, one might expect that left-wing governments are 
more likely to adopt strong tobacco control programmes since they are 
most open to imposing legislative measures to protect public health.5 
Several international studies have looked at the relationship between a 
government’s political orientation and its tobacco policy. There is anec-
dotal evidence from Canada and Australia that provinces or territories 
controlled by the left are more likely to adopt tobacco control measures, 
although the relationship is not very strong (Studlar, 2007a). In the 
United Kingdom, conservative governments opposed tobacco control 
regulation between 1979 and 1997, while subsequent Labour govern-
ments introduced a range of measures which resulted in the United 
Kingdom becoming Europe’s tobacco control leader (Asare, Cairney, & 
Studlar, 2009). In the United States, associations are found between 
Republican dominance at state level and lower cigarette taxes (Morley & 
Pratte, 2013), and between a legislator’s being Republican and his or her 
intention to vote against tobacco taxes (Flynn et al., 1998). In Europe, in 
the period between 1996 and 2003, left-wing governments were more 
likely to adopt tobacco control measures than were right-wing govern-
ments (Bosdriesz, Willemsen, Stronks, & Kunst, 2014).
To the extent that a left-wing political orientation in government is 
beneficial for tobacco control, the Netherlands has not been in a very 
good position to advance tobacco control. Between 1972 and 2017 the 
Netherlands had 15 governments and in all of them either the conserva-
tive–liberal Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for 
Freedom and Democracy) (VVD) or the Christen-Democratisch Appèl 
(Christian Democratic Party) (CDA),6 or both, was part of the ruling 
coalition. The Labour Party was only involved in seven instances, while 
the CDA took part in 12 cabinets and the VVD in 10. What is more 
important, perhaps, is that the Netherlands has had only one truly “pro-
gressive” cabinet, which was the Den Uyl cabinet (Labour Party), which 
lasted from 1973 until 1977. It had ten ministers from left-wing parties, 
six from Christian parties, and no liberal–conservative ministers. In Chap. 
2, I narrated how this cabinet presented the most comprehensive set of 
tobacco control ambitions ever in Dutch history, but was not in power 
long enough to realise any of it.
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tobacco control In tImes of economIc recessIon
An interesting question is whether tobacco control policy is lower on the 
political agenda during periods when the government struggles with eco-
nomic hardship. In such times, Dutch governments tend to resort to a 
policy of budget cuts, privatisation of government tasks, and economic 
stimulation by introducing business-friendly policies. Although the obses-
sion with wealth and economy is increasingly criticised by politicians from 
the left (Klaver, 2015; Thieme & Engelen, 2016), economic consider-
ations and citizens’ purchasing power continue to dominate the political 
discourse in the Netherlands. The following is an account of the economic 
situation of the various cabinets since the early 1970s (Van den Braak & 
Van den Berg, 2017) in relation to their accomplishments in tobacco 
control.
The Den Uyl (Labour party) government (1973–1977) was confronted 
with a blow to the national economy when Arab countries boycotted the 
Netherlands in 1973 by increasing the price of petrol and reducing the 
supply (the “oil crisis”), which was followed by an economic crisis, stag-
gering inflation, and alarming prognoses of unemployment. However, the 
Den Uyl cabinet ignored the crisis and increased spending. It developed a 
far-reaching tobacco control agenda, in line with the ideology of the 
maakbare samenleving (a just and modifiable society).
The conservative Van Agt (CDA) cabinets (1977–1982) had to deal 
with a second oil crisis (1979) and exploding unemployment; and in 1982, 
at the end of the second Van Agt cabinet, the Netherlands was in its deep-
est recession since the 1950s. Extra budget cuts were deemed necessary at 
around 13 billion guilders (a value of around €11 billion in 2016). Under 
these conditions it was not politically feasible to increase spending on 
tobacco control. The feeling was that any execution of a tobacco control 
agenda would hurt the economy and employment.
The first Lubbers (CDA) cabinet (1982–1986) regarded it as its mis-
sion to get the economy back on track. This was done through a neo- 
liberal “no nonsense” austerity programme with a pledge to cut seven 
billion guilders (around €6 billion), far-reaching privatisation of the public 
sector, and a business-friendly policy of deregulation. Despite economic 
growth, the second Lubbers cabinet (1986–1989) was unsuccessful in 
addressing the high unemployment rate. This led to a further decision to 
cut state spending in the beginning of the 1990s, which was also in 
response to demands from the European Union (EU) to reduce the state 
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budget deficit. In 1991 the third Lubbers cabinet (1986–1989) announced 
new drastic cuts in government spending and increased burdens on citi-
zens, such as higher taxes and fewer subsidies, which lasted until 1994. 
Tobacco control was put on the back burner during these cabinets. A 
Tobacco Act was adopted and implemented in 1990, but was insufficient 
to control smoking since it relied strongly on industrial self-regulation. 
Smoking rates went up between 1988 and 1996.
The first Purple cabinet Kok (Labour) (1994–1998) was an economic 
success, enjoying a miraculous growth in employment and a budget sur-
plus. This was partly ascribed to the successful outcome of negotiations 
between employers and employees (the polder model). During this cabi-
net, Health Minister Els Borst and Minister of Economic Affairs Hans 
Wijers presented unprecedented tobacco control policy intentions. The 
economy was still booming during the first years of the second Kok cabi-
net (1998–2002). This opened up another window of opportunity to 
advance the tobacco control agenda. The fact that state finances allowed 
for a more generous budgetary allocation to tobacco control, in the way 
of extra campaigns and education, was crucial in getting support from the 
CDA for the most far-reaching legislative part of the new Tobacco Act: the 
workplace smoking ban.
During the first Balkenende (CDA) cabinet (2002–2003), economic 
growth came to a virtual standstill, resulting in considerable budget cuts, 
limits on state spending, and reforms of social security and the health-care 
sector. The last Balkenende cabinet (2007–2010) was faced with the inter-
national financial crisis of 2008. Spending on tobacco control was less 
than in the previous cabinet, and no new legislation was realised. The first 
Rutte (VVD) cabinet (2010–2012) regarded its main task to be fighting 
the crisis through cuts in government spending and reducing the size of 
the government. During this cabinet, all health promotion non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) were confronted with cuts in gov-
ernmental subsidies, while support for the Stichting Volksgezondheid en 
Roken (Dutch Smoking or Health Foundation) (STIVORO) was com-
pletely withdrawn and financial reimbursement to smokers for smoking 
cessation counselling was discontinued. The second Rutte cabinet 
(2013–2017) continued to emphasise getting government finances in 
order, partly through reforms to the health sector. There was little room 
for new tobacco control initiatives on the part of the government.
From the preceding description it might be concluded that during eco-
nomically prosperous times the government is more generous and inter-
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ested in a tobacco control agenda, although this is somewhat confounded 
by the political orientation, discussed in the preceding paragraph, which 
offered an alternative explanation. In any case, when “the economy” is at 
the top of cabinets’ agendas, it seems more difficult to advance tobacco 
control.
framIng the smokIng Problem
In the previous chapter I explored the importance of research and statis-
tics, and concluded that there is a gap between knowledge about effective 
tobacco control and if and when it appears on the government’s executive 
agenda. It is not so much that the evidence does not find its way to the 
policy deciders; rather, it is determined by the ways in which arguments 
and evidence are constructed and framed by policy networks, and whether 
and how they resonate with policymakers (K. E. Smith, 2013). Coalitions 
differ in their capacity to discover and use such issue frames (Shiffman 
et al., 2015). Indeed, “if the tobacco control community is disbelieved, it 
may not be the result of being wrong, but rather from a failure to frame 
ourselves in such a way that our goals and our approaches resonate with 
the public” (Fox, 2005). Policy frames have been described as “weapons 
of advocacy” (Weiss, 1989). Unfortunately, the framing of tobacco con-
trol by Dutch pro- and anti-tobacco coalitions has not yet been subjected 
to systematic scientific research. The following is an attempt, based on a 
reading of official documents and reports of debates with health ministers 
in the parliament, to reconstruct the major changes to how the smoking 
problem was portrayed by the tobacco industry on the one hand and the 
Dutch tobacco control community on the other. The results are sum-
marised in Table 10.3.
The government’s take on smoking was first aligned with the industry 
framing that smoking was good for the economy. Until the 1980s, the 
tobacco industry and the government formed a policy monopoly in which 
tobacco was portrayed as a positive contributor to the economy. The gov-
ernment continued to use industry frames way into the 1990s. This 
monopoly was challenged by medical specialists who used a medical frame: 
that smoking is harmful to individuals. In the 1980s and especially in the 
1990s the debate increasingly turned to the issue of the danger of passive 
smoking. Health organisations framed smoking as a problem for non-
smokers, while the industry used a “tolerance frame”: common courtesy 
between smokers and non-smokers should solve most problems. This 
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Table 10.3 How smoking has been framed in the Netherlands by the tobacco 
control coalition, the government, and the tobacco industry
Years Ministers Tobacco control 
coalition
Government Tobacco industry





Smoking is good for 
business and the 
economy.
Economic frame: 
Smoking is good 
for business and 
the economy.





is harmful to the 
population and 
to non-smokers.
Mixed public health 
and economy frame: 
Smoking is harmful 
to public health but 
good for business 
and the economy.
Personal freedom 




Smoking is good 
























Combination of a 
public health frame 
and a personal 
freedom frame: 
Smoking is harmful 
to the population 
and non-smokers, 
while tobacco use 
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Years Ministers Tobacco control 
coalition
Government Tobacco industry





is harmful to the 
population and 
to non-smokers.
Public health frame: 
Smoking is harmful 










is a legal product 
and smoking is a 











addictive, not a 
free choice.
Public health frame: 
Smoking is harmful 




Smoking is bad for 





is a legal product 
and smoking is a 
free choice for 
adults.
2007–2010 Ab Klink Public health 
frame: Smoking 
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and smoking is a 













is deceptive and 









is a legal product 
and smoking is a 






Years Ministers Tobacco control 
coalition
Government Tobacco industry








Children deserve  






is a legal product 
and smoking is a 




harmful: The best 
solution is to 






control might be 
supported as long 
as it is 
evidence-based.
Table 10.3 (continued)
industry frame resonated well in the Dutch society. In these years the gov-
ernment approached the issue with a mixed economic and health frame: 
tobacco control is good for public health but must not harm business and 
the economy. This ended at the end of the 1990s when the World Bank 
published its influential report Curbing the Epidemic, which concluded 
that tobacco control is good not only for public health but also for national 
economies. In 1991 State Secretary Hans Simons emphasised that smok-
ing substantially contributes to societal costs.7 This was calculated for 
1987 at around one billion guilders per year, two-thirds in the health-care 
sector and one-third through productivity loss (Meijer & Tjioe, 1990). 
For Simons this was an important reason to intensify tobacco control.8 
Around 1996 the industry could no longer use the tolerance frame, since 
Philip Morris lost all credibility in a failed campaign where it compared the 
risks of passive smoking to that of eating cookies (see Box 8.1 in Chap. 8). 
The government adopted the passive smoking frame of the health coali-
tion, which carved the way for smoking bans.
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One particularly powerful industry frame is the notion that smoking is 
an adult’s personal lifestyle choice, which must be respected at all times as 
long as the smoker does not harm others. For many years the industry 
succeeded in presenting smoking as an adult “guilty” pleasure, no worse 
than coffee, good food, or a moderate alcohol intake. At the basis of this 
notion lies the idea that smoking is a habit, a learned behaviour that can 
be unlearned. Internationally, this conception was gradually replaced in 
the 1980s by the notion that smoking is a true addiction. This became 
more widely accepted in Europe at the end of the 1990s, and this made it 
easier for conservative politicians and the medical sector to support 
tobacco control initiatives. The Dutch tobacco control coalition was rela-
tively late in promoting the addiction frame (see Box 10.1).
Box 10.1 Smoking is an addiction
International recognition that smoking is addictive did not occur 
overnight. It was preceded by a period in which researchers tried to 
find and answer to the question of why it was so difficult for people 
to quit (Krasnegor, 1979), and in which the industry denied that 
nicotine is addictive. This was an important issue for the industry: 
“We can’t defend continued smoking as ‘free choice’ if the person is 
‘addicted’” (Knopick, 1980). The breakthrough came when the US 
Surgeon General’s report on the addictive properties of tobacco 
concluded in 1988 that nicotine addiction was an addictive disorder 
to which the same standards applied as to heroin, cocaine, and other 
drugs (U.S.  Department of Health and Human Services, 1988). 
The tobacco industry continued to deny the addictiveness of 
tobacco, culminating in 1994 when the heads of the major US 
tobacco companies gave sworn testimony before the US Congress 
that they did not believe nicotine was addictive. The revelation that 
they lied under oath was a devastating blow to the industry’s reputa-
tion. US experts understood that the evidence—that smoking is 
addictive and that most smokers start smoking during childhood—
morally legitimises a youth-centred tobacco control strategy (Lynch 
& Bonnie, 1994). In 1996 US President Bill Clinton declared nico-
tine an addictive drug, and addiction was regarded by scientists as “a 
brain disease” (Leshner, 1997). This challenged the mantra of free 
choice and went against the public’s view that people who cannot 
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The dominant “public health frame” adopted by the government was 
effective until around 2006. Health Minister Els Borst (D66) (1994–2002), 
a medical doctor, was most outspoken about the public health dangers of 
smoking. On many occasions she talked about smoking as the number one 
cause of death, more deadly than alcohol, drugs, traffic accidents, and 
HIV combined.9 In a debate in parliament she used the image of crashing 
jumbo jets, each week causing 441 deaths,10 and pointed out that smoking 
is the biggest epidemic that humankind has called upon itself, that death 
and disease by smoking are avoidable, and that government has a duty to 
act, especially to protect young people. She urged tobacco control using a 
combination of arguments: the high number of deaths, the health risks for 
non-smokers, the fact that smoking rates were not going down and were 
higher than in many other European countries, the notable increase in 
youth smoking, the high economic costs to society, and the heavy burden 
on the health-care system. She supported this with statistics made available 
by STIVORO. She made the problem tangible:
These seem emotionless statistics, but this changes if one looks at them dif-
ferently: 23,000 deaths means 23,000 times a premature death, so 23,000 
times a man or a women, often of middle age, who leaves behind a partner 
or a family. A dear family member, a valuable partner, friend or lover who 
passes away before his or her time has come. It is a great drama, first of all 
for the smoker who often dies in miserable conditions, and second for those 
who are left behind.11
quit smoking are weak or bad, unable to break the habit. In Europe 
the breakthrough came with the publication of clinical guidelines for 
the treatment of tobacco addiction in England (Raw, McNeill, & 
West, 1998). Soon after, the Royal College of Physicians published a 
report, Nicotine Addiction in Britain (Britton et  al., 2000), and 
WHO presented recommendations on how to treat tobacco depen-
dence (WHO, 2001). A Dutch guideline, similar to the UK one, was 
published some years later by the Partnership Stop Smoking (CBO, 
2004, 2006). It was endorsed by 19 professional organisations cov-
ering all medical disciplines. The Dutch guideline “deliberately 
[chose] a different perspective: not that of the smoker who is respon-
sible for his own behaviour, but that of an addiction for which help 
is necessary.”(CBO, 2006, p. 11)
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Irritated by the obstinate stance of the liberal–conservative VVD party, 
she added at one point in the debate, “Confronted with 23,000 deaths, 
the government cannot remain aloof and say: the people have to sort it 
out themselves. A minister of health who does not try to do something 
against such a great number of deaths is not worth a penny.” As a liberal- 
democratic politician, Borst choose her wording carefully and avoided 
being associated with nannyism. The solution was to present her proposals 
as policies to protect youth, since “for adults … we think these matters are 
not very sensible, but for them one’s own choice is paramount and, in 
addition, adults can do some things moderately, making it less harmful to 
them.”12 The next minister, Eduard Bomhoff (LPF) (2002), adopted 
Borst’s position that tobacco had created the biggest epidemic that 
humankind had ever called down upon itself. His temporary replacement, 
State Secretary Clémence Ross-van Dorp (CDA) (2002–2003), also used 
the general public health frame of 23,000 deaths caused by smoking.
At the beginning of the 2000s, in an attempt to retrieve its battered 
reputation, the tobacco industry initiated corporate social responsibility 
programmes, using their own version of health frames (Tobacco Free 
Initiative, 2003). The industry publicly acknowledged that smoking is 
harmful, and tried to promote an image of responsibility by declaring an 
interest in reducing youth smoking (McDaniel, Cadman, & Malone, 
2016). Industry representatives approached the government with offers to 
cooperate with preventing young people from smoking (See Chap. 8, 
where the industry’s “Platform Prevention of Youth Smoking” was 
discussed).
Health minister Hans Hoogervorst (VVD) (2003–2007), whose previ-
ous appointment was as minister of finance, frequently framed the need 
for tobacco control in economic terms. He occasionally mentioned the 
serious public health consequences of tobacco use and the need to protect 
non-smokers, and sometimes applied an addiction frame, but was most 
convincing when pointing to the fact that smoking substantially contrib-
utes to total health-care costs and is bad for employers (at the time esti-
mated at €105 extra costs per smoking employee) (Hoogervorst, 2005). 
Tobacco control is good for the economy since “health generates wealth” 
(VWS, 2005), a frame he hoped would appeal to his VVD rank and file.
Health Minister Ab Klink (CDA) (2007–2010) seldom used a public 
health or addiction frame. He distanced himself from anti-tobacco state-
ments and was reluctant to initiate new policy that did not fit his wish to 
deliver “positive stimulants” to smokers (Klink, 2008). Instead he was 
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most comfortable with a fairness frame. One of his biggest challenges was 
the implementation of the smoking ban in the hospitality sector. He took 
non-smoking employees’ right to work in a smoke-free environment and 
“level playing field” considerations between small and large bars as start-
ing point, but seldom talked about health risks.13
Minister Edith Schippers (VVD) (2010–2012), who was trained as a 
political scientist, consistently used a libertarian frame, emphasising that 
state interference with tobacco use is nannyism, and consenting adults 
must decide for themselves if they want to smoke or not. She said, “If 
adults decide on Friday evening to smoke together with their glass of beer 
in a small pub, who am I to forbid this?” (VARA, 2011).
During most of the time, the tobacco control coalition continued to use 
a general public health frame of deaths caused by smoking. When its appeal 
was worn-out, the tobacco industry demonising frame was used as well. In 
some countries, tobacco control advocates have been successful in challeng-
ing the tobacco industry frames through counter-frames such as protection 
of the vulnerable against a merciless industry (Cohen et  al., 2000; Fox, 
2005; Jacobson & Banerjee, 2005; Katz, 2005). The tobacco industry has 
been effectively portrayed as a deceptive industry that capitalises on addic-
tion, and such portrayal invokes anger and activism (Malone, 2014). Such 
a frame was used by the tobacco control organisations in the Netherlands 
around 2011, when Schippers was portrayed in a TV documentary as “min-
ister of tobacco” (VARA, 2011) and the Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd 
(Youth Smoking Prevention Foundation) (SRJ) began to name and shame 
everyone with affiliations to the tobacco industry. SRJ used the addiction 
frame to make the case that children are hooked on nicotine by the tobacco 
industry. This gave renewed impetus to viewing tobacco and the tobacco 
industry as morally bad, which made it more difficult for the industry lob-
byists to find the ear of policymakers and politicians.
Most recently, with the advance of the Alliantie Nederland Rookvrij 
(Dutch Alliance for a Smokefree Society) (ANR), tobacco control in the 
Netherlands has been framed in terms of protecting young people, which 
appeals to the general public and a wide range of societal organisations, 
and also to local and national government. The Ministry of Health adopted 
the idea of a “smoke-free generation” and State Secretary Martin Van Rijn 
(Labour party) (2013–2017) used the phrase “smoke-free generation” in 
communications with parliament.14 In the meantime, the tobacco industry 
tried to show goodwill by promoting less harmful product innovations 
such as electronic cigarettes and heat-not-burn products. They also 
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employed an effectiveness frame: tobacco control measures are acceptable, 
but only when their effectiveness is proven beyond any doubt.
One may conclude that Dutch tobacco control advocates have not 
been very successful in setting the agenda by issue framing, struggling to 
find a frame that resonated with policymakers, politicians, and the public 
during times when the government was less open to tobacco control, too 
long holding on to a general public health frame.
A Health Inequality Frame?
It is remarkable that the portrayal of smoking as a fundamental cause of 
health inequalities has rarely been used in the Netherlands. The social 
gradient in smoking emerged as an important policy problem in most 
European countries in the 1990s, and again at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century (Brown, Platt, & Amos, 2014). The Netherlands is 
no exception. Health inequalities are substantial: life expectancy among 
low-educated people is six years shorter than among the highly educated 
(RIVM, 2014). A reduction in health disparities was considered an impor-
tant task for the Dutch government around 2005 (VWS, 2006b, 2008). 
Dutch politicians on the left who valued social equality argued that tack-
ling inequalities in smoking helped to reduce health inequalities, and 
urged the government to act.15 This did not result in concrete tobacco 
control policy proposals from the government; although it acknowledged 
that the differences are substantial: while only 17% of the highest educated 
smoke, the rate is 31% among low-educated groups (VWS, 2013). Recent 
data (covering the years until 2011) show that inequalities in smoking 
have further increased (Bosdriesz, Willemsen, Stronks, & Kunst, 2015).
The dominant right-wing governments in the Netherlands have not 
been receptive to the argument that smoking must be targeted as a means 
to reduce health inequalities. This is in contrast to the United Kingdom 
(Department of Health, 2011) where this argument has broadened sup-
port for tobacco control in society (K. Smith, 2013) and has resulted in 
a national budget to set up smoking cessation support programmes in 
disadvantaged areas. In response to calls for a prevention policy that 
reduces health inequalities, the Dutch government did  set up broad 
community- based projects in municipalities (Kracht wijken),16 similar to 
the “New deals for communities” programme in the United Kingdom, 
but without specific aims for tobacco. The government has further 
 integrated the issue of health inequalities into its decentralised health 
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strategy Everything is health (VWS, 2013), which aims to stimulate inte-
grated local health promotion initiatives. A recent initiative is a national 
incentive programme, Healthy in the City, which supports local approaches 
to tackling health inequalities. A total of €44 million was made available 
between 2014 and 2017, most of which went directly to the municipali-
ties, which were given ample freedom to choose programmes and mea-
sures that they believed were best tailored to the problems they encountered 
in their respective communities (Van Berkum, 2016). There were no dis-
tinct incentives to tackle smoking. The programme is illustrative of the 
current approach to health promotion and disease prevention in the 
Netherlands: to give optimal responsibility and freedom at the local level 
without setting national targets or providing blueprints for local targets 
(see also Chap. 5 on decentralisation). Time will tell if this approach is 
effective.
medIa advocacy
According to the agenda-setting theory, if a topic is covered frequently 
and prominently by the media, the general public will regard it as impor-
tant. In the words of one of the founders of the agenda-setting theory, 
“elements prominent on the media agenda become prominent over time 
on the public agenda. The media not only can be successful in telling us 
what to think about, they also can be successful in telling us how to think 
about it” (McCombs, 2005, p. 546). Activists and lobbyists try to per-
suade the mass media to adopt their take on a problem and to promote 
their policy solutions. The media can also magnify movements that have 
already started (Walt, 1994), and can be especially important in encourag-
ing government to act on low-level political issues such as smoking (Buse, 
Mays, & Walt, 2012). A study of how newspaper coverage affects support 
for tobacco control in the Netherlands (Nagelhout, Van den Putte, et al., 
2012) found that most newspapers wrote in a negative manner about the 
smoking ban for pubs and restaurants implemented in July 2008, mostly 
approaching the topic from an economic perspective and highlighting 
potential negative economic effects. Readers of these newspapers adjusted 
their support for the ban downwards. The tobacco control network missed 
an opportunity to influence public opinion about the ban because it lacked 
a good media advocacy counter-strategy. Pro-smoking interest groups 
were able to dominate the media by focusing attention on staged 
 “problems” with the ban and presumed resistance from small bar owners 
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(discussed in Chap. 8). This was relatively easy, since problems are more 
newsworthy than successes.
Politicians and policymakers are sensitive to how an issue is covered in 
the press, and can hardly ignore media attention. Newspaper coverage is 
often a trigger for parliamentarians to ask questions to the responsible 
minister or state secretary. The influence of the media on the parliamen-
tary agenda in the Netherlands has grown considerably over time (Van 
Noije, Kleinnijenhuis, & Oegema, 2008). Dutch parliamentary questions 
are, indeed, almost always inspired or influenced by media attention (Van 
Aelst & Vliegenthart, 2013). Figure 10.1 shows the number of written 
questions asked by Dutch members of parliament about tobacco control.17 
I counted the number of parent questions (they typically consist of three 
to seven sub-questions) submitted at one point in time by a member of 
parliament.
The number of questions is remarkably modest, considering the major 
health consequences associated with smoking. It is also modest in com-
parison to the total number of parliamentary questions, which is between 
1400 and 2600 per year, with recent years seeing more activity. Until 
2008 there were few questions on tobacco, with the exception of the year 
2000 when liberal–conservative parliamentarians questioned Health 
Minister Els Borst regarding her attacks on the tobacco industry. The first 
peaks occurred in 2008 and 2009, caused by media attention to the trou-
blesome implementation of the smoking ban in bars. About half the ques-
tions were by the opposing right-wing populist Partij voor de Vrijheid 
(Freedom Party) (PVV). Soon after the Rutte cabinet (2010–2012) was 
installed at the end of 2010, and Edith Schippers became health minister, 
Socialist and Labour party members asked parliamentary questions about 
Schippers’ presumed ties to the tobacco industry in 2011. The year 2012 
continued with more questions on tobacco industry lobbying, prompted 
by a series of critical articles in the media. The peak in 2013 was partly 
caused by concerns about the electronic cigarette.
When the Labour party (28), Socialist Party (25), Green–Left party 
(2), Christian Union (3), and D66 (6) are taken together, there were 74 
questions from the left /progressive flank. On the right/conservative 
flank, I counted 38 questions (13 by PVV, 12 by CDA and 13 by VVD). 
This suggests that tobacco control coalition organisations have been 
more successful in putting pressure on the government by raising the 
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conclusIon
According to Kingdon’s multiple streams analysis, major tobacco control 
policy changes will only happen when a window of opportunity opens and 
three “streams” come together (Kingdon, 2003). There must be increased 
attention to the tobacco problem, a clear solution must be readily avail-
able, and policymakers must have both the motive and opportunity to 
adopt a new policy. Such moments have rarely occurred in the Netherlands. 
Dutch governments treated smoking most of the time as a low-level issue, 
a chronic “condition” and not a pressing political concern. The Dutch 
political landscape has been dominated by coalitions that executed neo- 
liberal agendas. Conservative governments tend to regard tobacco control 
legislation and regulation as infringements on citizens’ freedom, and 
tobacco control measures with paternalistic undertones were time and 
time again bluntly rejected by parliament. Tobacco control remained low 
on the policy agenda, especially in times of economic hardship. Only once 
there was a “natural” feeling of urgency, when smoking rates did not go 
down for several years in a row at the end of the 1990s. During the Kok 
cabinets (1994–2002), a window of opportunity opened: the ruling coali-
tion was relatively progressive and smoking rates had been going up at an 
alarming rate—something had to be done. An important beneficial factor 
was personal commitment to tobacco control by a determined Health 
Minister Els Borst. The fact that the economy was prospering was impor-
tant as well, since this made it possible to invest money in education and 
campaigns, which was crucial in obtaining support from the CDA for the 
revised Tobacco Act, to which the liberal–conservative VVD was opposed. 
A particularly strong and consistent public health frame used by the 
tobacco control coalition supported the government’s tobacco control 
ambitions.
In later years the tobacco control coalition has been less successful in 
finding frames that strike a chord with political parties. The once effec-
tive public health frame used by the coalition to argue for tobacco con-
trol in the 1990s did not inspire society and politicians to support 
tobacco control in the 2000s. When the fourth Balkenende cabinet 
with Health Minister Ab Klink (2007–2010) came to power, a second 
window of opportunity opened for tobacco control: the policy inten-
tion of banning smoking in bars and restaurants was part of the coali-
tion agreement, and the health minister seemed open to tobacco 
control. However, the industry was successful in framing tobacco con-
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trol as contradictory to libertarian values and Klink was portrayed as a 
moral crusader, which shut the door to further tobacco control initia-
tives. The tobacco control coalition was less successful in media advo-
cacy and lost its grip on the implementation of the smoking ban in bars. 
Only very recently, by portraying tobacco control as necessary to pro-
tect children against smoking, has the tobacco control coalition found 
a more effective strategy.
notes
1. Parliamentary papers II, 1992–1993, 22,894, nr. 1.
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3. Proceedings I, 26 March 2002, 24–1273.
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Policy Research). IBO reports are mandatory for all ministries and have the 
explicit aim of finding cost reductions and concrete proposals to increase 
the efficiency of governmental policy. On average, ten IBO reports are 
written each year and they cut across all branches of government (Van den 
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Public policy scholars propose that policy change emerges from the inter-
action of five elements: (1) the policy context, which can be more or less 
conducive to tobacco control policy change; (2) the workings of the insti-
tutions involved in the process of policymaking; (3) the diffusion of 
knowledge and ideas which highlight the urgency of a problem and inspire 
policy solutions; (4) the organisation and advocacy potential of coalitions; 
and (5) the relative success of opposing coalitions in setting the agenda of 
policymaking through issue framing (Cairney, Studlar, & Mamudu, 2012; 
John, 2012). I presented a general framework in Chap. 1 to illustrate how 
these elements are related and influence each other over time (Fig. 1.1). 
The reader may want to occasionally consult the framework while reading 
this concluding chapter.
Context and InstItutIons
Stable environmental factors rarely change within periods of a decade or 
less, and directly or indirectly influence all aspects and stages of the policy-
making process. The dominant type of governance system is one such 
all-encompassing stable environmental characteristic. The preference for 
self-regulation can be explained by the Dutch corporatist tradition of poli-
cymaking, where the business community is allowed to deal with a prob-
lem before the state intervenes. This means that interest groups are 
306 
integrated into the policymaking process itself and need to rely less on 
outside pressure strategies. Most often, negotiations with the industry 
over self-regulation pre-empt formal regulation by the state. Dutch poli-
cymakers are content with this arrangement because they want to avoid 
polarisation and conflicts between groups by trying the least controversial 
option first. As a consequence, most of the time tobacco control has 
advanced in small incremental steps, to prevent clashes with tobacco inter-
est groups defending the status quo and at the same time trying to pacify 
groups that want to advance tobacco control. This preference for seeking 
compromise (polderen) explains why it has been difficult in the Netherlands 
to move from an entrenched system of corporatism, with tobacco compa-
nies close to policymakers, to a system that no longer allows tobacco 
industry representatives to be consulted.
Although corporatism is considered a relatively stable characteristic, over 
a long period of time its importance in the Netherlands is believed to 
decline. With the increasing fragmentation of parliament, cabinets can no 
longer rely on comfortable majorities, and the influence of opposition par-
ties in parliament has grown. This is seen in other corporatist countries in 
Europe as well (Christiansen et  al., 2010; Kurzer & Cooper, 2016; 
Rommetvedt, Thesen, Christiansen, & Nørgaard, 2012). In the Netherlands 
there is increased lobbying at the expense of corporatism, evidenced by 
more frequent, more intense contact between interest groups and parlia-
mentarians, a greater use of the legislative arena, and a reduced role for 
institutionalised “old school” corporatist policymaking practices where civil 
servants act as policy brokers between competing coalitions. The judicial 
venue (taking the industry or the government to court) is increasingly used 
to enforce breakthroughs when policymaking is slow. The pressure on the 
government (including the use of legal action) to adhere to Article 5.3 of 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in the Netherlands fits in 
perfectly with these developments. Political parties have become more cen-
tral to policy change and the influence of public opinion and media advo-
cacy has grown. Tobacco control policymaking has moved from closed 
meetings and the internal workings of governmental bureaucracy to parlia-
ment and the wider society, benefiting tobacco control groups.
A second important stable environmental factor is cultural values, 
which permeated tobacco control policymaking in many ways. Christian 
and liberal principles that have had a profound mark on Dutch tobacco 
control policymaking are rooted in the unique combination of 
 individualistic and “feminine” (egalitarian) values. There is less societal, 
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and hence less political support, for measures with paternalistic overtones 
or that are considered particularly harsh for smokers. Such values explained 
why Dutch governments were reluctant to initiate hard-hitting risk aware-
ness campaigns.
Various important relatively dynamic context factors have also been 
identified. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) defines major pol-
icy change as an alternation in “policy core beliefs”, provoked by external 
events (Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). 
The most important external event is a change of government, when 
opportunities for policy change arise (advocates may get tobacco control 
into a coalition agreement) and any change of ideology may be more 
advantageous to one interest group than another—it may favour tobacco 
control, or favour a laissez-faire approach. The Dutch case presented three 
examples of major policy change following a regime change. The first was 
when the Purple cabinet came to power. For the first time in history, 
Christian Democrats were no longer part of the ruling coalition. This 
shattered the tobacco industry coalition’s decade-long grip on tobacco 
control policymaking. The new government appointed a health minister 
(Els Borst) dedicated to a strong tobacco control agenda and achieved a 
major focal shift by removing tobacco control from the supervision of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and handing it over to the Ministry of 
Health. Economic considerations were superseded by a public health 
frame of reference. A second window opened in 2007 when the tobacco 
control coalition succeeded in getting the idea of a smoking ban in pubs 
into the coalition agreement. However, when Minister of Health Ab Klink 
attempted to implement this, the health coalition failed to use media 
advocacy in a way that would consolidate the ban and prevent the industry 
from hijacking the issue. A few years later in 2010 a window of opportu-
nity opened for the tobacco industry to frustrate tobacco control, when 
Edith Schippers of the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s 
Party for Freedom and Democracy) (VVD) was appointed minister of 
health in 2010. She had opposed most tobacco control proposals as a 
VVD parliamentarian. This led to chaos and a weakening of the tobacco 
control coalition, and gave the tobacco industry’s policy agenda a tempo-
rary advantage.
The Dutch example testifies to the fundamentally ideological nature of 
decision-making concerning smoking, which is regarded as a difficult, 
politically contested subject matter, and illustrates how outcomes very 
much depend on the prevailing ideology of politicians and policymakers. 
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Dutch policymakers always had to find compromises between economy, 
public health, and ideology. Dutch governments have almost always been 
centre-right oriented with a majority backing in parliament. Politicians 
and policymakers were preoccupied with promoting a strong economy, 
alongside a trust in the power of the free market. This made it difficult to 
advance a tobacco control agenda. Even when ministers had personal 
motives to combat smoking, as did liberal–conservative Minister 
Hoogervorst (2003–2007), a non-smoker who was inspired by the fight 
against smoking when he went to university in the United States, they 
were unable to accomplish much without support from parliament.
Policy was for the main part determined by what is written in coalition 
agreements, which are the basis for state governance. Tobacco control was 
mentioned only three times in the coalition agreements of the 15 cabinets 
since 1972, and on only two occasions was it a positive statement for 
tobacco control. The importance of getting the topic in a coalition agree-
ment was paramount: one resulted in the important 2002 Tobacco Act 
and the other led to a smoking ban in bars and restaurants. That tobacco 
control had not been included in more coalition agreements might sug-
gest that the tobacco control lobby has been weak, but it also reflects a 
political environment not open  to legislative tobacco control, with few 
windows of opportunity for control advocates.
Other relatively dynamic factors that followed from the ideological 
preferences of governments and have come to define the Dutch policy 
context are retreating government and the accompanying process of 
decentralisation and the sharing of responsibility with lower levels of gov-
ernance and civil society. These processes have inhibited state-led tobacco 
control ambitions and leadership. Subsequent cabinets increasingly shared 
responsibility for disease prevention with local governments, the private 
sector, and civil society—and when health promotion was decentralised, it 
no longer was only a national priority. These ideological trends went 
against the need for a strong and well-coordinated strategy from the state 
to combat national smoking rates, as was emphasised by the FCTC. The 
process of handing over the responsibility for tobacco control to non- 
governmental organisations has already reached a point where central 
oversight over tobacco control has become scant and increasingly 
complex.
Much of tobacco control has become a Brussels affair. European Union 
(EU) governance became increasingly important, since EU directives 
 cannot be ignored by the government. Tobacco industry lobbying has also 
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focused more and more on the EU level: much of the national industry 
lobby is directly or indirectly aimed at influencing EU policymaking. In 
contrast with EU tobacco control initiatives, the FCTC treaty is more eas-
ily ignored by the government, and as the Dutch example demonstrates, 
signing the treaty does not mean much unless there is a policy environ-
ment conducive to its implementation. Although FCTC requirements are 
legally binding, in practice they were more or less ignored since there are 
no sanctions for non-compliance and much room for discussion about 
implementation, despite detailed WHO guidelines. While the FCTC was 
ratified in 2005 by the Dutch government, it took another five years 
before representatives from the tobacco control network began to give it 
the attention it deserved (Heijndijk & Willemsen, 2015; Rennen & 
Willemsen, 2012; STIVORO, 2010), indicating that proper implementa-
tion of FCTC in the spirit of WHO intentions must be enforced by civil 
society. Clean Air Netherlands (CAN) took the government to court over 
the proper interpretation of FCTC’s Article 8.2 (about smoke-free bars), 
and the Youth Smoking Prevention Foundation prompted the govern-
ment to a better and more extensive implementation of Article 5.3 of the 
FCTC, making it more difficult for tobacco industry representatives to 
contact Dutch government officials.
dIffusIon of Knowledge and Ideas
The final acceptance of the health risks of active and passive smoking as 
scientific fact occurred later in the Netherlands than in leading tobacco 
control countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. The 
Health Council was over-cautious and slow in acknowledging and warn-
ing against the public health risks. The government did not publicise the 
scientific evidence with clear statements about the damage of smoking, 
and failed to produce authoritative reviews of the literature on the health 
risks of smoking like the UK and US reports. In addition, there were few 
leading scientists who publicly spoke out against tobacco and the medical 
community remained reticent and did not involve itself in the fight against 
tobacco. Perhaps even more important was the fact that the authorities hid 
behind the health charities and the Stichting Volksgezondheid en Roken 
(Dutch Smoking or Health Foundation) (STIVORO) to communicate 
with the public about health risks, giving the false impression that the mat-
ter was not to be taken too seriously, and giving the industry leeway to cast 
doubt on links between smoking and health, whittling away at any political 
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support for tobacco control. STIVORO was not permitted to communi-
cate in a confrontational and clear-cut manner about the health risks of 
smoking, in line with Dutch “feminine” (egalitarian) cultural values men-
tioned before. All of these factors might have contributed to the slower 
start to regulate tobacco, compared to many other countries, until the 
mid-1990s.
Dutch government officials had an adequate understanding of evidence- 
based tobacco control policy measures. The government was already 
familiar with most options in the 1970s, and the evidence concerning 
effectiveness has accumulated since then. Dutch civil servants were gener-
ally well informed through their contacts with the national and interna-
tional tobacco control epistemic community, and had organisations such 
as the Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu (National Institute for 
Public Health and the Environment) (RIVM) and STIVORO at its dis-
posal to quickly provide up-to-date information about aspects of tobacco 
control. The government looked at what the effective measures were, but 
chose which to implement mainly on ideological grounds. Most Dutch 
health ministers lacked a public health or medical background, which may 
have further contributed to the inclination to give more weight to ideo-
logical and political considerations such as reducing the role of govern-
ment through deregulation and decentralisation.
Governments need basic national tobacco control capacity to be able to 
develop and deliver a comprehensive tobacco control programme in 
accordance with the FCTC. Such capacity rests on three pillars: a good 
infrastructure, access to empirical evidence and expertise, and leadership 
(Wipfli et al., 2004). The Dutch government has abundant access to evi-
dence, and the necessary infrastructure to build tobacco control interven-
tions is generally well developed. The weak pillar is undoubtedly leadership 
and coordination by the government. The government left it to charities 
and STIVORO to communicate about health risks, but these organisa-
tions were not in the same strong position to put the issue firmly and 
authoritatively on the societal, let alone the political, agenda. Remarkably, 
given the relatively high contribution of smoking to the national burden 
of disease, there has never been a distinctly identifiable tobacco control 
unit at the Ministry of Health—it has always been part of a larger depart-
ment that deals with lifestyle and addiction. Before 2000 the unit was 
understaffed and not sufficiently equipped to negotiate with the tobacco 
industry, leading to delays in the drafting of regulations. Changing jobs 
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within the government’s bureaucracy further hampered a continuous 
development of a coherent tobacco control policy, while industry lobby-
ists remained at their post for decades.
Problem IdentIfICatIon
Most of the time Dutch politicians and policymakers regarded smoking 
as a chronic condition that did not involve a crisis or present itself as a 
pressing concern. Each new government recognised that it remained a 
serious public health problem, evidenced by Public Health Status and 
Foresight (VTV) reports which it could not ignore, but the lack of a feel-
ing of urgency made it less likely that a government put it high on the 
agenda. This caused difficulties for tobacco control coalitions, who had 
to flog a dead horse, while the industry exploited direct contacts with 
government and politicians to obstruct any inclination for tobacco con-
trol progress.
The interest of policymakers in tobacco control was weakened by sev-
eral factors. First, the impact of governmental interference with smoking 
takes many years to appear in national statistics, so it gains policymakers 
no political credit. Second, smoking kills quietly, so that the direct con-
sequences are not always visible to everyone. Third, smoking is increas-
ingly marginalised in the public domain, reducing the chance that 
politicians and policymakers will personally experience problems with 
tobacco smoke and feel a need to take action. Fourth, the VTV reports 
after 2002 characterised trends in adults and youth in a less alarming 
manner than before, although smoking rates were still regarded as too 
high. In the national prevention policy documents tobacco control had 
to compete with other issues such as alcohol, depression, obesity, and 
diabetes, and since 2007 the government did not want to commit to a 
quantifiable target, further reducing the feeling of urgency about tighter 
tobacco control. This is despite the fact that the number of people in the 
Netherlands who are chronically ill or die prematurely because of smok-
ing remains high, and tobacco continues to be the largest cause of pre-
ventable death in the Netherlands (RIVM, 2017). These factors 
combined to lead politicians to believe that there is no great urgency, 
either politically or medically, to deal with smoking and undermined the 




CoalItIons, Issue exPansIon, and framIng
The Dutch tobacco control subsystem brought forward two separate 
coalitions: one of the three health charities (cancer, heart, lung) (coordi-
nated first by STIVORO, more recently by the Alliantie Nederland 
Rookvrij (Dutch Alliance for a Smokefree Society; ANR)), and one led by 
the tobacco manufacturers. In later years a third tobacco control coalition 
emerged, instigated by two lung physicians Wanda de Kanter and Pauline 
Dekker (the Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd or Youth Smoking Prevention 
Foundation: SRJ), with somewhat different core values and preferred 
strategies than those of the main tobacco control coalition. The main dif-
ference is that the SRJ coalition remained an outsider group, whereas 
STIVORO and ANR are insider groups. Insider groups are not part of the 
formal governmental bureaucracy but are nevertheless regarded as legiti-
mate stakeholders, are consulted regularly by the government, and are 
expected to play by the “rules of the game” (Buse, Mays, & Walt, 2012, 
pp. 114–115). Insider groups are generally considered to be more effec-
tive than outsider groups in corporatist political environments.
What constitutes a successful coalition? Scholars have identified several 
important characteristics. Shiffman et al. (2015) list distinguished leader-
ship, governance, composition, and framing strategies: a network is more 
effective when it has capable, well-connected and widely respected leaders, 
when there is a governing structure in place that is able to organise collec-
tive action, can resolve disputes, and links a diversity of actors. Such diver-
sity, which facilitates access to scientific knowledge, also increases the 
likelihood that solutions to problems will be found. Finally, the network is 
more likely to be effective if its members know how they can frame an 
issue in such a way that it resonates well with society and politicians. These 
factors are congruent with the strategies of ACF theory, which identifies 
similar necessary conditions for success: having the right allies, having 
shared resources, and being able to develop a common lobby and advo-
cacy strategy (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).
“Public policy and management scholars have long recognized the 
importance of effective leaders in agenda setting and organizational effec-
tiveness, as well as their rarity” (Shiffman et al., 2015) and for most of the 
time, the Netherlands has had no such clearly identifiable effective tobacco 
control leaders, which have a claim to being heard, are well connected 
with coalition building, have great rhetorical skills, and are able “to articu-
late vision amidst complexity” (Shiffman et al., 2015). Leaders must be 
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able to operate effectively within the particular Dutch policy environment, 
with its corporatist features and emphasises on compromise seeking. The 
relatively effective leaders were those who organised and lobbied behind 
the scenes, such as STIVORO’s director Boudewijn de Blij.
With respect to governance structure: the decision in 1974 to locate 
tobacco control in the one organisation, STIVORO, controlled by three 
charities and the government, thwarted the emergence of a broad nation- 
wide tobacco control coalition. STIVORO was a semi-governmental 
organisation responsible for executing the lion’s share of the government’s 
tobacco policy. In its 40 years of existence, it tried to balance the compet-
ing interests of its three “mothers” and the government. While the govern-
ment and parliament regarded health education as its sole task, the charities 
expected STIVORO to lobby against the tobacco industry, but also in 
parliament and against the government, for better tobacco control policy. 
Only STIVORO’s directors were responsible for lobbying and advocacy, 
which they had to combine with many other demanding tasks. This made 
the tobacco control coalition vulnerable. Only since 2006 has lobbying 
been carried out with support from a professional bureau, while the 
tobacco manufacturers have been employing professional dedicated lobby-
ists since the 1970s. I noted the few mentions of tobacco control in coali-
tion agreements, which suggests that the tobacco control coalition might 
have been more successful if it had professionalised its lobbying sooner.
A tobacco control coalition is stronger if it incorporates scientists who 
are quickly able to deliver evidence that counters industry arguments, and 
who can convincingly speak with politicians and policymakers. In the 
Dutch culture of consensus seeking, experts, both scientists and doctors, 
were not as inclined to become involved with tobacco control advocacy in 
the same way as their counterparts in countries with more pluralistic tradi-
tions, where interest groups are experienced and may be more comfort-
able in challenging policymakers directly.
In Chap. 10 I tried to capture how tobacco was framed by the two 
opposing coalitions, and how these frames resonated with those used by 
the government. The tobacco industry has been successful in framing 
tobacco control as an infringement on individual liberty and attracting 
libertarians to its arguments, from individuals fighting for the right to 
enjoy smoking to organisations that oppose government regulation. 
Dutch tobacco control advocates have been only moderately successful in 
setting the agenda, struggling to find the one frame that resonates with 
policymakers, politicians, and the various tobacco control organisations. 
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Until the 1970s they used a medical frame, but replaced it with a broader 
public health frame in the 1980s that remained the dominant frame of 
reference for many years. In the 2000s smoking as an addiction was added 
to the repertoire of arguments once science had showed convincingly that 
nicotine is a highly addictive substance. This stimulated activism among 
tobacco victims and health professionals and neutralised the industry’s 
frame of smoking as an individual lifestyle choice. It also contributed to 
finally getting the medical community on board. The public health frame 
that was effective in the 1990s, when smoking rates were high and the 
issue of passive smoking was still a noticeable problem for wide segments 
of society, has now lost most of its appeal. An attempt was made around 
2010 to use the frame of an immoral and evil tobacco industry, but this 
resulted in confrontation and STIVORO lost its insider status with the 
government’s bureaucracy. Most recently, around 2013, the tobacco con-
trol organisations reorganised and found a more successful frame in the 
image of the need to protect vulnerable children from exposure to tobacco 
smoke and from the seduction of tobacco products. This resulted in the 
appealing concept of a smoke-free generation, and made tobacco control 
a just and legitimate cause for a broad range of societal organisations. The 
preceding illustrates what is sometimes called “issue expansion,” which is 
an important contributing factor for policy change (Baumgartner & Jones, 
1993). A coalition can expand an issue by reframing so that groups in 
society, previously uninvolved, become champions of the cause.
further study and food for thought
The aim of this book was to understand tobacco control policymaking 
from the point of view of the government, in the specific context of the 
Netherlands. However, while much has been uncovered and explained, 
new questions arose during the process of writing. The role of coalition 
building received sparse attention here, and it would be worthwhile to 
examine the characteristics of effective tobacco control coalitions, includ-
ing the role of leadership, in more detail. A related issue is the role of the 
scientific and the medical community in tobacco control advocacy in the 
Netherlands. Other interesting lines of scientific inquiry relate to the suc-
cess of issue framing by the two opposing coalitions (tobacco control and 
tobacco industry) over time, and the role of media advocacy in this. 
Another issue, alluded to in the book but not extensively explored, is the 
transition from a dominant corporatist policy system to a system with 
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more lobbyist characteristics, and how this influences the effectiveness of 
pro- and anti-tobacco coalitions. The role that national cultural values and 
ideology play in tobacco control policymaking is another under-explored 
area. A final intriguing question is whether the process of decentralising 
tobacco control responsibilities and the increased dispersion of tobacco 
control tasks among governmental and civil society contributes to control-
ling the tobacco epidemic or might be counterproductive.
ClosIng remarKs
Despite worldwide convergence of tobacco control policies, accelerated by 
the ratification of the FCTC treaty by most nations, governments develop 
approaches to tobacco control in line with cultural values and ideological 
and political preferences. There is no one-size-fits-all approach. The main 
message in this book is that what works in any one country is contingent 
on its specific policy environment and the specific cultural values at its 
core. This book has recounted how the Dutch used various universal 
tobacco control building blocks to create a unique blend of tobacco con-
trol measures. Especially in the beginning of the 2000s, tobacco control 
was well financed and comprehensive, revolving around yearly smoking 
cessation mass media campaigns in combination with evidence-based 
youth prevention programmes, supported by a broad range of smoking 
cessation counselling options from which smokers could choose. It com-
bined education with a soft, non-patronising and non-confrontational 
advocacy approach. This was fairly effective, with smoking rates after 
2002 in line with the downward trend of other Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The period between 
2002 and 2013 were golden years for Dutch tobacco control, when 
STIVORO became an example for other countries in Europe. However, 
the model only worked as long as there was sufficient moral and financial 
support from the Ministry of Health and political support from parlia-
ment. With a retreating government, the model could no longer be 
sustained.
Another major lesson from the Dutch example is that the process of 
policy change in the Netherlands was subject to a policy environment not 
conducive to tobacco control, rooted in values of individual freedom and 
corporatist traditions where policymakers felt most comfortable when 
they involved all stakeholders in policymaking. Policymakers in the 
Netherlands do not march ahead of the troops. In such an environment, 
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securing sufficient, and broad, support in society for policy proposals is 
crucial for tobacco control advocates. The battle is ultimately fought in 
society, where hearts and minds must be won, and is no top-down affair 
controlled solely by the state. When civil organisations are able to show 
convincingly that society wants to be smoke-free, policymakers will 
follow.
Around 2013 the three charities aligned and professionalised their 
tobacco control advocacy capacity, forming a powerful and much broader 
tobacco control coalition than had existed before. A new issue frame was 
found in the protection of young people from tobacco, and this resonates 
better with politicians and society than the worn-out public health frame 
of death and disease. It ignited an unprecedented number of tobacco con-
trol activities at the local level, and civil organisations such as the major 
health charities have become increasingly important as catalysts for Dutch 
tobacco control, boosting both local and national efforts. However, the 
health ministry continues to face major challenges. Most importantly, a 
quarter of all adults still smoked at the time that this book was completed. 
The Netherlands still has many places where smoking is condoned, tobacco 
products are still on display in most shops, and tobacco taxation is rarely 
deployed as a control instrument. Ever since the adoption of the revised 
Tobacco Act in 2002 the government has not formulated inspiring pros-
pects or new concrete ambitions. Time will tell whether civil society and 
the government will find new ways of collaboration which will bring the 
Dutch closer to a smoke-free Netherlands.
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